A PERSISTENT FIRE

The Strategic Ethical Impact of World War I
❈ on the Global Profession of Arms ❈

Edited by Timothy S. Mallard
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This volume is dedicated to the innumerable souls forever affected by World War I. Their sacrifices indescribably altered the modern world in ways both large and small. We will remember them.

Solemn the drums thrill: Death august and royal
Sings sorrow up into immortal spheres.
There is music in the midst of desolation
And a glory that shines upon our tears.

They went with songs to the battle, they were young,
Straight of limb, true of eye, steady and aglow.
They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted,
They fell with their faces to the foe.

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.

Excerpt from Laurence Binyon, "For the Fallen," published in *The London Times*, September 21, 1914.

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On nine beautifully manicured fields in Europe lie 31,000 Americans who gave their lives for the cause of freedom in World War I. Another 4,400 are memorialized on Tablets of the Missing. Hundreds of thousands more British soldiers are similarly honored in foreign fields. These commemorative cemeteries, administered by the American Battle Monuments Commission and the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, honor men and women who left the comforts of their homes to do battle in distant lands. They were doing their duty in service to their countries. It is unlikely that the ethical or moral parameters of their mission were in their foremost thoughts. But as this important volume illustrates, we must take seriously "the moral and ethical component of being a member of the profession of arms."

We must do more to develop the moral character of our soldiers—the "spiritual" aspect of leadership. I applaud the Army chaplains of the United States and the United Kingdom for their leadership in organizing and hosting the symposium that resulted in this work. The character of war does not change. It will always be about killing. And there is no tougher test of a man's character than war. Thus comes into play the indispensable importance of morals and ethics. This is about the character of soldiers and leaders, and what differentiates the best from others. Character is the bedrock of good leadership. As one contributor writes, the soldier has no hope of coming out of battle unscathed either in body or in soul. War wounds not only the body but also the mind and spirit. Soldiers at every level of our profession of arms must consistently delve into the treatment of moral and spiritual injury. Doing so will help grow a soldier's character.

The essence of the soldier's duty is sacrifice. Whether through the willingness to leave the comfort and security of family and community, or

in the extreme to risk injury and death, soldiers of all nations are called to sacrifice themselves in service to the common good. In the supreme test, whether such sacrifice is carried out for a national ideal, for a friend or comrade to their right or left, or in fidelity to a sense of duty and the keeping of an oath, sacrifice becomes a living hallmark for true warriors. Indeed, it is for this reason that our nations and our peoples venerate warriors above every other class of citizen; these men and women embody in their willingness to sacrifice a selflessness that is the noblest and highest of virtues.

The First World War offers a vital touchstone to relearning this ideal, but not in a facile or easy manner. A conflict that claimed the lives of millions of military and civilian people reminds us that war is not only a political act but also one that affects the lives and families of those who survive such a conflagration. As a result, the study of such a conflict must be approached soberly, with a professional's concern to learn in order to shape future security decisions, with an appreciation for the cost of war, and with a commitment to avoid it when possible, but to fight and win once undertaken.

World War I therefore continues to provide lessons to study for the contemporary profession of arms. The role of both soldier and national morale were at play in this conflict. As well, significant ethical issues arose then that we continue to ponder today. Foremost among these are that soldiers' psychological, moral, and spiritual injuries remain long after war. These all find currency in the First World War and today. As the title of this work implies, this conflict in particular remains a "persistent fire" that will not be easily extinguished. Rather, our task, through assessment, study, and reflection is to control it and allow it to increase our own understanding about war, and so shape future conflicts, as well as our own ethical and moral thinking.

In my duty as Secretary of the American Battle Monuments Commission, I have a personal connection to the First World War. The American people have charged our organization to care for the graves and memorials of fallen American Soldiers buried around the world in lands where they fought and died. Once sites of fierce combat in Europe, sites like Aisne-Marne, Meuse-Argonne, and Saint-Mihiel are today places of peaceful

rest for our nation's Soldiers who died in the Great War. For the American Battle Monuments Commission, ours is a sacred calling to now tend and care for the graves of these fallen, to honor their memories and service, and to educate today's citizens about the terrible price that America and its Allies have been willing to pay to secure freedom from oppression and tyranny for all nations.

In my nearly 40 years of service to the American people, including my time in uniform as an infantryman, I have lived the cost that must be paid to secure liberty. I know all too well the burden of leading our nation's sons and daughters in battle, including those who do make the ultimate sacrifice. I know also that for many, there are deep, lingering wounds of the soul that remain long after the soldier has returned home to family and community, wounds that often demand the lifelong commitment of the Nation to care for that soldier and his or her family. I continue to find timeless currency in the words of General Douglas MacArthur, himself a veteran of the First World War, spoken to the cadets of West Point: "the soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war."

It is for these reasons that I commend this book and, more importantly, the professional reflection on the ethical lessons of World War I that continue to shape the profession of arms today. While serving to remind us of the timeless and sacred nature of sacrifice, and how we are called to honor those who have fought and fallen in conflicts near and far while in service to the Nation, the writings in this volume will cause readers to develop their own understanding of ethical judgment. This is a long overdue and needed resource for today's warriors as we carry on the proud tradition of fighting our nation's wars.

—The Honorable William M. Matz
Major General, USA (Ret.)
Secretary, American Battle Monuments Commission

The Army's professional ethic is built on the trust granted to our profession and the legal authorization to use violence in order to compel an adversary and to assert the Nation's will. The military remains among the most trusted professions in America. Our continued ethical conduct is paramount to maintaining the respect that generations of Soldiers have forged.

The American people trust us to fight and win the Nation's wars, but simply winning is not enough. We must win ethically and in accordance with our shared values. It means the basic concept of decent human conduct and doing the right things the right way. This is especially challenging for Soldiers in the chaos of battle who have to make life-changing split-second decisions. To ensure the Army remains a stronghold of moral correctness, leaders of character need to be present and demonstrate to Soldiers ethical courage in combat by doing the right things the right way.

Character does not happen by accident; it requires a commitment by the leader to internalize the values of the organization and to understand that the unit's success depends on the leader exhibiting ethical courage by doing the right things in the right way. This cultivation of character strengthens trust within the unit and preserves the American people's confidence in the Army.

In 2001, I attended the National Security Fellow Program at Harvard University. I took a course led by Father J. Bryan Hehir, who taught in the Divinity School at the time, about the ethical use of force. This was the class I was in when the 9/11 attacks shattered the world order as we knew it. Everyone at that time was scared and nervous. We discussed in shock what people could do because of how they saw the world. They could take airplanes and crash them into buildings and intentionally kill thousands

of innocent people. At that moment, the Army as we knew it was changed and we were going to war.

I took the notion of just means and just cause from Father Hehir's class with me throughout my combat experiences. As I went into positions of leadership, I felt that leaders had a responsibility to instill into Soldiers the just way of conducting combat operations. These thoughts are easy to talk about in classrooms, at briefing tables, and outside the environment of combat. It is essential for leaders to go beyond instruction for opportunities to demonstrate just actions and work through how we must conduct ourselves in combat.

During one deployment to Iraq in 2004, while I was assigned as an Air Cavalry Brigade commander, I experienced an engagement I will never forget. It was a trying period across the region, and many units were involved in intense combat. One day, I was on patrol on the west side of Baghdad with two Apache helicopters supporting an infantry unit engaged in serious combat that had taken many casualties over the course of the week from rocket attacks. The unit recently established checkpoints after receiving intelligence on insurgents moving equipment and people through their area of operations. Those reports also attributed the recent mortar and rocket attacks to a white van in the area. While Soldiers were conducting checkpoint operations, a white van suddenly approached. Despite the obstacles in place and Soldiers signaling to stop, the van swerved around it and took off. The unit on the ground followed rules of engagement and escalation of force criteria and assessed the van as demonstrating hostile intent. They made the decision to attack and called on us to engage the vehicle.

An Apache helicopter can take out a vehicle in less than 2 seconds, so we could easily eliminate the threat as soon as we arrived. This made me consider the ethical use of force, and I stated to my crew, "Hold on. Let's just make sure we know what's going on here. We're not taking fire. Just take a deep breath, and let's develop the situation. We have some time here." I maneuvered the aircraft and forced the vehicle to stop. We were stunned when women and children exited the van.

That was a hard lesson for everyone involved in that operation. It was a situation where everyone thought we were doing the right thing, but would it have been right to engage the van? These are the tough situations that Soldiers in combat are in, and they have to make hard decisions. It took a little more time to confirm if we should engage, but it made a difference. That is why leaders have an obligation to be involved and demonstrate to Soldiers how to apply just cause and just means in combat.

Our world continues to rapidly change. Advances in robotics, unmanned combat platforms, and artificial intelligence have the potential to increase our lethality in ways previously unimaginable. Adversaries with different views of ethics challenge and change the character of war as they innovate more lethal weapons and apply technology across multiple domains like cyber and space to control information. As these advances occur, so do the debates on military ethics.

One hundred years ago, the First World War brought technological changes including submarines, aircraft, and machine guns that sparked ethical debate. World War II and the nuclear age reignited the debate, as did the Cold War. The debates disguise the truth that, despite our constantly changing world and character of war, the moral foundation of our military remains fixed.

The Nation is going to send young men and women to war. These Soldiers will deploy and fight. What internal struggles will they sustain from decisions they made in combat? We are among the most trusted professions because of the moral foundations that are the basis of our Army. As the world continues to change around us, it is strength of character and our ethical foundation that must remain. We must do the right thing the right way.

—**General James C. McConville**
Chief of Staff of the United States Army

The completion of this work stands on the efforts of many tireless professionals, all of whom are deserving of tremendous thanks. First, the staff officers and noncommissioned officers of both the U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Chaplains and Royal Army Chaplains Department deserve mention, including Chaplain (Major General) Paul K. Hurley, USA, and Rev. Dr. (Chaplain General) David C. Coulter (co-hosts of the International Military Ethics Symposium 2018); Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Grace Hollis, USA; Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) "Bogie" Augustyn, USA; Rev. Father (Lieutenant Colonel) Pascal Hanrahan, Royal Army Chaplains' Department (British Army); Sergeant First Class Jason Gaulke, USA (action officer); and from NCI, Inc., Ms. Alana Gates and Ms. Tina Mincks (logistical organizers).

Second, the staff and faculty of the National Defense University, including Chaplain (Colonel) Kenneth Williams, USA; Commander Nolan King, USN; Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Dr. John J. Church, and Ms. Joanna Seich at NDU Press; and Mr. Mark Rzepka and his team at the NDU Foundation. Finally, the generous support of several private organizations allowed many officers of strategic partner nations to participate in this event, and particular thanks must go to Mr. Peter MacDonald and Mr. Mark Maurice of the MacDonald Agape Foundation, Mr. Mark Tooley and the Institute for Religion and Democracy, and General Carter Ham (Ret.) and Lieutenant General Guy Swan (Ret.) of the Association of the United States Army.

Notwithstanding the yeoman work of the above fine individuals, all mistakes in this work should wholly be considered those of this editor. We proffer this work to the wider community of warriors, ethicists, and scholars in the profession of arms in the hopes that our considerations may help shape the strategic ethical context of this profession now and in the future.

Moreover, we rely on this same community to dialog and debate with us on our insights. Only through this process will new students and warriors understand with clarity and conviction the continuing ethical impact of World War I and so guide the profession of arms in the coming decades.

By Timothy S. Mallard

Darkness is not better than light, death is not better than life;
no praise from comfortable men can bring the
dead back to the sun they loved.

—Sergeant Ernest Woodward
We Will Remember Them: Voices from the
Aftermath of the Great War

The profession of arms in the 21st century is at significant risk of losing its status as a *profession* due to several salient factors.[1] Because of the rapid development of technology in relation to warfare, for instance, there are growing questions as to how much control human beings will retain of future combat, particularly given the speed of decisionmaking required for victory on the modern battlefield. As well, with the rise of new geopolitical and military coalitions, many are concerned as to how much war will remain an act of and in accordance with the political interests, values, and histories of individual nation-states, especially considering the thornier problem of developing the same for coalitions or allied forces. Furthermore,

amid an increase in value-neutral societies (and the concomitant lack of personal moral formation of individual citizens), it may rightly be asked whether values-based institutions such as professional militaries can be adequately shaped to reflect any coherent national ethical consensus.

As a derivative of this problem, the increasing issue of strategic leader moral failure among professional military forces raises significant questions regarding the efficacy of standing programs for the ethical development of military leaders, not to mention the corrosion of trust in the institution by both their external clients (civic populations) and internal members (military formations) in the wake of such failures. Given the rise of fifth-domain warfare and multidomain battle (simultaneous, integrated combat action in and through land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), there is basis to question whether traditional nation-state constructs such as land borders, the rule of law, and even regulating theories (for example, jus ad bellum, in bello, and post bellum) will allow militaries to retain control of warfare in concert with their national interests. In the aggregate, then, it may be candidly wondered whether the utility of the profession of arms has passed in its service to the post-Westphalian nation-state.

These are but a few of the major strategic questions facing the profession of arms today. Such questions, however, do not adequately address other challenges in contemporary warfare, such as transnational threats from weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, resource shortages, immigration, climate change, the rise of mega-urban population centers, or even the increasing costs of war—not only monetarily but also in the resulting moral and spiritual injury among combatants and noncombatants alike.[2] But exploring such other challenges will not be the purpose of this edited volume. Rather, its purpose is to focus on the dominant strategic ethical challenges to the profession of arms in the first half of this century. In short, as a profession, what strategic questions should be answered for war to *remain* both under human control and guided by the exercise of the discreet, reflective judgment of morally formed military leaders? Answering that question is the specific purpose of this work.

Event Report, Thesis, and Purpose

The centenary of the end of World War I offers an appropriate waypoint to address such questions. Since "the war to end all wars" witnessed the rise of global war among competing nation-states conducted in often tenuous alliances with nascent professional militaries—characteristics that continue to mark contemporary warfare a century later—then studying that conflict's impact seems a relevant method to decide ways in which the profession of arms will develop in the next 25 to 50 years.[3] Indeed, like a smoldering, persistent fire that threatens to re-erupt into a fresh conflagration, World War I continues to deeply shape and guide the profession of arms today. Consequently, the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps and Royal Army Chaplains' Department of the British Army, in conjunction with the National Defense University in Washington, DC, decided to host a major academic and professional conference to undertake this project. The International Military Ethics Symposium occurred from July 30 through August 1, 2018, and its guiding theme encapsulates its purpose: "1918–2018: Lessons from the Great War—Ethical Imperatives for the Contemporary Profession of Arms." This volume captures the proceedings of this symposium and is intended to be a guiding primer in the strategic ethics of the present and future practice of war.

Accordingly, we argue that World War I encompassed the salient strategic ethical issues that shape the profession of arms today and will continue to do so for decades. The study of this conflict is thus vital preparation for every interested professional to navigate the complex challenges that will mark warfare for the foreseeable future. How so? First, we wish to state that demonstrably the profession of arms, as a regulating force within and among nation-states, remains both vital and necessary to societal flourishing in an era of rapid development. Despite this claim, the profession of arms remains under threat and in need of continual correction, particularly as it relates to the formation of morally informed ethical leaders. Second, we wish likewise to sketch out some of the strategic considerations that such

leaders must be masters of if they are to perfect their craft in this present century. While the term *masters* may seem somewhat freighted—perhaps even peremptory—we believe that, in the vein of Samuel Huntington, the "management of violence" today remains the sole province of morally informed strategic military leaders and that there are no substitutes for such experts in the multiplicity of democratic polities today.[4] Third, we hold that it is critical to examine how the profession of arms came to be in its present state, including ways in which World War I, as an epochal conflict in human history, continues to influence national and global relationships, even if such influence is not often clearly understood or articulated.[5]

Fourth, we believe that warfare has advanced to such a state that no national military force (or its leaders) will ever practice war again in a vacuum, as it were. Rather, the profession of arms will be from this point forward in human history an increasingly complex strategic act that melds the precise application of diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement powers in pursuit of defined geopolitical objectives.[6] Fifth, we believe that religion generally will remain an intractable problem in the calculus of political and military leaders precisely because it remains an organizing force in the locales where future coalition operations will occur. For example, most sociologists expect that by 2030 over 70 percent of the world's Christians will reside not in the Western nation-states but in the Global South across South America, Africa, and Asia. Sixth, deriving from this phenomenon, the chaplaincies of existing professional militaries will continue to have a vital role to play in the profession of arms in the future.[7] As the so-called conscience of the command, chaplains (along with their counterparts in moral philosophy) will increasingly need to remind military forces and the national leaders they advise of the summary costs of war.[8] Put another way, war remains a necessary yet costly enterprise in a world replete with both good and evil, and the profession of arms and nation-states must always count such costs before committing military forces to war—that is our moral and ethical strategic duty.[9]

Centenary Historical Context

If this is our task in this work, then what is the context within which modern warfare will occur? World War I gave us several markers that remain operative today. As we have alluded to, contemporary warfare will both remain a coalition enterprise and generally be exercised on a global stage (if not, then it will surely have global impact). War is increasingly carried out by nations among nations, even if substate actors are major players in individual conflicts.[10] Derivatively, warfare will increasingly be governed by coalition political alliances, aims, and military strategies. Increasingly distant is the age in which two competing enemy nations engaged in war for limited aims and with limited capabilities. As well, wars will likely remain decided by the application of force by professional militaries across multiple domains of conflict. However, this will surely be attenuated by the proliferation of technologies and capabilities for weapons of mass destruction to smaller nation-states and substate actors, a phenomenon I have termed previously the "democratization of war."[11]

Additionally, warfare will thus necessarily be guided toward the resolution of complex geopolitical strategic issues such as the interests of whole people groups, decisions about scarce resources, and even ultimate resolution regarding political philosophies or economies among great power competitors. Though substate actors will influence conflicts, it remains difficult to see how their aims for engaging in war will win out over those of the established nation-states, which continue to regulate the world order. Furthermore, present and future war will remain operative in an increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment, and that environment will likely produce outcomes of war that yield few concrete markers of peace. Concomitantly, while the ancient Greek and Latin ideals of both *eudaimonia* (human flourishing) and *tranquillitas ordinis* (an ordered social peace) will remain aspirational ideals for the outcome of war, they will increasingly yield to a cessation of hostilities marked by many of the tensions that caused conflict in the first place.[12]

Finally, the centenary cataclysm of World War I—though now a distant memory for many—remains a vital social act to commemorate the suffering and death of over 15 million souls who, through their loss, shaped, if not purchased, the modern democratic order. Marking their sacrifice is a worthy occasion to exercise our collective capacity for memory, to recommit ourselves and our institutions to those ideals for which they died, and to calibrate the modern forces that are the inheritors of the modern joint force first established on the fields of Europe in 1914. If, then, these indeed remain markers of warfare in the immediate future context, they will only be the descendants of their antecedent progenitors from World War I, for surely that conflict contained each of these markers in at least microcosmic form.

Outline of the Book

We now turn to the works of this symposium's plenary speakers and outstanding breakout paper presenters whose contributions comprise this volume. Part I considers some of the Great War's strategic ethical derivations, including a penetrating examination of at least five major ethical issues (framed as questions) that continue to guide the contemporary conduct of war across all nation-states (Nigel Biggar); a consideration of the necessary virtue in killing, which should guide the moral formation of present and future warriors and the beneficial implications for societies of a hardened warrior class (Marc LiVecche); a provocative examination of the enduring role of nationalism in geopolitical affairs, particularly as it relates to the exercise of military solution sets for whole-of-government problems among diverse international coalitions (Paul Coyer); reflections on several enduring geopolitical effects of World War I that shape international relations today, including incompetence, technology, and a drive for the elusive and often ill-defined concept of justice (Eric Patterson); and the presentation of a new thesis that one of World War I's lasting legacies is its continuing impact on the concept of international law, and particularly how that conflict set the paradigm for the modern law of war (Michael Hoffman).

Part II considers how ethics is actually carried out today at the operational and tactical levels of war and how the Great War even inchoately shaped this part of the profession of arms. Here, topics include whether societies today, and the individuals who comprise them, are adequately prepared for the cost of war (David Richardson); the effect of de-emphasizing the cultivation of virtue in the moral formation of warriors (Thomas Statler); how World War I shaped the interwar (and subsequently World War II and beyond) consideration of care for enemy prisoners of war, displaced persons, and refugees (Victoria Barnett); the weaponization of information in pursuit of war aims (Graham Fairclough); and an expert consideration of how this conflict shaped the contemporary ethical parameters of the limited use of chemical weapons (John Mark Mattox).

No consideration of World War I's lasting ethical impact would be complete without considering its effects on warriors, their families, and the forces they serve in. Part III concludes along this trajectory, examining topics such as the professionalization of the military chaplaincy in the nascent cooperation of British and American chaplains on the Western Front (Michael Snape); the continuing need for moral guidance and warrior religious care in war (Andrew Totten); how warriors today can recover from the trauma of war, particularly the hidden wound of moral injury (Mark Lee); what legacy remains from the Great War around the increasing awareness of moral and spiritual injury as strategic ethical considerations (Timothy Mallard); how militaries can and will continue to push the ethical limits of warrior enhancement through the incorporation of new technologies (C. Anthony Pfaff); how, even in the emerging context of multidomain battle, the medical care of warriors will stand on enduring lessons of battlefield "point-of-injury" care begun on the Western Front (Patrick Naughton); and how resilience as a concept is growing in importance to the profession of arms but must retain its social, martial, and even theological roots (Nathan White).

Notes

[1] Don Snider, "Remarks on Acceptance of the Malham M. Wakin Lifetime Achievement Award," speech before the Annual Meeting of the International Society of Military Ethics, Washington, DC, January 26, 2017. Snider's concerns center around threats to the two central underpinnings to the maintenance of any profession: the retention of human control and the continuing exercise of human judgment in the discrete application of a profession's expertise.

[2] The words of World War I veteran Rifleman Fred White, 10th Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps, evoke the continuing societal cost of moral and spiritual injury on warriors, their families, and their communities: "Us fellows, it took us years to get over it. Years! Long after when you were working, married, had kids, you'd be lying in bed with your wife and you'd see it all before you. Couldn't sleep. Couldn't lie still. Many and many's the time I've got up and tramped the streets till it came daylight. Walking, walking—anything to get away from your thoughts. And many's the time I've met other fellows that were out there doing exactly the same thing. That went on for years, that did." See "Reflections," in Max Arthur, *We Will Remember Them: Voices from the Aftermath of the Great War* (London: Orion Books, 2009), 157–158.

[3] Regarding World War I specifically, see Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 64–102. Strachan's discussion of the complex nature of political alliances and military commitments that underlay the July Crisis of 1914 is an excellent primer on the roots of the conflict. Also see Margaret MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914* (New York: Random House, 2014), 80–109, for a good summary of German nationalist ambitions that were foundational to the conflict.

[4] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 15.

[5] An excellent geopolitical analysis of the continuing shaping effects of World War I is David Reynolds, *The Long Shadow: The Legacies of the Great War in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Norton, 2014), 3–242.

[6] *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 4.

[7] When Peter Berger advanced his notion that the world was becoming more religious rather than less so, many broadly contested his thesis; now he is seen as prescient. See his *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World*

Politics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999) or "Globalization and Religion," *The Hedgehog Review* 4, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 7–20. Regarding the rise of the Global South, see Alister McGrath, *The Twilight of Atheism: The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World* (New York: Doubleday, 2004).

    8 Miroslav Volf, "Agents of Peace in Theaters of War: Re-Thinking the Role of Military Chaplains," plenary paper presented at the International Military Chiefs of Chaplains Conference, Cape Town, South Africa, January 2, 2009. This role hearkens back to that of their World War I counterparts. General John J. Pershing wrote regarding World War I chaplaincy: "Religious work in our Army before the war was carried on by chaplains, one to each regiment. To meet the greatly increased size of regiments, legislation was recommended by me to provide not less than one chaplain for each 1,200 men. . . . The religious work was directed and coordinate[d] by a Board of Chaplains at general headquarters, of which Bishop Charles H. Brent was the head. With great devotion to duty this work was maintained despite a lack of transportation and other facilities. Chaplains, as never before, became the moral and spiritual leaders of their organizations, and established a high standard of active usefulness in religious work that made for patriotism, discipline, and unselfish devotion to duty." See U.S. Army War Department, *Final Report of GEN John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 92–93. For additional reflection on World War I chaplain duties in the aftermath of battle, see B. Brooke, Escort and Guide, "Notation Regarding Post-War Battlefield Duties," in Arthur, *We Will Remember Them*, 90–91.

    9 To discount this lesson would be, ironically, to have forgotten one of the most enduring historical legacies of World War I and to abrogate the sacrifice of the more than 15 million souls lost globally in that conflagration. Chaplains today refuse to let such a lesson be lost; in the traditional words of the congregational declarative response in British army memorial services for their fallen comrades, "We will remember them." Just so.

    10 *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. This document famously and publicly focused the defense of the Republic on the threat from great power nation-state competitors, particularly China and Russia.

    11 Timothy Mallard, "The Democratization of War: The Rise and Impact of Autonomous Weapons Systems," paper presented at the International Military Ethics Symposium 2017, Washington, DC.

[12]   Reynolds, *The Long Shadow*. Note particularly Reynolds's fine observation that the major contemporary geopolitical ideals of nation, democracy, empire, capitalism, civilization, and peace all find their roots in how this conflict ended. For a case study in how the nationalist ideals that undergirded World War I continue to directly influence contemporary geopolitics, see Serhii Plokhy, *Lost Kingdom: The Quest for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 93–94. Regarding the start of World War I and Russian/German nationalism, he suggests, "On both sides of the freshly drawn front lines, nationalism was on the rise, and nothing fed it better than war." Plokhy accurately notes that contemporary Russian geopolitical designs are a direct outgrowth of President Vladimir Putin's appropriation of the *Kievan Rus* myth.

PART I

Strategic Considerations for Military Ethics: World War I to Today

What Should Military Ethics Learn from World War I? A Christian Assessment

By Nigel Biggar

We attacked, I think, about 820 strong. I've no official figures of casualties. A friend, an officer in "C" Company, which was in support and shelled to pieces before it could start, told me in hospital that we lost 450 men that day, and that, after being put in again a day or two later, we had 54 left. I suppose it's worth it.[1]

—Richard H. Tawney, "The Attack"

Thus wrote Richard H. Tawney—then a sergeant, later the famous Anglican socialist—of the action on the Somme on July 1, 1916, in which he himself was shot in the stomach and lay wounded in No Man's Land for 30 hours. In their assault on the German trenches, the British (which at that time and in that place included the southern Irish and Newfoundlanders) suffered 57,470 casualties *on the first day*, of which 19,240 were fatalities. The battle, which began in July, carried on for over 4 months into November. At its end, British losses amounted to 419,654 killed, wounded, missing, and taken prisoner. The French lost an additional 202,567.[2] And the gain for this appalling cost? An advance of about 6 miles.[3]

The Somme has become a byword for disproportionate military slaughter, caused by criminally stupid and callous generals in the prosecution of a senseless, futile war. This narrative began to take root in Great Britain when I was a teenager in the 1960s and against the background of widespread opposition to America's war in Vietnam. Although now under challenge from professional historians, it remains a common view and received something of a boost 5 years ago with the publication of Christopher Clark's widely celebrated *The Sleepwalkers.* Clark concludes his account of the outbreak and escalation of World War I thus: "There is no smoking gun in this story; or, rather, there is one in the hand of every major character. . . . The outbreak of war was a tragedy, not a crime."[4] "The crisis that brought war in 1914," he tells us, "was the fruit of a shared political culture," which rendered Europe's leaders "sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world."[5]

I do not agree with Clark, but on ethical rather than historical grounds. He draws too sharp a distinction between tragedy and crime, as if they are always mutually exclusive alternatives. Crime often has a tragic dimension. Human beings do make free moral choices, but our freedom is usually somewhat fated by forces beyond our control. In addition, Clark assumes that because blame was widespread, it was shared equally. I disagree—the fact that blame is spread wide does not make it even.

Take, for example, the question of whether or not the British government was justified in going to war in August 1914. Crucial to this is reaching a moral judgment about Germany's invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and France, because without that invasion Britain would not have fought. Why did Germany invade? It invaded because it feared that France would attack in support of Russia. According to the Christian just war reasoning, however, the mere threat of attack is no just cause for war. Only if there is substantial evidence that a threat is *actually in the process of being realized* would the launching of *preemptive* war be justified. It is not justified to launch a *preventative* war simply because one fears that an enemy *might*

attack. One may not launch war on speculative grounds. In August 1914, France was not intending to attack Germany (and nor, of course, was Belgium). Indeed, France deliberately kept one step behind Germany in its military preparations so as to make its defensive posture unmistakable, and as late as August 1, France reaffirmed the order for its troops to stay 10 kilometers back from the Franco-Belgian border.[6] Notwithstanding that, Germany declared war on France on August 3 "on the basis of trumped-up allegations that French troops had crossed the border and French aircraft had bombed Nuremberg."[7]

It was the German government, dominated by its military leadership,[8] that launched a preventative war against France and Belgium in August 1914. It did so because social Darwinism was the "prevailing orthodoxy,"[9] and the government took it for granted that war is the natural way of deciding the balance of international power;[10] because it foresaw that the longer the next war was delayed, the longer would be the odds against Germany's victory;[11] and because "the memory of 1870 [the Franco-Prussian War], still nurtured through annual commemorations and the cult of Bismarck, had addicted the German leaders to saber-rattling and to military gambles, which had paid off before and might do so again."[12]

Clark's metaphor of the sleepwalker is a striking one, which picks out important features of the situation in the runup to the outbreak of world war. But a metaphor is, by definition, both like and unlike the reality it depicts, and it should not be taken literally. Germany's leaders were not actually sleepwalkers, but fully conscious moral agents, making decisions according to their best lights in a volatile situation of limited visibility. In such circumstances, which are not at all unusual, error was forgivable. Not so forgivable was their subscription to the creed of a Darwinist *Realpolitik*, which robbed their political and military calculating of any moral bottom line beyond that of national survival through dominance.[13]

It is perfectly natural for a nation not to want to see diminished its power to realize its intentions in the world. But if social Darwinism thinks it is natural for a nation to launch a preventative war simply to forestall the

loss of its dominance, just war reasoning does not think it is right. Just cause must consist of an injury, and Germany had suffered none. Nor was it about to. As David Stevenson writes, "no evidence exists that Russia, France, or Britain intended to attack."[14]

One thing that World War I has to teach those of us who care about the rights and wrongs of war is this: *metaphysics matters*. It matters whether or not we take a fundamentally Darwinist or Hobbesian view of the world, or, say, a Christian or Kantian one. If Berlin's anxieties about national survival and dominance in 1914 had been disciplined by the principles of Christian just war reasoning—or something like it—there would have been no Western Front.

Disciplining the Pursuit of National Interest

Of course, the fact that Germany invaded France and Belgium did not determine Great Britain's entry into the war. Indeed, a majority of the British government's cabinet initially opposed sending troops to aid France. The Entente Cordiale formally committed the British only to consult with the French in case of a threat to European peace, and not automatically to activate their joint military contingency plans.[15] Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, argued strongly that Britain was morally obliged to come to France's aid. But what eventually decided the cabinet in favor of war on August 4 was Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality. In British minds "Belgium" conjured up a variety of just causes: vindicating a treaty to guarantee Belgian independence and defending the rights of small nations against unwarranted aggression.

Of course, in addition to moral obligation to France and legal obligation to Belgium, national interest was also involved in Great Britain's motivation to help fend off a German attack. The Belgian coast faced London and the Thames estuary, and it had therefore long been British policy to keep that coastline free from hostile control in order to prevent invasion and preserve command of the sea.[16] It is true, therefore, that in rising to the defense of France and Belgium, the British also sought to forestall German

domination of northwestern Europe, which menaced their security. Not all national interests are immoral, however, and this one seems unobjectionable. What is morally crucial is that Britain did not *initiate* a *preventative* war to maintain a favorable balance of power; nor did it support France in launching such a war.

Germany had suffered no actual injury, nor was it under any actually emergent threat of suffering one. Unprovoked and on a fabricated pretext, it launched a preventative invasion of France and Belgium to assert and establish its own dominance. In response, Great Britain went to war to repel an unjustified attack on a neighboring ally, maintain international order by vindicating the treaty guaranteeing Belgian independence, and forestall a serious *and actualized* threat to its own national security, in which it had a legitimate interest. The second thing that World War I has to teach us is that legitimate national interests can be pursued in a manner disciplined by both law and morality.

Attrition Can Be Proportionate

The Australian Catholic moral philosopher Tony Coady is not unusual in identifying the attritional character of the Great War as its most morally revolting feature.[17] What he finds so repulsive is its apparent expression of a dullness of strategic imagination that only a criminal indifference to the loss of human life could allow: "Had the general staff viewed the wastage of life as the moral enormity it has subsequently come to seem, they would have exercised more imagination in trying to find other ways of fighting," he writes; and in a footnote he adds that "[i]n fact, there were other strategies and tactics available, most notably tank warfare, which was introduced at Cambrai but used inappropriately."[18]

If contemporary historiography is to be believed, however, Coady is almost wholly wrong here. For example, William Philpott, author of a highly praised history of the Battle of the Somme, writes that "[i]t is overly simplistic to judge that the British army was too rigid or conservative in its tactics and command. It was keen to learn, engaging with its task

thoughtfully and professionally."[19] Generals and government ministers were shocked by the numbers of casualties and strove to find ways of breaking the stalemate on the Western Front and avoiding the need for attritional warfare. That is mainly why the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign was launched in 1915—to try and open up a new, more mobile front in southeast Europe. That is why Field Marshal Douglas Haig was so quick to champion the development of the tank.[20] And that was also why he persisted in planning for a dramatic breakthrough on the Western Front in July 1916, long after others had concluded that it could not be achieved.

It was not lack of human feeling or military imagination that led the British (and French) to adopt an attritional strategy; it was the lack of alternatives during a fateful period of history that favored defense by coming after the mass production of machine guns but before the mass production of tanks and, more importantly, the development of the "creeping barrage" of sound-ranging techniques in counterbattery fire[21] and wireless communications.[22] According to Philpott, strategic attrition "made sense in the dead-locked circumstances of 1916,"[23] was necessary for any decisive defeat of the German army,[24] came close to success [in September 1916],[25] and in the end "it worked."[26]

In addition, those who damn the generalship of World War I for waging attritional war, and accepting casualties on a massive scale, must reckon with the fact that the undisputed turning point in the later war against Adolf Hitler—the Battle of Stalingrad—was horrifically attritional, its human cost rivalling that of the Great War battles.[27] They must also take on board the fact that on the mercifully few occasions in World War II when Allied troops found themselves bogged down in near-static fighting—hill-to-hill in Italy and hedge-to-hedge in Normandy—they reverted to the attritional tactics of 1917[28] and that casualty rates in the 1944–1945 campaign in northwest Europe equaled, and sometimes exceeded, those on the Western Front in 1914–1918.[29]

So here is the third lesson from the Great War: attrition, dreadful though its costs may be, can sometimes be the only effective way of

prosecuting war. And what is the only effective and available means is, logically, proportionate.

Callousness Can Be a Military Virtue

What Tony Coady found objectionable about the generals, however, was not just their boneheaded lack of strategic and tactical imagination. It was also their inhumane callousness. As he writes:

> Part of the widespread moral revulsion from the dreadful conflict of World War I is produced by the perception that there was a callous disregard by the general staff of both armies for the well-being of their own troops. . . . Certainly, the generals seldom got close enough to the conflict to gain any sense of what their policies were inflicting upon the men, and they displayed an attitude toward the wastage of human life that suggested they viewed the troops as mere cannon fodder.[30]

My first response to these charges is to distinguish callousness from indifference or carelessness. There is a sense in which any military commander who is going to do his job has to be able to callous himself—to thicken his skin. He has to be emotionally capable of ordering his troops to risk their lives, and, in some cases, he must be capable of ordering them to their probable or certain deaths. Moreover, the doctrine of just war requires the prospect of success, and history suggests that successful military commanders are those who are calloused enough to be ruthless in what they demand of their own troops. Take this example from the battle of El Alamein in October 1942, which was the first major land success that British imperial troops achieved against German forces in World War II. In the middle of the battle, the New Zealander Major General Freyberg held a briefing where he communicated General Bernard Montgomery's orders to Brigadier John Currie, commander of the 9th Armoured Brigade:

> [T]he task for 9th Armoured Brigade . . . was so obviously one of difficulty and danger that when Currie's time came to make comment,

he rather diffidently suggested that by the end of the day his brigade might well have suffered 50 per cent casualties. To this [Bernard] *Freyberg had replied with studied nonchalance, "Perhaps more than that. The Army Commander* [Montgomery] *says that he is prepared to accept a hundred per cent.*[31]

Was Montgomery callous? In a certain, militarily necessary sense, yes, he was. Was he careless of the lives of his troops? Not at all. On the contrary, Montgomery was a highly popular commander because, while he was willing to spend his soldiers' lives, he was careful not to waste them,[32] and he was also careful to make sure that his men understood what was being asked of them and why.[33]

To be just, a war must have the prospect of success. To be successful, a military commander must be sufficiently callous to spend the lives of his troops. Such callousness can accompany carefulness. But can it also accompany compassion? In one colloquial sense, the answer has to be negative, for *compassion* connotes a certain emotional identification, an entering into the suffering of others, which is exactly what a commander must callous himself against if he is to order his troops to risk or spend their lives. In the midst of battle, he cannot afford compassion of this sort if he is to make a success of his job. This callousness, however, is perfectly compatible with having such sympathy for the plight of frontline troops before battle, or for the plight of the wounded afterwards, as to make sure that they have what they need. In sum, then, carefulness before battle, callousness in it, and compassion after it.[34]

Let us return to Field Marshal Haig on the Somme. Was he callous? Did he treat his own soldiers "as the merest cannon fodder"?[35] Haig was characteristically taciturn and outwardly impassive, as Edwardian gentlemen were wont to be. He also displayed exactly the kind of professional callousness that I have just defended. Winston Churchill, who knew him "slightly,"[36] wrote that Haig "presents to me in those red years the same mental picture as a great surgeon before the days of anaesthetics [*sic*]: intent

upon the operation, entirely removed in his professional capacity from the agony of the patient. . . . He would operate without excitement . . . and if the patient died, he would not reproach himself." But then Churchill adds, "It must be understood that I speak only of his professional actions. Once out of the theatre, his heart was as warm as any man's."[37] Haig was a professional soldier, but he was not insensible to the plight of his men.

Contrary to popular myth (and to Tony Coady), he did get close enough to the frontline to witness the effects of his decisions on the men required to carry them out. He visited the trenches, was appalled by what he saw, and took steps to improve his troops' lot by ordering the construction of "a vast infrastructure of canteens, baths, and the like."[38] In the early days of the Battle of the Somme he paid visits to the wounded in field hospitals,[39] which made him so "physically sick" that his staff officers had to persuade him to stop.[40] After the war, he devoted the better part of his time to working for the cause of war veterans through the British Legion.[41] Haig did not view his men as mere cannon fodder.

Our fourth lesson is that successful generalship requires a certain kind of callousness—that callousness can be a military virtue—but that it need not displace all compassion.

Military Leadership Needs to Marry the Virtues of Resolve and Openness

It seems that the enormous number of casualties suffered by the British on the Somme cannot be blamed on Haig's lack of compassion for his men, or on his carelessness in spending their lives, or on his disdain for technical innovation. Can it nevertheless be attributed to his failure to adopt a more efficient strategy? Some contemporary historians think so, claiming that alternative, more efficient means of waging war were indeed available to Haig and that he declined to use them. J.P. Harris, for example, argues that by mid-1916 "a substantial proportion" of the British army's most senior officers had come to favor a cautious, step-by-step approach—"a series of limited attacks backed by concentrated artillery fire, designed to inflict

loss on the enemy rather than to gain ground." [42] Haig, however, "became fixated on the achievement of dramatic breakthrough and achieving serious strategic results,"[43] and he therefore "proceeded with an approach that practically all the sources of advice available to him indicated to be dangerously overambitious."[44]

It seems, then, that Haig's planning for the battle of the Somme suffered not from a lack of ingenuity or imagination but from a measure of over-optimism. The irony—the dreadful irony—is that it was not his boneheaded commitment to a long attritional slogging match that made his battle strategy wasteful but rather his bold refusal to settle for it. His eagerness for a breakthrough, while not just wishful thinking, nevertheless led him to compromise his attritional operations. Therefore, on the first day of battle the British artillery bombardment was spread too deeply into enemy territory, with the result that its firepower was dissipated and too much of the German frontline survived to entangle the attacking British infantry in barbed wire and mow them down with machine guns.

It seems that Haig may have been culpably stubborn. In one sense, of course, military commanders are paid to be stubborn. They are expected to keep their nerve when everyone else is losing theirs and to be resolute in the face of terrible adversity and fierce criticism. And Haig did keep his nerve right up until the war's end, while the politicians around him were going weak at the knees. Nevertheless, a wise commander will not be so stubborn as to make himself impervious to cogent criticism. Rather he will seek out colleagues whose advice he can respect, and he will listen to that advice even when its import is not welcome. Paul Harris argues that Haig was not so wise:

> [t]*he evidence is overwhelming that Haig did not engender at* [General Headquarters] *an intellectually stimulating environment in which force structure, policy, plans and operational methods could be frankly debated in his presence. . . .* [H]*e did not want some of his fundamental ideas and preconceptions disturbed. . . . He seems*

to have chosen the staff officers with whom he had the most regular
contact from people who would implement his will without trying
fundamentally to change his thinking.[45]

Our fifth lesson from World War I, therefore, is that military leaders need somehow to combine two vying virtues: resolve that remains firm in adversity, with an openness to unwelcome counsel.

Love Can Walk the Battlefield

I began at the level of international politics by considering the justice of going to war. I then stepped down to the level of military strategy and tactics, by considering the morality of attrition and the virtues of military leadership. Now, in conclusion, I step down even further, onto the battle-field. And here, as a Christian, I am bound to ask: Can love walk on it?

I am bound to ask this because the Christian tradition of just war thinking takes its cue from St. Augustine, who argued that, while the New Testament does not forbid the use of violent force always and everywhere, it does require it to be motivated by love. To many this will seem quite implau-sible in practice. As the nonreligious pacifist Robert Holmes puts it, "[O]ne cannot help but wonder . . . whether it is humanly possible amidst the chaos of slaughter and gore that marks . . . combat to remain free of those things Augustine identifies as evil in war, the cruelty, enmity, and the like."[46] I do not doubt that soldiers are sometimes motivated by vengeance and hatred, but there is ample empirical evidence that that is not normal. Normally, soldiers are mainly motivated by love for their comrades, which is one of the forms of love that the New Testament endorses in Jesus' name: "Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:13).

Self-sacrificial love for one's friends is admirable, but those who follow Jesus must extend love to their enemies, too. Is this possible in the heat of combat? Many will suppose not, assuming that soldiers typically hate their opponents. But this is not so. In his extraordinarily wise meditation on the psychology and spirituality of combat, informed by his own experience of

military service in World War II, Glenn Gray writes, "A civilian far removed from the battle is nearly certain to be more bloodthirsty than the front-line soldier."[47] This view is substantiated by Richard Tawney, whom we left wounded on the Somme on July 1, 1916. Fortunately, he was discovered by a medic and eventually shipped back to Great Britain and convalescence in Oxford. The following October, he published an article in the press, where he reflected on the bewildering gulf in understanding that, he observed, had opened up between the men at the front and their families and friends back home. At one point he protests against the view of the soldier that has come to prevail in many civilian minds:

> And this "Tommy" [this caricature of the British soldier] *is a creature at once ridiculous and disgusting. He is represented as . . . finding "sport" in killing other men, as "hunting Germans out of dug-outs as a terrier hunts rats," as overwhelming with kindness the captives of his bow and spear. The last detail is true to life, but the emphasis which you lay upon it is both unintelligent and insulting. Do you expect us to hurt them or starve them? Do you not see that we regard these men who have sat opposite us in mud—"square-headed bastards," as we called them—as the victims of the same catastrophe as ourselves, as our comrades in misery much more truly than you are? Do you think that we are like some of you in accumulating on the head of every wretched antagonist the indignation felt for the wickedness of a government, of a social system, or (if you will) of a nation? . . . Hatred of the enemy is not common, I think, among those who have encountered him. It is incompatible with the proper discharge of our duty. For to kill in hatred is murder; and soldiers, whatever their nationality, are not murderers, but executioners.*[48]

Tawney's experience was by no means unique. Frontline servicemen do not necessarily hate the enemy. Sometimes they even feel a sense of solidarity or kinship with him. Thus Gerald Dennis, who also fought on the Western Front, confessed that at Christmas 1916 he would

> *not have minded fraternizing as had been done the previous two*
> *years for in a way, the opponents on each side of No Man's Land*
> *were kindred spirit. We did not hate one another. We were both*
> *P.B.I.* [Poor Bloody Infantry] *we should have liked to have stood*
> *up between our respective barbed wire, without danger and shaken*
> *hands with our counterparts.*[49]

Thus, too, Ernest Raymond, a British veteran of the Gallipoli campaign in 1915, recalled that the Turk "became popular with us, and everything suggested that our amiability toward him was reciprocated."[50] Love for the enemy, at least in the weak sense of a certain sense of kinship with him, is not foreign to the experience of frontline troops.

This is true, but it is not the whole truth. It would surely strain credibility to pretend that pleasure in destruction, anger, and hatred are all strangers to the battlefield. Of course, they are not. "The least acknowledged aspect of war, today," writes Vietnam veteran Karl Marlantes, "is how exhilarating it is."[51] This exhilaration, however, is not always malicious. It is not always the destruction that pleases, so much as the pure thrill, even the ecstasy, of danger. A month before he was killed at the end of World War I, the poet Wilfred Owen—yes, he of the pity-of-war fame—wrote to his mother:

> *I have been in action for some days. I can find no word to qualify*
> *my experiences except the word SHEER. . . . It passed the limits of*
> *my Abhorrence. I lost all my earthly faculties, and fought like an*
> *angel. . . . With this corporal who stuck to me and shadowed me*
> *like your prayers I captured a German Machine Gun and scores*
> *of prisoners. . . . I only shot one man with my revolver (at about 30*
> *yards!); The rest I took with a smile.*[52]

That said, it has to be admitted that the exhilaration of combat is sometimes inspired by the sheer joy—the ecstasy—of destruction. Ernst Jünger, in his classic memoir of World War I, *Storm of Steel*, bears witness:

*As we advanced, we were in the grip of a berserk rage. The over-
whelming desire to kill lent wings to my stride. Rage squeezed bitter
tears from my eyes. The immense desire to destroy that overhung
the battlefield precipitated a red mist in our brains. We called out
sobbing and stammering fragments of sentences to one another,
and an impartial observer might have concluded that we were all
ecstatically happy. . . . The fighter, who sees a bloody mist in front
of his eyes as he attacks, doesn't want prisoners; he wants to kill.*[53]

Looking back at his experience in Vietnam, Marlantes recognizes the
same phenomenon: "This was blood lust. I was moving from white heat to
red heat. The assigned objective, winning the hill, was ensured. I was no
longer thinking how to accomplish my objective with the lowest loss of life
to my side. I just wanted to keep killing gooks."[54] Marlantes is acutely aware
of "the danger of opening up to the rapture of violent transcendence," of
"falling in love with the power and thrill of destruction and death deal-
ing. . . . There is a deep savage joy in destruction. . . . I loved this power. I love
it still. And it scares the hell out of me."[55] Nevertheless, he is quite adamant
that it is "simply not true . . . that all is fair in love and war, that having rules
in war is total nonsense."[56]

Anger, hatred, rage, the sheer pleasure of destruction: these are all
powerful emotions on the battlefield, but they can be governed. The last
one can be refused; the first three can be rendered discriminate and dis-
proportionate. Whether or not they *will* be governed depends crucially on
the military discipline instilled by training, and especially on the quality of
leadership in the field. In support of this, let me close with testimony from
a more recent conflict. Writing about his experience in Helmand Province
in 2008, Lieutenant Patrick Bury of the Royal Irish Regiment wrote this:

*Killing, whatever its form, can be morally corrosive. Mid-intensity
counterinsurgency, with its myriad of complex situations, an enemy
who won't play fair and the constant, enduring feeling of being
under threat, compounds such corrosiveness. . . . [A]t the beginning*

of the tour, it was relatively easy to maintain a sense of morality among the platoon. But when the threat to our lives increased, as the Taliban began fighting increasingly dirty, as the civilians became indifferent and as we were either nearly killed or took casualties, this became increasingly difficult.

There is a balance to be struck between morality and operational effectiveness, between softness and hardness. . . . My platoon sergeant would always strive to keep the soldiers sharp, aggressive, and ready to fight their way out of any situation. . . . However, as a junior officer I felt the need to morally temper what the platoon sergeant had said to the men. . . . I think, in hindsight, this unacknowledged agreement I had with my platoon sergeant worked well. He kept the platoon sharp and ready, "loaded" as it were, and I just made sure the gun didn't go off at the wrong place at the wrong people. . . . The platoon was so well drilled it barely needed me for my tactical acumen. But they did need me for that morality.

Sometimes I felt my own morality begin to slip, that hardness creeping in. Sometimes I thought that I was soft, that my platoon sergeant was right and I should shut up and get on with it. Sometimes I'm sure the platoon felt like that! I was unsure. And at these times my memory would flit back to Sandhurst, to the basics, and I would find renewed vigour [sic] that what I was saying was indeed right. My moral compass, for all its wavering, was still pointing North. And that was the most important lesson I was taught in Sandhurst, and that I learnt in Afghanistan.[57]

So, the sixth and final lesson that military ethics should learn from World War I, supplemented by Vietnam and Afghanistan, is that love *can* walk the battlefield—in the strong form of love for one's comrades, in the weaker form of a sense of fellowship with the enemy, and in the weakest form of disciplined forbearance.

Notes

*Parts of this article first appeared in chapters 2 and 4 of my book, *In Defence of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), and are reprinted here with the kind permission of Oxford University Press.

[1] Richard H. Tawney, "The Attack," in *The Attack and Other Papers* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), 20. "The Attack" was originally published in *The Westminster Gazette* in August 1916.

[2] Consensus about the numbers of British and French casualties in the Battle of the Somme settles around those given by Captain Wilfrid Miles in his contribution to the British official history of the war, which are the ones cited here. See William Philpott, *Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of the 20th Century* (London: Little Brown, 2009), 600. Estimates of the German figures, however, range from 400,000 to 680,000 killed and are the subject of vigorous dispute, since what is at stake is the identity of the victor in the battle of attrition (Philpott, *Bloody Victory*, 600–601); Gary Sheffield, *The Somme* (London: Cassell, 2003), 68, 151.

[3] During the whole of the battle, "the deepest Anglo-French penetration of the German lines was less than six miles." See Martin Gilbert, *Somme: The Heroism and Horror of War* (London: John Murray, 2006), 243.

[4] Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Penguin, 2013), 561.

[5] Ibid., 562.

[6] Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, vol. 1, *To Arms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 91. See also David Stevenson, *1914–1918: The History of the First World War* (London: Penguin, 2004), 30.

[7] Stevenson, *1914–1918*, 29.

[8] Strachan, *First World War*, vol. 1, *To Arms*, 21.

[9] Ibid., 54. According to Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, *Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 54, one expression of social Darwinism that was "widely celebrated" at its publication in 1912 was Friedrich von Bernhardi's *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg*. In it Bernhardi writes, "War is a biological necessity of the first importance. . . . Without war, inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow. . . . Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things." See Friedrich von Bernhardi,

Germany and the Next War, trans. A.H. Powles (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), 10, 12, 15.

[10] It seems that German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg was an independent convert to Darwinist fatalism. As a young man his reading of Ernst Haeckel, Charles Darwin, and David Strauss had undermined his religious-humanist-Aristotelian confidence in basic cosmic harmony and replaced it with a vision of the universe as subject to the eternal struggle of blind forces. See Thomas Lindemann, *Les Doctrines Darwiniennes et la Guerre de 1914*, Hautes Études Militaire (Paris: Institut de Stratégie Comparée & Economica, 2001), 203–204.

[11] At the War Council of December 8, 1912, Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke pressed the view that a European war was inevitable and that, as far as Germany was concerned, the sooner it happened the better. See Strachan, *First World War*, vol. 1, *To Arms*, 52. His advocacy of preventive war prevailed, with the result that "the decision for peace or war was made conditional not on the objectives of policy but on the state of military readiness" (54).

[12] Stevenson, *1914–1918*, 596.

[13] Incidentally, one of the dangers of Christopher Clark's deliberate withdrawal from moral judgment is exposed in an article that appeared in *Die Welt* in January 2014, where three German historians and a journalist invoke Clark's historiography of 1914 as a reason for renouncing the "moralisation" of war and returning to national *Realpolitik*. See Dominik Geert et al., "Warum Deutschland nicht allein schuld ist," *Die Welt*, January 4, 2014, available at <www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article123516387/Warum-Deutschland-nicht-allein-schuld-ist.html>. The fact that social Darwinist *Realpolitik* gave us the Western Front seems to have escaped them. For critical German commentary on both Clark and Geert et al., see Heinrich August Winkler, "Und erlöse uns von der Kriegsschuld," *Die Zeit*, August 18, 2014, available at <www.zeit.de/2014/32/erster-weltkrieg-christopher-clark>.

[14] Stevenson, *1914–1918*, 596. Lest this reading seem like the familiar fruit of traditional British chauvinism, let me invoke one of today's leading German historians of World War I, Gerd Krumreich. A critic of Clark's thesis, Krumreich wrote in *Le Monde* in March 2014 that, while both sides had piled up the gunpowder in the years preceding 1914, it "is incontestable that it was the Germans who set it alight." See Krumreich, "Les deux camps ont rempli la poudrière," *Le Monde*, March 11, 2014, iii.

[15] Stevenson, *1914–1918*, 35.

[16] British anxiety about the Belgian coast was not paranoid; during the Great War the Germans used Belgium as a U-boat base. See Stevenson, *1914–1918*, 147.

[17] C.A.J. Coady, *Morality and Political Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 181.

[18] Ibid., 185n8.

[19] Philpott, *Bloody Victory*, 151.

[20] J.P. Harris, *Douglas Haig and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 197, 259; Philpott, *Bloody Victory*, 361–363.

[21] According to Strachan, artillery was "the true artisan of victory." See *The First World War* (London: Pocket Books, 2006), 307.

[22] Jeremy Black, *Warfare in the Western World, 1882–1975* (Chesham, Northern Ireland: Acumen, 2002), 47; Philpott, *Bloody Victory*, 156, 606.

[23] Philpott, *Bloody Victory*, 130.

[24] Ibid., 129.

[25] Ibid., 346.

[26] Ibid., 597.

[27] Ibid., 628.

[28] G.D. Sheffield, "The Shadow of the Somme: The Influence of the First World War on British Soldiers' Perceptions and Behaviour in the Second World War," in *Time to Kill: The Soldier's Experience of War in the West 1939–1945*, ed. Paul Addison and Angus Calder (London: Pimlico, 1997), 36.

[29] Ibid., 35: "British and Canadian battalions suffered about 100 casualties per month on average on the Western Front in the First World War. In the 1944–1945 northwest European campaign, battalions suffered a minimum of 100 per month but 175 per month was not uncommon. The daily casualty rate of Allied ground forces in Normandy actually exceeded that of the [British Expeditionary Force], including the [Royal Flying Corps], at Passchendaele in 1917."

[30] Coady, *Morality and Political Violence*, 184. Shortly before this passage, he explicitly connects the battle of the Somme with his indictment of military leadership: "Images of the Somme . . . fueled antiwar sentiment as very little before had done; and much of the revulsion and moral outrage sprang from the futility of the trench warfare and the sense that the generals on both sides had too little concern for the human lives committed to their responsibility. . . . Many believed at the time that this war was unjustified, and with the benefit of hindsight, many more believe it now. . . . [M]uch of the rejection of World War I as unjust stems from the wholly intelligible belief that the costs were so disproportionate" (181).

[31] Barrie Pitt, *The Crucible of War*, vol. 1, *Year of Alamein 1942* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), 396–397.

[32] Ibid., 190, 192: "Montgomery's view was the staff were the servants of the troops, and that it was the staff's job to see that whatever objective was given to fighting troops, it was within their capability and that they were provided with everything necessary to achieve it."

[33] At El Alamein, Montgomery instructed his officers to explain to every one of their men, on the eve of battle, the overall plan and the part he was to play in it. Ibid., 282–283.

[34] As it happens, A.J. Coates means by *compassion* largely what I mean by *carefulness*: "the principle of proportionality applies in the first place to the economical and compassionate deployment of one's own troops. . . . It demands economy in the use of force: that commanders should not waste the lives of their own soldiers in the pursuit of unattainable or relatively unimportant military objectives. . . . Compassion is a military as well as a civilian virtue." See Coates, *The Ethics of War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 221, 227. My reservation is not over what Coates means by compassion, but over what the word generally connotes.

[35] Coady, *Morality and Political Violence*, 95.

[36] Winston Churchill, *Great Contemporaries* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1937), 226.

[37] Ibid., 227.

[38] Niall Barr and Gary Sheffield, "Douglas Haig, the Common Soldier, and the British Legion," in *Haig: A Reappraisal Seventy Years On*, ed. Brian Bond and Nigel Cave (London: Leo Cooper, 1999), 226.

[39] Douglas Haig, *War Diaries and Letters, 1914–1918*, ed. Gary Sheffield and John Bourne (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 197 (July 1), 199 (July 4).

[40] Robin Neillands, *The Great War Generals on the Western Front, 1914–1918* (London: Robinson, 1999), 170; Gordon Corrigan, *Mud, Blood, and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War* (London: Cassell, 2003), 205. The report that his hospital visits made Haig "physically sick" Neillands attributes to Haig's own son, whose witness is, arguably, not disinterested; and Corrigan's report of Haig's staff officers persuading him to cease visiting I have not been able to corroborate. Nevertheless, what they claim is consistent with my reading of Haig's diaries (as edited by Sheffield and Bourne), where I found mention of visits to field hospitals and a main dressing station in the entries for July 1 and 4, 1916, but none thereafter.

[41] Barr and Sheffield, "Douglas Haig," 230.

[42] Harris, *Haig*, 537.

[43] Ibid., 537.

[44] Ibid., 539–540, 545–546. While Sheffield qualifies Harris's judgment, he does not disagree with it. See Sheffield, *The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army* (London: Aurum, 2011), 163, 174, 175, 369, 374.

[45] Harris, *Haig*, 538–539. Again, Sheffield qualifies, rather than refutes, Harris's argument (*The Chief*, 180, 375).

[46] Robert L. Holmes, *On War and Morality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 133–134, 135.

[47] J. Glenn Gray, *The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle*, intro. Hannah Arendt (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 135.

[48] Richard H. Tawney, "Some Reflections of a Soldier," in *"The Attack" and Other Papers* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), 25, 27.

[49] Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare* (London: Granta, 1999), 148, quoting Gerald V. Dennis, "A Kitchener Man's Bit (1916–1918)," 1928, 129, Imperial War Museum.

[50] Ernest Raymond, *The Story of My Days: An Autobiography 1882–1922* (London: Cassell, 1968), 120, quoted by Richard Harries in "The De-romanticisation of War and the Struggle for Faith," in *The Straits of War: Gallipoli Remembered*, intro. Martin Gilbert (Stroud, UK: Sutton, 2000), 190–191.

[51] Karl Marlantes, *What It Is Like to Go to War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2011), 62.

[52] Wilfred Owen, Letter 662, to Susan Owen, 4 or 5 October 1918, in *Collected Letters*, ed. Harold Owen and John Bell (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 580. The irregular capitalization is Owen's.

[53] Ernst Jünger, *Storm of Steel*, trans. Michael Hoffman (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 232, 239.

[54] Marlantes, *What It Is Like to Go to War*, 103.

[55] Ibid., 61, 63, 67, 160.

[56] Ibid., 228.

[57] Lieutenant Paddy Bury, "Pointing North," unpublished paper, May 2009. Bury instances the demoralization that poor leadership allows to develop in *Callsign Hades* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 117, 233: "I can't trust some of that platoon to make the right decisions. Some of them are fully aware that down here they are indeed deities of their own little universes. . . . Much of it is down to leadership. . . . It feels like the platoon commander lost the respect of his platoon months ago. It was the little things that added up, the little things he didn't do."

Grim Virtue: Decisiveness as an Implication of the Just War Tradition

By Marc LiVecche

> *I do not slay man or beast needlessly, and not gladly even when it is needed. . . . War must be while we defend our lives against a destroyer who would devour all. But I do not love the bright sword for its sharpness, nor the arrow for its swiftness, nor the warrior for his glory. I love only that which they defend.*[1]

So proclaims J.R.R. Tolkien's Faramir, second son of Denethor, brother of Boromir, captain of the rangers of Ithilien, and later captain of the white tower when his brother falls. Faramir makes this assertion in a moment of great peril, in the midst of conflict, when he is given an opportunity to do a terrible thing in order to bring about a great good. He does not do it, and his proclamation, above, as to *why* he does not provides a tidy summary of the core of the just war framework, which could be rendered thus: Wars may be justly fought only in the last resort and for the aim of peace, when a sovereign authority—over whom there is no one greater charged with the care of the political community—determines that nothing else will properly

retribute a sufficiently grave evil, take back what has been wrongly taken, or protect the innocent. In such cases, and only such, force may be rightly deployed to restore justice, order, and peace.

While it took its more recognizable form only in the Middle Ages, what we know as the just war tradition evolved over a long expanse of religious and secular thinking about the moral use of force within the context of responsible government of the political community. The tradition's early roots rest in the intellectual loam of classical Greco-Roman political thought and practice and deeper down into the more ancient earth of the Hebrew world and scriptures.[2]

The tradition's more specifically Christian expression is found, if somewhat latently, in St. Ambrose and his student St. Augustine of Hippo. While Augustine is widely regarded as the father of Christian just war thinking, the tradition's systematic character would not emerge until the 12th century and, particularly, with St. Thomas Aquinas in the latter part of the 13th century.

My whole point in this summary is to signal that the tradition of just war thinking has been a developing one; it did not land ready-made. Instead, while a basic framework was established early, the just war tradition represents the Christian faithful—and others—standing in ancient streams of thought, harnessing, refining, and renewing the moral patrimony of Christian intelligence in order to think more properly about war, peace, sovereign responsibility, the common good, love of neighbor, and much else.

Of course, the fact that the human practice of morally reflecting about war is an ancient practice only proves that war is ubiquitous in human history. Nevertheless, as this volume makes plain, World War I—the human cataclysm of 1914–1918—in some ways shoved humanity into a new era. Here we are, a hundred years on, still striving to compel 21st-century moral reflection to account for 20th-century history—beginning with the Great War and the advent of modern, mechanized industrial warfare.

I mean to reflect a bit more on the just war tradition itself and, through that, to tease out what I take to be two rather grim—though

virtuous—implications of just war moral reflection: namely, the necessity of decisiveness and callousness. I will suggest that it is because justly fought wars ought to be fought decisively that those who fight them will need a degree of callousness. Nigel Biggar's chapter in this volume discusses callousness, and, while I take some of my bearings from his work, I hope to survey some new terrain as well. In any case, I am willing to risk some repetition because I think Biggar's suggestion about the necessity of callousness is important enough to bear repeating. I trust what follows will prove this suspicion sound.

Everything I assert hinges on the fact that the just war tradition in which I stand has as its central commitment the Dominical command "to love" our neighbor. This is exemplified in Thomas Aquinas, whose discussion of war in his great masterwork the *Summa Theologica* takes place in the midst of his discussion of love.[3] St. Paul does something similar in his letter to the Romans.[4]

This love command is not an option; it is an absolute mandate. But because of the conditions of this world and the human soul, it is not always clear precisely how it is we are to love our neighbor. For instance, how do we love one neighbor when he is unjustly kicking in the face of another neighbor—who we are also called to love? If the first neighbor—let's call him the enemy-neighbor—refuses to stop his kicking and our victim-neighbor is unable defend himself, then we cannot love *both* neighbors in precisely the same way. But the question is never *whether* to love one or the other, but what does loving both, individually, look like *now,* in this moment? The just war tradition provides guidance in how we are to love, in conflict situations, both our enemy-neighbor as well as our victim-neighbor.

A brief review of the tradition's criteria is helpful. There are, of course, two sets of related guidelines. The first tells us about when to fight, and the second about how to fight.

The jus ad bellum criteria, answering the question about when it is justified to go to war, gives us three conditions that need to be met: proper authority, just cause, and right intention. These, not by accident, map onto

what Augustine asserted were the chief political goods of order, justice, and peace. These are political goods without which other goods—like health or life—are imperiled.

The necessity of *proper authority* underlines the necessity of order and, therefore, of ruling authorities to meet their divinely appointed responsibilities. On that dark day when the planes hit the Twin Towers in September 2001, the late political ethicist Jean Elshtain remarked to a friend, "Now we are reminded what governments are for." Elshtain was gesturing to the assertion that the most basic task of government is to provide for the care of the political community. The just war tradition helps orient a sovereign toward the proper exercise of his vocation.

The second condition that must be present before going to war is a *just cause*, which maps to the political necessity of justice. Classically, there are three just causes: the protection of the innocent, the taking back of what has been wrongly taken, and the punishing of evil. Each, in different ways, provide for both the vindication of victims as well as the restraint of the enemy and the incapacitation of his ability to continue his injustice.

The final condition of *right intention* aims at being sure that motives are pointed toward the proper end of war. This intention can be conveyed in both negative and positive terms. Negatively, we are reminded of what we ought always to avoid: hatred, desire to see the enemy suffer per se, cruelty, a lust for power over others, and the like.[5] Positively, right intention reminds us that the properly desired end of war ought always to be peace.

This peace is desired, in the first place, for the innocent victims under unjust assault. But, in the second place, this desire for peace extends to the enemy as well—toward the restoration of the enemy into the fellowship of peace. You cannot reconcile with someone who has not seen the error of his ways, repented, and given you solid reasons to trust that he will not seek to harm you again. There is much more to say about this, and some of it will be said in a moment. For now, suffice it to summarize the point this way: right intention, properly understood, casts warmaking as peacemaking. It stresses that just war is the initiation of the process of forgiveness.[6]

The second set of guidelines instructs us in how to prosecute a just war. There are two primary requirements. The first mandates *discrimination* separating combatants and noncombatants and allows for the intentional targeting of the former only. The second, *proportionality*, argues that the amount of force and means of expenditure employed should be appropriate to the intended task.

In sum, the primary aim of the just war framework is to show us when and how to love our neighbor through rescuing him: whether our victim-neighbor under assault, who needs deliverance from his assailant, or our enemy-neighbor, who needs to be rescued from the evils of his own wrong-doing. The rescue in both cases is aimed at the flourishing of our neighbor. In both cases the prize is peace. Now, with that in hand, let's get historical.

On October 30, 1918, General John J. Pershing, the commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, gave a letter to the Allied Supreme War Council. The council was meeting to discuss the terms of armistice with Germany. Pershing's letter argued that the Allies should refuse to grant Germany any terms and that they should instead press their attack against the Kaiser without quarter. Oddly—and of continued historical dispute—this appeared to contradict Pershing's view from 5 days earlier.

On October 25, Pershing had attended a conference of Allied commanders to discuss the cessation of fighting. He apparently gave no indication that he was opposed to the idea. But he did have particular views as to the character of a truce. He asserted that "If Germany was really sincere in its desire to end the war, then neither the German government nor the German people should object to strict conditions." Because of the extraordinary carnage of the war, Pershing suggested "there should be no tendency toward leniency with Germany."[7]

The terms he listed included the German withdrawal from Allied territory and Alsace-Lorraine. This retreat was to be accomplished at a pace so rapid that the evacuation could only be done in chaos. Pershing wanted to force what would clearly be a full retreat; there could be no capacity for an ordered repositioning. The Allies would then occupy the departed territory,

as well as the Rhineland and bridgeheads across the Rhine. Pershing further demanded the freedom to continue to transport American troops overseas, the return of French and Belgian railroad equipment, and the surrender of all U-boats and U-boat bases to a neutral power until such time as the treaty could determine their fate.

All this points to Pershing's insistence that "the armistice should provide a guarantee against resumption of hostilities" and, if Germany *did* become aggressive again, then the terms would give the Allies an absolute advantage over a resurgent Germany.[8]

It is important to understand that Pershing genuinely believed the Allied position to be strong; therefore, the conditions they imposed should not be light. This carries a presumed corollary: the German position must be weak; therefore, they should not hesitate to accept even harsh conditions. So, all this was a kind of test. Should Germany refuse to accept harsh—though just—conditions, it could only mean that Germany did not, itself, believe its position to be weak and the Allied position strong.

President Woodrow Wilson worried that Pershing's terms were harsh to the point of being humiliating to Germany. He accepted only the commander's suggestion regarding the German evacuation of Allied lands—though without the speed requirement—and a qualified version of the U-boat ultimatum—under Wilson's terms, Germany should intern the U-boats in neutral waters, but it need not surrender them; and he did not threaten their future status. It was only after Wilson's general dismissal of Pershing's suggestions that the general sent his missive of October 30 arguing that no armistice whatsoever be given.

There are a great many details to all of this that would need to be evaluated before arriving at any firm conclusion as to precisely what Pershing was up to. I am going to leave resolute explanations to the historians. But I do want to assert one thing that does seem perfectly clear about Pershing's intentions. I will then evaluate that intention through the just war lens.

But first a basic assumption: both Wilson and Pershing wanted an armistice, and both agreed that this must involve a German surrender.

However, for Pershing this meant an *utter* surrender. His proposal was intended to confirm and safeguard the Allied victory. Wilson's proposal would not destroy the military potential of Germany. For instance, the Germans could still back and secure a defensive perimeter. That is to say, they could preserve the ability to fight again. Wilson appeared content to accept a Germany strong enough to negotiate terms. Pershing, it seems clear, wanted to impose peace terms on a Germany that knew—*knew*—that it had been beaten, and that therefore could not refuse terms.

Pershing's aspirations would go unrealized. At 11 a.m. on the 11th day of the 11th month, the Great War—after some 4 years, 3 months, 7 days, and 16 million lives—was over.

While Pershing was glad the shooting had stopped, he continued to insist the armistice was a mistake. "We shouldn't have done it," he stated. "If they had given us another ten days we would have rounded up the entire German army, captured it, humiliated it."[9] Some have attributed this attitude to Pershing's unrelenting competitive nature—or to ambitions for a Presidential run. I suspect that a more satisfying explanation is found elsewhere. Pershing also stated, revealingly, the "German troops today are marching back into Germany announcing that they have never been defeated. . . . What I dread is that Germany doesn't know that she was licked. . . . Had they given us another week, we'd have taught them."[10] Pershing believed that a premature "cessation of hostilities short of capitulation postpones, if it does not render impossible, the imposition of satisfactory peace terms."[11] Pershing was looking for a decisive victory that would lead to a durable peace.

How does the just war tradition evaluate such an ambition? On the surface, there seem to be at least two immediate problems. One, recall that the right intention—the aim of war—is peace. Is it not clear that if peace is being offered, then peace should be accepted? Job done, correct? The aim has been achieved; there is no more just cause. Two, if peace is being offered, does it not become disproportionate to continue fighting? If the objective has been gained, further force is simply gratuitous. I will take these in turn.

The question of peace: was it really nearly at hand? It pays to revisit Augustine, for whom war was a sometimes morally appropriate—if always tragic—necessity for the maintenance of a peace defined by the presence of justice and order. Ultimately, this is the only kind of peace durable enough to hold firm against the conditions of the world. For *Augustine* to say this, it seems to me, is really to be saying something. Remember, Augustine was not talking about the eschatological peace of *shalom*—that blessed state of comprehensive welfare in which everything is as it really ought to be. He was talking about the peace of the *Pax Romana*—compelled peace.

Nevertheless, however tawdry an imitation of the goodness of shalom, however much lacking in appropriate degrees of justice, the Pax Romana was significant. More than any available alternative, it appeared best capable of keeping neighbor from eating neighbor, and of preserving the interconnected web of culture, civilization, art, and tradition that, by Augustine's time, was well in jeopardy. The approximate good of compelled peace is more often than not a far sight better than anarchy.

Much better still, of course, is Augustine's notion of the *tranquilitas ordinis*, the tranquility—the peace—of order. Such peace, rooted in justice, is not externally compelled but rather internally coaxed by love of God and neighbor. This peace, Augustine tells us, is born of a commitment that "one be at peace, as far as lies in him, with all men." The basis of this commitment is the "observation of two rules: first, do no harm to anyone, and, secondly, to help everyone whenever possible."[12] Of course, the pursuit of this kind of peace, in our world, must be accompanied by a modesty of expectation. It will not result in the "perfect peace" promised to believers in the Kingdom of God, the one in which the lion lies down with the lamb. Instead, we must remember, as Elshtain liked to remind us, that if the lamb rests against the lion in *this* world, the lamb will need to frequently be replaced.

Pershing did not, of course, believe that by marching on Berlin love would suddenly spread across the battlefield, or that Germany would suddenly come awash with the inner tranquility of uncompelled order. But neither, more basically, was he confident that Wilson's terms, without the

imposition of order, would sufficiently deter Germany from attempting to eat its neighbors again.

In pressing for conditions in which the German people should know they had been licked, Pershing recognized that a beaten enemy is more easily compelled toward a durable peace. A decisive victory, having taken the fight out of the enemy, allows for a more realistic hope than a weak armistice that the matter has truly been settled and that the contest will not have to play out again.[13] The simple fact that someone is *not* shooting at you does not mean he does not *want* to or that he *will not* if given half a chance. Peace is more than the absence of open conflict.

As it turns out, history sides with Pershing. Despite its surrender, Germany did not appear exactly convinced that it had really lost the war. On Armistice Day, to cite one example, General Karl Von Einem, commander of the German 3rd Army, announced to his troops, "Firing has ceased. . . . Undefeated! You are terminating a war in enemy country."[14] He was not being entirely revisionist. When Germany surrendered, its armies were indeed on French and Belgian land—it still held enemy ground. On the Eastern Front, Germany had already won the war against Russia and concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In the west, it had come within close reach of winning the war entirely with the 1918 Spring Offensive. Importantly, German propaganda led—or, rather, *mis*led—the German people back home into believing they were winning the contest abroad. Pershing's fear that Germany's martial spirit had not been broken seemed legitimate.

The Treaty of Versailles would do little to change this. It left Germany neither pacified nor conciliated nor weakened beyond recovery. This inability to reconcile the apparent facts on the ground with the fact that it had surrendered left Germans grasping for an explanation. Alas, to terrible consequence, they would find one.

In the autumn of 1919, Sir Neill Malcolm, the head of the British Military Mission in Germany, was dining with German Chief of Staff General Erich Ludendorff. Malcolm asked Ludendorff why he thought Germany had lost the war. Ludendorff gave a laundry list of excuses but stressed that

the homefront had failed the army. For clarification Malcolm asked, "Do you mean, General, that you were stabbed in the back?" We are told that Ludendorff's eyes lit up and that he leapt on the idea like a dog on a bone. "Yes! That's it exactly. We were stabbed in the back!"[15]

Just how pernicious this myth of the stab in the back would prove—morally and practically—became clear a scant decade later. Adolf Hitler found the cultural and political conditions ripe for his vindication of the German people through his toxic cocktail of blood-and-soil nationalism, scapegoating, and insatiable expansionism. In its wake were set the conditions for a new and terrible conflagration. The lamps would soon go out all over Europe again. But everything else would be burning.

The Treaty of Versailles did not yield a durable peace. It did not prove the Allied victory decisive. Therefore, Pershing was correct to reject it, and he could do so without violating the principle of right intention. To the second point, by stressing that the right intention principle is not seeking simply *any* peace, but only one that sufficiently approximates a rightly ordered political community, both within and among nations, I suggest that Pershing's push to defeat Germany in the field even after it sued for peace is not a violation of proportionality.

It is a mistake to conceive of proportionality as having economy of effort or restraint as its basic imperative. It is true that combatants are required to employ only as much force as is necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives and as is proportionate to the importance of those objectives. The just warrior must be neither gratuitous nor excessive. So if the basic imperative of proportionality is not restraint, what is it? I propose it is the deployment of that amount of force sufficient for a decisive victory aimed at a durable peace.

In this rather exploratory section, I have tried to present a description of the just war tradition that has as its chief aim the acquisition of an enduring, enforceable peace characterized by the presence of justice and order. In looking at the example of General Pershing, I have suggested that one implication of the just war tradition is the necessity of decisiveness

in war. If it is just to fight a war, it is just to fight to win it. Indeed, in light of right intention and neighbor love, this is something more than a mere allowance—it is a mandate.

In this centennial year of the end of Great War, it is a tragedy that we can look 2 years ahead to what will be the 75th anniversary year of the war that followed the war that was supposed to have to ended all wars. We had World War II because the first one did not settle things. Toward the end of his life, it must have been unimaginably grievous to Pershing that all the battlefields his army had occupied in 1917–1918 were again in possession of the enemy against whom it had fought and driven off the land at such staggering costs.

Of course, it is one thing to say, in principle, that when just wars ought to be fought, they ought to be fought in order to win. It is another thing entirely and practically to fight them that way. When the guns of the Nation discharge—even in the cause of justice, order, and peace—someone has to pull the trigger. In light of the advent of new understandings of moral injury, we recognize—and must account for—the cost of trigger pulling.

If Pershing had had his way, the costs of a decisive victory would surely have been great. An Allied march on Germany would have added, probably enormously, to the already inflated butcher's bill. Some of those costs would have been paid in Allied lives. But if one is justly fighting a just war decisively and with the aim of a true and durable peace, then it seems plausible for a commander to pay this bill, to spend the lives of his men, to quote Biggar again, without ever having wasted them. Nevertheless, as Biggar mentions, so sending your own men to their potential death requires a certain thickening of one's skin. Such callousness allows the difficult deed to be done.

But it is not only the costs in lives of one's own warfighters that carry a heavy burden and epidermal challenges. I want to touch briefly on the cultivation of callousness as a kind of martial virtue in view of adding to the enemy dead. I realize this might not sound promising. I dug around for an alternative term to *callousness*—which I agree seems grim—but I ended up

settling on *dehumanization*. I doubt this is precisely the spoonful of sugar needed to help the medicine go down.

Let me draw on a paper by two Jewish anthropologists who analyzed Israeli military snipers serving during the Second, or Al-Aqsa, Intifada of 2000–2005. The paper examines, and ultimately challenges, the prevalent assumption among scholars that in order to go about the business of sniping other human beings, one has to somehow dehumanize—to objectify or demonize to the point of refusing the humanity of—their enemies.[16]

Snipers are an interesting case due to their somewhat unique status among warfighters. While occupying a battlespace unlike either combat aviators or the infantry, snipers nevertheless share characteristics of both. They closely combine an aviator's distance-from-the-enemy with a boots-on-the-ground empirical awareness of the effects of their shooting—often with an even amplified clarity because, despite the range, there is no question as to exactly who is responsible for the corpse in the road. Just as importantly, the sniper's lethal task is most often not carried out in a miasma of physical exertion, situational chaos, and danger to life and limb out of which lethal action is assisted by the passion of combat. Instead, snipers often operate from a state of composure, situational awareness, intense emotional concentration, and determination—all intimately focused on a personal target.[17]

As with their medical counterparts, military professionals such as snipers must use an array of technologies to navigate the moral difficulty of their tasks. By technology, I simply mean any kind of craftlike knowledge, or *technê*, such as methods or devices, used to overcome practical problems. Here I want to enlist—or commission—one such technê: the four "images of the enemy" found in J. Glenn Gray's classic *The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle*.[18]

On the same day in May of 1941, Gray received two letters in the mail. The first was from Columbia University, informing him that he had been granted a doctorate in philosophy. The second letter ordered him to report for induction into the Army. Entering as a private, Gray became a special

agent with the Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps and served in both the North African and European theaters. He would be discharged as a second lieutenant in 1945, having received a battlefield commission during fighting in France. *The Warriors* is Gray's unromanticized meditation on what war does to human beings and why warfighters act the way they do.

In Gray's typology, these "images of the enemy" are "ideal types" describing the common attitudes warfighters have toward those against whom they contend. The first image is of the enemy as a "comrade in arms" against whom one may use all destructive force necessary while he is still in the fight, but to whom we give the respect owed to any skilled professional who is simply doing his job. The second is that of the enemy as "totally evil" against whom our crusade must be absolute. The third image conceives the enemy as "a creature who is not human at all." Against such loathsome enemy-beasts, the warrior is freed in his lethal force from even remorse, let alone restraint. In the last image, the enemy is considered to be just another poor chump like any other—an "essentially decent man who is either temporarily misguided by false doctrines or forced to make war against his better will and desire."[19]

Clearly, some of these images conform closer to just war prescriptions than others. The image of the enemy as unadulterated evil or a subhuman animal comports hardly at all. Rather, these images call to mind Gray's observation that "most soldiers are able to kill and be killed more easily in warfare if they possess an image of the enemy sufficiently evil to inspire hatred and repugnance."[20] On the other hand, the images of the enemy as a peer professional or a generally decent person make the task of having to kill profoundly difficult. Gray writes:

> *It is nearly impossible for a combat soldier to prepare himself psychologically for bloody combat with a will to victory while holding such an image of his foe. How can he become enthusiastic about Operation Killer or look forward with eagerness to carrying out a superior's orders to close with the enemy? The war itself is more*

likely to seem the greatest folly and criminality ever perpetrated. If he kills, he is troubled in conscience.[21]

If this is correct, we have a problem, or rather a crisis. We see it manifest in the large number of psychiatric battle casualties suffered during combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, throughout history, combat veterans have staggered home suffering not necessarily from physical injuries—at least as classically perceived—but wounded all the same. I have in mind here what I mentioned briefly above: "moral injury"—a proposed, if controversial, subset of post(combat) traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Following clinical interaction with Vietnam veterans, Veterans Affairs psychiatrist Jonathan Shay began to recognize that many veterans all too often suffer symptoms atypical to their PTSD diagnosis. Instead of, or in addition to, the paranoia, hyper-vigilance, and other responses typical to life-threatening ordeals, many veterans anguish over what Shay termed *soul wounds*—crippling degrees of guilt, shame, sorrow, or remorse.[22] This pointed to something new.

Over time, and through the corroborating work of other clinicians, moral injury has come to signify the harm that comes from committing, failing to prevent, or witnessing acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs. It has become increasingly clear that while psychic wounds occur, appropriately enough, after atrocities—intended or accidental—warfighters are suffering moral injury from having performed the most basic business of war: killing a lawful enemy under conditions cohering with the rules of armed conflict and commensurate with the dictates of reason and natural law.

As I have argued elsewhere, I believe much of this is owed to a diminished confidence in the West—especially the Christian West—that love can be compatible with the use of force.[23] This slide toward an increasingly maudlin view of love has been taking place for some time. In his own day, the Oxford don C.S. Lewis observed that we mistakenly conflate "love" with "kindness," which he termed as "the desire to see others than the self happy; not happy in this way or in that, but just happy."[24] Believing that

one cannot both restrain another's actions *and* will his happiness, love has come to mean the antithesis of judgment and coercive power. One upshot of this is that too many people, including too many in uniform, now believe that killing is, and always is, *malum in se*—morally wrong in and of itself, even when morally required. We see this, if we look for it, in one combat memoir after another. It presents itself in some form of the locution: "I know that killing is wrong, but in war it is necessary." Thus, the very business of warfighting is rendered inevitably morally injurious.

This is not simply a theological or conceptual crisis. Clinical experience has shown that having killed in battle is the chief predictor of moral injury among combat veterans. In turn, moral injury has been shown to be the chief predictor of suicide among veterans. In those cases falling short of self-slaughter, moral injury is the chief predictor of functional impairments, violent behavior, substance abuse, marital and other relational difficulties, unnecessary risk-taking, and depression.

This brings to mind combat veteran Karl Marlantes's lament in *What It Is Like to Go to War*, his memoir of his service in Vietnam. "The violence of combat assaults psyches, confuses ethics, and tests souls," he writes. "This is not only a result of the violence suffered, it is also a result of the violence inflicted."[25]

Illustrating this, Marlantes recounts a fierce assault he led up a steep hill laced with interconnecting fighting positions. From one of the positions above, a Vietnamese soldier kept dropping grenades blindly down on him and his team. Knowing it was only a matter of time before one of the explosions killed them both, Marlantes's buddy pinned down the soldier with a grenade toss of his own while Marlantes quickly maneuvered into a flanking position. In place, he settled the stock of his weapon into his shoulder and waited for the enemy soldier to pop up again. Marlantes writes:

Then he rose, grenade in hand. He was pulling the fuse. I could see blood running down his face from a head wound. He cocked his arm back to throw—and then he saw me looking at him across my

rifle barrel. He stopped. He looked right at me. That's where the image of his eyes was burned into my brain forever, right over the sights of my M-16. I remember hoping he wouldn't throw his grenade. Maybe he'd throw it aside and raise his hands or something and I wouldn't have to shoot him. But his lips snarled back and he threw it right at me.[26]

As the grenade left his hand, Marlantes fired. The soldier died, and the grenade detonated harmlessly. When Marlantes asks himself what he felt then, he answers, "pleasure and satisfaction—he was alive! That felt good. Relief, no more grenades! Another obstacle was out of the way; that felt good too." But, he admits, "it also felt just plain pleasurable to blast him. . . . There is a primitive and savage joy in doing in your enemy."[27]

Now, however, he feels differently. Now he has the time to imagine the North Vietnamese soldier as one of his own sons. He sees him trapped, filled with fear as he battles against these huge Americans who charge "relentlessly from out of the jungle, swarming up the hill, killing his friends in their holes around him." In his sensitized state, Marlantes envisions the boy's final moments: wounded, knowing that "death is coming in a crummy little hole hundreds of miles from his family, and he has never made love to a woman and he will never know the joys and trials of a family of his own." Marlantes asks, "My feelings now? Oh, the sadness. The sadness. And, oh, the grief of evil in the world to which I contributed."[28] He continues:

What is different between then and now is quite simply empathy. I can take the time, and I have the motivation, to actually feel what I did to another human being who was in a great many ways just like my own son. Back then I was operating under some sort of psychological mechanism that allowed me to think of that teenager as "the enemy." I killed him . . . and . . . moved on. I doubt I could have killed him realizing he was like my own son. I'd have fallen apart. This very likely would have led to my own death or the deaths of those I was leading.[29]

Gray's four images reflect a larger practice of creating various kinds of distance between an agent performing a difficult, sometimes harmful action and the object of that action. What I want to do is focus on dehumanization as a primary distancing technique, especially in combat, and to then suggest that dehumanization is both not as morally disturbing as it might immediately appear and, in any case, not as inevitable among warfighters as immediately assumed.[30]

Moral agents across a spectrum of circumstances find themselves cultivating distance between themselves as subjects and the object against whom they are acting. Sometimes this distancing is a psychological mechanism by which individuals overcome social conditioning that prevents them from becoming perpetrators of atrocities. Dehumanization, for example, "draws on other defense mechanisms, including unconscious denial, repression, depersonalization, isolation of affect and compartmentalization . . . [and] . . . allows the perpetrator to go beyond hatred and anger, and commit atrocious acts as if they were part of everyday life."[31] Marlantes describes this process as *pseudospeciation*, the "disassociation of one's enemy from humanity." He writes, "You make a false species out of the other human and therefore make it easier to kill him."[32] This should call to mind Gray's typologies.

But dehumanization, while always potentially dangerous, need not be malignant. At its benign core, dehumanization is simply a psychoanalytic defense mechanism allowing agents to avoid fully processing troubling events: "Sometimes dehumanization can be adaptive; for example, in a crisis, dehumanization of the injured or sick allows for an efficient rescue. Certain occupations classically teach and perhaps require selective dehumanization, including law enforcement and the military and medical professions."[33]

While it is the military profession that is of primary interest to me, to note the prevalence of distancing techniques within the medical profession may serve to provide a useful analogue, less emotionally charged than killing in war, by which we can suggest the existence of a morally neutral, and carefully delimited, species of dehumanization that we can then reinsert into our martial context.

It is widely understood that medical professionals necessarily employ coping mechanisms to insulate them from what they are actually doing. For instance, the role language plays in coping with discomfort is evident in the tactic of *medicalization*, or the use of overly technical language by which healthcare providers view patients not as hurting human beings but only in terms of their medical status or diagnosis—for example, referring to a patient by his surgical procedure, such as "the bowel resection in Room 2" or simply as "cases."[34] Language is also routed through euphemism to speak about uncomfortable situations: a dying patient may be referred to simply as "boxed," or other terms that mask the uncomfortable reality.[35] Since feeling the pain of every patient would overwhelm a doctor, physicians may morally disengage when having to cause necessary pain—such as when setting a bone. It is also seen in the operating room in which surgeons reduce a patient's body to a "field of operation" around which are arrayed marked-off sections and curtain covers. While these serve to help ensure sterility, they have a dual function in creating a visual disfigurement of the body's *gestalt*. Around the planned incision area, the flesh is brushed with disinfectant, coloring the skin in an alien orange-brown rust. Additional practices follow, by the sum of which the patient effectively vanishes from the surgeon's view.[36] Numbing, humor, anger, euphemism—each is a distancing technique employed by medical professionals.

In the martial realm, dehumanization can rely on mechanisms such as racial and ethnic distance, assertions of moral superiority, and social stratification. To this, David Grossman—an expert on the psychology of killing—adds the dimension of mechanical distance, which includes the videogame-like unreality of killing on computer screens, through a thermal sight, sniper sight, or other mechanical buffer permitting the killer to dispense with empathy toward the enemy and thereby deny the humanity of his victim.[37] Certain linguistic technologies further collaborate to cultivate distance. Our Israeli snipers might blur the clarity of what they are doing by referring to killing as "neutralizing," "cleaning up," "surgical action," or "focused assassination."[38] Nevertheless, the

snipers appear to remain aware of the linguistic ploy. One specifically acknowledges the process:

> *From my view, I have a target, an object that is now carrying out*
> *certain actions that threaten the force I am working with. And the*
> *object is the enemy. And I neutralized* [him] . . . *Sometimes when*
> *I say "neutralized" it's like Freud, it's a sort of repression. Listen,*
> *I know what I am doing and believe in what I am doing. . . . But*
> *try to disengage from the fact that this is a human being and it*
> *becomes an object that is shooting and threatening the situation. I*
> *neutralized him and he no longer does what he does and won't do*
> *it in the future.*[39]

Closer to home, in his autobiography *American Sniper*, Chris Kyle, the late Navy SEAL operator who garnered both wide public celebration and vilification, may have sometimes employed distancing euphemisms like "hit," "took out," or "dropped" to describe taking a shot, but he far more often, by my own count, simply wrote "kill."[40]

Similarly, shifting to a related trope, Israeli snipers, while often referring to enemy personnel as a "terrorist," "target," "Arab," or simply "armed person," no less commonly used the designation "human being" (*ben-adam,* literally "Son of Adam").[41] This corresponds with the sniper study's overall findings: dehumanization, while objectifying, was generally unaccompanied by demonization of the enemy. What I take this to demonstrate is that while objectification obtains as a self-protecting measure, enemies are not generally perceived, themselves, in terms of personified evil, so emotions of hate and disgust are not usually created. These last observations seem crucial. As with the medical profession, it appears within the martial vocation that the object of one's harmful actions can undergo a certain degree of objectification—genuine dehumanization—without, finally, being denied his due humanity. Just as the surgeon knows that beneath the orange-brown disinfected surface is human skin, that amid the cloth partitions, drapery, dressings,

instruments, tubes, and all the assorted medical equipment there lays, in the surgeon's good care, a human being, so, too, it is at least possible, if not altogether prevalent, for warfighters to understand, all objectification and obfuscation aside, that captured within their crosshairs is an adversary who is a Son of Adam as well.

From this we might draw several conclusions. First, it must be wrong to refer to dehumanization strictly in the pejorative. For certain, distancing oneself from the object of one's action does not mean the object is not loved, not cared for, or necessarily disrespected. In fact, the very need to dehumanize strongly suggests that the object is perceived precisely as a human being of some value—otherwise, the dehumanization would not be necessary. Moreover, second, the very fact that one dehumanizes the object of his action does not prove the action itself to be wrong; it only proves that the action is hard, that it bears moral gravity.

This suggests that the casual assumption that distancing or dehumanization is morally reprehensible requires greater nuance. The surgeon, like the warfighter, knows that on occasion a hard thing has to be done to prevent the advent of an even harder thing. The surgeon also knows, as at least a *just* warfighter ought also to know, that the hard thing is not simply necessary but, very often, morally right—therefore morally obligatory. It is clear, it seems, to medical professionals that they are not performing "lesser evils" but rather the greatest *possible* good. Military professionals employ essentially the same techniques to equip themselves with the moral insulation to do the hard but necessary and moral thing.

I want to see if I can press this a bit further. Can one love *while* fighting his enemy? Let's first consider a scene from Gray in which he recalls the experience of advancing with the Allied front across France. He notes the strangeness, sitting in a hotel room, of writing in his notebook by the light of a German candle. Hurriedly fleeing the enemy advance, the Germans abandoned an array of food and equipment, which subsequently sustained and benefited their pursuers. Gray notices the humanizing elements of this arrangement: sheets that only a few nights ago comforted Germans are

now slumbered on by Americans. Writing desks at which sat the enemy—possibly writing letters to friends or family in the Fatherland—now give support to writers of homeward-bound letters in English. This sense of intimate connection grows, and Gray wonders if the German who slept in what is now his own room was the same German whom he earlier spotted dead alongside the road. That German corpse was notable in that it was lying with hands folded neatly over the chest, one of the few corpses, Gray remarks, that did not look altogether horrible. An accompanying French officer noted the corpse and commented, "I'd like to see them all this way." One wonders if the Frenchman means he would like to see all his German enemies dead or, more likely given the reverie's tone, that he would prefer to see all corpses so pleasantly arrayed.

It strikes me as clear that what Gray is experiencing is empathetic love for his enemy. Regardless, the sense of intimacy with one's adversary casts a jarring discordance with what follows. Gray writes, "The basic aim of a nation at war in establishing an image of the enemy is to distinguish as sharply as possible the act of killing from the act of murder by making the former into one deserving of all honor and praise." Gray continues, "Most soldiers are able to kill and be killed more easily in warfare if they possess an image of the enemy sufficiently evil to inspire hatred and repugnance. Thus, the typical image of the enemy is conditioned by the need to hate him without limits."[42]

Perhaps. But I do not think so. And neither, by the way, I think, does Marlantes. Let's conclude by returning to him and that hillside in Vietnam. Remember that Marlantes contends that had he been aware of his love for that Vietnamese boy then, in the midst of combat, he never would have been able to kill him. But, if I might suggest, Marlantes's own testimony appears to stand against his claim. Recall that after he and that boy locked eyes over the sights of his M-16, Marlantes hesitated. He hesitated long enough to hope the kid would not throw the grenade, that he might, instead, simply toss it harmlessly aside and raise his hands "or something," and he would not need to be shot.

What is that about? What is that silly, foolish, naïve, hoping-against-any-reason-to-hope hope in the midst of combat? It is desiring that he might not have to do the terrible, and terribly necessary thing when that necessary thing means bringing harm to the human being positioned against him. In this "interval of hesitation"—that luminous moment in the midst of raw, red, flesh-hewn conflict—Marlantes encountered a *fifth* image of the enemy: the enemy as *neighbor*. What is that? By my lights, that is love.

And then Marlantes killed him.

And yet, because the neighbor is worthy to be loved, the just warrior keeps the goal of peace as the chiefly desired end: in the first place for the tormented-neighbor through his rescue but, in the second place, to the enemy-neighbor through establishing the conditions that, alone, might lead to reconciliation. That the motive for all of this is love ought to be clear to anyone with children.

On more than one occasion, Augustine made plain that parenting is a study in the interpenetration of love and justice. Among the many corollaries, a loving father gives his children their due. When praise is what their child's actions warrant, then praise is dispensed; when a rebuke, then a rebuke; when a stronger restraint, then a stronger restraint is employed to prevent the child from further wrongdoing, to confront him with his own injustice and to point him toward what he ought to be, and so to encourage him toward repentance and the mutual joy of fully restored relations.

Conclusion

The just war proposal that I have been advocating does not see a contradiction in hoping for peace but engaging in war, and weeping over it after the fact. Nor is there a contradiction in loving your enemy and fighting to win. Decisive victory is sometimes a bridge too far, and, therefore, it is a strong presumption based on prudent reasoning rather than a categorical imperative. But for both strategic as well as moral reasons, we should lean toward clean margins and err in the direction of thoroughness, just as we would in surgery for cancer. It is because we desire the good of concord

that we fight for a decisive end to conflict, one that secures and allows the enforcement of a durable peace.

Granted, in light of this, the image of the enemy-as-neighbor requires the cultivation of a certain callousness—much as that surgeon does when cutting away tissue and limbs to save lives, as does a parent when punishing an errant child, so *too* a warfighter when stopping an enemy by slaying him. If everyday life furnishes us plenty of occasions in which we must thicken our skin to do the right thing despite painful—even destructive—side effects, how much more will a life in a combat zone? But callousness, like other forms of distancing, betrays itself. It makes plain that the calloused heart can be the one that, in fact, grasps the gravity of the present task. With a kind of peripatetic moderation, the calloused warfighter knows it must not be too easy, nor too hard, to make the necessary kill.

All the while there is sorrow—the image of the enemy-as-neighbor means that we never rejoice in *getting* to kill, but lament in *having* to. It is, perhaps, only in this way that it is possible both to recognize the humanity of the enemy and to kill again and again and again, and yet not be a man of blood.[43] One can fight, decisively, and yet not lose sight of the prize.

Notes

[1] J.R.R. Tolkien, *The Lord of the Rings: 50th Anniversary*, one vol. ed. (Boston: Mariner Books, 2005), 671.

[2] James Turner Johnson, "Just War, as It Was and Is," *First Things*, no. 149 (January 2005), 14–24.

[3] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiæ*, n.d., II.ii.40.

[4] In Romans, 9th verse of the 12th chapter, St. Paul launches into a discussion of love, beginning with the instruction that we ought to love—cling to—what is good and to hate what is evil. He shows how this love ought to be manifest not only in succor for the distressed but also in care for one's enemy. From here Paul seems to change direction, and, in the 13th chapter, he begins to discuss the role of the government in wielding the sword against evil. But scant verses later, he is again talking directly about love. The chapter breaks obscure the fact that Paul finds it relevant, in a discussion about love, to discuss the ruling authority's divinely appointed role as a punisher of wrongdoing.

[5] St. Augustine, "Contra Faustum," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Richard Stothert, vol. 4 (Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), 22.74.

[6] To explore this in more detail, an excellent starting point is Nigel Biggar, "Natural Flourishing as the Normative Ground of Just War: A Christian View," in *Just War: Authority, Tradition, and Practice*, ed. Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Cian O'Driscoll, and John Williams (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).

[7] Bullitt Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," *The Journal of American History* 55, no. 2 (1968), 282.

[8] See HS Secret File: Fldr. H-1: Cablegram in: *United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919, The Armistice Agreement and Related Documents*, vol. 10, part I (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1991), 23.

[9] Donald Smythe, *Pershing: General of the Armies*, 1st paperback ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 232.

[10] Ibid.

[11] HS Secret File.

[12] Augustine, *The City of God*, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 2003), IXX.14.

[13] For a very good book-length discussion of the importance of bringing wars to decisive conclusion, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988).

[14] Smythe, *Pershing*, 232.

[15] John Wheeler-Bennett, "Ludendorff: The Soldier and the Politician," *The Viginia Quarterly Review* 14, no. 2 (Spring 1938), available at <www.vqronline.org/essay/ludendorff-soldier-and-politician>.

[16] Neta Bar and Eyal Ben-Ari, "Israeli Snipers in the Al-Aqsa Intifada: Killing, Humanity and Lived Experience," *Third World Quarterly* (2005), 133.

[17] Ibid., 135.

[18] J. Glenn Gray, *The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1959).

[19] Ibid., chapter 5.

[20] Ibid., 133.

[21] Ibid.

[22] See, for example, Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).

[23] See, for example, Marc LiVecche, "Kevlar for the Soul: The Morality of Force Protection," *Providence: A Journal of Christianity & American Foreign Policy* (Fall 2015), available at <https://providencemag.com/2016/01/kevlar-for-the-soul-morality-force-protection/>; Marc LiVecche, "The Fifth Image: Seeing the Enemy with Just War Eyes," *Providence: A Journal of Christianity & American Foreign Policy* (Summer 2016), available at <https://providencemag.com/2017/01/fifth-image-seeing-enemy-just-war-eyes/>.

[24] C.S. Lewis, *Problem of Pain* (London: Collins, 2012), 35–40.

[25] Karl Marlantes, *What It Is Like to Go to War* (New York: Grove Press, 2011), xi.

[26] Ibid., 29.

[27] Ibid., 30.

[28] Ibid., 31.

[29] Ibid., 32.

[30] I grant that *dehumanization* is a problematic term. While the aim of my handling of the term is to argue that not all dehumanization is morally wrong, the fact that it remains the term, by definition, has to be seen as offensive to human beings. Various other terms, including *depersonalize*, would be better options. Nevertheless, the term dehumanize is the one used in the discussion regarding distancing in the several medical journals to which I referred. I therefore keep the term but note its problematic usage.

[31] Michael Grodin and George Annas, "Physicians and Torture: Lessons from the Nazi Doctors," *International Journal of the Red Cross* 89, no. 867 (2007), 639–640.

[32] Marlantes, *What It Is Like to Go to War*, 40–41.

[33] Grodin and Annas, "Physicians and Torture," 640.

[34] D. Schulman-Green, "Coping Mechanisms of Physicians Who Routinely Work with Dying Patients," *OMEGA—Journal of Death and Dying* 47, no. 3 (2003), 256.

[35] Ibid., 257.

[36] Stefan Hirschauer, "The Manufacture of Bodies in Surgery," *Social Studies of Science* 21, no. 2 (1991), 279–319.

[37] Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (E-Reads, 2010), Loc. 2654. This idea is also found in Bar and Ben-Ari: States one sniper, "When you look out a window, everything appears less human. Also when you ride a car and look outside it looks less human. . . . That's what makes a difference between riding in a car or on a motorcycle. . . . It is much harder to shoot a man, and the fact that I look at him through a [rifle] sight it is like looking at something on television more or less. Of course, you know to differentiate between them because this is real, but to look through the sight makes things less human." "Israeli Snipers in the Al-Aqsa Intifada," 142.

[38] Bar and Ben-Ari, "Israeli Snipers in the Al-Aqsa Intifada," 143.

[39] Ibid., 143.

[40] Chris Kyle, Scott McEwen, and Jim DeFelice, *American Sniper: The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History* (New York: William Morrow, 2012). Of course, a published memoir might differ from interviews in that particular phrases may be used for stylistic purposes, the avoidance of redundancy, or other reasons. Nevertheless, the raw frankness of Kyle's frequent description of what he did as "killing," while perhaps of suspect clinical value, stands out.

[41] Bar and Ben-Ari, "Israeli Snipers in the Al-Aqsa Intifada," 134.

[42] Gray, *The Warriors*, 131–132.

[43] John of Salibury, *Policraticus*, trans. Cary J. Nederman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), BK IV.ii.31.

The Ethics of Nationalism

By Paul Coyer

W e are observing the 100th anniversary of the ending of World War I, a war that has been blamed to a large degree on the passions of nationalism. Today we see a debate over the virtues of nationalism vis-à-vis a growth in the importance of supranational institutions and more global governance that is strikingly similar in many ways to that which occurred in the aftermath of the war. The Brexit vote, the election of Donald Trump, and the surge of what has been referred to in a pejorative manner as "populist" and "nationalist" movements throughout the West are only the opening salvos of what I am convinced will be a mammoth struggle over ideas regarding national identity versus cosmopolitanism, more local national governments versus transnational governmental institutions, and so forth, and the impact that these ideas will have on the shape of the future international order.

Nationalistic tendencies are driving global politics wherever we look, from China attempting to regain its past glory and assuage its wounded pride to Russia, perennially paranoid and insular; to the large rising democracy of India; to other rising states with strong senses of national identity, including Brazil and Indonesia; to Europe (see Brexit, Scottish, and Catalonian drives for independence, and the rise of anti–European Union forces and political parties that are winning elections in places such as Austria,

Hungary, Italy, and Poland); to the United States. It is important that we grasp the implications and find ways to address the phenomenon and to harness its positive traits while guarding against its more negative tendencies. To reflexively condemn all forms of nationalism as morally equivalent is not only to ignore the virtues of nationalism but also to ensure that the popular discontent we see and the gap between the perceptions on the part of many of our ruling elites and those of a large proportion of our citizenry continue to grow with negative implications for domestic political stability, for the West's ability to meet the challenges that face it, and for the international order as a whole.

To help us get some perspective on what I believe will be one of the most important debates of the coming years, I should like to start with a favorite of mine, the poetry of Sir Walter Scott:

> *Breathes there the man, with soul so dead,*
> *Who never to himself hath said,*
> *This is my own, my native land!*
> *Whose heart hath ne'er within him burn'd,*
> *As home his footsteps he hath turn'd*
> *From wandering on a foreign strand!* [1]

The concept of "home" is one that usually fills each of us with warm feelings and a sense of belonging and rootedness—and it is entirely natural that it should do so, as Scott's poem so poignantly expresses. Home is usually a place where we live out our loves and commitments, our loyalties and reciprocal obligations. It provides us with an anchor as well as a place where we learn to live for something larger than ourselves. It provides us with a sense of solidarity and shared sacrifice and purpose. This is true of the family, of the local communities where our lives are rooted, and of our nation, or "homeland." National identity, as Roger Scruton has written, "is an outgrowth of the experience of a common home."[2]

Scott's poem articulates a view that has fallen out of fashion today— that the bonds that connect us to our homeland, our nation, are entirely

natural and, as his words imply, healthy. There was a time, not that long ago, when this was understood and far more broadly accepted among the ruling class than it is today, and when the principle of national self-determination and a system of equal and independent nation-states were seen as moral goods. Arguing that love of one's nation is a naturally occurring and even healthy phenomenon and that the nation-state may have a significant role to play in facilitating human flourishing and in building a just and stable international order, however, is not always a popular pastime these days, when the terms *nationalism* and *populism* are virtually always used as pejoratives and regularly paired with loaded words such as *fear, jingoism, xenophobia, parochialism,* and *chauvinism*.

And yet I am convinced that this dominant narrative is incorrect, that its view of nationalism is simplistic, and that an affirmation and cultivation of a healthy form of nationalism and of the importance of a sense of each nation's unique identity is just as necessary today as it has ever been—perhaps even more so, given the centrifugal forces unleashed by globalization and the impact that those forces are having in human societies around the globe. The process of globalization, while having many positive aspects, nevertheless has had some significant negative repercussions as well—for example, the dissolution of many of the traditional bonds that have historically held peoples together has contributed to the atomization of societies. And it is atomized societies, as Rusty Reno has argued, "that are susceptible to demagogues—not societies that enjoy strong social bonds and organic communal solidarity."[3] I believe defining and cultivating a healthy form of nationalism to be necessary for the sake of our domestic political stability and unity in the West (as well as for the international order writ large), for its unique ability to create conditions necessary for the advancement of human flourishing, for its ability to safeguard and pass down to future generations the cultural distinctiveness of each nation that is unique, and for the contributions it can make to sustaining a just and stable international order.

Let's take a minute before we really get started to briefly address the issue of definitions: the terms *nation*, *nation-state*, and *nationalism* are

all closely interrelated, yet each is distinct from the other. One can be a nation, having a distinct language and culture and a considerable degree of autonomy, for example, without being a full-fledged nation-state, or an internationally recognized sovereign power. One example would be the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq. Because of the limitations of time and space, we cannot delve into discussions over the precise nature of such differences, but in what follows I will refer to nationalism as the public commitment to a nation-state that enjoys de jure independence, that exerts political control over a clearly defined and delimited territory, and that is recognized as sovereign over that territory and the population within that territory.

Much of the commentary on nationalism portrays it, almost reflexively, as a uniformly and self-evidently dark force, one that is implicitly assumed to be contrary to humanity's inevitable march toward modernity, progress and peace, and cosmopolitanism. The legacy of World Wars I and II regarding how we view nationalism has been that the term has come to be synonymous with the darker angels of human nature that were held responsible for such carnage. Negative examples of a militant, jingoistic nationalism certainly exist, but it is important to recognize that the caricature and perversion of an ideal does not discredit that ideal. As classicist Bruce Thornton has written, "To blame nationalism for the horrors of fascism and Nazism is to blame a healthy cell for becoming cancerous."[4]

Following the world wars, Europe, understandably horrified by the carnage, deemed a weakening of loyalties on the part of Europeans to their homelands to be necessary if peace, prosperity, and human rights protections were to prevail, lending the argument against nationalism. In addition to moral content, the issue was seen on the part of many in eschatological terms—it was a struggle related to the all too regularly referenced "arc of history" in which a vaguely defined "universal brotherhood of man," which history was allegedly trending toward as a utopian endpoint, was advanced by the gradual diminution and ultimate destruction of old loyalties.

This postwar moral logic has been extended into the 21st century, and this process in which old loyalties become increasingly less important is believed by many to be more enlightened and morally superior than narrow-minded particularisms derived from a less enlightened past. The process of globalization has been viewed in a similar manner—as a positive lessening of particularist loyalties, which have come to be viewed as increasingly anachronistic in a world that appears much smaller and more tightly bound together due to modern communications technology, the nature of international trade flows, and increasingly intertwined economic and political relationships. And here I would say that Graham Fairclough's discussion of the global communications network of World War I and the echoes of that in our world today helps to illustrate that what we think is new is not necessarily so new, a point that has relevance to the debate over nationalism versus cosmopolitanism.[5]

Many of the cultural elites in the West, found in the halls of academia, policymaking circles, and the upper reaches of our governments, long ago made the assumption that the international order would increasingly come to be characterized by transnational organizations and that national sovereignty and the importance of national identities and more local ties would gradually fade into history. As Gideon Rachman expressed it, "In a borderless world of bits and bytes the traditional concerns of nations—territory, identity, and sovereignty—looked as anachronistic as swords and shields."[6]

In light of this passage about the modern world being so much more tightly woven together than at any point in history and the presumed implications of that fact for an emerging international brotherhood of man and the diminution of more particular kinds of identities and loyalties, it is interesting to note that similar predictions were made in the wake of World War I. In response, the British scholar G.K. Chesterton wrote:

> *What we call the modern world is more ancient than we thought; and its simplicities will survive its complexities. Men care more for the rag that is called a flag than for the rag that is called a newspaper. Men*

care more for Rome, Paris, Prague, [and] *Warsaw than for the inter-national railways connecting these towns. . . . Nobody has any such ecstatic regard for the mere relations of different peoples to each other, as one would gather from the rhetoric of idealistic internationalism. It is, indeed, desirable that . . . men should love each other; but always with the recognition of the identity of other peoples and other men.*[7]

Chesterton illustrates a truth that a study of history bears out—that love of our family, tribe, and nation is a very human trait that has always existed and is not likely to disappear, no matter the degree to which it is castigated by a ruling elite. Ever quotable, one of Chesterton's best retorts is to the cosmopolitan "who professes to love humanity [yet] hates local preference. . . . How can you love humanity and [yet] hate anything so human?"[8]

The attitudes on the part of our cultural elites in the West have been given expression in the form of active hostility toward anyone who still believes that issues of national identity and loyalty to king and country can be positive goods. In November 2017, European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker, quoting François Mitterrand's well-known statement made in the midst of the conflict in the Balkans in 1995, "Le nationalisme, c'est la guerre," added that this was still true and that therefore "we have to fight it." He went on to assert that, far more than the threat from a revanchist Russia and China or the threat from the Islamic State and Islamic radicalism, the resurgence of nationalist sentiment within Europe "is the real war."[9] Juncker has also labeled nationalism "a poison."[10] Numerous European Union leaders have made similar statements.

These attitudes are shared by members of the "tribe" of self-described cosmopolitans (and they exhibit all of the attributes of a tribe, with all of the negative connotations, which I will address later) around the globe, including here in the United States. A 2016 article in *Foreign Affairs* co-authored by a former senior Clinton administration official foresaw a world in which nations become less significant, supranational institutions become "stronger and more independent," and the various world civilizations "fuse" together.

This will, according to the authors, inevitably lead to a world that is more peaceful and prosperous because, the article implies but does not explicitly state, the ultimate causes for human conflict will then have been removed. The article confidently ends by asserting that "the progressive direction of human history . . . is set to continue."[11] (This, of course, ignores what a Christian theological anthropology teaches us, that the ultimate cause of human conflict is to be found within the human heart and in the brokenness of the human condition.)

The resurgence in nationalist sentiment and reaffirmation of the importance of identity are calling into question this cosmopolitan vision of the future, however, and are highlighting a growing gap between the West's ruling elites and vast swathes of its citizenry. And rhetoric such as that of Juncker and other high-profile Western leaders contributes to the sense of alienation on the part of Western citizenry, who believe that national identity and related loyalties are not inherently dark or sinister but rather contribute positively to their lives in substantive ways. The bonds of nationalism have exhibited a stubborn durability that has surprised many Western elites. The de-emphasis of the importance of national identity and associated loyalties as well as the attempted delegitimization, atomization, and secularization that have accompanied globalization is leaving people feeling unrooted, unmoored, and adrift, resulting in cultural anxieties that are both making themselves felt in Western politics and reshaping global affairs in tumultuous ways.

The more strenuously the voices affirming faith, family, tradition, and identity are condemned and the greater the amount of energy expended in marginalizing and/or silencing them, the stronger and more virulent will be the backlash, with a concomitant increase in more extreme voices throughout the West gaining a greater hearing than would otherwise have been the case. This carries grave implications for the future of the international order, particularly political order in the West. The more strongly our political and cultural elites dig in their heels, the more violent is likely to be the counter-reaction.

The resurgence of nationalism across the West (as well as globally), contrary to the hopes held in some quarters, is not a temporary phenomenon but rather the symptom of deeper cultural shifts that are occurring. The era that is gradually emerging from the prolonged fluctuations following the ending of the Cold War could be the dawning of the new age of the nation rather than a continued diminution of the importance of the nation-state.

In the debate between proponents of the nation-state and the self-described cosmopolitans, a cliché we regularly hear is, "I'm a citizen of the world," a phrase attributed to the Greek thinker Diogenes, who first used the term *cosmopolitan* in relation to political identity more than three centuries before Christ. While I have lived several places around the world, am simultaneously an Anglophile and Francophile—at the cost of serious cognitive and cultural dissonance, I must say—have lived in China and am deeply attracted to Chinese history and culture, and am married to someone born and reared in Venezuela, I am, nevertheless, fundamentally American. Former British Prime Minister Theresa May has rightly stated, "If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere." And she is correct; human beings, by our very nature, lead lives that are rooted in a particular time and place. In a similar vein, one author has noted that "'the international community' doesn't give out citizenship, or even green cards."[12] And his point, while humorously made, makes a more serious one: the countries in which each of us reside and to which we owe our loyalties are the particular communities that give our lives meaning— the corollary of this is that without these countries and our loyalties and affections for them, our lives would be much the poorer.

To those who argue that the rise of nationalism is a dark appeal to "blood and soil," French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut has responded that "it is inhuman to define man by blood and soil, but no less inhuman to leave him stumbling through life with the terrestrial foundations of his existence taken out from under him."[13] The backlash we are seeing throughout the West is precisely due to this sense of insecurity that comes from the feeling

that "the terrestrial foundations" are being removed. Bruce Thornton explains this in more detail, writing that:

> *Cosmopolitanism is viable only for a tiny elite of businessmen, politicians, entertainers, academics and professional media. The vast majority of people live in local communities rooted in a specific landscape, language, beliefs, history, and customs, in a nation that needs secure borders and strict qualifications for citizenship in order to protect its identity and security. The nation, properly understood, makes its citizens who they are and gives their civil and political lives meaning.*[14]

Increasingly, the United States and many of its Western allies are being led by those whom Samuel Huntington in his 2004 essay "Dead Souls" (a phrase borrowed from the Sir Walter Scott poem with which I began this article) referred to as a "denationalized elite," who "have forgotten the mystic cords of memory [while] the American people have not."[15] The growing gap in perceptions between the ruling elites and a significant proportion of their citizenry is going to increase, with negative implications for our domestic political stability in the West and for the larger international order unless something is done to address the issue and our elites begin to express a greater level of appreciation and support for the roles that faith, family, tradition, and identity play in the lives of their citizens. The restoration of a sense of solidarity between our leaders and our citizenry is necessary to the future of liberal democracy. At this point, I am not optimistic that a reevaluation of attitudes on the part of our elites will take place, and I see trouble ahead.

Addressing this gap is also vital for geopolitical reasons. Vladimir Putin, to take an obvious example, has quite shrewdly played on the sense among large portions of the West that their leaders no longer share their appreciation of the importance of faith, family, and national identity. He has played on this theme in order to increase his soft power appeal throughout major segments of the West while at the same time creating a positive spin

for a Russia whose reputation has taken a huge hit in the past few years and is in desperate need of rebranding. The Kremlin's skillful propaganda in this regard, which has been interwoven with its propaganda regarding the West turning hostile to its Christian civilizational roots (the implication being that Russia remains traditional and Christian), has found broad resonance in Europe (and much of the rest of the world), despite the obvious fact that Putin is hardly a paragon of Christian virtue or an exemplar of ethical Christian leadership.

Theological-Ethical Perspectives

Looking at the phenomenon of affection and loyalty to nation from the perspective of Christian theological and ethical thought, does the Christian tradition contain tools that would help us determine whether there is any virtue in loyalty to one's nation? Or is the morally superior position, as so many voices tell us these days, a negation of that loyalty and a substitution of that loyalty with one to universal humankind?

The Christian concept of *agape* tells us that God's love is universal and that we are to be channels of that love. The parable of the Good Samaritan makes clear that those whom we should consider to be neighbors and the objects of our goodwill and love are not just those of our own tribe. This does not, however, address the issue of where and the manner in which particular loyalties and affections fit into that larger ethical framework. It also does not address our finite, limited attention, reach, and resources, and the manner in which they ought to be apportioned in keeping with both Christ's call to love our neighbor and with the fact that God has placed each of us within particular communities and nations that also have a legitimate claim on those limited affections and resources.

Yet the Christian tradition does provide instructive approaches to how to think of our particular affections and loyalties in the context of living out God's calling to be conduits of His love for the whole world. As one example, primary affection for and loyalty to one's spouse and one's family were not to end and become submerged in a larger loyalty to the whole of society.

On the contrary, our primary commitments to marriage and family and, after that, to our community are seen as the means by which we contribute to and build a healthy larger society. These particular bonds have not been abolished by Christ's call to a universal agape. Rather, contributing to and prioritizing bonds to family, community, and nation, which is a larger community that nevertheless has a shared sense of common identity, contribute to our own well-being while simultaneously contributing to that of other members of the nation. Particular loyalties to family, community, and nation teach us to live for something larger than ourselves, and so contribute to moral formation and maturity. As C.S. Lewis has written, "As the family offers us the first step beyond self-love, so this [love of country] offers us the first step beyond family selfishness."[16]

There are numerous examples of particular affections and loyalties to people and nation, and distinct national identity, being affirmed in the Christian Scriptures, including the record of the Gospel that Christ himself, when questioned by the Pharisees, the Jewish religious leaders of his day, affirmed the value of Gentiles, asserted that faith in God existed among the Gentiles and not just the Jews, and affirmed Jewish duty to the Roman emperor—yet maintained his uniquely Jewish identity and love of the Jewish people. Also relevant is that the Apostle Paul, even while spending most of his life preaching to the Gentiles, nevertheless wrote that he would sacrifice himself for his people, the Jews, and that on the day of Pentecost, members of each nation visiting Jerusalem heard the Gospel in their own tongues, affirming national differences.[17]

As finite creatures, it is also true that we are bound by our limitations in time and space. We therefore have limited ability to positively affect the whole of humanity, but must by necessity focus our efforts on those to whom we have access through the proximity of family, community, and nation. Augustine explained the need for concrete objects of our love when he wrote that "nothing can be loved unless it be known."[18] Expanding on this, Edmund Burke, in his critique of the French Revolution, wrote in the 1790s that "to be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon

we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country, and to mankind."[19]

Moving ahead about 120 years, G.K. Chesterton wrote during the early 20th century in defense of love of nation vis-à-vis a vaguely defined cosmopolitanism: "Patriotism begins the praise of the world at the nearest thing, instead of beginning it at the most distant."[20] And C.S. Lewis, writing a few decades after Chesterton, echoed this sentiment when he wrote that "those who do not love the fellow villagers and fellow-townsmen whom they *have* seen are not likely to have got very far towards loving 'Man' whom they have not."[21] Nigel Biggar, addressing the impact that our finiteness has on balancing the call to love all with potential obligations to those nearest us, writes:

> *We may be responsible* [to all]*, but ours is a responsibility of creatures, not of gods; and our creaturely resources of energy, time and material goods are finite. Therefore, we are only able to benefit some, not all; and there might be some to whom we are more strongly obliged by ties of gratitude, or whom we are better placed to serve on account of shared language and culture or common citizenship. In short, notwithstanding the fact that all human beings are equal in certain basic respects, no matter what their native land, we might still be obliged—depending on the circumstances—to benefit near neighbors before or instead of distant ones.*[22]

Gratitude for the patrimony bequeathed us by those social and political structures that provide the conditions within which we flourish might be one justification for our loyalty and affection being prioritized toward them. Along these lines, Pope John Paul II spoke repeatedly throughout his papacy about love of country and outlined a theology of the nation in a series of talks given at Castel Gandolfo. He first notes that "the family and the nation are both natural societies, not the product of mere convention. Therefore, in human history, they cannot be replaced by anything else."[23] He writes that this patrimony that we receive from our homeland is "the

totality of goods bequeathed to us by our forefathers . . . [including] the values and the spiritual content that go to make up the culture of a given nation." As part of his theological justification of the justness of primary loyalty to one's homeland, he points to the Decalogue, specifically to the fourth commandment, to honor one's father and mother, drawing a link between father and mother and fatherland or motherland, noting that the Latin pater and patria are related and arguing that the patrimony that our homeland provides us ought to be honored in a similar manner to the way in which we honor our parents.[24] Relatedly, and providing some additional context for the Biblical injunction to love our neighbor, Biggar argues that "whether near or far, human neighbors are not the only proper objects of our respect and care. So are customs and institutions."[25]

The concept of nation is addressed repeatedly in Hebrew and Christian scripture, with substantial support from the Judeo-Christian tradition existing for the idea of the nation having a role in the economy of God. Israeli scholar Yoram Hazony argues that the idea that international political order should be based on a system of independent nations was not new to the Treaty of Westphalia, contrary to popular perceptions. Rather, it can be traced to one of the earliest shapers of Western culture, the Hebrew scriptures. According to Hazony, the concept of a self-determining nation and a system of self-determining nations rather than a universal imperial system was a key distinguishing characteristic of ancient Israelite thought. Ancient Israel was surrounded by imperial powers—Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia—each of which sought to impose an imperial political order on the ancient world. As Hazony has argued, those empires did bring positive goods including wealth, stability, and peace within the empire, but Hebrew scripture nevertheless was the first to offer "a sustained presentation of a different possibility: a political order based on the independence of a nation living within limited borders alongside other independent nations."[26]

Hebrew scriptures also portray nations as having providential purposes and portray God as ruling over the international political order. Psalm 22 perceives God as "ruler over the nations." The prophet Daniel

records that governments rise and fall according to God's will (2:21–22 and 4:35), as does the book of Job: "He makes nations rise and then fall, builds up some and abandons others." These passages emphasize both the temporal nature of nations and the fact that they are not the highest authority, key considerations that should shape and temper our love of nation. Relatedly, the Hebrew scriptures record that God holds nations accountable for virtue or lack thereof, with Proverbs 14:34 stating that "righteousness exalts a nation," an assertion that would inform one's willingness to criticize one's nation when it is in the wrong.

The prophet Isaiah (19:25) records God as referring not just to Israel as "His people," but others, as well: "Blessed is Egypt, my people, and Assyria, the work of my hands, and Israel, my inheritance." Furthermore, the nation as defined in the Hebrew scriptures was centered on common beliefs and culture, rather than on an ethnic purity. God tells the Israelites that others are welcomed in their national community as long as they accept Israel's God and customs.

The earliest followers of Christ, who were Jews, inherited the Hebraic tradition and passed it into the Christian tradition, with the Apostle Paul affirming in Acts 17:26 that God has ordained nations to exist at particular points in history. Speaking in Athens, Paul states: "From one man He made all the nations, that they should inhabit the whole earth; and He marked out their appointed times in history and the boundaries of their lands." Christian thinkers who followed Paul wrote about the nature of the Christian's relationship to his earthly home and provided Christians with strong arguments in favor of a dual citizenship that was equally rooted in transcendent authority and in the earthly polity, rooted in the particular time, place, and circumstance within which they found themselves. Such arguments supported the idea that Christian believers were simultaneously citizens of not only a heavenly kingdom but also their earthly kingdom and that they should seek its welfare.

The Protestant Reformation significantly altered how we think of international order and asserted the role of the modern nation-state

vis-à-vis rule by a transnational authority. Protestantism has been credited with making possible the modern system of nation-states, but despite criticism that the Roman Catholic Church presided over a form of empire for hundreds of years, Roman Catholic thought also provides support for loyalty toward one's nation. Pope Leo XIII appealed to natural law when he wrote in his 1890 encyclical *Sapientiae Christianae* that the "natural law enjoins us to love devotedly and to defend the country in which we were born, and in which we were brought up. . . . We are bound . . . to love dearly the country whence we have received the means of engagement this mortal life affords."[27]

Closer to our own time, John Paul II wrote and spoke repeatedly on his theology of the nation, including in a letter to his homeland just after his accession to the papacy, when he wrote of the bonds that the love of country can create between disparate members of that nation as ennobling: "Love of our country unites us and must unite us above all the differences. It has nothing in common with a narrow . . . chauvinism, but springs from the law of the human heart. It is a measure of man's nobility."[28]

Nationalism's Virtues: Countering the Dominant Narrative

A defense of the ideal of the nation-state is not a defense of the evils that certain types of nationalism have perpetrated. It is, rather, a recognition that the virtues present in nationalism have the capacity to contribute to human flourishing in unique ways. The phenomenon of nationalism itself is not inherently dark or anti-modern, despite the fact that nationalistic impulses can indeed be mobilized for jingoistic and aggressive purposes, just as any other human political and social organization can be used for good or ill. But just as nationalistic impulses can be the cause of great evil, so they can also be the source of great good.

What are some of the virtues that can be attributed to nationalism? One of the most fundamental is the role that citizenship in a nation-state plays in giving our lives meaning. Due to the fact that humans are rooted

in a particular location and in a particular culture, "the nation . . . makes its citizens who they are and gives their civil and political lives meaning."[29] And, as Rusty Reno notes, "Human beings thrive best as members of a particular people and as proud recipients of a distinctive cultural inheritance."[30]

There is something in human nature that seeks such localized, fundamental attachments, which are natural, healthy, and to be encouraged. To blithely state that we should all seek to be "citizens of the world" and, worse, to repudiate such attachments as somehow morally suspect, ignores a fundamental human reality that has positive moral content. In fact, the danger of the dissolution of such traditional, historical, and natural ties of community, ties meant to preserve and hand down the unique cultural inheritance of various peoples, is a far greater danger than the current resurgence of nationalist fervor. A commitment to a unique national identity and common values, which can be most surely protected by means of the institutions of a state supported by a strong civil society, is absolutely vital for the survival of any human society. Emphasizing this point, British historian Michael Burleigh asks the rhetorical question, "Can a society survive that is not the object of commitments to its core values or a focus for the fundamental identities of all its members?"[31]

Membership in a nation, where its citizens hold a common identity, are committed to common values, and have a shared sense of destiny, is also a spiritual good that meets some of humanity's deepest spiritual needs for solidarity and fellowship. Genesis records God as stating that "it is not good for man to be alone," hinting at the fact that we are created for fellowship with others. Rusty Reno also notes that the experience of being a citizen in a "polis," a common political project in which all of our individual efforts contribute to something larger than ourselves, "provides us with an experience of solidarity in the service of a common good" and "anchors ordinary lives in something transcendent."[32]

Pope John Paul II hinted at the useful role that national bonds can play as a source of unity and social cohesion in a letter to his homeland just after his accession to the papacy when he wrote, "Love of our country

unites us and must unite us above all the differences."[33] The sense of having fraternal bonds of mutual obligation that comes from belonging to the same nation reminds us that the differences between us pale in comparison to the strength of that communal bond, and thus can be a source of social progress, providing for the building of ties between segments of society that would otherwise have little to do with one another.

The idea of citizenship in a common polity implies mutual responsibility to one's fellow citizens, and numerous scholars have emphasized the role of nation-states as moral communities. David Miller, for example, argues that the phenomenon of nationalism creates an ethical incentive to care for one another due to the fact that we are all part of a collective political effort from which we all benefit. The bonds of mutual obligation created by common citizenship are the means by which personal interests and group interests overlap, as occurs when the sacrificial acts of a citizen sustain a set of relationships from which they themselves will benefit in some manner. Miller also argues that nation-states can combine aspects of both "ethical particularism," in which we show love for those with whom we are in a particular relationship and whom we may (or may not in the case of the larger nation) know personally and to whom we have an easier time understanding our moral obligation due to proximity, on the one hand, and, on the other, "ethical universalism," in which we recognize the principle that, despite the priority of our ethical obligation to our fellow citizens, we nevertheless still have universal obligations based upon the human dignity of all.[34]

Another important virtue generally ignored today is the fact that the nation-state has made modern, consensual government possible and is therefore necessary for political freedom. Liah Greenfield argues that without nationalism and the modern nation-state, democracy would not have been possible. In her 1992 work on nationalism she explains that:

> *The location of sovereignty within the people and the recognition of*
> *the fundamental equality among its various strata, which constitute*

the essence of the modern national idea, are at the same time the basic tenets of democracy. Democracy was born with the sense of nationality. The two are inherently linked, and neither can be fully understood apart from this connection. Nationalism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world.[35]

Echoing Greenfield, Bruce Thornton notes that the current dominant critique of nationalism:

ignores the critical role of the nation-state as the foundation of modern consensual government and political freedom. The nation-state allows large groups of people to create a solidarity that binds them together and gives them a common destiny. Without this shared identity and values, this affection for their own way of life and for those who share it with them, people are left rootless and fragmented into niche identities, connected now only by consumerism, popular culture, and sporting events. . . . No one will risk his life to die for the United Nations, the European Union, or the World Bank.[36]

Diplomatic historian Walter Russell Mead has made similar observations about nationalism in the American context, writing that "nationalism—the sense that Americans are bound together into a single people with a common destiny—is a noble and necessary force without which American democracy would fail."[37]

The principles of national independence and self-determination have also been at the core of the Western conception of a just international order since the Westphalian system began. Contrary to the legitimacy of empire, which rests upon conquest and in which the only real commonality is the common ruler, the democratic nation-state's validity rests on pillars of shared fraternal bonds and the principles of consent of the governed and self-determination—the right of the citizens to be the rulers of and to control the state, and for that state to have the right to determine its own course.

Another reason the nation-state system has historically been considered just is due to its fundamental egalitarianism, the principle of the equality of all states, regardless of disparities in size or wealth or other measures of national power. Our post–World War II international system, including the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions, is constructed around an assumption of the equality of nation-states, and forcing such states into supranational governance structures and reducing their sovereignty does away with that real-world moral good of the current international system in pursuit of a misguided utopian dream of building international peace through reducing state sovereignty.

A reassertion of the centrality of the nation-state and a reaffirmation of the value of particular identities are also essential if true human difference and diversity are to flourish, particularly in the face of a simultaneously homogenizing, atomizing, and dehumanizing globalization. Each nation of the world represents a distinctive culture, and a major purpose of each nation-state is to cherish its unique culture, to prize its unique history and perspectives, and to pass that culture and self-understanding onto future generations. An appreciation for the uniqueness of each nation and for the genuine cultural diversity that is protected by a system of nation-states is thus an important reason to prize such a system. Imperial projects have seldom facilitated the celebration of true difference and diversity, and it is extremely unlikely that governance by supranational institutions and a cultural homogenization brought about by globalization and the attempt to minimize the importance of national identities and particularist ties will do so.

Looking back at the interwar years, it is interesting to note that the debate over nationalism versus cosmopolitanism was just as vigorous as it is today, and many of the arguments made in favor of the nation-state then are still just as relevant today. William Temple, for example, a socialist who served as Archbishop of Canterbury during World War II, wrote in 1928 as Bishop of Manchester defending the ethics of nationalism on the grounds of the good of the diversity of cultures in the world, and used that argument

to justify a national right to self-defense. Temple argued that affection for and loyalty to a particular nation, even to the point of taking up arms and killing the members of another nation committing aggression against it, were defensible on the grounds that individual nations and the cultures represented by those nations make valuable contributions to the whole of the human experience. Temple understood having particular loyalties to a particular nation to be a form of agape. He wrote, "Not only is the State the trustee for the community, but each national community is a trustee for the world-wide community, to which it should bring treasures of its own; and to submit to political annihilation may be to defraud mankind of what it alone could have contributed to the general wealth of human experience."[38]

Developing that theme further, and criticizing the arguments of the self-proclaimed cosmopolitans of his day who sought then as now to minimize and ultimately do away with national loyalties, Temple wrote, "The variety of nations is good. A non-national cosmopolitanism, which would depreciate national distinctions, would thereby also demolish many valuable elements of our experience. But we can learn to rejoice in each other's peculiarities instead of detesting them."[39]

Chesterton defended nationalism on similar grounds, likewise positing that the multiplicity of cultures and nations is to be appreciated for the variety it brings to our experience of the world: "The fundamental spiritual advantage of patriotism and such sentiments is this: that by means of it all things are loved adequately, because all things are loved individually. . . . Nationalism gives us a hundred countries, and every one of them is the best."[40]

Another virtue of nationalism is the scale of the nation-state. Transnational or global institutions are too large and abstract to have a legitimate claim on our loyalties and do not provide a realistic environment within which human beings can live out their particular commitments. Due to the fact that the nation-state sits at the nexus of empire and universalist claims on the one hand, and more narrow, parochial interests on the other, it provides for a political entity of manageable size that binds people together in

shared, fraternal loyalties, while also providing for the protection of rights and the passing down to the next generation of a unique cultural heritage. As Mark Tooley has written, "This sort of nationalism . . . fosters unity while protecting dissent and self-critique. Such nationalism is a noble alternative to parochialism and narrow self-interest, sustaining a wider community in which persons otherwise uninterested in mutual welfare find common purpose and fraternal bonds."[41]

Elaborating on this and echoing the point that William Temple made some 90 years ago, Yoram Hazony has argued that the nation-state, due to its scale, provides for a "cast of mind" that "paves the way for certain positive traits of character that are more difficult, if not impossible, to attain" in an international order that is organized around any other principle. He explains that because the nation-state sits at the midway point between empire and narrow tribalism, the citizen of the nation-state "takes part in a political endeavor which is quite different both from the indefinite expansion of empire and from the petty warfare of anarchy [tribalism]. And this endeavor encourages in him a different cast of mind in two respects"—first, it encourages the citizen of the given nation to prize the "truth and beauty in his own national traditions and . . . his own loyalty to them," while at the same time recognizing that "they are not the sum of human knowledge, for there is also truth and beauty to be found elsewhere, which his own nation does not possess." Hazony continues, "This balance of factors permits a moderating skepticism with respect to one's own national inheritance, which is recognized as a product of a particular history and circumstances. And it gives rise to a willingness to consider on an empirical basis, the advantages of the institutions and customs of other nations."[42]

This point leads to a commonly expressed criticism of nationalism, that it is defined by hostility to "the other" and, therefore, that it is a primary cause of conflict in the world and is almost uniquely the channel for the darker impulses in human nature. This not only wrongly assumes that all forms of nationalism are equivalent but also ignores the fact that a perverted form of nationalism is not the only cause of human conflict (both

history and an orthodox Christian theological anthropology teach us that conflict will always be with us, as its most fundamental causes are rooted in human nature). This claim is often made in relation to an assumption that particular loyalties are by nature characterized by fear of and hostility toward the other at least as much as it is by love of those with whom one shares a common familial bond.

An expression of a unique culture and the political and other bonds and institutions that preserve and hand down that culture and way of life to future generations is not necessarily defined by a "hostility" to those from a different culture and national community. Herbert Kelman, a Harvard-based pioneer in the social psychology of conflict analysis, recognizes that issues of identity can be a key part of any ongoing conflict between groups but has nevertheless argued throughout his career that maintenance of a cultural identity does not depend on or necessitate hostility toward that of others. Kelman has posited that a major goal of conflict analysis and resolution is to arrive at an understanding of the other group that affirms its identity without believing that identity to be a threat to one's own.[43]

Hostility toward the other can indeed take place within the context of competing national loyalties, but it is just as likely to take place in any other human context given the universality of human failings and the brokenness of the human condition. The weaknesses of human nature are evident in any form of human political organization, and the giving of power to supranational governing institutions does not form any type of barrier to the exercise of those more negative tendencies found in human nature. In fact, the argument can be made that larger governments, with greater distance from the lives of those citizens over whom its regulations hold so much sway, such as supranational institutions, are far less likely to be held accountable for their actions and thus their more negative tendencies are less likely to be curbed and a gradual trend toward authoritarianism is more likely to result. Supranational, statist solutions to the potential problems of an unhealthy form of nationalism, or "nationalism gone wrong," are not convincing.

It should be noted that tribalism, with which nationalism is regularly equated, is just as evident among those who proclaim their own enlightened cosmopolitanism. Even though they do not see themselves in this manner, no less than anyone else, those self-proclaimed "citizens of the world" tend to advocate on behalf of their tribe, and their hostility toward all others who do not share their perspectives is often every bit as intolerant and tribalist as the tendencies that they justifiably condemn in others. This elite tribalism has its own easily identifiable worldview, is uncomfortable with and rarely encounters genuine cultural difference, and is utterly unwilling to change its views after coming into close contact with anyone who sees things differently. In fact, the vehemence with which this tribe attacks those who do not belong to it, their pronounced sense of moral superiority, and their conviction that they alone are worthy of governing illustrate just how "uncosmopolitan" they truly are.[44]

Every society addresses issues that are at the core of defining a given nation's brand of nationalism differently, and another weakness of typical arguments against nationalism is that, as hinted at earlier, they tend to view nationalism as a monolithic phenomenon and all nationalisms as being morally equivalent, ignoring the fact that different types of nationalism exist. Today, the authoritarian nationalisms of Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan are fundamentally different in nature from the democratic nationalisms of countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Is anyone threatened, for example, by Canadian nationalism, despite the fact that we know Canadians love their country fiercely? With the exception of those of us non-Canadians who have ever faced a Canadian hockey team on the ice, probably not.

Historically, a comparison of the very different types of nationalism represented by Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, Benito Mussolini, and Hideki Tojo, on the one hand, and George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela, on the other, also illustrates the point. In the case of the latter, it is clear that each

was based on a belief in the equality and dignity of all human beings, in the rule of law, and in a clear-eyed ability to see his nation's failings while continuing to believe in and work toward the achievement of that nation's higher ideals. Most today do not think of the word nationalism when they think of the American Founding Fathers. But that they were by definition nationalists would appear obvious given the fact that they made enormous sacrifices in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds to birth a nation that was shaped by their deepest convictions about the nature of human freedom and dignity (and one that was informed by the conviction that human freedoms and rights are sourced in divine authority, not merely granted by government, thus limiting government's authority in our lives and shaping their conception of the type of nation they were creating). Indeed, they would hardly have pledged to each other their "lives, fortunes and sacred honor" had they not firmly believed in the national project to which they were giving birth and in the political, moral, and, indeed, spiritual principles upon which it was based.[45]

Examples of this type of high-minded, "constructive" nationalism should give us a goal to shoot for. Lincoln, another whose name is not typically paired with the descriptor of "nationalist," was clearly also one by definition; he was willing to sacrifice much to save his nation as a political union yet was nevertheless painfully aware of the ways in which his own nation, much as he loved it, had fallen short in terms of national righteousness. As a Congressman in the 1840s, for example, Lincoln argued strongly against the Mexican-American War on moral grounds, decrying it as a sin against heaven itself. As President, he was humbled by the knowledge that the sin of slavery had brought the Civil War, which threatened the Nation's continued existence. In his second inaugural address, he referenced what he understood as God's providential decree that the bloodshed that took place during that war was a direct result of the "lash" of the slave owner and the spiritual need for recompense. His knowledge of that grave national sin, and our other moral failings, however, did not halt his belief in the American national project. Rather, he understood that human sinfulness meant

that both individuals and nations will inevitably fall short of their ideals, and suffer God's judgment for it, but that that does not mean the national project based on those ideals is not worth pursuing. Lincoln is an example of a leader who recognized that one should seek not only the material but also the moral and spiritual prosperity of one's nation.

But if moral perfection is the standard for loyalty to our respective nations, rather than a humility and determination to strive toward greater realization of those ideals in both our domestic and international actions, no national polity (or any other type of polity) could exist that could ever command our loyalty, all polities being composed of imperfect men and women whose actions all too often reflect the broken condition of humanity. As Biggar has written, "The line between virtue and vice runs down the middle of each human community, as it runs through the heart of every individual."[46]

At the same time, an awareness as Americans, Britons, Canadians, Frenchmen, and so forth of our nations' past failures to live up to our lofty standards should not cripple our nations so that they no longer act on the global stage, but rather should motivate us to do better in the future and to strive to interact with the world in keeping with our self-proclaimed values. A self-loathing due to real and imagined past sins can cripple a nation's ability to be an active force for good in the world. (Referencing, in relation to the United States, the need for a moral self-confidence to fuel the Nation's ability to act for good on the world stage, one former British government official has written, "That's right, U.S. nationalism exists—and thank heaven it does. America would be weaker without it and much less use to the rest of the world."[47]) A healthy nationalism balances a humbling awareness of our failings as a nation, on the one hand, and on the other the moral self-confidence necessary to act in pursuit of the high ideals upon which we were founded. None of our nations has a monopoly on either sin or righteousness, and this fact should both imbue us with humility and give us the confidence to attempt to tackle the ills facing our own nations and the world.

Christian theology sees all political community as provisional—a "grace," if you will—to pursue order, justice, and peace, and to attempt to maximize human freedom and flourishing on Earth to the extent possible within the limits of sin and humanity's unhealthy propensities. For Christians, our loyalties to our nation are to be shaped both by the realization that our nations are not eternal but temporal, and by the realization that all nations, as all individuals, are deeply impacted negatively by the brokenness and imperfection of the human condition. These realizations emphasize the limits of the nations and inject needed humility into our attitudes toward our own nation and empathy for others. While it is important to remember that all nationalisms are not morally equivalent, it is also true that a deep sense of humility before God is a necessary ingredient to guard against an arrogant sense of one's own superior virtue. Biggar articulates well the reasons we should have this sense of humility when he writes, "The Christian doctrine of the universal presence of sin means that we cannot fondly imagine that the line dividing virtue from vice runs with reassuring neatness between our people on the virtuous side and another people on the viscious [*sic*] side."[48]

It is self-evident that we cannot achieve a perfectly peaceful and just world order given the reality of sin and human brokenness. Catholic writer George Weigel holds that the peaceful international order Christians should seek to cultivate:

> coexists with broken hearts and wounded souls. It is built in a world in which swords have not been beaten into plowshares, but remain swords: sheathed, but ready to be unsheathed in the defense of innocents. Its advantage, as Augustine understood, is that it is the form of peace that can be built through the instruments of politics.[49]

A system of nation-states will not change human nature and turn us into angels, no more than evolving into an international system ruled by supranational and/or global institutions will do so. A system of nation-states is, rather, one designed to work within the reality of an imperfect

humanity, prone to so many moral failings, to provide an environment within which stability, justice, and human liberty and flourishing can be achieved to the greatest extent possible in any human political system created and managed by flawed humans.

While the desire to love one's nation is natural, like other desires and needs found in human beings, this one needs to be carefully cultivated and bounded to ensure that this natural need finds healthy expression. Nation-states, as long as they exist, will always be profoundly human—that is, they will always be characterized by the same flaws that mark all social and political endeavors. Yet at the end of the day, it is difficult to see how alternatives to the nation-state can conceivably provide similar social, cultural, political, and moral goods, and there appears to be nothing that is better positioned to set conditions that can enable human flourishing. Our respective nations, and the ideal of nation-states, can do much to contribute to a healthy world and deserve our considered support, not our blanket condemnation.

Notes

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⁵ See chapter 10 by Graham Fairclough, "The Ethical Challenge of Information Warfare: Nothing New," in this volume.

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¹⁵ Samuel Huntington, "Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite," *The National Interest* 75 (2004), 5–18.

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Incompetence, Technology, and Justice: Today's Lessons from World War I

By Eric D. Patterson

Some wars seem fresh on the mind, despite the passage of decades. World War II is such a war: despite the passage of 80 years, Adolf Hitler, the Holocaust, Pearl Harbor, Iwo Jima, the atom bomb, and Winston Churchill's speeches still belong to our world, to our time. In contrast, World War I long ago faded to seem like a different epoch, a clash of Old World civilizations with little connection to today. Yet on the centennial of that truly cataclysmic war, which not only resulted in millions of battle deaths and the collapse of empires but also unleashed Spanish influenza on the world, are there lessons for today that are relevant for our political and military leaders? Yes.

This chapter looks at leadership issues from the Great War and draws lessons regarding accountability, the philosophy of technology, and postwar justice. Each of these areas tracks with one of the three basic components of just war thinking: the ethics of going to war (jus ad bellum), of how war is fought (jus in bello), and of ending war well (jus post bellum).[1] When thinking about World War I, one has to consider whether the grotesque body counts were the result of incompetent leadership, and, if so, why were these incompetent leaders not fired? Second, World War I was characterized by the pell-mell introduction of new armaments and technologies, including tanks, machine guns, submarines, and chemical agents. What is

the appropriate philosophical framework for establishing protocols for use and restraint of the tools of modern warfare? Third, each of the principal victors—Georges Clemenceau (France), David Lloyd George (the United Kingdom), and Woodrow Wilson (the United States)—took a different approach to postwar justice, ranging from vengeance to restoration. What was at stake, and which was the most appropriate? Operating from the just war framework, this chapter argues that these questions have currency today, whether in the consideration of how to measure the success of battlefield commanders, defining the norms and limits of cyber warfare, or advancing postconflict stability and justice.

Dealing with Incompetent Leadership

Most militaries have been slow to fire incompetent leaders, and World War I is apparently no exception. I state "apparently" because in another chapter in this volume, Nigel Biggar takes a more generous view of the performance of General Douglas Haig and some other Allied generals. Regardless, our focus is on the *willingness to fire* incompetent or poorly performing military leaders. This is a stewardship issue because it has to do with how decisions are made and how men and military materiel are spent. This is the blood and the treasure of a nation.

How does one measure the success of military leaders? One benchmark might be whether they look the part. Historically, it was important for military leaders to look gentlemanly, whether they were knights during the Middle Ages or gentlemen officers in the 19th and 20th centuries. "Looking the part" set them up for success, in some eyes, from the very beginning. The rigid class structures of many European countries meant that social distinctions and pedigree were important: senior leaders had gone to the right schools, knew the right people, and were from the right social class. The distinction between officers as gentlemen and the enlisted class was quite dramatic. But is that a measure of success?

Americans had faced a similar set of issues early in the Civil War (1861–1865) when many flag officers were political appointees, not trained

or prepared warriors. It was even worse down the ranks, as many officers were elected by their peers.

Field Marshal Sir John French led the British expeditionary force in the first year of World War I. On seeing the unprecedented destruction of early trench warfare, explosives, and machine guns, he apparently lost his nerve on the battlefield and eventually was replaced with Sir Douglas Haig. Critics can quibble over whether it took too long to replace French, but the larger questions are about whether Haig truly was a competent general for modern warfare and whether he was able to adapt. To be fair, let's dispel for a moment the fallacy that leaders in World War I should be excused because they could not have foreseen the shocking destructive power of machine guns, barbed wire, trench warfare, and so forth. This point is often used as an excuse, at least for the first year of the war, to exonerate those leaders for sending tens of thousands of men to their deaths *on a daily basis.* The "How could they have known?" argument falls apart because European armies had sent observers to the U.S. Civil War a generation earlier and had witnessed first-hand not only the advances due to rifled bullets and artillery, but also the introduction of the Gatling gun there (and on the American frontier). In fact, European armies employed machine guns in colonial conflicts across Africa and Asia in the decades before World War I. Consequently, military leaders in London, Paris, and elsewhere should have had a better appreciation for just how destructive pitched battles would be, or they should have learned more quickly not to simply throw waves of men at emplaced machine guns and artillery.

From a just war perspective, these are "likelihood of success" issues, but they are rooted in the cardinal just war principle of "legitimate authority": wars are waged under the aegis of proper political and military authorities, which demand a high level of political and strategic responsibility from elected officials, senior civilian officials, and flag officers in particular. Moreover, the nexus of authority (decisions and deeds by leaders) and likelihood of success demonstrates the multidimensionality of how the prudential jus ad bellum criteria (for example, proportionality of ends,

likelihood of success, last resort) are intertwined with the jus in bello criteria (proportionality, discrimination).

Consequently, lessons were drawn from the Crimean War and U.S. Civil War—hence other advances in weaponry on land and sea and in the air. Thus, by the first year or so of World War I, lessons should have been learned about trench warfare, barbed wire, and the rest. Yet it was throughout the entire 4 years of war that the mass group tactics continued to result in thousands of men dying in a single day. In fact, on a single day in a single battle—the first day of the Battle of the Somme—General Haig oversaw the loss of 57,000 men. His response was that people at home did not understand just how vast the battlefield was.[2]

I raise this point about firing incompetent leaders because, from the just war perspective, the first principle of jus ad bellum is legitimate political authority. For the past century, that has meant elected leaders in the West. But then they delegate battlefield authority to general officers, to admirals, and to their subordinates. So again the question arises: what should be the measure of success? This is a moral principle that involves leadership and stewardship.

Recently, military officers have thought a lot about this because of Tom Ricks's famous book *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today*.[3] Ricks is a Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist and popular historian, and *The Generals* looks at the willingness of General George Marshall during World War II, supported by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, to fire many incompetent leaders. The book also discusses some general officers' willingness to hold some of their subordinates accountable, while contrasting the Marshall era with the unwillingness, particularly during Vietnam, for political leaders to question the viewpoints of military officers and for military leaders to hold their subordinates accountable for winning. Ricks reports this is due to a shift in the U.S. military, where officers were trained for staff duties rather than to be warriors and leaders, resulting in a cautious, bureaucratic organization rather than an audacious fighting machine. Ricks argues that this is one of the reasons that the United

States was not successful in Vietnam and that it accounts for some of the missteps in Korea a decade earlier as well: poorly prepared senior officers who were better at staff work than leading a warfighting organization, an overreliance on technology, and at times some disregard (or disdain) for the common Servicemember.

In World War I, there were some isolated instances of officers, such as French General Joseph Joffre, who lost their jobs due to performance. It is more noteworthy that First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill manfully took the blame for Gallipoli in the Dardanelles campaign and resigned his position in government. He was scapegoated for a campaign that he was a mastermind in promoting but that was not effectively executed on the ground by generals and admirals. Churchill then freely went to fight in the trenches. That was a voluntary resignation. Again, the point has to do with accountability, about how we measure success, and about legitimacy. The questions for us today are multiple: do we have a culture of self-accountability where those who are promoted beyond their ken will self-select out? Will elected officials hold flag officers accountable for success? How do modern militaries define and measure the success of a military leader, ethically and prudentially, in wartime? There are many subsidiary questions to be raised here, but it is noteworthy that at the time of this writing, an anonymous U.S. Air Force officer has captured the attention of the Pentagon and beyond for his criticisms of how officers are developed and promoted.[4]

I realize that I am closing this section with both an assertion (We need to do better at having indicators of success for wartime military leaders.) and questions (How do we measure success? And why do we not fire the unsuccessful?) rather than answers. That is in part because this chapter began as an exhortatory address to military officers at the National War College in Washington, DC. But let me point to a couple of resources that may help. The first is that we must get back to the basics of winning. As Colin Powell remarked over and over again, the purpose of the U.S. military is to fight and win the Nation's wars. With that simple maxim in mind, we need to reestablish the notion that meaningful victory is our purpose. My

chapter on the "morality of victory" in an edited volume of the same title demonstrates the morality of winning as well as why the West has given up on seeking outright victory in recent years.[5] The country cannot expect to have successful military leaders on the battlefield if there is not a culture of excellence and expectation of victory. Second, there is plenty of literature on the difference between management and leadership. The U.S. military needs both. But in times of hot war, we will need well-prepared, moral warriors who will serve their nation by leading, not simply by managing numbers, accounts, and reports. Many of the experiences that they will need to be courageous, broad-thinking, risk-taking leaders who will be trusted by their troops will not be found on the campuses of war colleges, in the cubicles of the Pentagon, or managing PowerPoint presentations as staff officers. We need to think about how to put rising leaders into situations that demand physical and moral courage, perhaps as battlefield observers in foreign countries, on current deployments, and in risky natural disaster situations, in order to develop a sense of responsibility and decisionmaking under real conditions of pressure.

Technological Utilitarianism

A second moral issue from the Great War is technological utilitarianism, or the morality of technology. This is an ethics of how we fight (jus in bello) issue, which makes it different from the jus ad bellum issues of incompetent leaders.

More specifically, I am talking about just means, or what General James McConville in this volume's preface calls "doing the right thing the right way." There are multiple ways of thinking about how to do ethics. One way is to do virtue or deontological ethics, which have to do with right and wrong, good and evil, moral obligations and duties. But a different way of thinking about ethics is about what works or what might work in any given situation. One part of this utilitarian approach is a realpolitik that states the moral end of a state is its own preservation, and thus the morality of high politics and national security is quite different than the morality between individuals.

Those who take a utilitarian approach to technology argue that technology is amoral; it is simply a set of ideas that is constructed into reality, whether it is a laser, hydrogen bomb, computer, or an M16. For the utilitarian, it is how these things are used and the purpose to which they are put that define whether they are right or wrong. This is the morality of the ends justifying the means.

One might think that this is not a pressing moral issue, but it truly is. It was an issue during World War I because technological advancements were hurried to the battlefield and things such as chemical and biological agents were used, including on civilians, with the argument that the other side had them, the other side had used them, or the other side would use them sooner or later—so it is appropriate for us to do so. That is simply not right. In our modern era of warfare, this is increasingly an issue because as we automate the weapons of war, we are distancing human moral judgment from action. Think for a moment about how artificial intelligence (AI) works: an algorithm is created, and then there is an expectation that the algorithms will replicate, ultimately resulting in machine learning, and eventually an autonomous machine will make decisions. AI's fundamental DNA is an algorithm, but human agency recedes over time, and the expectation is that the autonomous interface makes the decisions. This violates just war principles of authority, just cause, and right intention, or it at least violates them if the programming is just numerical code disembodied from the kinds of virtue and deontological ethics that are the backbone of American society.

Think about how cyber warfare works. At any given second, many of America's adversaries are knocking on our cyber doors. They are trying to infiltrate our banks, intelligence secrets, and defense plans. And we have set up a sophisticated array of technological traps and walls to halt those hackers in their tracks. There is no way that a human can respond in real time to all of these threats, so we create a set of algorithms, a set of protocols that respond in nanoseconds to our adversaries. It is thrust and parry at the subatomic level occurring at the speed of light in bits and bytes. A

technologist will simply say that if it works, if it protects us, then it is okay. But this is not the way that warfare works.

We need to think in terms of not just utility but also morality, and that morality begins with thinking about who writes the code, what is his training, what are the limits, what would we be willing to do on the offense, what would we consider beyond the pale? In just war terms, who is authorizing and monitoring the content, under what conditions do we respond (and how), what are our frontiers of action (and our limits), how do we train the programmers on the ethics of technology, and how do we define supreme emergency? When it comes to nuclear deterrence, we have worried a great deal about these issues as they apply to watch officers sitting in missile silos, and we have bookshelves of books on the morality of deterrence, second- versus first-strike capacity, tactical (restrained?) versus strategic nuclear weapons, and so forth. But in 2019 and beyond, one worries that our elected leaders and our flag officers are far divorced from the young personnel sitting in cubicles who are doing the code work when it comes to these types of things.

Jus Post Bellum and the Versailles Treaties

One way to consider the moral challenges of bringing the Great War to an enduring resolution is to consider the jus post bellum criteria of order, justice, and conciliation and to see if the political objectives of leaders and the political outcomes (that is, treaties and their aftermath) at the war's end promoted these principles. As I wrote in *Ending Wars Well* and *Just American Wars*, the jus post bellum criteria can be implemented in practice by establishing the military, governance, and international security dimensions of a basic postconflict order, such as buttressing local law enforcement; investing in governance (domestic politics and institutions) and the rule of law; and ensuring a positive international security dimension, which means that the state no longer faces an imminent threat from an internal or external foe.[6] In some cases it is possible to move beyond order to justice, with a focus on the responsibility of aggressors (punishment) as well as the

needs of victims (restitution). In some cases, it is possible to come to terms with what occurred in the past and imagine some form of conciliation with past adversaries.

A look at the bargaining positions of the Big Three (Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson) suggests that the last was zealous about transcending this conservative model. Wilson envisioned revolutionary change. He did not want to rehabilitate Germany—he wanted to transform the world and earnestly believed that he had a divine mission to do so.[7] Lloyd George was in tune with the vengeance demanded by the British public, while secretly ordering his negotiating team to seek outcomes that would restore Germany to its place as a British trading partner and counterbalance to Soviet Russia. Meanwhile, Clemenceau represented French and Belgian opinion: grind the Germans in order to punish them and hold them down in perpetuity.

Clemenceau: Make Germany Suffer

The battles of World War I's Western Front were fought almost entirely in France and Belgium, and at war's end, both countries wanted significant reparations from Germany.[8] French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau wanted not only vindication but also vengeance and a new transcontinental political order that neutered the German people (Germany, Austria) and resulted in both restitution and new overseas territories for France.

Clemenceau's, and France's, memory was long. The French people were humiliated by the quick collapse of their armed forces in 1914 and over the course of the war lost 1.4 million troops and 4.3 million wounded. Parts of France were uninhabitable at war's end due to mine fields and the decimation caused by artillery shelling. But France did not just have the Great War in mind when it demanded German reparations. A generation earlier, in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), Germany had humiliated the French army, seized territory, marched victoriously through the streets of Paris, and forced the French to pay a 5-billion-franc indemnity.[9]

Consequently, the French citizenry were unified in demanding a pound of flesh from Germany and its allies but were also riven by political

intrigue and factionalization, from the French right to surging communists enthused by events in Russia. Certainly, the French wanted some form of justice, but typical sentiments went far beyond justice to revenge. Not only did the French want to see Germany and its allies take responsibility and make amends for what had been done, but France also wanted to hurt Germany: most French citizens wanted the satisfaction of seeing Germany as a country, as a set of leaders, and as a people expiate French losses through German pain and suffering. As French President Raymond Poincare stated in a 1922 speech:

> *You who witnessed these horrors, you who saw your parents, wives, children fall under German bullets, how could you be expected to understand and stand idly by if today, after our victory, there were people sufficiently blind to advise you to leave unpunished the actions of such outrages, and to allow Germany to keep the indemnities she owes.*[10]

What was galling was that the war actually never touched German soil: the German armies, however weak, marched home at war's end. This was a stark contrast to the wastelands of France and Belgium. So the French public and its leadership, as well as many among their allies in the publics of Belgium, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, wanted to crucify Germany. This was not vindication; it was vindictiveness of a very human kind.

In practice, this policy of revenge as well as France's understanding of the strategic landscape resulted in policies designed to weaken Germany and its closest allies so that a German state could never threaten France again. For example, the Austro-Hungarian empire was dismembered, but independent, German-speaking Austria was left with only a small, landlocked territory and a legal prohibition from merging with Germany. Germany's first reparation payment alone was the staggering equivalent of $5 billion today, not to mention the unique language of the Versailles Treaty blaming the war on Kaiser Wilhelm II and Berlin. John Maynard Keynes observed:

*So far as possible . . . it was the policy of France to set the clock back
and undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accom-
plished. By loss of territory and other measures her population
was to be curtailed; but chiefly the economic system, upon which
she depended for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron,
coal, and transport must be destroyed. If France could seize, even
in part, what Germany was compelled to drop, the inequality of
strength between the two rivals for European hegemony might be
remedied for generations.*[11]

Lloyd George: Short-Term Politics and Long-Term Statesmanship

David Lloyd George served in many cabinet posts before taking over as
prime minister in 1916. He did not begin as a hawk, arguing early on that
war with Germany, if it could be averted, was not in Great Britain's interest
because the two were major trading partners and such a war could have
disastrous consequences. Lloyd George was a shrewd and bold elected
official overseeing a coalition government. His own Liberal Party was
fractured between his faction and that of H.H. Asquith, and Lloyd George
consistently looked to the Conservative Party for support. Like many
politicians, he gave hundreds of speeches, interviews, and commentaries,
from Whitehall to newspaper interviews. Thus, on the one hand, he was
the leader of a powerful empire and, on the other, he had to be responsive
to public opinion in a bruised and vengeful country. In fact, he faced an
election the very week of the 1918 armistice.

Consequently, one finds many statements by Lloyd George about
what should be done with Germany, but for our purposes we will only
look at two. The first is a public campaign statement made in November
1918. The second is a memorandum, marked "Secret," for internal use by
the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in March 1919. In
general, it is noteworthy that Lloyd George's primary consideration was
to balance justice with long-term European order and to focus sharp-
est attention narrowly on Germany's leaders while providing a path of

targeted retributive justice that would ultimately restore Germany to the community of nations.

Lloyd George's campaign speeches were in tune with a public weary of war and hungry for victory and vengeance. Shortly before the elections, he stated "that German industrial capacity 'will go a pretty long way'" and that "[w]e must have . . . the uttermost farthing" and 'shall search their pockets for it.' As the campaign closed, he summarized his program:

- trial of the exiled Kaiser Wilhelm II
- punishment of those guilty of atrocities
- fullest indemnity from Germany
- Britain for the British, socially and industrially
- rehabilitation of those broken in the war
- a happier country for all.[12]

This was Lloyd George's *public* position during an election cycle, and although it is tough on Germany and its allies, it is certainly not nearly as harsh as it could have been. Lloyd George calls for a juridical process for holding accountable the individual widely seen as responsible for orchestrating the war by goading Austria-Hungary into invading Serbia in the first place—Kaiser Wilhelm II. The Germans were also considered guilty of "atrocities," particularly in the early days of the war in what historians call the "rape of Belgium." These atrocities included the massacre of thousands of civilians,[13] destruction of over 25,000 homes as well as public buildings, and displacement of nearly one-fifth of Belgium's population in August–September 1914.

In public pronouncements, Lloyd George also called for the "fullest indemnity" from Germany. Later we will look specifically at what the Versailles and other treaties demanded of Germany and its allies and what Britain was to receive. The key point, for the British electorate, was that Germany had started the war and was responsible for nearly one million dead (about 700,000 British troops killed and another 250,000 from Australia,

Canada, and other imperial dominions) and 2.27 million wounded.[14] Germany (and its allies) should make atonement, and that payment should be for most or all of the cost of the war.

But Lloyd George had a different strategy for the private negotiations at Versailles. In a secret cable he laid out some considerations for the negotiating position of the British government and, by extension, the Allies. Lloyd George recognized the tensions inherent in trying to actualize a new European political order in the face of spreading communism, widespread desolation, and calls for rough justice. Here are Lloyd George's reflections and directions to the British negotiating team:

> When nations are exhausted by wars in which they have put forth all their strength and which leave them tired, bleeding and broken, it is not difficult to patch up a peace that may last until the generation which experienced the horrors of the war has passed away. Pictures of heroism and triumph only tempt those who know nothing of the sufferings and terrors of war. It is therefore comparatively easy to patch up a peace which will last for 30 years. . . . What is difficult, however, is to draw up a peace which will not provoke a fresh struggle when those who have had practical experience of what war means have passed away. History has proved that a peace which has been hailed by a victorious nation as a triumph of diplomatic skill and statesmanship, even of moderation in the long run has proved itself to be shortsighted and charged with danger to the victor. . . .

> You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; all the same in the end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of 1919 she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors. The impression, the deep impression, made upon the human heart by four years of unexampled slaughter will disappear with the hearts upon which it has been marked by the terrible sword of the great war. The maintenance of peace will then depend

upon there being no causes of exasperation constantly stirring up the spirit of patriotism, of justice or of fair play to achieve redress. Our terms may be severe, they may be stern and even ruthless but at the same time they can be so just that the country on which they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no right to complain. But injustice, arrogance, displayed in the hour of triumph will never be forgotten or forgiven. . . .

If Germany goes over to the spartacists it is inevitable that she should throw in her lot with the Russian Bolshevists. Once that happens all Eastern Europe will be swept into the orbit of the Bolshevik revolution and within a year we may witness the spectacle of nearly three hundred million people organised into a vast red army under German instructors and German generals equipped with German cannon and German machine guns and prepared for a renewal of the attack on Western Europe. This is a prospect which no one can face with equanimity. Yet the news which came from Hungary yesterday shows only too clearly that this danger is no fantasy. . . .

If we are wise, we shall offer to Germany a peace, which while just, will be preferable for all sensible men to the alternative of Bolshevism. I would, therefore, put it in the forefront of the peace that once she accepts our terms, especially reparation, we will open to her the raw materials and markets of the world on equal terms with ourselves, and will do everything possible to enable the German people to get upon their legs again. We cannot both cripple her and expect her to pay.[15]

Lloyd George argued that efforts at justice should not undermine security (order), nor should punishment make long-term conciliation impossible. He was writing with real-world events in mind, including the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, communists (Spartacists) marching across Germany, and communist agitation (the day before writing this memorandum)

in Hungary. Lloyd George recognized that the Paris Peace Conference needed to not push Germany's vast population and industrial strength into the hands of Vladimir Lenin and his ilk.

Lloyd George summarizes that justice may be "severe," "stern," and even "ruthless, but at the same time they can be so just that the country on which they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no right to complain." He thus represented the positions of a wise statesman and wily politician. He understood that there was tension between the vengeance demanded by many Western publics and the realities of the great game of high politics. He focused attention on punishing Germany, but doing so in a way that made it unlikely that communists could take over the country. At the same time, he understood that Germany required some economic success if it was to be able to pay its reparations bills to London and the other Allies; it was in the best interests of the United Kingdom for its trading partner, Germany, to return to the world stage as an active economic player.

Wilson: Idealism in Transforming the World

"The moral climax of this, the culminating and final war for human liberty, has come." This is how President Wilson closed his famous Fourteen Points speech to a joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918. This dramatic proclamation was not just an oratorical flourish in the moment; rather, it illustrated the transformational, moralistic, and revolutionary nature of Wilson's desired outcome for World War I. In short, Wilson did not simply seek a return to the status quo ante bellum or even a revised international order that included some targeted punishment of aggression. Wilson sought a revolution of the global order, an end to the old institutional arrangements that had governed Europe and much of the globe for the preceding three centuries and a new system based on the self-determination of ethno-linguistic groups. Wilson's Fourteen Points attempted to end history.

When one reads Wilson's famous speech a century later, it does not seem revolutionary or transformational. All the talk of transparency, democracy, openness, the aspirations of ethnic and national groups, and

a league of nations seems consonant with the spirit of our times and the goals of most citizens in most places since at least 1989, if not 1945. On the other hand, if one is suspicious that Wilson actually meant what he said, one could see it as the canny speech of a veteran politician in that it tries to bypass Europe's elites by speaking directly to the masses. Furthermore, Wilson rhetorizes—with little practical detail—utopian but impractical goals.

But Wilson's objective really was a brave new world. First, Wilson distinguishes not simply between the militarists and "the more liberal statesmen," but more importantly, between elites and the revolutionary spirit of the masses. He identifies the former as the old order, made up of that "military and imperialistic minority." In contrast, Wilson presents an almost Hegelian tone when speaking of the people whom "liberal statesmen" in Europe represent: "to feel the force of their own peoples' thought and purpose." Wilson asserts that there is a universal spirit of freedom advancing across the globe. This is a revolution. Today's reader is probably surprised that Wilson's exemplar is not the United States or any other Western power or even the unleashed energies in the collapsing empires of Central Europe, but rather the populace of Russia that was at the time going through the Communist Revolution. He states that the "voice of the Russian people" is calling for universal "definitions of principle and purpose," which to Wilson was "thrilling and compelling" because "their soul is not subservient" despite reverses on the battlefield, and they "have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe." He concluded that the Russian people's "utmost hope" is not for vindication or vengeance, but for "liberty and ordered peace":

> It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see

*very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done
to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program;
and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this.*[16]

In addition to Wilson's confidence in the spirit of a new age, so too he
presents a dramatic reshaping of how politics should work. He derides the
formal institutions, customs, and courtesies of yesteryear's political elites:
it "is an age that is dead and gone." The practice of princes and generals,
remote from the trenches, playing global chess in their ornate staterooms
and making "secret covenants" that "upset the peace of the world" is over:
"the day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by." High politics should
not be the domain of elites making secret bargains and competing for land
and resources with little thought for the faceless everyman; high politics
should be practiced in the light of day with the best interests of the global
citizenry in mind.

Today's reader is typically familiar with the first few of Wilson's Four-
teen Points, which outline what today we call a liberal international order.
In 2019, they do not sound revolutionary:

- Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at . . . but diplomacy shall
  proceed always frankly and in the public view.
- Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas.
- The removal . . . of all economic barriers and the establishment of an
  equality of trade conditions among all the nations.
- Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments
  will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with *domestic* safety
  (note that Wilson states domestic, not international—this is a very
  dramatic statement).

In 1918, these goals sounded radical, and they struck at the old impe-
rial order of not only America's enemies but also its closest allies. Wilson
called for "open" and "public" negotiations and peace treaties, whereas the
high politics of Europe typically involved private diplomacy among elites.

Professional diplomats and government officials assert that such privacy is absolutely necessary to enable the opportunities for negotiation and compromise; indeed, even the U.S. Continental Congress had to go into private sessions to complete its most important documents. But Wilson's argument struck at the motives of those in power. He was effectively arguing that the national interest was often out of touch with the interests of local people on the ground, and thus peace settlements typically just moved around pieces of geography between kings with little regard for the sentiments of the populace.

The issues of "free navigation" and "free trade" also were a blow to most of the world's leading powers, including mercantilist Britain and France. Colonies such as India and in Africa provided raw materials to the imperial center as well as markets for finished goods, and these patterns of exchange were typically protected by a web of laws and policies that were well-known to American colonists in 1776. Thus, Wilson was calling for a transformation of international markets and trade that would primarily affect his closest Allies and their colonial dominions.

Wilson also called for dramatic disarmament: "Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." Again, he does not call for national armaments reduced to the lowest point consistent with "international security" but rather "domestic safety." Clearly weapons do not cause a war, but a criticism of the arms industry was that the United States, along with its Allies, prolonged the war by profiting through wide-scale production of ammunition, weapons, and munitions. This issue of military and industrial readiness ultimately came back to haunt the United States when it was forced to enter the war.

Much more could be said about Wilson's Fourteen Points, but only one more point needs to be made. What is missing from the speech? Wilson has little to say about justice. Indeed, it is clear that what is most important to Wilson is avoiding punishment and seeking a form of global conciliation based on the creation of a new world order. In other words, Wilson is trying

to leap through conciliation to a new 20th-century order without dealing with the elements of the 19th-century order that still existed and handling the justice issues present in the minds of Europeans, especially in Brussels, Rome, Paris, and London. Wilson was correct that 1919 was not just a new year but a new epoch, but many of his ideas would not become enshrined in such a charter until 1945, and it was not just his Allies abroad that resisted him: Congress and many Americans were suspicious of his grandiose plans as inviting risk and expense to the United States.

When we think about ethics at war's end, we need to be humble in the attempt to establish enduring order in all its dimensions and then think through whether efforts at justice bring resolution and chart a path toward conciliation, or if ethics are instead a fig leaf for vengeance in ways that are counterproductive.[17] Statesmen will practice creativity and restraint and will need the help of military and diplomatic leaders to bring conflict to a real ending.

Conclusion

One might make the mistake of thinking that we have not learned from the lessons of the past, that we learned nothing from "the war to end all wars." That would be inaccurate. Although there remain things to learn, such as having mechanisms—and the will—to hold ineffective leaders accountable, nevertheless some policies and practices have changed. Here are a few things that the United States and its allies have learned or have changed for the better.

First, General John "Black Jack" Pershing, leader of the American Expeditionary Forces in 1917–1918, created the Military Police (MP). In fact, he set up the first MP school in France on his authority. The training and development of MPs are important for security, discipline, and accountability.

Second, World War I added impetus to law of armed conflict jurisprudence and moral thinking. Sadly, this was largely due, at least in part, to the use of chemical and biological agents on the battlefield. The Hague

Conventions of 1907 were given a fresh look, and various additional protocols, later resulting in the Geneva Conventions, began to develop.

Third, the postwar world heightened the accountability of political leaders, and elites more generally, to their publics. There was a sense in the United Kingdom, France, and elsewhere that elites had dragged the citizenry into the war and that it was not just royalty, such as the Russian tsar, German emperor, or Austro-Hungarian emperor, but political and business elites who profited from the war but did not have skin in the game. There was a global democratic reaction across societies against political elites who did not have to pay in blood, sweat, and tears for this terrible war. This resulted in democratic impulses in Wilson's Fourteen Points and across Europe's masses. Some of those energies were common people who got caught up in socialistic types of movements, such as the Spartacist movement, but the point should be made that these were often mass movements for greater rights and greater accountability of their leaders. By war's end, four empires were destroyed and many new countries were born in what Samuel Huntington famously labeled the "first wave of democracy."

Fourth, today we do noncombatant immunity and protection of innocents (discrimination) much better than we did during World War I. We should feel proud about this. One of the lessons in the past 100 years has been an increasing emphasis on protecting prisoners of war, noncombatants, civilians, women and children, the weak, and the elderly. This emphasis has been led by Western governments who fought in the trenches of World War I. Similarly, we fight with far greater precision (proportionality) than a century ago. In 1918 our artillery, airplanes, battleships, and other weapons were largely indiscriminate. The United States in particular has led advances in targeted precision weaponry that are a dramatic and positive change over the past.

Finally, in the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and elsewhere, the professionalization of our services means far greater stewardship of resources. It means less likelihood of untrained recruits doing things they should not on the battlefield. It also means a much more thoughtful

and accountable generation of Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who are fighting the Nation's wars. We are much more professional today than we were a century ago when mass armies fought across the European theater, and hopefully we will continue to be wise learners so that future generations can point to 2019 and say that we were careful to consider the moral content of our plans and deeds.

Notes

¹ For a basic explication of just war principles, see Eric D. Patterson, *Just War Thinking* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007). Also see James Turner Johnson, *The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

² John Keegan, *The First World War* (London: Vintage, 2012).

³ Thomas E. Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today* (New York: Penguin Books, 2012).

⁴ A U.S. Air Force officer, using the pseudonym "Ned Stark," has published multiple articles that have drawn attention from the ranks all the way up to the Service's Chief of Staff General David Goldfein. A summary of the debate can be found in Brian Ferguson, "Goldfein Reaches out to 'Ned Stark,' Critic of Air Force Promotion System," *Stars and Stripes,* August 21, 2018.

⁵ See Eric D. Patterson, "Moral Victory and the Just War Tradition," in *Moral Victories: Ethics, Exit Strategies, and the Ending of Wars,* ed. Cian O'Driscoll and Andrew Hom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

⁶ Eric D. Patterson, *Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Post-Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), and *American Just Wars* (London: Routledge, 2019).

⁷ Milan Babik, "George D. Herron and the Eschatological Foundations of Woodrow Wilson's Foreign Policy, 1917–1919," available at <www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44254537.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab8602106a88ef4013fd43fe669139c6a>; Lloyd Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Cara Lea Burnidge*, A Peaceful Conquest: Woodrow Wilson, Religion, and the New World Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016); Barry Hankins*, Woodrow Wilson: Ruling Elder, Spiritual President* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Malcolm D. Magee*, What the World Should Be: Woodrow Wilson and the Crafting of a Faith-Based Foreign Policy* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2008).

⁸ Belgium's King Albert argued against draconian punishment of Germany (and the dethroning of so many Central European monarchs) as destabilizing; he wanted reparations but did not want an anti-monarchical set of dominos falling with the tsar already gone and Kaiser Wilhelm in exile.

⁹ This amount was another example of "tit for tat": it was based on the amount Napoleon had forced on Prussia in 1807.

¹⁰ Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: 6 Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2007), 214.

[11] John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of Peace* (London: MacMillan, 1920), 32.

[12] Alfred F. Havighurst, *Britain in Transition: The Twentieth Century,* 4th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 1985), 107.

[13] According to two databases as reported by Wikipedia, "Throughout the beginning of the war, the German army engaged in numerous atrocities against the civilian population of Belgium, including the destruction of civilian property; 6,000 Belgians were killed, and 17,700 died during expulsion, deportation, imprisonment, or a death sentence by court. 25,000 homes and other buildings in 837 communities were destroyed in 1914 alone, and 1.5 million Belgians (20% of the entire population) fled from the invading German army."

[14] John Graham Royde-Smith, "World War I: Killed, Wounded, and Missing," in *Encyclopedia Britannica,* available at <www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I/Killed-wounded-and-missing>.

[15] Lloyd Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism (*Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 88.

[16] See "President Wilson's Fourteen Points, Delivered in Joint Session, January 8, 1918," available at <https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points>.

[17] Eric D. Patterson, ed., *Ethics Beyond War's End* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012).

The Law of the Great War as an Ethical Paradigm, 1918–2038

By Michael H. Hoffman

T he law of war as recognizable to modern military leaders comes from World War I in both its form and practice. Though the basic rules guiding care for the wounded and sick and the protection of captured enemy combatants and civilians long predate the Great War, no historical inevitability dictated the makeup of the law of war as it has formed over the past hundred years.

The modern law of war is in many ways the Law of the Great War. The paradigm has strengths and weaknesses, but it was not inevitable that today's legal framework would come into force and play such an important role in military planning and operations. If this is understood, it makes it easier for military and civilian leaders to visualize contemporary rules as a paradigm shaped by events—but one that could have taken a different form and could do so in the future.

This chapter does not present an analysis of the current law of war. It provides the background and context for these rules that have been influenced so greatly by the Great War and its aftermath. The rules could change again, with or without strategic insight being employed to shape them, and with or without influential input from democratic states that strive to implement them. They could alter for better or worse.

Foundations (1863–1907)

Military leaders are accustomed to implementing laws of war as found in treaties such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Hopefully, they have the benefit of able counsel by judge advocates to help them interpret and apply the law. However, this paradigm is not timeless; it is one that solidified during and after World War I.

For many centuries, the rules of war were almost entirely contained in customary rules *applied on the battlefield*. Protection for captured and wounded combatants and civilians, hospitals, towns, property, and civilian infrastructure relied on combatant compliance with customary rules that had the force of law.[1] By 1914, a large part of the law of war was solidly founded in treaty-based rules. Whether the new trend to codify rules of war would survive a major military conflict, however, remained to be seen. The transformation from custom to treaty began 50 years earlier and did survive the challenge. It is useful to consider this transition; it provides an opportunity to compare and contrast the customary law paradigm from the treaty-centered one that exists today.

In 1859, Swiss businessman Henry Dunant found himself deeply engaged in work with civilians to care for surviving wounded soldiers carried from the battlefield in Solferino, Italy. In 1862, Dunant wrote *A Memory of Solferino* in which he called for the establishment of medical teams on the battlefield. His tireless work following the book's publication led to the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the first national Red Cross societies in 1863.[2] One element of familiar modern humanitarianism—the role of nonstate actors—was thus established. In 1863, a key element of modern military practice also took form with the first comprehensive codification of rules of war promulgated for the U.S. Army, then engaged in the American Civil War.

That codification, officially titled General Orders No. 100 and more generally known as the Lieber Code, became influential in shaping thought and practice on implementing the law of war. This process accelerated with

the adoption of the first Geneva Convention in 1864, which established protected status for military medical workers and civilians caring for wounded and sick on the field.[3] The move from application of centuries-old customary law on the battlefield to the implementation of explicit, codified rules was under way. Though customary law remains a potentially important element in current and future rules of war, this form of international law began moving into the open by the late 19th century.

In the same era, diplomats and private organizations claimed a prominent role in promotion and development of this growing system of treaty-based rules for application in both peace and war. The transportation and communication revolutions of the mid-19th century (steamships, railroads, telegraph) opened new possibilities in international relations. One consequence was that civilians gained significant influence in developing the law of war and were no longer confined to describing it in scholarly writing as had been the case in earlier generations.

In 1907, the *American Journal of International Law* published an optimistic article titled "The International Congresses and Conferences of the Last Century as Forces Working Toward the Solidarity of the World."[4] While the author identified only a miniscule handful of instances where international conferences were held between the Middle Ages and 1840s, he found more than 300 held between 1850 and 1906 on a wide range of subjects. Some of the latter were state sponsored, such as the International Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899 that adopted the world's first systematic series of treaties to regulate warfare, and others were conducted by private organizations today known as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).[5]

In the late 19th century, an international peace movement emerged that promoted the building of international institutions and writing international law to resolve disputes. This new form of advocacy was exemplified by initiation of the long-running annual Mohonk conferences on international arbitration that began in 1895. Edward Everett Hale, the prominent 19th-century American clergyman and writer, was a driving force in promoting law as the preferred mode to resolve international disputes.[6] He

argued for the emerging wisdom of international law at the first Mohonk conference: "Why was not Henry IV. [*sic*] right in proposing a United States of Europe? Why not have a Permanent Tribunal to which all questions now leading to war might be referred?"[7] The international reach of this view was not only supported by the groundbreaking conference of 1899 but also reaffirmed at the Second International Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907, which generated new and replacement law of war treaties building on those adopted in 1899.[8] By 1914, the rules of war were shifting, gradually but noticeably, from custom to treaty, and civilians were beginning to have their say in the interpretation and application of international law.

The law of war and its modern context were taking form. However, this trend could have been snuffed out by the Great War. Instead, the combatants began applying the new rules in the best case, and in the worst arguing that their actions were at least compatible with international law even when they were not. World War I was the watershed that secured the emergence of the law of war paradigm that we know today.

The Law of the Great War (1914–1918)

Modern state practice in communicating the purpose of going to war began moving decisively to an international law context in 1914. The deliberations by the British cabinet, and ultimate declaration of war by England against Germany, were as strongly influenced by the German breach of Belgian neutrality in violation of international law as by security concerns. That breach of international law also turned world opinion against Germany.[9]

Proof that an international law paradigm was also coming to play a role in American public thinking comes from the title and content of James M. Beck's *The Evidence in the Case: An Analysis of the Diplomatic Records Submitted by England, Germany, Russia and Belgium in the Supreme Court of Civilization, and the Conclusions Deducible as to the Moral Responsibility for the War*, which was published in 1914. Beck, although now largely forgotten, was once a prominent member of the American bar.[10] The ideas presented in his book were widely circulated in magazine form even before the book's

publication, and his writings offered early notice that international law had assumed a place in public thinking on war and international relations.[11]

That influence grew as U.S. opinion turned negative toward Germany's aggressive submarine campaign against neutral trade. Between 1915 and 1917, international law assumed a growing place in public and official views. Ultimately, growing diplomatic tensions that followed the sinking of commercial vessels with large-scale loss of civilian lives led to the U.S. declaration of war against Germany.[12] The British decision to go to war in 1914, and the U.S. decision to follow 3 years after, was shaped by international law, and not by just war theory, theology, or ethics.

International law as applied in land warfare also played a prominent role in the fight for world opinion. This field of application still balanced between customary practice and application of the new Hague Rules of 1907. The harsh German military government in occupied territory resulted in extensive reports of breaches of customary and treaty law and turned opinion against Germany.[13]

Neither side resolved emerging issues relating to the application of international law to new technologies and domains. They did not arrive at answers to the legality of chemical weapons, and they grappled with practical issues that came up regarding aerial targeting and overflight of neutral airspace. Despite the slow start in addressing these challenges, by 1918 it was clear that international law was more than a side issue in the planning and execution of war; it was a major factor in strategic political and operational military planning.

In principle and sometimes in practice, international law was now a key factor in ethical decisionmaking. To that extent, modern military practitioners would find the role of the law of war as it existed by the end of World War I quite familiar. The institutional and political context in which the law of war developed by 1918 would also be familiar. However, the experience of the Great War strengthened the trend toward treaty-making as the dominant paradigm used for ethical problem-solving in war. The influence of that paradigm has endured ever since.

The Law of the Great War as the Dominant Ethical Paradigm (1918–2019)

The centennial of the armistice also brings us close to another noteworthy anniversary that helped shape modern influences on the law of war. The adoption of the United Nations (UN) Charter in 1945 is seen as a historic moment in the development of international institutions. However, the starting point for universal reliance on international organizations such as forums for ethical deliberation traces to the founding of the League of Nations. At the strategic level, law of war practitioners need to consider the diplomatic domain, in which trends favorable or unfavorable to the credibility and utility of those rules play out.

Part I of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 was the Covenant of the League of Nations.[14] Though the organization ultimately failed as a source of international security, in concept it assumed missions similar to those of the UN as a matter of law and diplomatic practice. Article 10 of the covenant states that the "Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."[15]

In addition to military security, the administrative units of the league included staff sections that were responsible for human rights and humanitarian responsibilities not unlike those now assigned UN staff. As successor to the league, the diplomatic and operational role of the UN cannot be disregarded as a source of influence on application and interpretation of the law of war. The league's administrative units included some responsible for "minorities questions,"[16] the still-remembered and controversial mandates governing colonies,[17] health,[18] social questions (that included trafficking in women and children[19]), and disarmament.[20] There was also a refugee service first known as the High Commissioner for Refugees and later as the Nansen International Office for Refugees.[21]

War crimes trials were not an entirely new development by the out-break of World War I. However, they were not commonplace and were not a general object of attention in popular or official thinking about international events. This component of the law of war is also a legacy of the Great War. The Versailles Treaty provided for the trial of the former German emperor "for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties"[22] and of other Germans "accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war."[23] Under pressure by the Allied powers, 12 defendants were tried in German courts with 6 convicted and given light sentences.[24]

Attempts to have the postwar Turkish government secure justice for massacres perpetrated by the Ottoman government were also inconclusive. Three Ottoman leaders were convicted and sentenced to death in absentia. The executions were never carried out (two of the defendants were assassinated along with other Ottoman officials implicated in massacres of Armenians.[25]) An international tribunal led by England was supposed to try other Ottoman defendants but never came to fruition.[26] These outcomes were not without longer term impact. Moreover, this uncertain start was followed by historically and legally important trials following World War II. Between 1945 and 1948, over 8,000 war crimes trials were conducted across Europe and Asia.[27]

The Great War might have ended the move toward codification of the law of war, but it did not. If anything, it encouraged a move to expand the range of issues and technologies covered by treaty. Treaties adopted into the 1920s addressed chemical and bacteriological weapons and attempted to address submarine and aerial warfare with treaties that were never adopted and thus did not go into force.[28] Though not adopted, they did validate the assumption that treaties were the required approach to address emerging law of war challenges.

The treaty-based approach to humanitarian protection and to restrictions on means and methods of war was also validated in the postwar era. In 1929, experience with prisoners of war led to the adoption of the Geneva

Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the first treaty specifically dedicated to their protection. In 1938, on the eve of World War II, the 16th International Red Cross Conference in London called for adoption of a treaty for the protection of civilians in wartime.[29]

The treaty-based paradigm continued to dominate after World War II with the adoption of four new Geneva Conventions in 1949. These replaced their predecessor treaties and apply to the protection of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked of armed forces, prisoners of war, and civilians. Since then, some 20 other treaties and protocols have been negotiated that address varied aspects of the law of war.[30]

The Implications for Future Rules of War (2019–2038)

The existing law of war paradigm is centered on treaties, public international organizations, and war crimes tribunals. It is founded on expectations, new a hundred years ago but certainly not any longer, that international law is the preferred mode to address humanitarian challenges in war. It has prevailed to the point of being the default ethical paradigm in war. This paradigm has the virtue of specificity. The rules of war are now extensively set out in treaty form. No treaty can ever anticipate all challenges, but the rules in place provide more guidance than can be obtained from customary law. The weakness is that reliance on treaties and, most recently, on war crimes tribunals has perhaps stifled initiative that could advance humanitarian practice in war by an appeal to the ethical dimension of the profession of arms. The center of gravity on military ethics in war has also shifted, in some respects, to NGOs and international organizations that interpret the law without necessarily accepting it as a source of authority for legitimate military action.

Over the next generation, we should expect continuing trends that challenge the law of war construct and thus the still-powerful Great War legal paradigm. These trends will include persistent use of international law in information warfare against democratic societies, fragmentation of war by the addition of newly emerging nonstate actors, continuation

of the scourge of mass atrocities and genocide, and proliferation of new technologies that defy efforts to draw a hard line between war and peace.

Cyber war illustrates the technological challenge in drawing an ethical or legal framework for new capabilities and domains. As often observed, attacks conducted in cyberspace are potentially as devastating as those launched with kinetic weapons but do not require state actors or state sponsorship. Globalization has created other challenges. Terrorist organizations projecting regional and global military threats defy traditional categorization of war as either internal (for example, civil wars) or international, thereby confounding attempts to address terrorism with reference to established rules of war.[31]

Informational misuse of international law and brutal violations of the rules of war by some state and nonstate actors are endemic. States that do not respect the rule of law domestically are sometimes quick to use international law as a blunt propaganda instrument against those that do. This is highlighted by the persistent misuse of international human rights law and the law of war for propaganda purposes by some states—seated on the UN Human Rights Council—that oppress and brutalize their own populations at home.[32] Some state and nonstate actors continue to commit mass atrocities and genocide.[33]

The armed forces of democratic societies and diplomatic services of their governments need to maintain effective advocacy that supports principled use of military force. Principled use does not mean hesitant or ineffective use. However, in light of the informational challenges before us, it will take real work to maintain the distinction between practical and impractical application of the rules of war. The proliferation of new combat environments and actors will continue to challenge familiar military experience and, sometimes, the utility of existing international law.

New interdisciplinary methodologies should also be nurtured to incorporate ethical decisionmaking and religious considerations, along with law of war training and education, to prepare members of the armed forces for humanitarian decisionmaking in war. Such preparation will also be

required for ethical decisionmaking in scenarios that defy traditional categorization as either war or peace. Despite these changes, the Law of the Great War paradigm still offers indispensable protection and proof that the world still needs the law of war.

Both customary and treaty-centered rules of war evolved to meet real problems. They evolved in a state-centric world that is not going away any time in the near future, even though new actors and capabilities challenge the international system. The established law of war is essential to preservation of humanity in military conflict, but we should look to ethical and religious sources of authority for a fresh perspective and perhaps new approaches.

We should not assume, without reflection, that the Law of the Great War is our only paradigm; there may be others. Our best approach to advance humanitarian protection in war may encompass a new, interdisciplinary paradigm. If we construct that paradigm, we can reinvigorate the law of war legacy of the Great War for continuing humanitarian effect through the rest of this promising and transformative century.

Notes

[1] Geoffrey Best, *Humanity in Warfare* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 59–67.

[2] Pierre Boisser, *From Solferino to Tsushima: History of the International Committee of the Red Cross* (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1978), 47–49, 70–83.

[3] Best, *Humanity in Warfare*, 150–156.

[4] Simeon E. Baldwin, "The International Congresses and Conferences of the Last Century as Forces Working Toward the Solidarity of the World," *American Journal of International Law* 1, no. 3 (July 1907), 565–578, available at <www.jstor.org/stable/2186820>.

[5] Ibid.

[6] "Edward Everett Hale," *The Advocate of Peace* 71, no. 7 (July 1909), 150–151, available at <www.jstor.org/stable/20665757>.

[7] "Edward Everett Hale's Address," in "Proceedings of the Mohonk Arbitration Conference," *The Advocate of Peace* 57, no. 7 (July 1895), 163, available at <www.jstor.org/stable/20665330>.

[8] Best, *Humanity in Warfare*, 139–141.

[9] Isabel V. Hull, *A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law During the Great War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 33–41.

[10] "Majority of James M. Beck Papers Now Available Online," Princeton University Archives, available at <https://blogs.princeton.edu/mudd/2016/02/majority-of-james-m-beck-papers-now-available-online/>.

[11] James M. Beck, *The Evidence in the Case: An Analysis of the Diplomatic Records Submitted by England, Germany, Russia, and Belgium in the Supreme Court of Civilization, and the Conclusions Deducible as to the Moral Responsibility for the War* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1914), publisher's note, unnumbered page, 195–200.

[12] Hull, *A Scrap of Paper*, 259–265.

[13] James Wilford Garner, *International Law and the World War*, vol. 2, rpt. ed. (London: Longman's, Green and Co., 1920), 58–185.

[14] "The Versailles Treaty: June 28, 1919," Part I, Yale Law School, Avalon Project, available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp>.

[15] "The Versailles Treaty," Part I, Article 10, available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp>.

[16] Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945), 109–111.

[17] Ibid., 116–117.

[18] Ibid., 120–123.

[19] Ibid., 125–126.

[20] Ibid., 128–130.

[21] Ibid., 86.

[22] "The Versailles Treaty," Part VII, Article 227, available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partvii.asp>.

[23] Ibid., Article 228.

[24] Thomas J. Shaw, *World War I Law and Lawyers: Issues, Cases, and Characters* (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2014), 388–392.

[25] Ibid., 394–395.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Dan Plesch, *Human Rights after Hitler: The Lost History of Prosecuting Axis War Crimes* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 90–91.

[28] Hull, *A Scrap of Paper*, 272–274.

[29] André Durand, *From Sarajevo to Hiroshima: History of the International Committee of the Red Cross* (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1978), 383–389.

[30] Office of General Counsel, *Department of Defense Law of War Manual* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2015, updated December 2016), 1148–1154, available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190>.

[31] Michael H. Hoffman, "Rescuing the Law of War: A Way Forward in an Era of Global Terrorism," *Parameters* 35 (Summer 2005): 18–35, available at <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/05summer/hoffman.pdf>.

[32] "President Donald J. Trump Is Standing Up for Human Rights at the UN," fact sheet, June 21, 2018, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-standing-human-rights-u-n/>.

[33] U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, available at <www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/about>.

Ethical Praxis
in Diverse Settings

Society and Intensive Conflict

By David Richardson

On a well-known Internet auction site, it is quite easy to find the commemorative medals that Great Britain and the United States issued to veterans of the Great War. Both nations used the identical phrase on the reverse of the medal—*The Great War for Civilisation*. However odd such an inscription might seem a century later, it clearly had a contemporary resonance. Moving to the next war, the resonance continues. In his thoughtful account of the closing days of World War II, Max Hastings argues that the character of the conflict in Western Europe was determined by the character of the Western democracies themselves. The armies of Great Britain, the United States, and their associates, he suggests, may have lacked the ruthless military prowess and determination of the German and Soviet forces, but they "fought as bravely and well as any democracy could ask, if the values of civilization were to be retained in their ranks."[1] When Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt invoked "Christian civilization" in public pronouncements as the grand cause worthy of sacrifice, they were not so much making a religious statement as appealing to a shared sense of identity, one that they expected their listeners to understand and relate to.[2] Eighty years later, it is by no means obvious that this shared identity still holds.

As peace returned to the shattered remains of Europe in 1945, there were still reasons for hope. West of the Oder, at least, liberal democracy

seemed to strike deeper roots than ever before. This went hand in hand with a prosperity that for once seemed to be following a solid upward trajectory. From across the Atlantic Ocean, the United States abandoned isolationism and committed itself to be both the guardian and bankroller of freedom. Although the Cold War waxed and waned for decades, Marxism-Leninism was essentially seen off the stage after 1990. It seemed as if the unstoppable liberal democratic steamroller would flatten a global path for economic and personal freedom. However, all was not quite as it seemed.

Before we look at how the course of history unraveled after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is useful to lay out—with a broad brush—some of the suppositions that had driven Western society up to this point. From the fall of Rome until the Enlightenment, the world was essentially bound by religious horizons, symbolized most powerfully by the Holy Roman Emperor kneeling in the snow at Canossa. Architecture, art, and music all reflected this human concern about relating to the divine. Come the Enlightenment, the focus changed to working out what kind of world humans could create for themselves, relying on their own unfettered reason and empirical discoveries. This was the age of science and developing democracy, which held out a dream of unending human progress. The waves of devastation that swept across Europe twice in the first half of the 20th century cruelly mocked any such hopes. But at least we can say that the last spasms of Enlightenment optimism gave birth to the liberal democratic project—perhaps the sacrifices of two world wars really were worth it in the end.

But the liberal democratic project rested on increasingly shaky foundations. Premodern people could find their certainties in religious truth. Enthusiasts for the Enlightenment could base their philosophy on a confidence that the truth was out there for any rational person to discover. Although the views were divergent in almost every respect, they had this in common—a belief in a transcendent universe that provided a framework for understanding the place of human beings in the world. As James Davison Hunter expresses it, people had a common grammar that applied to human feelings and morality—and public good had a connection to private

interests.[3] To put it another way, the individual was part of something universal. Immanuel Kant and John Calvin may have profoundly disagreed, but they would at least have understood one another. This is precisely the kind of transcendent worldview assumed by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1945. But one of the tragic ironies of recent history is that just as the liberal democratic project appeared to triumph, its inner coherence began to dissolve.

To put it crudely, liberal democracy split into liberal and democratic elements. In terms of liberalism, this was not the classic liberalism that Adam Smith and William Gladstone would recognize. Rather it is something new—literally, *neo*liberalism. The basic assumption behind this concept is that the market is sovereign—and not simply over economic issues. Based on the theory of Friedrich Hayek, nothing has a given and immutable value, even those aspects of human significance and meaning that previous generations would have treated as givens. Objective truth is no longer "out there" to be revealed or reasoned out, but is determined by what the market will bear. As Stephen Metcalf points out, the old political processes of public reason—debate and thoughtful argument—are at odds with this process, as in market terms they are simply opinions. What happens instead is that the public square "ceases to be a space for deliberation, and becomes a market in clicks, likes, and retweets."[4] There is no longer a transcendent cultural backdrop to human existence but a green screen. Virtues have transformed into values—one can individually hold and formulate them—but they can be of no binding significance.

In terms of the democracy, the individual now has an unprecedented status and ability to choose. Once seen in relation to a divinity or wider society, human beings are now increasingly regarded as sovereign agents. As the public sphere has been emptied of a shared cultural story, the individual is now free to decide his or her path through life. Or so the theory goes. Jackson Lears expresses it like this: people are "redefined as human capital, each person becomes a little firm with assets, debts, and a credit score anxiously scrutinized for signs of success or failure."[5] He is not so much a citizen, then, as an entrepreneur.[6] The individual may be more

free to choose than ever before, but he also carries an increasingly heavy burden for his own destiny. If the individual does not have safeguards of a benevolent Providence—or a paternalistic society—he must shift for himself. The mantra that every schoolchild knows so well—*follow your dreams and you can achieve whatever you want*—has a darker side that few if any primary school assemblies ever spell out. Failure to achieve those dreams or ambitions will be your responsibility alone. In such a culture, the individual faces an unrelenting pressure to boost his own image and perception. An intriguing textual analysis of Norway's main national newspaper between 1984 and 2005 revealed that as the occurrence of words such as *I* and *my* increased, references to concepts such as *duty* and *obligation* declined.[7]

What, if anything, does all this have to do with intensive warfare in the 21st century? Going back to where we began, the armies that liberated Western Europe in 1945 did so against a broadly shared cultural outlook. Britannia, Marianne, and Columbia are hardly identical sisters, but they bequeathed a remarkably similar legacy of shared understanding to their descendants. It is not being too romantic to say that the freedoms for which the dead of World War II gave their lives had a transcendent quality. This situation, it may be argued, no longer obtains. We have lost the sense of belonging to something bigger. Evidence for this can be seen in a wide variety of forms, from Allan Bloom's analysis of education to Robert Putnam's influential work on the decline of social cohesion in late 20th-century America.[8] As the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor observes, "The individual has been taken out of a rich community life and now enters instead into a series of mobile, changing, revocable associations."[9] With his small stock of human capital, each person makes his way through life via a series of short-term contracts, running the gamut of human existence from car insurance to employment. What matters most is the utilitarian and the instrumental. In this kind of world, traditional concepts such as humility, duty, and sacrifice seem anachronistic and pointless. Could this be the polar night of icy darkness that Max Weber anticipated, where there is no faith, no morality, and no heroism—nothing outside the market?[10]

One of the founding principles of modern democracy is that the individual citizen surrenders certain freedoms and benefits to the state in exchange for protection and stability. This relationship is perhaps seen in its starkest form when a nation sends its citizens to war. That, arguably, is really what the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is about—not so much the right to bear arms but the responsibility to do so.[11] The freedoms of democracy must be guarded by its citizens. In post-2001 operations, when the legitimacy of the campaigns was subject to intense public scrutiny, this affected the commemoration of those citizens who had given their lives. As one academic study observed, British repatriation ceremonies became "deeply political acts" protesting against military action, where those who died were remembered as victims of government policy.[12] Anthony King, in his analysis of the obituaries of British service personnel, comments that the death of soldiers was not seen so much as an act of service for the nation as "the meaningful expression of a man who defined himself by his profession."[13] This brings us back to an earlier point. If the individual is indeed a small firm with a limited stock of human capital, a strong relationship of trust between citizen and society is vital should the citizen be required to sacrifice that capital for a bigger purpose. Because if our small stock of human capital really is all we have, why should we give it up?

One of the most insightful commentaries on these issues was published just after World War II: Richard Weaver's *Ideas Have Consequences*. There is a particularly intriguing passage where Weaver talks about the "ancient solidarity" between the priest and the soldier.[14] What does he mean by that? Essentially, that both callings have an interest in the transcendent. As he argues, any undertaking that entails sacrifice of life has implications of transcendence. If we do not have transcendence, sacrifice is ultimately pointless. In our culture of commemoration, we make much of service and sacrifice, and rightly so. We will pause much in the coming months as the reminders of 1918 roll around. But in the 21st-century value system, is it not all rather pointless if there is ultimately nothing beyond the individual consumer?

And this is the nub of the argument. As Alexis de Tocqueville clearly saw some two centuries ago, a society that favors atomism and instrumentalism actually undermines the very freedoms that it claims to cherish.[15] Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the freedoms that the Western world enjoys have largely been sustained without significant periods of intensive conflict—and the associated heavy demands of blood and treasure. Future military operations may not follow this pattern, and free nations may have to pay a large price for such nebulous terms as liberty and democracy. If we furnish our worldview from the moral stockroom of utilitarian instrumentalism, we will find little strength in such circumstances. To quote Taylor again, "High standards need strong sources"—a stripped-down public square does not provide the wherewithal to sustain a deep understanding of human meaning and purpose.[16] Churchill and Roosevelt clearly saw the battle that they were engaged in as something more than a struggle over resources and the possession of territory. Or, in other words, they understood the need for spiritual resilience—an awareness that human existence cannot be reduced to a profit-and-loss transaction. The free society that values the individual did not arise from a utilitarian worldview—indeed, Larry Siedentop has recently published a fascinating volume that traces the development of modern liberal equality right back to Christian thinkers in the Middle Ages and even back to the Apostle Paul.[17]

One does not need to share the faith of these ancient scholars to appreciate their insights. Perhaps it is time to pause in our pursuit of relentless individualism to consider the bigger truths of the world to which we belong. James Davison Hunter remarks that our current cultural trajectory is likely set to bend us away from the very concepts of justice, freedom, and tolerance that we treasure.[18] Before we are called on to defend these convictions in intensive conflict, it is surely worth reflecting on why they are worth defending in the first place. Those of us who approach this question from a religious perspective have something unique to offer here.

Notes

[1] Max Hastings, *Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944–1945* (London: Macmillan, 2004), 588.

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[3] James Davison Hunter, "Liberal Democracy and the Unravelling of the Enlightenment Project," *The Hedgehog Review* 19, no. 3 (2017), available at <https://iasc-culture.org/THR/THR_article_2017_Fall_Hunter.php>.

[4] Stephen Metcalf, "Neoliberalism: The Idea that Swallowed the World," *The Guardian*, August 18, 2017, available at <www.theguardian.com/news/2017/aug/18/neoliberalism-the-idea-that-changed-the-world>.

[5] Jackson Lears, "The Long Con of Neoliberalism," *The Hedgehog Review* 19, no. 3 (2017), available at <https://iasc-culture.org/THR/THR_article_2017_Fall_Lears.php>.

[6] Wendy Brown, "Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy," *Theory and Event* 7, no. 1 (2003), 44.

[7] Jean M. Twenge and W. Keith Campbell, *The Narcissism Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement* (New York: Free Press, 2010), 264.

[8] Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Touchstone, 2000).

[9] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 502.

[10] Brown, "Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy," 45.

[11] Elaine Scarry, "Constitutional Narratives—War and the Social Contract: The Right to Bear Arms," *Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities* 2, no. 1 (January 1990), 121, available at <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol2/iss1/9>.

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[13] Anthony King, "The Afghan War and 'Postmodern' Memory: Commemoration and the Dead of Helmand," *The British Journal of Sociology* 61, no. 1 (March 2010), 1–25.

[14] Richard M. Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 30.

[15] Quoted in Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 502.

[16] Ibid., 516.

[17] Larry Siedentop, *Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2015).

[18] Hunter, "Liberal Democracy and the Unravelling of the Enlightenment Project."

A Profession of Arms? Conflicting Views and the Lack of Virtue Ethics in Professional Military Education

By Thomas J. Statler

The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.

—General Sir William Butler

The profession of arms is viewed in one of two ways by those who put on a military uniform. Holders of one perspective see what they do as an *occupation*—the principal means of making a living. From an occupational point of view, the profession of arms is a collection of technical skills, or what I call a more quantitative view, that encompasses performing the duties that are expected of them, but such performance may not necessarily be a part of their self-identity. The evaluation of their job is associated with some end result: increasing profit margin, meeting quotas, completing a mission or report, and the like. In the military, extensive training hones skills in a particular context to reach outcomes desired by higher authorities.

The second perspective on military service is more qualitative and rooted in the wording of the concept *profession of arms* itself. Don Snider outlined this perspective in a lecture at the U.S. Naval War College in 2016 where he described a *profession* as having four components. The professional thus:

- provides a vital service to the society that it cannot provide for itself, but still must have to flourish

- works with expert (abstract) knowledge developed into human expertise; does not participate in routine or repetitive work; takes years of study and experiential learning

- earns and maintains trust of his or her society by the effective and ethical application of his or her expertise; the means of social control is the ethic

- is, therefore, granted relative autonomy in the application of his or her art and expertise.[1]

The contrast between seeing military service as an occupation versus a profession creates a problem for *professional* military *education* (PME).[2] To be more specific, the two italicized terms in the phrase are exactly where the root of the problem lies. I will further define the problem in the first person for clarity and ease of language.

If I only see my time as a military officer as an occupation—as a specialized and highly trained job that I do and for which I get paid—then I am not likely to seek out broader knowledge and higher levels of education, including ethical education, unless I am compelled/ordered to do so by some higher authority (or a representative of that higher authority). In such cases, I am likely to view that experience as extensive training that I must accomplish to do my job as required by that higher authority. If I do attend a PME institution out of self-interest, it is to set myself up for a promotion that, in turn, leads to more income. In such circumstances, I am a highly skilled, perhaps high-ranking, military technician but *not*

a military professional. I have not taken seriously the moral and ethical components of being a member of the *profession* of arms and the soft power skills required for both effective staff work and leadership, and instead have only done what is necessary for my job.[3] The shared or core values of my service and the joint force are not related to the performance of my job.

This dichotomy of *occupation* versus *profession* is important because PME seems to assume that professional education is synonymous with occupational training—for example, giving officers specific skill sets, such as joint planning. This hypothesis stems from personal experience and cases of moral, ethical, and legal failure among a glaring minority of military officers, including field-grade and flag/general officers, who have gone through some form of PME prior to their misconduct. Such behavior suggests that the words *professional* and *education* in the acronym PME have lost their meaning to the point where it should be called *occupational* military *training* instead.[4]

Two assumptions need to be challenged in light of leadership failures great and small as I continue to define the problem. The first is that all military officers possess positive inner character, and they maintain that ethos of shared values on their own throughout a career. Maybe some do, but such integrity of character is certainly not universal in the officer corps given the evidence that is before us. The second assumption is connected to the first. Because it is assumed military officers first *possess* and then, second, *maintain* positive inner character on their own, PME institutions can get by with minimal instruction on ethics using didactic methods, rote learning, and a meta-ethic based on action/inaction. To counter these false assumptions, I describe the proper doctrinal and philosophical grounding of the profession of arms that PME should build its ethics education on.

Before doing so, a less obvious facet of the problem recently came to mind as the result of a conversation I had with a student. This student stated her belief that ethics has nothing to do with morals or morality and later

revealed that, for her, morality stemmed from religiosity. Her comment reflects a belief that may be more prevalent in the military mindset than I want to believe, and the conversation reminded me that we cannot make assumptions about the meaning of ethics in a pluralistic culture such as the military.

A dictionary definition of the adjective *moral* describes it as relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior, or expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior.[5] It is the community—in this case, the profession of arms for the military officers who attend PME institutions—that determines the principles of right and wrong. The adjective *just*, defined as acting or being in conformity with what is morally upright or good, could be somewhat of a synonym for moral. *Morality* is a moral discourse, statement, or lesson to members of the community, and it is closely connected to *justice*, which is the maintenance or administration of what is just or doing what is morally good. *Ethics* is defined as the discipline dealing with what is good and bad (what is moral), moral duty and obligation, and a set of moral principles or values. Acting or behaving in an *ethical* manner is simply "of or relating to ethics."

Immediately, we can see that morals are clearly connected to ethics, and that nothing is stated about the necessity of having a religious source of determining what is good and, conversely, what is bad. We can also see that ethics, and thus morality, is connected to justice. All those concepts are interrelated; without one, we do not have the others, or they are so diminished or restricted as to not have any meaning at all. When that is the case, concepts such as moral, ethical, and just are relative and self-serving. If the behavior of a military officer is immoral—that is to say, contrary to shared values of the profession of arms—then his or her behavior is also unethical and unjust. If, on the other hand, our individual choices, decisions, or lines of effort—all forms of human behavior—are moral, then they are by definition also ethical and just. It is an open question as to whether such a connection is conveyed to students in PME institutions. I am skeptical that those institutions have robust military ethics programs and thoughtfully

consider the relationship between morality and ethics. Ethical education is not seen as grounded in military doctrine, and thus military ethics is a "nice to have" instead of a requirement for officer development.

Doctrinal Foundation for Virtue Ethics in the Profession of Arms

Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), *The Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*, appendix B, "The Profession of Arms," describes a professional as having both competence *and* character. I begin with character instead of competence for two reasons. First, of the two components of the definition, character is largely ignored in military practice over a clear preference for competence.[6] Secondly, JP 1 assumes that the word *character* is positive in and of itself, and this assumption needs correction. According to JP 1, "Character refers to the aggregate of personal features and traits that form the individual nature of a person."[7] Nothing in that definition, however, assumes one's features and traits are always positive. As Aristotle put it:

> *For what we do in our dealings with other people makes some of us just, some unjust; what we do in terrifying situations, and the habits of fear or confidence that we acquire, make some of us brave and others cowardly. The same is true of situations involving appetites and anger; for one or another sort of conduct in these situations make some temperate and mild, other intemperate and irascible. To sum up in a single account: a state* [of character] *results from* [the repetition of] *similar activities.*[8]

Character refers to ingrained traits of an individual gained through the process of socialization, and those traits then determine behavior. If such traits and behavior only lead to the betterment of the individual and/or his defined group, and not the general well-being of society or the community at large, then character takes on a negative connotation. In fact, character in this sense, and the behavior that stems from it, may clash with societal or communal values.

JP 1 describes adherence to shared values as "the heart of the relationship of the profession with the American people, and to each other."[9] For our ethos to have a positive meaning and to benefit others *outside* of the group as well as those *within* the group, members of the profession of arms must see themselves as connected to or in relationship with the larger society they serve. Adherence to shared values of our society becomes a matter of rational and personal choices made over time, and they are chosen by individuals within the profession of arms because it is the right thing to choose.

What JP 1 is describing is *trust*. In his white paper while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey referred to two kinds of trust: an external trust we have with the citizens we serve as military professionals, and an internal trust we must have with each other within the military profession.[10] Snider describes the necessity of trust by stating that it is the currency of a profession.[11] Stephen M.R. Covey describes why trust is the lifeblood of both a profession and a healthy society:

> *There is one thing that is common to every individual, relationship, team, family, organization, nation, economy, and civilization throughout the world—one thing which, if removed, will destroy the most powerful government, the most successful business, the most thriving economy, the most influential leadership, the greatest friendship, the strongest character, the deepest love. On the other hand, if developed and leveraged, that one thing has the potential to create unparalleled success and prosperity in every dimension of life. Yet it is the least understood, most neglected, and most underestimated possibility of our time. That one thing is trust.*[12]

JP 1 connects competence with a nontechnical, but altogether necessary, skill of developing and keeping trust: "Competent performance includes both the technical competence to perform a task to standard *as well as the ability to integrate that skill with others.*"[13] Competence certainly involves technical abilities and the assumed mentality to carry out those abilities, but PME largely ignores the deeper meaning of competence in JP

1 for reasons that have yet to be uncovered. Competence must also include the development of interpersonal skills in order to communicate with others, and such communication requires trust. Whether as a commander or a member of a staff, interpersonal skills *will* involve one's behavior; behavior, then, is the evidence of one's inner character, and inner character is a matter for virtue ethics, which I address in the next section.

The Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) is the other doctrinal foundation for ethical education. The OPMEP establishes the Officer Desired Leadership Attributes (DLAs).[14] The DLAs trace back to a memorandum from the Chairman issued in June 2012, where General Dempsey defined the fifth DLA as "make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the Profession of Arms."[15] It should be evident that moral and ethical decisions of military officers should *not* be based solely on an outcome (a consequentialist framework), yet that is one predominant ethical thrust in practice at the operational and tactical levels of the military, and on rare occasions even at the strategic level.

The OPMEP appendix A to enclosure A, "Officer Professional Military Education Continuum," gives some guidance on the education of ethics, but the guidance there is a mixed message when it comes to the ethical education of military officers. In the overview of the appendix, the continuum is described as reflecting "the dynamic system of officer career education,"[16] and it identifies and defines areas of focus at each educational level of a military career and provides joint curriculum guidance for PME institutions: "It is a comprehensive frame of reference depicting the progressive nature of PME, guiding an officer's individual development over time."[17] Later in the appendix, PME is described as conveying "the broad knowledge and develop[ing] the habits of mind essential to the military professional's expertise in the art and science of war."[18] The art of war includes "critical and reflective thinkers who broadly view military affairs across an array of academic disciplines."[19]

What is lacking in the OPMEP is clear guidance about what role the education of ethics plays in the development of critical and reflective

thinkers. Annex A to appendix A gives a graphic view of the continuum that assumes the DLAs, including DLA 5, are continued with equal intensity throughout an entire career—for general/flag officers as much as for cadets/midshipmen. This image, however, is in contrast to the text of appendix A, where ethics of any sort is *not* mentioned as a focus of study for intermediate, senior, and general/flag officer levels of PME, and an education on core or shared values stressed in JP 1 is not in the text for *any* level of the continuum. It stands to reason that because ethics is not specified and mentioned in the text of the OPMEP appendix A, the education of ethics is not stressed in PME. An individual's moral and ethical foundation and the habits he or she demonstrates as a member of the profession of arms are elements of the *art* of war, and why they are not being addressed at *all* levels of PME with equal intensity is at the heart of my critique.[20]

JP 1 and the theoretical foundation of the OPMEP make it clear that a commitment to a decision or course of action is based on a set of shared values—what the ancient Greeks called cardinal virtues and the U.S. military calls core values. This assumes that military leaders both cognitively know and affectively show those core values each and every day regardless of rank, authority, or who is watching. This assumption, an addendum to the false assumptions above, must be challenged given the moral, ethical, and legal failures of junior and senior military personnel previously mentioned. What is important to note is that most moral and ethical failures within the military never make the headlines. They are occurring, perhaps on a daily basis, at all levels of command. Officers who enter a PME institution may not cognitively know and affectively show service core values. If these failures are not addressed in PME against the standard of core values, and if members of the profession of arms who have gone through some form of PME are not held visibly accountable for their behavior, or worse, their misconduct is overlooked because of status, rank, friendship, false loyalty, or ability to produce desired outcomes, then the ethos, trust, and morale of the unit, Service, or joint force suffer. As if that were not bad enough, our trust with the citizenry we serve, and those they elect to Congress, is severely damaged.

Philosophical Foundation for Virtue Ethics in the Profession of Arms

PME's lack of address on the ethical failures of military officers is also due to prevailing ethical frameworks at work in the military, which are not concerned about inner character and shared values. The Enlightenment brought those streams of ethical thought into being, and the most well-known ethical theories from this period used in military ethics today are Immanuel Kant's ethics of duty (deontology) and Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism (a corporate form of consequentialism that I have already mentioned above).[21]

Philosophical thought during the Enlightenment was dominated by rational thought and scientific approaches to problems in several disciplines, including ethics; hence, it is called the Age of Reason. As a result, affections or emotions were not trusted and thus marginalized, or they were eliminated from ethical thinking altogether. Deontology and utilitarianism utilize a meta-ethic on action in addition to an emphasis on reason. In other words, the rightness and wrongness of the situation depend on the nature or consequence of the act, depending on which framework one is using. As a result, those theories abstract the individual from said act. An overemphasis on rational thought, and the consequential elimination of affections within ethics, leads to a training mentality and insistence that ethics can be taught using didactic classroom methods. It also assumes that ethics can be learned by rote and evaluated on written tests rather than by experience.[22]

Over 2,000 years before the Enlightenment, Aristotle taught a different understanding of ethics based on the morality of the person rather than the nature or consequence of the act. Referring back to the definitions I shared when defining the problem, our sense of faithfulness to the well-being of the community (what they called *eudaimonia*, or what I am referring to as morality) is tightly linked to our ability to put things right or do the right thing in our individual behavior within that community (*ethos* or ethics).[23] Aristotle defined the virtue of the moral actor in two ways, as virtue of thought and virtue of character:

> *Virtue of thought arises and grows mostly from teaching; that is why
> it needs experience and time. . . . Hence, it is also clear that none of
> the virtues of character arises in us naturally. . . . Rather, we are by
> nature able to acquire them, and we are completed through habit.*[24]

To acquire intellectual virtue, or virtue of thought as Aristotle put it, a community (*polis*) must invest time in its members, and those members must be willing to "experience" the process of Socratic instruction.[25]

Though informed by reason, Aristotle also acknowledged the role of affections in moral life, and this is carried forward by modern neo-Aristotelians. This balanced approach, using both cognition and affection, is the key difference from the ethical theories of the Enlightenment and a missing element in ethical instruction in PME. Emotions are connected in powerful ways to our dispositions or our informed states of character. The avoidance of emotion leaves us well disposed to vice or the corruption of virtue. If well-disposed to vice, then our choices and resulting behavior will not reflect virtue of character. Robert Roberts and W. Jay Wood argue that "for the knower to function properly as a knower, his will, especially as a source of emotions or affections, needs to be shaped and completed to form such . . . virtues as charity, fairness, intellectual honesty, love of knowledge (truth), perseverance, openness, caution, boldness, and humility."[26]

While Aristotle suggested that virtue of character can be modeled and experienced—and thus taught—within a community, he also made it clear that the individual bears responsibility for making virtue of character a habit in order to demonstrate moral behavior. If people lack integrity, honesty, and trustworthiness, they have only themselves to blame if immoral and unethical behavior gets them in trouble because they have chosen to not practice integrity, honesty, and trustworthiness.[27] Aristotle put it this way:

> *Virtues, by contrast, we acquire, just as we acquire crafts, having
> first activated them. For we learn a craft by producing the same
> product that we must produce when we have learned it; we become
> builders, for instance, by building; and we become harpists by*

playing the harp. Similarly, then, we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions.[28]

In the same manner, we develop trust within the profession of arms and with the citizens we serve by being trustworthy in *both* our public and private lives.

Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis alludes to a meta-ethical focus on the military officer as a moral actor, the framework of virtue ethics, and the importance of internal and external trust in a memorandum released on August 4, 2017: "Those entrusted by our nation with carrying out violence, those entrusted with the lives of our troops, and those entrusted with enormous sums of taxpayer money must set an honorable example in all that we do."[29] Secretary Mattis echoes and accentuates JP 1 and the theoretical foundation of the OPMEP by stressing the need for virtue of character. General Dempsey stated the same sentiment in 2012: "If we really are a profession—a group of men and women who are committed to living an uncommon life with extraordinary responsibilities and high standards—we should want to figure it out before someone else figures it out for us."[30]

Within the memorandum, the Secretary also uses a simple metaphor to describe his ethical approach—one he states that all within the Department of Defense must follow:

I expect every member of the Department to play in the ethical midfield. I need you to be aggressive and show initiative without running the ethical sidelines, where even one misstep will have you out of bounds. I want our focus to be on the essence of ethical conduct: doing what is right at all times, regardless of the circumstances or whether anyone is watching. . . . Our prior reflection and our choice to live by an ethical code will reinforce what we stand for, so we remain morally strong especially in the face of adversity.[31]

The Secretary is describing a military profession that demonstrates virtue of character, or, as he puts it, one that plays in the ethical midfield. That is precisely what Aristotle argued centuries ago in his doctrine of the mean. Vice, as moral depravity or corruption, exists on either of two extremes: one of excess of a given character trait ("too much of a good thing," as the saying goes) or one of deficiency of that same trait. The table gives examples using three of the ancient Greek cardinal virtues. The similarities of ethical approaches between Aristotle and the Secretary are striking. For Aristotle, virtue of character is found in an ethical mean; for Mattis, it is found in the ethical midfield.

Table. Examples of Aristotle's "Doctrine of the Mean"

Vice of Deficiency	Virtue of Character	Vice of Excess
Ignorance	Prudence	Manipulation
Asceticism	Temperance	Hedonism
Cowardice	Courage	Foolhardiness

There is an internal tension when living in the virtuous midfield as forces of vice pull us toward one sideline or the other, and that tension is something that a meta-ethic on action cannot address. Consequently, it does not get addressed in current ethical education within PME. This is the case because the dissonance is affective as well as cognitive, and the Enlightenment theories mentioned herein will not address the affective domain of learning. The tension, and the maturity that comes by dealing with that tension, is never relieved simply by classroom teaching, reaching a certain age, or obtaining a particular status in the profession. That ethical tension and emotional and cognitive dissonance do not magically go away; they must be internally examined by looking at one's character and choices of behavior and then externally sharing those realizations in experiential learning in order to keep oneself in the ethical midfield. An occupational military training approach to the education of ethics will not give students the time in a structured educational environment to analyze

that tension, understand their personal ethical constitution, and realize how their behavior affects others.

There is another reason maintaining an ethical balance, or staying in the ethical midfield, is difficult, and it is a factor that, again, PME does not take into consideration. Grady Scott Davis writes:

> *What is less frequently recognized is that the virtues of human character are, of their nature, fragile. This fragility is not an unfortunate happenstance but an essential aspect of what it means to be a virtue. For virtues are always begging* [to be] *tested, and they frequently require reaffirming our resolve and reminding ourselves of where our true love lies. There is no rest in the past achievements of virtue, any more than there is for the competitive athlete or concert musician. Like any other skill or art, it will weaken and eventually vanish if not regularly employed. The most common enemies of virtue are indifference, self-indulgence, and despair, which persuades someone that something needn't be done, or not just now, or can't possibly be accomplished anyway.*[32]

It is hard work to stay in the ethical midfield, and PME has a key role in providing the intellectual and professional white space to find an ethical center of gravity (COG)—a concept I have borrowed from my joint PME education and described in other essays as the inward or spiritual ability to maintain a virtuous mean.[33] Bruce Birch and Larry Rasmussen explain why a meta-ethic focused on the moral actor, and virtue ethics as the predominant theory of ethical instruction, is important in education as a whole and PME in particular:

> *Vexing moral problems and innumerable issues of social justice arose for the ancient Greeks, of course, as they have for every people. Yet the work of morality was directed less to the resolution of moral quandaries ("what would you do if . . .") than to deliberation of how we should live, with special concern for the sorts of persons*

we should be. This side of the moral life brings moral formation to the fore and accentuates moral education and training for the good life as key elements of ethics. The formation and ordering of society [are] *crucial in this, since society is both the tutor and the living environment of morality. Society is both the teacher and classroom for character formation.*[34]

William F. May puts it more bluntly: "[The] field of ethics does not reduce to the utilitarian concern for producing good. Ethics must deal with virtues as well as principles of action, with *being* good as well as *producing* good."[35]

Results were important to the ancient Greeks, as they certainly are for modern institutions such as the military, but those outcomes should not ignore or passively degrade the ethos and morale of the individuals who embody the institution in order to achieve particular outcomes. PME has a role to play in correcting the meta-ethical approach to the education of ethics. When the meta-ethical question changes to what kind of officers we should become, and ethical education addresses that internal development, then moral and ethical conduct as virtuous members of the profession of arms and of society should naturally follow.[36] John Maxwell writes, "Our character represents who we are on the inside. And the good news is that if you focus on being better on the inside than on the outside, over time you will also become better on the outside."[37] That is the proactive and timeless approach of virtue ethics. It is the difference between ounces of prevention, which focus on the morality of the actor, and pounds of cure, which focus on immoral, unethical, or illegal action. If military officers are *not* willing to be *both* involved in the reinforcement, recalibration, or replacement of their moral compass *and* exhibit the virtue of character as Aristotle taught, then their choice says everything about what kind of character they possess—and their view of military service as a job rather than as a profession.

Intellectual Humility and Civic Virtue in the Profession of Arms

The ability to stay in the ethical midfield through a clear understanding of the profession's values as they relate to one's own values requires another cardinal virtue that has received recent review. *Intellectual humility* has the flexibility to address fluid and complex situations facing military leaders and planners today and is a key component to civic virtue—the trust we have with the citizens we serve.[38]

Humility is the state of *not* being proud, haughty, assertive, or rude. The definition does not suggest a sense of weakness or passivity that is usually associated with the virtue. Rather, it suggests that humility is the strength to resist an impulsive reaction to external stimuli and, at the same time, a refusal to submit to the reactions of others. In other words, humility is an Aristotelian mean or virtuous balance between the vice of *arrogance*, a deficiency of humility, and the vice of *timidity*, or excess of humility. When one is arrogant, he thinks too highly of himself and ceases to listen to others. He then becomes close-minded, perhaps tyrannical, and exhibits a serious lack of ethical wisdom by not heeding the advice of others around him, including those in subordinate positions. Such officers, to some degree or another, too often step out of bounds morally and ethically.

On the other extreme, a timid person thinks too little of himself. Such a person runs the risk of listening to too many voices around him, particularly those who are the loudest, the most influential, or the last one to have his ear. When the vice of timidity is in play, there is a lack of moral courage to state original thoughts and sentiments, stand one's moral ground, and propose unpopular alternatives, especially in the presence of intimidating personalities and/or groupthink dynamics.

Combining the character trait of humility with the adjective *intellectual* is in keeping with the virtues Aristotle put forth many centuries ago and gives humility a needed dimension that is missing in common, and less positive, interpretations of the virtue in religious and philosophical

discourse. Taken together, intellectual humility conveys an emotional strength and rational capability in order not to be arrogant in our interactions with others, both in and out of uniform and, in the same moment, not lose integrity and be subverted by others in the interpersonal dynamics of groupthink and intimidation. Intellectual humility is also open-mindedness to other perspectives, even those that are different from the viewpoints and values one firmly holds. Even in disagreement, intellectual humility conveys a moral courage to say to oneself and others, "That is a valid point; let's discuss it more," "I was wrong and need to approach the issue differently," or "With all due respect, I disagree, and here is why."

Intellectual humility is a state of being that is in the ethical midfield that Secretary Mattis stressed in his memo. Those who possess and demonstrate intellectual humility can see value in disagreement and leverage the ensuing discussion as a means of seeking the best solution.[39] This is in stark contrast to those who see disagreement with their perspective, opinion, or assessment as an insult—or worse, as a threat. It is more than fair to say that nobody wants to work with, or for, such individuals. While not specifically mentioning intellectual humility, Dallas Willard alludes to it as he describes a reasonable person:

> The main point in all of this, to my mind, is simply that the reasonable person—the one who acts in accordance with reason in life as well as in their academic or other profession—is the one who governs his or her beliefs and assertions by insight into truth and logical relations. In particular, they are not mastered by how they want things to be, by the beliefs they happen to have, or by styles or currents of thought and action around them. If they advance claims as true or justified they do so on a basis of such insight, and are very careful to be sure that that basis is really there. The difficulty of securing such a basis will make any reasonable person quite humble in their claims and willing (indeed, happy, even solicitous) to be corrected when they are mistaken. Thus the reasonable person

is not close-minded or dogmatic, or insistent on having their own way, but just the opposite.[40]

Willard's description also describes someone who possesses civic virtue. Robert Audi describes civic virtue and ties it back to our earlier discussion of the virtue of character:

Virtuous citizens . . . try to contribute in some way to the welfare of others, including others beyond their immediate community. In a society that is complex, pluralistic, and so, inevitably, somewhat divided, civic virtue implies trying to take reasonable positions on important issues, voting, discussing problems with others, and more. Civic virtue in a liberal democracy implies a degree of responsible political participation. . . . I would stress that insofar as we are thinking of the advocacy or other public behavior as supposed to be action from virtue, we should look not just at what kind of act it is and what can be said for it abstractly, but also at how it is grounded in the agent's character.[41]

Summary

Training in the military is necessary, but it is singular in focus—preparing Servicemembers to do specific things in specific contexts and for a specific reason. Professional military education should be much more encompassing than occupational military training. It must involve a multidisciplinary approach to topics, including those, like ethics, *not* directly related to achieving some defined outcome or product. Within PME, however, the processes of training and education are confused at the risk of becoming synonymous, and the breadth and depth of military study in general and the education of ethics in particular suffer as a result.

If PME is a process of achieving milestones in an individual's military career without reinforcing, or perhaps fundamentally changing, the moral constitution of a given officer, then it is ignoring clear strategic direction.

Perhaps this is the condition to which Secretary Mattis refers in the National Defense Strategy:

> *PME has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity. We will emphasize intellectual leadership and military professionalism in the art and science of warfighting, deepening our knowledge of history while embracing new technology and techniques to counter competitors. PME will emphasize independence of action in warfighting concepts to lessen the impact of degraded/lost communications in combat. PME is to be used as a strategic asset to build trust and interoperability across the Joint Forces and with allied and partner forces.*[42]

To move beyond just getting a military education for what Mattis called "mandatory credit," JP 1 clearly dictates educational instruction on virtue ethics in PME across the entire continuum of a military career, with the goal of producing military professionals who possess independence of thought and action through intellectual humility and thus build trust in whatever billet they fill. That, it seems, is what the Secretary desires. Voluntary adherence to core values, and a relationship of trust with each other and the American people through our oath to the Constitution, separates a highly qualified military *technician* with high rank from a military *professional* of any rank who can fully comprehend and apply what it means to be a member of the profession of arms. Consequently, I have suggested that virtue ethics is the philosophical foundation of the profession of arms and not Enlightenment theories currently in place.

To accomplish the educational mission being demanded by Secretary Mattis and PME doctrine, a review of the ethical education based on virtue of character is necessary while the current OPMEP is under revision. Don Snider states why this must take place: "The current scope of moral corrosion from the past decade of war shows that our services have taken for too long a *laissez faire* approach to the development of the moral

character of our warriors. Our forces are superbly trained and equipped, but in the moral domain the recent record shows they are far weaker than their leaders believe."[43]

In the *Apology*, Socrates claimed to be wiser than other men not because of what he knew but rather because of what he did *not* know. Many of the Socratic dialogues, in fact, end in uncertainty, and the characters in those dialogues reacted to that uncertainty in different ways—some well, others not so well.[44] The aim of PME then should be to give military officers the educational and ethical white space within any given curriculum to think critically, seek out what they do *not* know with intellectual humility and civic virtue, and react to uncertainty with an affective internalization of military core values in conjunction with other skills gained through PME in order to find solutions to current and complex problems.

Notes

¹ Don Snider, "The Military Profession of the Future," U.S. Naval War College lecture, December 2016, available at <www.youtube.com/watch?v=hZEtR_F-NRO>.

² My use of the acronym *PME* in this chapter includes joint PME (JPME).

³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., is credited with coining the term *soft power* in 1990 in his book *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004). He described how a nation-state like the United States could use soft power to frame relationships with other nation-states, and he argued that soft power is more effective in the long term in the geopolitical world over and against hard or kinetic power. I have borrowed his concept but applied it to interpersonal relationships—in particular, that of a leader to subordinates rather than relationships between nation-states.

⁴ There is a spectrum of ethical failure—most of which does not make the news but is equally damaging to the morale of a unit. Some, maybe most, of these failures are captured in Department of Defense (DOD), Standards of Conduct Office, *Encyclopedia of Ethical Failure* (Washington, DC: DOD, updated October 2014). None of the cases in the encyclopedia involve dereliction of duty or incompetence, only behavior based in a poor or nonexistent grasp of personal virtue. Many more cases from the past 3 years could be added. For one Service's account of moral and ethical failure, see Mark Light, "The Navy's Moral Compass: Commanding Officers and Personal Conduct," *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 3 (Summer 2012). Captain Light is a member of the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Naval War College.

⁵ The definitions in this paragraph come from *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*.

⁶ John Maxwell puts it like this in his book *How Successful People Grow: 15 Ways to Get Ahead in Life* (New York: Center Street, 2014): "Most people focus too much on competence and too little on character" (76). My thesis is that the same is true in PME.

⁷ Joint Publication (JP) 1, *The Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017), B-1.

⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1999), 19.

⁹ JP 1, B-1.

¹⁰ Martin Dempsey, *America's Military—The Profession of Arms* (Washington,

DC: The Joint Staff, February 23, 2012), available at <www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/aprofessionofarms.pdf>. General Dempsey was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) at the time. His paper directly parallels JP 1.

[11] Snider, "The Military Profession of the Future."

[12] Stephen M.R. Covey, *The Speed of Trust* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 1.

[13] JP 1, B-1. Emphasis added.

[14] CJCS Instruction 1800.01E, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy* (OPMEP) (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, May 29, 2015), paragraph 7, "Summary of Changes," § e, available at <www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/1800_01a.pdf>.

[15] Martin E. Dempsey, "Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020," CJCS Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Services; Commanders of the Combatant Commands; Chief, National Guard Bureau; and Directors of the Joint Staff Directorates, CM-0166-13, June 28, 2013, available at <www.ndu.edu/Portals/59/Documents/BOV_Documents/2014/CJCS%20Joint%20Education%20Review%20Implementation%20Memo%20only.pdf>.

[16] CJCS Instruction 1800.01E, enclosure A, A-1.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] It is an intellectual curiosity that the current OPMEP, with its lack of direction on the instruction of ethics and core values, was written after General Dempsey's white paper on profession of arms.

[21] Jeremy Bentham's work on utilitarianism—seeking what is best for "us"—was further developed in the 19th century by a more well-known proponent of the theory, and follower of Bentham, John Stuart Mill. An individual form of consequentialism is psychological and ethical egoism—both proposing that morality is found in what is best for "me" by denying that altruism exists.

[22] One-third of my career as a military chaplain (6 years) has been spent in the Navy Chaplain Corps program Chaplains Religious Enrichment and Development Operation. The model used in the program's resilience retreats and workshops is experiential learning using dyad, triad, and small group discussion.

[23] N. Thomas Wright, "Letter to the Romans—Introduction," in *The New Interpreter's Bible*, ed. Leander E. Keck, vol. X (Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 404. Writing as a theologian, Wright states that the Reformation as well as the Enlightenment separated *righteousness* (covenant faithfulness, morality, theology) from *justice* (putting

things right, ethics, politics), to which I add that we have since institutionalized that separation and lived with the negative consequences in human interaction.

[24] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 18.

[25] Another key word in Aristotle's definition is *habit* or the continual practice of the virtue of character in one's life, and the importance of that part of the virtue of character I address in this chapter's summary.

[26] Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, "Proper Function, Emotion, and Virtues of the Intellect," *Faith and Philosophy* 21, no. 1 (January 2004), 21–22.

[27] Unfortunately, some do not accept responsibility. M. Scott Peck described such individuals as *character disordered*. Unlike neurotics who take on too much responsibility, he writes, character disordered individuals take on too little responsibility. In short, they blame their problems on someone or something else and never take responsibility for the consequences of their actions.

[28] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 18.

[29] James N. Mattis, "Ethical Standards for All Hands," Memorandum for All Department of Defense Employees, August 4, 2017, available at <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Ethical-Standards-for-All-Hands-Sec-Def-04-Aug-17.pdf>.

[30] General Dempsey as quoted by Don Snider in "The Moral Corrosion Within Our Military Professions," lecture given at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 27, 2012, available at <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/The-Moral-Corrosion-within-Our-Military-Professions/2012/11/27>.

[31] Mattis, "Ethical Standards for All Hands."

[32] Grady Scott Davis, *Warcraft and the Fragility of Virtue: An Essay on Aristotelian Ethics* (Moscow: University of Idaho Press, 1992), 85.

[33] For the sake of brevity, one's inner or spiritual center of gravity is not dependent on a religious belief system. I free the concept from that domain where now it simply involves all the intangible, untouchable aspects of being human that are centered on one's emotional center (heart, gut) and cognitive center (mind). Thus understood, spirituality is something *all* human beings have; it then becomes a matter of what is not allowing a person to think or feel in harmony with others around him. Spirituality is the necessary counterbalance to our physicality or physical aspects that are centered on our bodies and our environment, but one affects the other, sometimes in profound ways.

[34] Bruce C. Birch and Larry L. Rasmussen, *Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life*, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1989), 45.

[35] William F. May, "The Virtues in a Professional Setting," *The Annual Journal of Christian Ethics* 4 (1984): 71–91, available at <www.jstor.org/stable/23559367>.

[36] There are always exceptions to any rule, so it stands to reason that even if professional military education adopts this approach to the education of ethics, there is no guarantee that there will not be moral and ethical failure. What I hope is that the trend of moral, ethical, and legal failure I have mentioned will show a downward direction over time.

[37] Maxwell, *How Successful People Grow*, 77.

[38] I first saw the concept of intellectual humility in Nick Romeo's article, "Platonically Irrational," *Aeon*, May 15, 2017, available at <https://aeon.co/essays/what-plato-knew-about-behavioural-economics-a-lot>. Romeo does not define the concept, but ample peer-reviewed research is available on intellectual humility.

[39] Tim Alberta, "Americans Are Being Held Hostage and Terrorized by the Fringes," *Politico*, May 13, 2018, available at <www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/05/13/arthur-brooks-american-enterprise-institute-interview-218364>. At the time of the writing, Arthur Brooks was the outgoing president of the American Enterprise Institute.

[40] Dallas Willard, "How Reason Can Survive the Modern University: The Moral Foundations of Rationality," in *Faith, Scholarship, and Culture in the 21st Century*, ed. Alice Ramos and Marie I. George (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2002), 185.

[41] Robert Audi, "Liberal Democracy and Religion in Politics," in *Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate*, ed. Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 16, 32–33.

[42] *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018).

[43] Snider, "The Moral Corrosion Within Our Military Professions."

[44] Romeo, "Platonically Irrational."

The Ethics of Care for Civilians, Internally Displaced Persons, and Enemy Prisoners of War

By Victoria J. Barnett

On the Web site of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum is a film titled *The Path to Nazi Genocide*, which gives a 38-minute overview of the history of Nazi Germany, World War II, and the genocide of the European Jews.[1] The film begins not with the 1933 ascent of the Nazis to power in Berlin or the German invasion of Poland in 1939, but with the events in Sarajevo in 1914—because so much of what occurred during the years of National Socialism, World War II, and the Holocaust itself can be traced back to the events of World War I and its turbulent aftermath.

A particularly deep connection between the two wars pertains to the issues of humanitarian and military care for civilians, displaced persons, and enemy prisoners of war (POWs), including the ethical implications for how such programs were conceived and carried out. War has always had unpredictable and disastrous effects for these vulnerable populations, and these challenges were hardly new to the 20th century. Many of those involved in such work after World War II, however, drew a direct link between the humanitarian challenges after 1918 and the related issues that arose in the wake of World War II and the Holocaust. Part of the international network that mobilized during and immediately after World War II actually grew out of earlier work during the interwar period, with a number

of humanitarian leaders and staff having started their careers during the 1920s. In meetings, white papers, and correspondence, many of those who had been engaged in this work then believed that it was crucially important, as they developed a foundation for postwar Germany in 1945, that they "not make the same mistakes" that had been made after 1918.[2]

These leaders were referring primarily to the punitive effects of the Versailles Treaty on Germany. These effects were blamed for the subsequent political instability in Weimar Germany and for the rise of Nazism.[3] Especially among those engaged in humanitarian work, however, there was a sense that the post-1918 humanitarian efforts on behalf of civilian and POW populations had been inadequate and that this was a central reason for the failure to create the necessary conditions for a lasting peace.[4] The conclusion they drew in 1945 was that successful coordination of policies for these vulnerable populations was absolutely crucial for long-term stability in Europe.[5]

A major challenge in the wake of the Great War was the sheer scope of human devastation. In addition to the enormous casualties suffered by the troops involved (approximately 10 million dead soldiers and more than 21 million wounded), an estimated 13 million civilians died as a result of the war, and another 5 to 10 million were displaced.[6] Around 8 million soldiers became POWs in the course of the conflict.[7] While these figures are the final tally, they represented a daily, weekly, and monthly toll from the beginning of the war, posing an ongoing and daunting challenge to military leaders and humanitarian workers.

There were codes and regulations in place that established clear ethical conventions for the treatment of injured soldiers as well as protections for medical personnel. The Lieber Code from the U.S. Civil War regulated the military protection of civilians and was incorporated into the 1907 Hague international regulations, which "expanded the scope of humanitarian law and the laws of war to cover the treatment of enemy combatants" as well as civilians.[8] The Hague regulations were closely related to the 1864 Geneva Convention, which had codified the treatment of injured combatants.

As Heather Jones observes, these regulations "did provide a functioning measure of protection in the First World War" for injured soldiers and prisoners of war—and yet "the war led to the widespread *perception* that the laws had failed."[9]

At the time of World War I there were international organizations that could address the needs of noncombatants, including displaced persons and refugees: the International Red Cross, Salvation Army, Young Men's Christian Association, and Quakers.[10] After 1918, additional organizations and initiatives were founded by the international missionary movement, Protestant ecumenical movement, and Jewish aid organizations, and for the first time there was active interfaith cooperation and engagement around refugee issues.[11] A new Protestant office in Geneva, the Central Bureau for Relief, was founded by Swiss pastor Adolf Keller to coordinate Protestant missions dealing with hunger, displaced persons, and refugees throughout Eastern Europe.[12] During the same period there was a growing focus on the concepts of human and minority rights, particularly focused on the situation of vulnerable Jewish minorities throughout Eastern Europe.[13] The 1920s also saw the founding of new international bodies such as the League of Nations.

Out of these interwar developments emerged a loose international network of individuals and organizations that continued to work together after the Nazis came to power in 1933. Many had already concluded that a different scale of international cooperation was needed to prevent another European war, but they were also dedicated to a new internationalism with respect to humanitarian issues. While their motives were largely pragmatic and political, there was also an underlying ethical commitment. In his essay on "The Pity of War," which traces the emergence of humanitarian work in the wake of World War I, David Bryer (who directed Oxfam International for a number of years) notes that the common motive shared by the numerous individuals who became involved in these efforts was not a particular religious or political orientation, but "a human response to the suffering caused by war."[14]

A striking example of one individual whose career bridged the two wars is the story of Hertha Kraus, who began her career working in Berlin with the Quakers after World War I, played a pivotal role in the German social welfare system during the 1920s, and became a leading figure in the American Friends Service Committee refugee work during World War II.

Kraus was born in Prague to a secular Jewish family that moved to Germany at the turn of the century. After completing her doctorate in sociology in 1919 in Frankfurt, she moved to Berlin. By this time, she had become a Quaker and a Social Democrat, and she worked in a social settlement project in eastern Berlin. It was the first such social settlement in Germany, drawing the attention of American social workers such as Jane Addams. During the 1920s, Kraus traveled to the United States and established ties to American Quaker circles. She remained in Berlin until 1923, working with the American- and British-run Quaker soup kitchens (the Quaker Feeding Mission) and eventually becoming the executive director of the Berlin office, from which she created and oversaw a network of around 50 urban Quaker settlement centers throughout Germany.

In 1923, she was invited by the mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, to direct the Office of Public Welfare there, which she did until 1933. Adenauer's leadership of the city from 1917 to 1933 was remarkable in several respects. The first is that in the aftermath of the Great War he developed a close and cooperative working relationship with the First British Army of the Rhine, which occupied Cologne until 1926. The second is that he skillfully managed the contentious divisions between the different German political movements and parties during this period. The third is that he invited Kraus to oversee public welfare in Cologne during the 1920s, which included oversight of the offices of public assistance, youth programs, unemployment offices, housing projects, institutional programs, and the budget offices that dealt with all these programs.[15]

Adenauer was a Catholic and a member of the Catholic Centre party; Kraus was a Jewish-born Quaker whose political affiliations were with working-class leftist groups. Despite these differences, they shared strong

leadership and organizational skills and a pragmatic approach to navigating political complexity. In March 1933, Adenauer was forced out of office by the new Nazi regime, as was Kraus because of her Social Democrat ties and Jewish ancestry. Adenauer went underground; Hertha Kraus left Nazi Germany, coming to the United States. After teaching for several years at Bryn Mawr, by the late 1930s she began to organize efforts to help Jewish refugees enter the United States. When World War II began in 1939, she started working with the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and became a U.S. citizen. AFSC consisted of a team of about 25 staff and 25 volunteers throughout the war, but that modest staff fielded more than 50,000 requests for help; this work was coordinated with that of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) when it was founded.

In April 1945, shortly after the Western forces had liberated the Rhineland, a letter for Kraus arrived in Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, delivered via the American military. It was from her former colleague, Konrad Adenauer:

> *I have a very great request to make of you: please come back here for at least a little while, as soon as possible! I can imagine that this will mean a great sacrifice for you. But I know your readiness to help and your work ethic. You are familiar with our country, and you are familiar with the United States. I believe that you could perform an invaluable service to the city of Cologne, to Germany, and to our shared ideals.*[16]

Although the official end of the war was still weeks away, U.S. First Army forces in the Rhineland were reaching out to figures such as Adenauer who had well-established records of public service and governance and were known to have been opponents of National Socialism.[17] Adenauer was appointed as mayor of Cologne following the German surrender on May 8. The political and military situation on the ground prevented direct communication between Kraus and Adenauer until well into the summer of 1945, and Kraus was unable to return to Germany until the summer of 1946—by which time the British had removed Adenauer from his post as

mayor. He remained involved in politics, however, and when Kraus returned, they worked together to establish two neighborhood centers. In March 1947, she returned for a longer period, staying until 1949 to work with the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), and religious aid organizations including the Quakers and other humanitarian organizations. She played a significant role in coordinating relief work for displaced persons, civilians, and POWs with the different branches of the Allied governments.[18]

As in 1918, the numbers and scope of the humanitarian crisis were daunting.[19] In April 1945, there were more than 10 million displaced persons in German territory. That figure included civilians from throughout Europe who had been forcibly brought into the Reich by the German army to serve as forced labor, as well as POWs from various countries and concentration camp survivors. It did not include the millions of ethnic Germans who continued to flee from the east into German territory, nor did it include German civilians whose homes and cities had been destroyed and were living in temporary housing. A relatively small percentage of these people (approximately 250,000) were Jewish concentration camp survivors. In the early months after the war, many of these populations were housed together in the displaced person camps before separate camps were set up for them.[20]

As in the wake of World War I, the situation posed numerous complexities. In contrast to 1918, however, there was a more extensive network of aid organizations in place. Even before the war ended, Allied leaders, anticipating a massive humanitarian crisis, agreed to dedicate aid workers, resources, and money to help Allied countries in Europe devastated by the events of the war. In November 1943, UNRRA was established for this purpose. Its early plans to care for the anticipated refugee population vastly underestimated the numbers it would be dealing with, and after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the combined Allied forces (the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) soon realized that UNRRA was overwhelmed and that more extensive coordination with other agencies would be crucial.[21]

The crisis was worsened by two factors. One was the extensive destruction of German cities, exacerbated by the record bitterly cold of the winters

of 1945–1946 and 1946–1947. Of the 18 largest German cities, 14 had been damaged by more than 50 percent; 61 percent of the city of Cologne had been destroyed.[22] The military occupation government was spread thin, resources were insufficient, and in the early months it struggled to cope. Hunger and starvation were serious problems. In Cologne, for example, only 11 percent of the children were of normal weight at the end of 1946.[23]

The combination of logistical challenges, division of postwar Germany into different occupation zones under the control of the French, U.S., and British military governments, enormous humanitarian needs, and involvement of multiple aid organizations made the immediate postwar months a humanitarian nightmare. These challenges were compounded by the complexities of the German political situation and growing German resentment. There had been widespread popular support for the Nazi regime, and in the wake of defeat, Nazi loyalists throughout the country began to fan the old resentments about the Versailles Treaty. During the initial period before aid and humanitarian coordination began, there were real concerns about political unrest. In April 1945, a general "nonfraternization" directive was issued that prohibited British and U.S. troops from working directly with German civilians, and the Allies began developing ambitious plans for denazification, reeducation programs, and democracy-building activities.[24]

By late 1945 and early 1946, there was greater coordination between the different aid organizations and OMGUS. International religious aid organizations and Protestant ecumenical leaders reached out directly to German church leaders, leading to cooperative efforts that were more effective in reaching civilians.[25] In February 1946, the Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operation in Germany was created; it comprised 11 international religious humanitarian organizations.[26] As J. Bruce Nichols has noted in his study of refugee work, "World War II was the decisive turning point in the humanitarian alliance between church and state in refugee work abroad."[27] The extent of coordination between Hertha Kraus and Konrad Adenauer during the 1920s had been unique, but after 1945, it became modus operandi for religious, governmental, and military bodies working together.

And—as had been the case during the 1920s—the period between 1945 and 1950 included a number of parallel developments. A new international-ist sensibility was emerging among American leaders, eventually leading to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization military alliance and economic partnerships between Europe and the United States. In the wake of the Holocaust, a deeper understanding of and commitment to human rights led to the establishment of new international laws, including the genocide convention and universal declaration of human rights. The Nuremberg trials led to clearer definitions of war crimes and the establishment of new international tribunals.[28]

It has become commonplace to talk about systems theory and the ways in which simultaneous events and processes intersect and affect one another. When one looks historically at the realm of humanitarian work after 1945, however, including the care for POWs, civilians, and the displaced, it was clear that the establishment of lasting peace had to be coordinated among governmental leaders, religious leaders, the military, and other institutions.[29]

It was strategically important to resolve these issues as humanely and expeditiously as possible—but as Kraus and Adenauer were well aware, this was not only a logistically pragmatic or political task but also a profoundly ethical one, with long-term implications for postwar Germany. Adenauer in particular was already thinking of how to create a viable foundation for postwar Germany in terms of a political or economic stability and what could be described as a kind of ethical stability.

The Ethical Foundations and Implications of Humanitarian Care

The ethics of care for civilians, displaced persons, and POWs is delin-eated in the regulations and guidelines of the military, international law, and humanitarian organizations. Practically, however, ethical values are concretely realized in the on-the-ground, real-life, in-real-time practical implementation of such work. Ethics depends ultimately on the actions of individual human beings.

The destabilizing aftereffects of World War I were not only political and economic, but also, in a profound sense, ethical. The collapse of empires and the redrawing of ethnic and national boundaries were followed by new waves of ethno-nationalism and separatism, making fascism increasingly attractive in some places. In Germany, the fragile Weimar Republic proved incapable of withstanding these social and political currents, and younger Germans in particular began to search for a political cause or leader who seemed to offer a clear vision and certainty about what Germany's future should look like. In this quest, many turned toward Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party.

Born in 1906, the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer was of this generation. Two of his brothers fought in the Great War, and one of them was killed in France. Bonhoeffer personally experienced the food shortages that afflicted German families in the war's aftermath, and as a student during the mid-1920s, he briefly flirted with one of the nationalist paramilitary groups. In 1932, he described his generation as being "in free fall."[30] By then, however, he had become critical of the new nationalism that was sweeping the nation, although he understood why it was so attractive to young Germans. Shortly after Hitler came to power in 1933, Bonhoeffer wrote a short critical essay about the lure of National Socialism for his generation.[31] World War I had left them, he wrote, "with a convincing impression of the meaninglessness and complete isolation of the individual and of the blunt power of the masses," a development that had led young Germans to abandon any sense of personal or ethical responsibility.[32] The disaster, in other words, had both political and ethical consequences. These insights subsequently shaped Bonhoeffer's writings on ethics, both as he understood ethics within the Christian theological context and more broadly as he wrote about it in the societal and political context.

Discussions about Bonhoeffer's ethics often focus on the ethical complexities of his involvement in the resistance conspiracy to overthrow the Nazi regime, but his approach to ethics was a central aspect of his theology throughout his adult life. For Bonhoeffer, "ethics" encompassed all

spheres of human existence and was closely related to what he called the "mandates."[33] The mandates are the four primary spheres of life in which human life is lived: in family and marriage, in the sphere of work, as citizens under the authority of a government, and in the church (today one would say more broadly within one's respective religious community). In each of these spheres, individuals have a certain role that gives them clear responsibilities—whether as head of government or citizen, as parent or child, as teacher or student.

Bonhoeffer understood those responsibilities ultimately as God-given, delineated in the values, principles, and rules of a society and its institutions. For people of a faith tradition, these are grounded in teachings and commandments, clear standards that must be followed and obeyed, setting a clear difference between right and wrong. In any given profession, there are additional ethical norms, and of course in human society generally there are norms about our behavior and responsibilities as we go about our daily lives.

In his writings on ethics, Bonhoeffer focused particularly on what happens when we are confronted with life's complexities, and here he offered two insights that are particularly relevant to the ethical ambiguities that arise during war and its aftermath. The first is that even in situations in which we have a clearly defined role and responsibility and in which there are clear rules, the act of responding ethically to a given situation often demands a judgment call on our part. Core ethical concepts do not offer the fine print for every situation that may arise; even if they did, in real-time moments of crisis one does not rely on the fine print. These are the moments when people draw on their capacity for decency, for moral courage, for their most deeply rooted sense of right and wrong, and for a basic respect for human dignity. They make decisions about how to act in the knowledge that they must take responsibility for their decisions and actions. This is when character plays a central role.

Bonhoeffer understood that in times of political turbulence, violence, and war, there are complex and ambiguous ethical situations that may

suddenly challenge people in a profound way. How people choose to act at such moments can affect the behavior of those around them and alter subsequent events. Bonhoeffer expressed this most eloquently in his 1942 essay "After Ten Years," when he reminded his fellow conspirators that the goal of their actions could not be some kind of self-justification or the hope that history would judge their actions heroically. The goal and central ethical motive guiding their actions had to be simply that they would act in such a way that their actions prepared the foundation, politically and ethically, "for how a coming generation is to go on living."[34] Bonhoeffer understood that in our actions we set an example, not just for those around us, but also for those who come after us.

This is related to Bonhoeffer's second insight, which concerns the ripple effects of ethical action: the connection between individual acts and the wider social and political contexts in which human beings live and act, a context that includes history itself. As early as 1927, Bonhoeffer wrote that all human sin is inherently social: even an individual transgression or injury done to another human being has broader ripple effects, including longer term impacts such as the shifting of social or political norms.[35] A single act of dehumanization against another human being may help foster and normalize collective forms of dehumanization, increasing the vulnerability of those targeted. As such, that single act can contribute to the erosion of moral norms both at the individual and collective levels. Bonhoeffer's insight is related to his corresponding emphasis that the ethical nature of human action reflects our personal purposes or goals, but at its core there must be action taken for the sake of others, for the sake of a deeper commitment to the greater good—the protection and well-being of others, the fundamental morality of our society, and the integrity of our respective institutions.

Theologically, this approach to ethics was central to how Bonhoeffer understood the call to Christian discipleship, but the interrelationship between individual ethical behavior and the broader social ethical fabric can be found in all religious traditions. Writing about the relationship between different religious traditions and the tenets of international

humanitarian law, for example, legal scholar Brian Lepard has noted that in every religious tradition, "particular rights and duties are nested within a humanity-oriented framework."[36] That framework rests on the ethics of individuals and links them to a greater community.

The connection between individual ethical perspectives and action and the greater good is the foundation for the leadership programs at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum for members of the military, judiciary, and law enforcement. These groups come to the museum for several days to a week, touring the exhibitions and exploring case studies that portray specific ethical challenges and dilemmas that confronted their counterparts in Nazi Germany.[37] This exercise gives participants new insights into their own professional and individual responsibilities. More than 50,000 military professionals from the U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Military Academy at West Point, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and other military training institutions have participated in these programs.[38]

Colonel Edward Westermann, USAF, a participant in one of these programs, was interviewed several years ago for a Holocaust Museum podcast in which he described why he thought these programs were so important for the troops he was training: "Looking at the Holocaust," Westermann noted, compelled his students to reflect on the difficult situations they might confront in the field. It is an important form of preparation:

> *If you first face that question in the moment when you're standing on a street in Baghdad or when you're standing on a street in Kabul, if that's the first time you asked yourself the question about "What are my ethical and moral responsibilities in morally ambiguous situations where I have to react?" then you're asking the question too late.*[39]

As his insight indicates, part of the ethical grounding for our actions must be conscious reflection about our role and responsibilities, which is important for both our professional training and our daily lives as citizens.

This is evident in the writings and actions of many of those who were involved in humanitarian work between 1918 and 1945. The insights of

humanitarian workers after 1918, and the insights that Hertha Kraus and Konrad Adenauer gained during the 1920s in interwar Cologne, shaped how they approached the challenges of humanitarian care in postwar Germany after 1945. The conclusions they drew from their experiences after 1918 led them much later to advocate for greater coordination between humanitarian and religious agencies and the military governments, opening the way for different approaches to navigating postwar political issues. The resulting extensive coordinated networks of aid were a reflection of the lessons learned, which included the insight that certain political and humanitarian structures have to be in place if the ethics of care in wartime is to find continuity when the peace begins. Such coordination goes beyond creating organizational structures and networks; the ethical underpinnings and goals of such collaboration must be articulated and incorporated. As Adenauer wrote in his letter asking Kraus to return to Germany in 1945, his invitation came not only because of her proven capability and work ethic, but also because—as he put it—of their "shared ideals."

The importance of attending to the needs of civilians, displaced persons, and POWs is not morally ambiguous in the way that other wartime decisions may be. Nonetheless, the daunting circumstances under which millions of human beings have to be fed and housed, and their longer term needs for relocation or repatriation met, inevitably pose logistical and political challenges. The central ethical challenge for those doing this work under the extraordinarily difficult circumstances of the postwar era (after both 1918 and 1945) was how to do this with compassion and concern, in a way that respected the humanity and dignity of these vulnerable populations. That fundamental respect for human dignity became a cornerstone of the post-1945 European project.

There were numerous difficulties, complexities, and political crises along the way, and we should not oversimplify the aftermath of National Socialism and the Holocaust. On the humanitarian front, however, these issues were navigated more successfully after 1945 than they were after 1918, due in no small part to the collaborative and ethical foundations that

had been laid by people in humanitarian and religious agencies, starting with some of the work done during the 1920s. Combined with substantial economic aid programs, notably the Marshall Plan, this led to a different kind of political stability and helped create a foundation for decades of postwar peace among European nations. As is so often the case in history, the essential ethical underpinnings of the humanitarian work done during this period became one part of a much larger story.

Notes

[1] The full film is available at <www.ushmm.org/learn/introduction-to-the-holocaust/path-to-nazi-genocide/the-path-to-nazi-genocide/full-film>.

[2] See my study of European and U.S. church leaders' engagement in this area. Victoria J. Barnett, "'One Notes a Difference Between American Super-Idealism and European Realism': North American Church Engagement for Reconciliation in Postwar Germany," in *Verständigung und Versöhnung: Beiträge von Kirche, Religion und Politik 70 Jahre nach Kriegsende*, ed. Ralf Karolus Wüstenberg and Jelena Beljin (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlangsanstalt, 2016), 66–67. See also chapter 3 in J. Bruce Nichols, *The Uneasy Alliance: Religion, Refugee Work and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[3] See Conan Fischer, "Remaking Europe after the First World War," in *Oxford Handbook of European History, 1914–1945*, ed. Nicholas Doumanis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), esp. 163–166.

[4] Ibid., as well as Tammy M. Proctor, "Total War: Family, Community, and Identity during the First World War," in Doumanis, *Oxford Handbook of European History*. See also Heather Jones, "International Law and Western Front Prisoners of War in the First World War," in *Wartime Captivity in the Twentieth Century: Archives, Stories, Memories*, ed. Anne-Marie Pathé and Fabien Théofilakis, trans. Helen McPhail (New York: Beghahn Books, 2016), 38, 40.

[5] See Barnett, "'One Notes a Difference,'" in Wüstenberg and Beljin, *Verständigung und Versöhnung*, 68–71; Nichols, *The Uneasy Alliance*, chapter 3; and Willem Visser t'Hooft, *Memoirs* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), 173–175.

[6] See "World War I," *Holocaust Encyclopedia*, available at <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/world-war-i>. Regarding the number of displaced persons and refugees, see Peter Gatrell, "World Wars and Population Displacement in Europe in the Twentieth Century," *Contemporary European History* 16, no. 4 (November 2007), 418–419.

[7] John Horne, "Wartime Imprisonment in the Twentieth Century," in Pathé and Théofilakis, *Wartime Captivity in the Twentieth Century*, 13.

[8] Douglas Irvin-Erickson, *Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 135.

[9] Jones, "International Law and Western Front Prisoners of War in the First World War," in Pathé and Théofilakis, *Wartime Captivity in the Twentieth Century*, 38, 40.

¹⁰ There are a number of works on the history of these respective organizations. For a good overview, see Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

¹¹ Victoria Barnett, "Track Two Diplomacy, 1933–1939: International Responses from Catholics, Jews, and Ecumenical Protestants to Events in Nazi Germany," *Contemporary Church History* 27, no. 1 (2014), cf. 77–79; Marianne Jehle-Wildberger, *Adolf Keller: Ecumenist, World Citizen, Philanthropist*, trans. Mark Kyburz with John Peck (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013), 62–114; Nichols, *The Uneasy Alliance*, 23–52.

¹² See Jehle-Wildberger, *Adolf Keller*, 62–114.

¹³ See especially Irvin-Erickson, *Raphäel Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide*.

¹⁴ David R.W. Bryer, "'The Pity of War': The First World War and Humanitarianism," in *Life after Tragedy: Essays on Faith and the First World War Evoked by Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy*, ed. Michael W. Brierley and Georgina A. Byrne (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2017), 153.

¹⁵ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction*, vol. 1, *From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), 98.

¹⁶ Quoted in Barnett, "'One Notes a Difference,'" in Wüstenberg and Beljin, *Verständigung und Versöhnung*, 75.

¹⁷ Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, 293.

¹⁸ Gerd Schirrmacher, *Hertha Kraus, Zwischen den Welten: Biographie einer Sozialwissenschaftlerin und Quäkerin* (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2002), 341–362.

¹⁹ Gatrell, "World Wars and Population Displacement in Europe in the Twentieth Century," cites one figure of "55 million people forcibly displaced between 1939 and 1947" (419).

²⁰ See "Postwar Refugee Crisis and the Establishment of the State of Israel," *Holocaust Encyclopedia*, available at <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/postwar-refugee-crisis-and-the-establishment-of-the-state-of-israel>.

²¹ See Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 110–122.

²² See Peter Doyle, *World War Two in Numbers: An Infographic Guide to the Conflict, Its Conduct, and Its Casualties* (London: A&C Black, 2013), 164–165.

²³ Schirrmacher, *Hertha Kraus*, 316.

²⁴ Ibid., 330. Regarding the complexities of denazification and reeducation, see Victoria Barnett, "The Changing View of the 'Bystander' in Holocaust

Scholarship: Historical, Ethical, and Political Implications," *Utah Law Review* 2017, no. 4 (2017), 640–642.

²⁵ Schirrmacher, *Hertha Kraus*, 335.

²⁶ Ibid., 335, 338–339.

²⁷ Nichols, *The Uneasy Alliance*, 52–53.

²⁸ For a study that traces the development in these areas over the course of the 20ᵗʰ century, see Irvin-Erickson, *Raphaël Lemkin*.

²⁹ See Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, ch. 8, esp. 168–169.

³⁰ Victoria J. Barnett, ed., *The Collected Sermons of Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, vol. 2 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), 103.

³¹ See "The Führer and the Individual in the Younger Generation," in *Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works*, vol. 12, *Berlin: 1932–1933*, ed. Larry L. Rasmussen, trans. Douglas W. Scott, Isabel Best, and David Higgins (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 268–282.

³² Ibid., 271.

³³ See "The Concrete Commandment and the Divine Mandates," in *Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works*, vol. 6, *Ethics*, ed. Clifford J. Green (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 297–312.

³⁴ See Victoria Barnett, *"After Ten Years": Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Our Times* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), 22 (this volume includes Bonhoeffer's entire essay).

³⁵ This can be found in his first work, *Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church*, which was his dissertation, in chapter 4, "Sin and Broken Community." See *Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works*, vol. 1, *Sanctorum Communio*, ed. Clifford J. Green, trans. Reinhard Krauss and Nancy Lukens (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998).

³⁶ Brian Lepard, *Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Legal Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law and World Religions* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 49.

³⁷ See Jody Prescott et al., *Ordinary Soldiers: A Study in Ethics, Law, and Leadership* (Washington, DC: The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2014), available at <www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20140830-ordinary-soldiers-case-study.pdf>.

³⁸ See "Military," available at <www.ushmm.org/professionals-and-student-leaders/military-professionals>.

³⁹ Edward B. Westermann, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum podcast, February 12, 2009, available at <www.ushmm.org/confront-antisemitism/antisemitism-podcast/edward-westermann>.

The Ethical Challenge of Information Warfare: Nothing New

By Graham Fairclough

T his chapter considers the ethical challenge of a problem that was not new in 1914, had not been resolved by 1918, and continues to exist: the strategic weaponization of information as an instrument of war. It describes how Great Britain used its global cable and high-powered network in conjunction with its cryptographic expertise and military assets to conduct a highly successful information war campaign against Germany and its allies. The interception of the now famous Zimmermann Telegram, which many historians and analysts see as critical to the U.S. entry into the conflict in 1917, is *the* focal event.[1] Drawing on the experiences of Britain's 1914–1918 information war, this chapter next draws out five challenges that states continue to face in the increasingly ubiquitous domain of cyberspace.

Technology and the Changing Character of War

One of the most momentous aspects of World War I, as is frequently the case in all wars, was the weaponization of new and emerging technology and its use on the battlefield—the tank and airplane being those that come most readily to mind. Technological developments changed the character of war and led to these developments being described as the first *modern* conflict.[2] Another technology that impacted the character of the war significantly

was what is now referred to as information and communications technology (ICT), represented in 1914 by the cable telegraph, cable telephone, and high-powered wireless network.[3] This technology enabled the passage of information across significant distances and at a speed that far outstripped that of the carrier pigeon, dispatch rider, or ship. States that possessed these capabilities could conduct war on a global footing and could, for the first time, weaponize information through their ability to use the technology to achieve strategic effect against an adversary. Strategic information warfare had not only become possible, but its conduct influenced the outcome and the character of the Great War as well. Similarly, today's ICT, manifested in the recently defined fifth operating domain of cyberspace, is frequently cited as changing the outcome of conflict.[4]

Information War

It is important to be clear on how information warfare is defined in this chapter. In 1914, no formal definition of what today is recognized as information warfare existed,[5] although Great Britain did recognize the importance of the passage of information and the need to defend the cable and wireless networks that it passed through during war.[6] Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that any conceptualization of it as a means to achieve strategic intent had been considered by the politicians and generals planning the war. At the time, the actions taken by Britain and other states, including Germany, related to the strategic weaponization of information were perceived to be nothing more than a means to an end, comparable to the use of an artillery barrage or a naval blockade to restrict enemy maneuver.

Today, a wide spectrum of definitions of the concept exists. These range from John Arquilla's 1995 offering, "striking at communications nodes and infrastructures," to that more recently stated by Mariarosaria Taddeo, "a spectrum of phenomena, encompassing cyber-attacks as well as the deployment of robotic-weapons and ICT-based communication protocols [malware]."[7] The most fitting definition for this chapter is that presented by Winn Schwartau, "a conflict in which information and

information systems act as both weapons and the targets."[8] This definition reflects the approach taken by Britain a century ago, consisting of physical attacks made against Germany's cable and wireless networks and the use of the information transmitted through these networks to deliver effects in pursuit of its strategic objectives.[9] These effects were control, intelligence, and influence.[10]

Tactical Information Warfare in World War I

At this point, brief mention must be made of the information war that took place throughout the war at the tactical level. Activity was undertaken by each of the protagonists to obtain intelligence on adversary future intent, order of battle, and disruption of communications networks. These requirements were met through wireless intercept and direct access to telephone and telegraph cables.[11] On the Eastern Front, it was instrumental in the Russian defeat at Tannenberg in 1914—the first battle "in the history of man in which the interception of enemy radio traffic played a decisive role."[12] In the Middle East, Sir Frederick Stanley Maude credited it with providing 30 percent of his intelligence requirements during his campaign in Iraq, while Polly Mohs viewed it as having played an important role in putting down the 1915–1918 Arab revolt through its integration with small mobile indigenous forces, leading her to describe the campaign as the first modern intelligence war.[13] On the Western Front, it proved critical in preventing the annihilation of General John French's British Expeditionary Force and the subsequent success of the Marne offensive in 1914 and later in supporting the battles of Messines Ridge, Cambrai, and Amiens.[14] Intercept at sea played an important role in enforcing the blockade of Germany and warned Admiral John Jellicoe of the sailing of the German High Seas Fleet prior to the Battle of Jutland.[15] Tactical intercept also impacted the air campaign, providing early warning for the British of German bombing raids through the interception of ground-to-air radio transmissions and the employment of early direction-finding technology.

Britain's Strategic Information War

By 1914, Britain had recognized that information could and subsequently would be used to defeat Germany. The seeds for this recognition had been sown in Britain's experiences in strategically controlling the flow of information and manipulation of its content during the Boer War.[16] In 1911, discussions held by the Committee on Imperial Defence formalized these seeds into a plan concerning the actions that would be taken on the outbreak of war with Germany, an event that even 3 years before the start of hostilities seemed increasingly likely.[17] Britain saw this weaponization of information as supporting its strategic aims *militarily* by disrupting Germany's ability to command its overseas forces, preventing the conduct of war on a global basis; *diplomatically* by preventing Germany from establishing alliances with other states sympathetic to its cause; and *economically* by restricting German access to global financial markets and the establishment of economic relationships with other states, hindering its ability to resource its war effort. This last aspect was particularly important regarding the enforcement of the maritime blockade that Britain and its allies imposed on Germany from 1914.[18]

Ethical implications concerning the actions taken by Britain during the 1914–1918 period were seemingly not discussed at the time. The reason for this remains unclear. One explanation can be related to the overall lack of the application of ethical consideration to the use of new technology in warfare. A second, more specifically, concerns the view taken during the period, or lack of it, to the exploitation of private information, whether that of the state or of the individual. At the outbreak of the war, Britain's only legislation concerning the interception of information related to postal intercept and was based on the proclamation of May 25, 1663.[19] Inception of the telephone (encompassing its transit through cable networks) and radio communications was not placed on the statute book until the 1921 Official Secrets Act.[20] Yet with hindsight and reference to events in the last decade—including the 2013 Edward Snowden revelations and the weaponization of

information through cyber means by state and nonstate actors to mount military, diplomatic, and economic attacks—Britain's actions would today generate ethical questions regarding access to Germany's information, its manipulation, disruption to its transmission, and the subsequent use that it was put to.[21] These are ethical issues that 100 years after the end of the war still resonate.

The All Red Line

At the center of Britain's information war was the exploitation of its own global cable and high-powered wireless network: the All Red Line. The network, whose construction began in the early 1850s with the laying of the first submarine cable across the English Channel, was extended in 1858 with the laying of the first transatlantic cable between Ireland and New-foundland and completed in 1903 with the final link across the Pacific to America.[22] On completion, the global reach achieved by the All Red Line and the similar communications structures led Tom Standage to describe it as the "Victorian Internet."[23]

For Britain, the exploitation of its own network and those of other states contributed to its war effort in two ways—the first, by allowing it to govern its empire and maintain security through the command of its own troops and those contributed by states within the empire, and the second, and of significant importance to its conduct of information warfare, was the opportunity that it gave Britain to control the flow of all diplomatic, economic, and military telegraphic traffic between Europe and North and South America, including that of Germany. It had achieved this position through the physical destruction of Germany's own global communication network and critical nodes within it and the suppression of German traffic and that of its allies that passed over British-controlled cables and of traffic that transited cables operated by other states that Britain could access by the spring of 1916.[24] These efforts were supplemented by physical interdiction against myriad high-powered radio networks employed by states to reach the farthest corners of their territories and by the use of diplomatic

pressure on neutral states not to carry German traffic. In some cases, such pressure provided Britain access to traffic not possible through other means that it could exploit to reinforce its information war. All of this activity was euphemistically captured under the title of "censorship."[25]

Conducting Information War

On the opening night of the war, the British cable ship *Alert* severed Germany's five Atlantic cables that passed through the English Channel, cutting its secure communications links to the Americas. Six more cables running between Germany and Britain were also cut in the following weeks, further isolating Germany from its global cable network and the ability to use those of other states running through the United Kingdom. In the following months, British action turned to destroying German land-based communications facilities, the vast majority of which were based on high-power radio in Africa and the Far East. Noticeably, the destruction of one such capability prevented the Germans from accessing their own cable, running from neutral Liberia to South America. By May 1915, the German network in Africa and its ability to reach out globally through the African continent had effectively been neutralized.[26]

In the Far East, Britain's key focus was on the ground radio station located on the island of Yap. This station formed the pivotal node of Germany's communications network in the region and provided access to cable routes linking the island with Shanghai, the Dutch East Indies, and Guam, which in turn provided access to the United States.[27] Having completed these actions and those in Europe, Britain then concentrated on the elements of Germany's communication network located in neutral countries, the most important of these being in Spain, Portugal, Liberia, and the United States. These elements represented Germany's principal means of gaining access to its remaining cable networks and wireless stations. To achieve this, Britain relied initially on diplomatic pressure. Regarding the United States and Liberia, this worked well, with both states taking direct action to prevent Germany's use of its capabilities located in their territories.

However, diplomacy was unsuccessful in persuading Spain, Portugal, Brazil, and other Latin and South American states to act, leading the British government to conclude that it could not rely on individual states to comply with its request. Consequently, in the period between November 1914 and September 1915, German cables located within Spanish, Portuguese, and Brazilian sovereign territory were also severed.[28]

These actions left Germany dependent on its remaining radio stations in the Western Hemisphere, the passage of secret messages either through enemy lines, including the naval blockade that the Allies had put in place, and the support of neutral states, including Sweden, that were prepared to transmit German diplomatic messages under cover of its own diplomatic traffic. In 1916, in response to Britain's actions and the success of its information blockade, Germany began the construction of a global radio network using new technology that allowed transmissions to occur over greater distance, intending to link its high-powered radio station located at Nauen, a short distance from Berlin, with stations in Argentina, China, and Mexico, which in turn would link with sub-stations in Asia and the Americas.[29]

The attempt failed, as Britain attacked the network physically and diplomatically. With the assistance of Japan, diplomatic pressure prevented development of any new capability in China. Diplomacy was also successful in causing Argentina to take action against German construction, but only after Britain released intercepted German diplomatic traffic from its ambassador in Buenos Aires. This traffic was less than flattering about the United States, which the United States then released, resulting in a deterioration of German-Argentine relations and the dismantling of the German radio station. Mexico proved to be a more difficult case. After the failure of diplomatic approaches, Britain decided to take direct physical action to prevent Germany from establishing a communications network in Central America that would provide access to South America by conducting a clandestine attack against a newly built station in Mexico City, which operated as a regional node connecting Germany with the entire region. The neutralization of the station was achieved through the destruction of

newly developed vacuum tubes necessary for amplifying the signal from Nauen in an act of sabotage undertaken by a captain of the Royal Navy.[30]

The information blockade imposed on Germany's external communications network severely restricted its ability to act in the international arena and conduct military operations on a global basis. Diplomatically, it prevented Germany from gaining the support of other states to participate in the conflict against the Allies directly and, in enlisting their support to apply political pressure on Britain and the other Allied states, to prevent it from having to succumb to unfavorable peace treaty arrangements. Economically, it significantly strengthened the effect of Britain's naval blockade by preventing Germany from entering into economic relationships with other states and by restricting access to the international banking system, curbing its ability to generate financial resources to continue the war and preventing the purchase of supplies from outside of Europe. Militarily, Britain's actions constrained Germany from conducting warfare against the Allies globally by its inability to communicate securely with its overseas stations.[31] These outputs, achieved through the exploitation of intelligence on German intent, the control of Germany's strategic flow of information, and the exertion of influence on those states that Germany communicated with allowed Britain to achieve what would now in military doctrine be referred to as information advantage.[32]

The Zimmermann Telegram

The Zimmermann Telegram demonstrates how Britain used these three effects to significantly affect the outcome of the war by securing the entry of the United States into the conflict on the side of the Allies. In January 1917, German leadership, seeking to make a decisive move to break the deadlock of trench warfare on the Western Front and hasten the end of the war, embarked on a global campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. Its purpose was to deny Britain the economic resources, primarily coming from the United States, necessary to continue to fight.[33] Concerned that this action would bring the United States into the war on the side of Britain,

German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann attempted to mitigate this by proposing an alliance with Mexico. If the United States did enter the war on the side of the Allies and Mexico subsequently aligned itself with Germany, then it would receive Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona after the Allies had been defeated.[34] Although Zimmermann considered sending the proposal by the more secure route of long-range submarine, this proved impossible due to time constraints imposed by the military's proposed start date of the campaign, February 1, 1917. The offer to the Mexican government was therefore dispatched, ironically as it turned out, through U.S. diplomatic channels to the German ambassador in Washington, DC, for onward transmission to his counterpart in Mexico.[35] This was one of the few routes open to Germany for the passage of diplomatic traffic across the Atlantic.[36]

As a consequence of the control that Britain exerted on Germany's flow of telegraph cable traffic, the message was intercepted by Britain as it passed en route through the United Kingdom.[37] Decryption of the telegram provided Britain with significant intelligence on Germany's future intent regarding both its decision to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare and its proposed alliance with Mexico should the United States enter the war on the side of the Allies. After some deliberation in London on how this intelligence should be used, and the failure of the recommencement of the unrestricted submarine campaign to bring the United States immediately into the war, a copy of the telegram was passed by Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to the U.S. Ambassador in London, Walter Page. Simultaneously, to ensure the credibility of the telegram and increase pressure on President Woodrow Wilson, Balfour magnified the German threat in Mexico and the consequences that it might have for the United States by mounting what today would be categorized as "fake news."[38] In the United States, the contents of the telegram did influence President Wilson's decisionmaking and the views of elements of American society that, up until then, had been isolationist, but only after its publication in March 1917. While it was not the *sole* reason for America's entry into the war, the principal one being

the indiscriminate sinking of U.S. merchant ships, the domestic political pressure that publication of the telegram caused contributed to forcing Wilson's hand into declaring war on Germany.[39] For Britain, however, it helped achieve its intended effect.

Information War Today

Moving forward 100 years and acknowledging the development of technology during this period, the description of the ways and means of Britain's information war mirrors closely the media headlines of today concerning the actions of states in cyberspace. Events are frequently framed through the language of conflict that describes a cyber war between states in which they seek to achieve their strategic intent through the control and exploitation of information. These events are manifested in the illegal acquisition of technology by China and Iran in pursuit of economic and military parity with their Western opponents, the theft of financial resources by North Korea and organized criminal groups (the latter of which now have capabilities once only the preserve of states), and the manipulation of news reporting through social media by Russia that has heralded the advent of fake news.[40]

Analysis of these information wars identifies five shared activities that present ethical challenges. In reflecting on these challenges, continued reference to the phrase *information war* as opposed to that frequently employed today—*cyber war*. The rationale is simple. At the center of the discussion sits the resource of information. Its control, exploitation, and use to influence the actions of a state are important, not the ways and means through which these effects are achieved, whether these are the analog measures employed in the First World War or the digital capabilities of today.

The first challenge is that information war conducted at the strategic level is a geographically boundless war that pays no adherence to national boundaries and the sovereignty of the states that they belong to. Britain's actions from 1914 onward showed that this boundless nature allowed it to deliver effects that encircled the globe from the Far East and across the African continent before extending to the Americas. This global action

mirrored the flow of information that they sought to prevent, to denude Germany from external communication, significantly reducing its ability to exercise its military, economic, or diplomatic power. Today, conceptually similar activities by states are undertaken to provide obstacles to a state's use of cyberspace and the Internet, including the prevention of information flow by distributed denial-of-service attack as experienced by Estonia in 2007 and South Georgia in 2008, undertaken from within Russia, being the digital equivalent of cutting physical cables to prevent external communications and internal system operability.[41] The theft of data belonging to Sony Pictures undertaken from within North Korea, with the purpose of influencing Sony and the U.S. Government, is reminiscent of the use of the Zimmermann Telegram in Mexico.[42] In each of these cases, the attacks were unconstrained by geographical distance and matters of state sovereignty.

The second challenge relates to the proposition that information war does not represent a single battle or engagement that can be bounded by time or traditional constraints of war regarding declaration and cessation. Rather, it is a continuous campaign that occurs beyond the duration of conflict. For Britain, its information war began 3 years prior to the official declaration of the conflict in regard to planning and generating capability, lasted throughout the war, and continued beyond the signing of the Armistice in 1918.[43] It consisted of short-term skirmishes that witnessed the cutting of cables, the physical destruction of communication structures, and the interception of telegraph and radio transmissions, to long-term diplomatic engagements with neutral states undertaken with the aim of denying Germany their support as conduits through which it could communicate in support of its war effort. Today, this notion of information war is reflected in the constant competition between states, and increasingly nonstate actors, in cyberspace as they seek to use the opportunities that this newly emerged domain has to offer. For the states involved, competition results in their being in a state of "persistent engagement," directly through the physical destruction of information or the systems on which it transits or indirectly through its manipulation and exploitation.[44]

The short-term information skirmishes of the 21st century have become those of the hack to exfiltrate data, information, or financial assets. Three prominent examples are the 2015 theft of the personal security records of 21.5 million individuals believed to have been undertaken by Chinese-affiliated hackers; the theft of $1 million by North Korea–based criminals from the central bank of Bangladesh; and the 2017 ransomware attack, subsequently attributed to Russian cyber criminals, that caused major disturbance to the operation of elements of Britain's National Health Service.[45] The long-term engagement is the diplomatic initiatives that seek to establish behavioral norms in cyberspace or create partnerships between states as a means to improve their cyber security and counter the global threat posed. In the 21st-century examples, none of the states are involved in a conflict, yet the outcomes of the attacks were those traditionally seen only in the context of war.

The next challenge is that information war produces a conflict that encompasses the spectrum of national power: diplomatic, economic, and military. Britain's diplomatic efforts to influence neutral states at the strategic level not to support Germany's expansionist ambitions or, more tactically, not to provide resources to allow it to maintain or reestablish its communication network proved successful. Equally, its ability to prevent Germany's engagement with the international finance and economic markets through the lack of communications channels delivered material effects on Germany's ability to maintain its war effort, compounding the impact of the naval blockade significantly.[46] In the military sphere, Britain's strategic effect succeeded in preventing Germany from commanding its overseas garrisons and deployed units, restricting its ability to conduct a coordinated global conflict. Success allowed Britain to focus its resources almost exclusively on defeating Germany on the Western Front. The two most noticeable exceptions were the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign in 1915 and numerous skirmishes in East Africa.

Today the use of fake news to shape and proffer the foreign policies of states in their relationships with others in the international system is an

accepted aspect of international relations and the exercise of power. It was a fundamental element of the Israel/Hamas conflict, the continuing war in Ukraine, and, perhaps most prominently, its employment by Russia in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.[47] In the economic arena, the impact of information war has been mentioned previously in relation to the theft of intellectual property by China and North Korea, but increasingly it is the activities of cyber criminals, operating as state proxy actors, blurring the distinction between state and nonstate actor boundaries, that is having the most dramatic effect.[48] For the military lever of national power, it now operates in an environment of constant aggression, whether engaged in a legally defined conflict or not. In this environment, it must protect its networks from disruption, ensure that its data are secure and validated to maintain the level of trust necessary to conduct kinetic actions effectively and legally, and guarantee that its weapons systems will function as intended when required.[49]

The penultimate challenge is found in Britain's demonstration that information war is not devoid of or divorced from events in the physical world. Britain's destruction of Germany's undersea cables and the sabotage of station nodes on its global high-powered radio network starkly illustrated that the passage of information was reliant on manmade structures that, when destroyed, had severe consequences on Germany's ability to conduct the war both within Europe and globally. One hundred years on, and despite frequent popular reference to the "virtualness" of cyberspace, its existence as a conduit for the passage of information remains dependent on a physical infrastructure in which undersea cables remain vital to its operation, alongside increasingly large and power-hungry server farms and Wi-Fi antenna networks that have replaced the high-power radio networks of the past.[50] Plotted on a map, the infrastructure network of the contemporary environment of cyberspace would bear remarkable similarity to the telegraphic and radio network existing in 1914.

The final area of challenge relates not only to the information war that was fought during World War I and those occurring today, but also to the

wider role played by technology in driving the realities of conflict—the technological determinism of war.[51] Viewed through this lens, ethics will always be playing catch up. For Britain, consideration of its information war occurred through a prism founded on ideas related to the interception and exploitation of postal letters as they transited through the country's postal system.[52] Further ethical considerations related to the technology of the telegraph and the radio that existed on the commencement of the war were absent. Although the last decade has seen consideration by Britain and an increasing number of other states of the challenges posed by the impact of the rapidly evolving digital domain, agreement on related ethical principles remains elusive. This situation is most starkly demonstrated by the challenge of fake news and its influence on the outcome of popular votes in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.[53]

In conclusion, three comments can be drawn from the above discussion. First the scale of the weaponization of information undertaken by Britain in World War I to control Germany's ability to conduct strategic maneuver and to influence its allies or potential allies had not occurred before. While information war has always been an element of conflict, as Thucydides noted when identifying the effects of messaging and narrative during the Peloponnesian War, its *scale* in World War I was new.[54] It was a consequence of the emergence of new communications technology in the four decades prior to the start of the conflict and its continued evolution as the war progressed. This evolution outstripped the ability of the government and military decisionmakers to comprehend the ethical challenges and requirements that the new form of warfare brought. This situation continues to exist, despite the considerable efforts made in the last decade through such vehicles as the Tallinn Manual and the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on cyber security to reach agreement on what constitutes the ethical and just use of information as a weapon.[55] The future shows little prospect for change given the positions taken on the matter by Russia, China, and a number of other states. Positions that are diametrically opposite to that of the West are a debate over information freedom or information control.

The second concluding comment is that while just war theory existed and was acknowledged before the outbreak of World War I, it proved inadequate in dealing with the advent of new technologies of war including the tank and aircraft, alongside those related to information war. In the latter case, available documentation suggests that no direct consideration was given to the weaponization of information and the ethical impacts that might be generated.

The only identified legal consideration was made through the lens of postal intercept and exploitation, as recognition of the intercept of telephone and radio communications was not placed on the statute book until the passing of the 1921 Official Secrets Act.[56] This inadequacy of just war theory continues today in the academic and military debates surrounding cyber warfare and how states engage in and respond to the evolving technology of cyberspace.

Finally, in war, states seek to exploit opportunities to the edge of existing legal, moral, and ethical boundaries in pursuit of their strategic objectives. This position was summarized by an unidentified British statesman in 1914 concerning the exploitation of information: "Few practices save cannibalism were beyond the pale for British statesman, subject to the principle that they not be caught publicly in the act."[57] Today, for some states, the adoption of an ethical approach to the weaponization of information has changed little. For others, including Great Britain and other Western states, while the need to develop appropriate ethical principles has been recognized, reaching an agreed position continues to produce the same challenges today as existed in 1914.

Notes

[1] Thomas Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and Americas Entry into World War I* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, November 2003), 1–37.

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[3] While this technology existed prior to the commencement of the First World War—for example, the first transatlantic telegraph cable was laid in 1858 and Great Britain completed its global cable network in 1903—it had not been used so deliberately and with such an impact as a means of achieving strategic outcomes prior to 1914.

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[5] Jonathan Reed-Winkler, "Information Warfare in World War I," *The Journal of Military History* 73, no. 3 (July 2009), 845–867.

[6] P.M. Kennedy, "Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914," *The English Historical Review* 86, no. 341 (October 1971), 728–752.

[7] John Arquilla, "Ethics and Information Warfare," in *The Changing Role of Information in Warfare*, ed. Zalmay Khalilzad, John P. White, and Andy W. Marshall (Washington, DC: RAND, 1999), 379–401; Mariarosaria Taddeo, "Information Warfare and Just War Theory," in *The Ethics of Information Warfare*, ed. Luciano Floridi and Mariarosaria Taddeo (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2014), 123–138.

[8] Winn Schwartau, "Ethical Conduct of Information Warfare," in *Cyberwar: Security, Strategy and Conflict in the Information Age*, ed. Alan Campen, Douglas Dearth, and Thomas Gooden (Fairfax, VA: Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, 1996), 243–249.

[9] It is worth noting that each of the three definitions is taken from academic works situated firmly within what their authors consider the field of ethics.

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[12] Wilhelm F. Flicke, *War Secrets in the Ether*, trans. Ray W. Pettengill (Washington, DC: National Security Agency, 1953), 7.

[13] Ferris, "The British Army and Signals Intelligence in the Field During the First World War"; Polly A. Mohs, *Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War* (London: Routledge, 2008).

[14] Ferris, "The British Army and Signals Intelligence in the Field During the First World War."

[15] Ibid.; Reed-Winkler, "Information Warfare in World War I."

[16] Ferris, "Before 'Room 40'"; Peter Freeman, "M.I.1(b) and the Origins of British Diplomatic Cryptanalysis," *Intelligence and National Security* 22, no. 2 (August 7, 2007), 206–228.

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[19] Government of the United Kingdom, *Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom* (London: The Stationery Office, June 21, 1999).

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[21] Glenn Greenwald, *No Place to Hide* (London: Penguin UK, 2014).

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[24] Freeman, "M.I.1(b) and the Origins of British Diplomatic Cryptanalysis"; Reed-Winkler, "Information Warfare in World War I."

[25] Reed-Winkler, "Information Warfare in World War I."

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ferris, "The British Army and Signals Intelligence in the Field During the

First World War"; Ferris, "Before 'Room 40'"; Freeman, "M.I.1(b) and the Origins of British Diplomatic Cryptanalysis."

[32] Phil Osborn, "Air Marshal Phil Osborn on Intelligence and Information Advantage in a Contested World," paper presented at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, May 18, 2018.

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[34] Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), "Real World Impact: How GCHQ's Predecessors Contributed to the U.S. Entering World War I," January 16, 2017, available at <www.gchq.gov.uk/information/century-how-work-gchqs-predecessors-contributed-us-entering-world-war-i>; Boghardt, *The Zimmermann Telegram*.

[35] The inference of this action is that Britain was actively intercepting U.S. diplomatic traffic as it transited through the country—a practice that Boghardt suggests was not stopped until the start of World War II.

[36] GCHQ, "Real World Impact."

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.; Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, "Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 31, no. 2 (April 19, 2017), 211–236.

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The Moral Status of Chemical Weapons: Arguments from World War I

By John Mark Mattox

Eighteenth-century British poet Alexander Pope once famously mused, "Vice is a monster of so frightful mien / As, to be hated, needs but to be seen; / Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face, / We first endure, then pity, then embrace."[1]

While the human condition affords countless examples of what Pope had in mind, perhaps no more striking wartime example can be found than that of the employment of chemical weapons in World War I. Chemical weapons—regarded as vicious and hated by all self-identified "civilized peoples"—were first endured, then pitied, then embraced by both sides, even as both sides held their noses, both literally and figuratively, for having chosen to employ weapons condemned throughout history. Then, in a turn so quick as to make the head of the body politic spin, the international community roundly condemned these weapons, even as individual states muttered under their breath—in the form of treaty reservations—their willingness to employ them again if an enemy did. At least some in Germany took all of this in stride, as evidenced in a now famous diary entry by army officer and author Rudolf Binding, written in the immediate aftermath of the gas attacks at Ypres, Belgium: "I am not pleased with the idea of poisoning men. Of course, the entire world will rage about it at first and then imitate us."[2] Imitation did, indeed, follow, both in the attacks employing progressively

more lethal weapons and the amassing, over the course of the 20th century, of huge stockpiles of chemical weapons.

From the perspective of the 21st century, most would say that chemical weapons are immoral, but then again, that is what most were saying on the eve of World War I. This leads inexorably to a set of interrelated moral-philosophical questions:

- Is the employment of chemical weapons morally permissible or not?
- If so, what is all the fuss about?
- If not, why not?
- Finally, if their employment is immoral, what justifications, if any, could plausibly be offered to override their moral prohibition?

These questions, as they pertain to World War I, present themselves against the immediate backdrop of The Hague Peace Conferences, the first of which occurred in 1899 and included the following declaration: "The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases."

What followed were two "exit" clauses: "The present Declaration is only binding on the Contracting Powers in the case of a war between two or more of them. It shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between the Contracting Powers, one of the belligerents shall be joined by a non-Contracting Power."[3] The declaration was ratified by all major powers except the United States and Japan.[4] However, both the 1899 and 1907 conferences include bans ratified by all major powers that expressly prohibit:

- employing poison or poisoned weapons
- killing or wounding treacherously
- employing arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.[5]

That the chemical weapons employed in World War I were "poison" in the relevant sense was hardly a point of dispute. However, the question of

whether clouds of gas creeping eerily along the ground and seeping down into the trenches was a case of "killing or wounding treacherously" *was* a matter of dispute—the answer to whether these chemical weapons were materials "calculated to cause *unnecessary* suffering" depended very much on whom one asked.

World War I was supposed to be a war from which the victorious German troops returned home "before the leaves [fell] from the trees,"[6] but of course it did not work out that way. Within months, German and Allied advances on the Western Front ground to a standstill as both sides took to the trenches,[7] where then over time, if not immediately, the living and operating conditions for the average soldier were simply ghastly. For both sides, the question became how to break what appeared to be an intractable stalemate, which recent improvements in the machine gun and rapid-fire artillery had helped promote. World War I was, perhaps more than any war that preceded it, a scientist's war that also gave rise to significant technological improvements not only to the machine gun and artillery but also to the airship, airplane, dreadnaught, mine, and submarine.

So perhaps it should come as no surprise that some regarded "improvements" in poison gas weapons as part of a natural technological evolution. Perhaps neither should it be a surprise that *all* these technological improvements pressed up against some kind of moral boundary. Gas was just one of the things that the belligerent states of World War I were willing to "first endure, then pity, then embrace." Moreover, during the war, gas, like all these other technologies, was expected by many to become a permanent feature of future warfare. After the war, German chemist Fritz Haber, on receiving the Nobel Prize for chemistry in 1919, stated, "In no future war will the military be able to ignore poison gas."[8] For Haber, the embrace was complete. But why? Haber supplies his own answer: "It is a higher form of killing."[9]

Whatever else World War I was about, it was, in some undeniable sense, about killing. As British II Corps commander Lieutenant General Sir Charles Ferguson stated:

> [Gas] *is a cowardly form of warfare which does not commend itself to me or other English soldiers, but it is clearly impossible to get the enemy to desist from this and other contraventions of previously recognized rules of warfare by holding up our hands with abhorrence at such unseemly conduct on his part. . . . We cannot win this war unless we kill or incapacitate more of our enemies than they do of us, and if this can only be done by our copying the enemy in his choice of weapons, we must not refuse to do so.*[10]

General Erich von Falkenhayn, German imperial minister of war and later chief of the General Staff, reflectively argued that "the ordinary weapons of attack often failed completely" against trench warfare and, hence, against Germany's ability to kill its way to the English Channel. "A weapon had, therefore, to be found which was superior to them. . . . Such a weapon," he argued, "existed in gas."[11]

The pragmatic argument that seems to have emerged—even if none wished to articulate it in polite company—was an all too simple syllogism applied by both the Central and Allied powers:

> *Whoever breaks the stalemate (which as a practical matter meant whoever kills the most of the enemy) will win this war.*

> *Gas will enable the killing of more of the enemy.*

> *Therefore, gas will enable us to win the war.*

Actual outcomes falsified the argument but did little to prevent the expenditure of unimaginably large quantities of gas during World War I.

Falkenhayn's reflection also reveals an economic argument for employing gas: Germany needed a weapon that "would not excessively tax the capacity of German war industry in its production."[12] A similar selling point could be found on the Allied side. The developer of one British chemical weapon delivery device calculated that if it were "manufactured 'on a large scale the cost of killing Germans would be reduced to only sixteen

shillings apiece.'"[13] At that bargain price, who could afford *not* to fight with poison gas?

Next, we should note a patriotic argument that stretches back at least as far as Cicero and still made a great deal of sense to many in the imperial world as it existed at the beginning of World War I: "Death is not natural for a State as it is for a human being, for whom death is not only necessary, but frequently even desirable. On the other hand, there is some similarity, if we may compare small things with great, between the overthrow, destruction, and extinction of a State, and the decay and dissolution of the whole universe."[14] States have often implicitly appealed to arguments such as this in order to employ extraordinary means of war-making under the banner of "military necessity." When the disastrous confluence of events in August 1914 precipitated a war that, within months, became hopelessly bogged down, consuming critical resources with every passing day, the logical next step was to break the stalemate by whatever means necessary before the state's war-making capacity was exhausted.

Germany's chemical industry, by far the most advanced in the world at that time, was quick to do its "patriotic" duty, working to weaponize chemicals with progressively lethal effect (although it would not reach the apogee of its "patriotic" contribution until it developed Zyklon-B, the chemical pesticide that facilitated the "final solution" a generation later). On the other side of the channel, World War I Allied "patriots" were busy developing their own chemical killing mechanisms for not dissimilar reasons.

Early on, at least, Germany offered a hair-splitting legal argument to the effect that its gas attacks did not violate The Hague Conventions because the gas was released from canisters and not delivered by projectiles. Both sides later advanced the legal argument from negation: that the other side had employed it first and that existing international legal strictures were thereby superseded. (We should, of course, remind ourselves that the relationship between the "legal" and the "moral" is hardly a logical biconditional.)

Finally, we find attempts at moral argumentation: Gas, so the argument goes, "was actually the most *humane* of the weapons used in the First

World War, wounding far more than it killed."[15] Of the roughly 1.29 million gas casualties of the war, the survival rate was about 93 percent, even though about 12 percent were permanently disabled.[16] At this juncture, we could put on our actuarial hats and dispute the statistics. To do so, however, would miss the larger moral-philosophical point. A weapon's relative "humanity" depends far more on whether it causes gratuitous suffering to another person than it does on the number of persons it is used to kill or incapacitate. Moreover, the numbers of dead or wounded do not begin to capture the psychological damage done to those who experienced gas attacks themselves. The same soldier who became accustomed to shrugging his shoulders—that is to say, when a comrade-in-arms was blown to pieces by artillery as the soldier stood next to him in the trenches, or whose head was shattered into fragments by machine gun fire when he peered over the trenches—was enraged at the horrors he witnessed from the employment of gas. Consider, as one of many possible examples, the reaction of British Army Company Sergeant Major Ernest Shepard, who found himself on the frontlines during the first gas attack at Ypres and called what he experienced "the most barbarous act known in modern warfare":

> [T]*he enemy . . . started pumping out gas on us. This gas we were under the impression was to stupefy only. We soon found out at a terrible price that these gases were deadly poison. . . . The scene that followed was heart-breaking. Men were caught by fumes and in dreadful agony, coughing and vomiting, rolling on* [the] *ground in agony. . . . Hell could find no worse the groans of scores of dying and badly hurt men.*[17]

His diary entry the following day affords some small glimpse at the rage felt by those who survived: "Had we lost as heavily while actually fighting we would not have cared as much, but our dear boys died like rats in a trap, instead of heroes as they all were. The Dorset Regiment's motto now is, 'No prisoners.' No quarter will be given when we again get to fighting."[18]

The experience of Ypres does not appear to have produced in the Allies an aversion to gas warfare per se, but only to the awful suffering it induced. Take away the permanent effects of gas poisoning, and gas warfare became more palatable. As Winston Churchill characterized the moral problem a few months after the armistice:

> *I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. We have definitely adopted the position at the* [Versailles] *Peace Conference of arguing in favor of the retention of gas as a permanent method of warfare. It is sheer affectation to lacerate a man with the poisonous fragment of a bursting shell and to boggle at making his eyes water by means of lachrymatory* [that is, tear-producing] *gas.*[19]

In this telling statement, Churchill rather turns reality on its head, to wit: Shrapnel from bursting shells does not kill and maim by virtue of toxic properties. It kills it because the shrapnel, hurled at a great speed, is jagged, sharp, and searingly hot. Tear production is hardly the principal moral problem associated with gas warfare. Of much greater concern is the fact that gases, especially those produced after World War I, can, like shrapnel, have deleterious effects that linger in survivors long after the battle is over.

In the same 1919 memorandum, Churchill distinguishes between "civilized" and "uncivilized" peoples, apparently seeing no reason why any should pause over the employment of gas against the latter: "I am strongly in favor of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes. The moral effect would be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum."[20] He then mercifully adds, "It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gases: gases can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected."[21] The point in referencing this often *mis*quoted memorandum is not to castigate Churchill but rather to identify some of the points of confusion that attended moral reasoning vis-à-vis chemical warfare against the backdrop of World War I.

Also against that backdrop, B.H. Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller argued that:

- Gas was a weapon of the future that could be employed in both "offensive and defensive operations."[22]

- Its versatility would enable its dispersion from "tanks, ships, and aircraft,"[23] thus producing an economy born of interoperability.

- It was relatively humane inasmuch "as it achieved effects without causing as many fatalities and permanent disabilities as high explosives."[24]

Both Allied and German sources advanced arguments as to how the relative morality of a weapon should be assessed. On the Allied side, one of the best known arguments comes from U.S. Army Colonel Harry L. Gilchrist, who in 1928 wrote the Army's official comparative study of casualties from the Great War: "The measure of humaneness for any form of warfare is the comparison of the degree of suffering at the time of injury by the different weapons, their permanent after effects, and the percentage of deaths to the total number injured by the particular methods of warfare under consideration."[25] On the basis of this calculus, Gilchrist concludes:

> [T]he part played by chemical warfare in the maintenance of military morale is of extraordinary moment, especially in connection with the mortality. The large number of casualties produced by chemicals compared with the low death rate from them is striking and brings up the question as to the military importance of a weapon which wounds but does not kill. Naturally, the first impression would be that such a weapon would have no place in military armament, but when considering the great encumbrance to an enemy of a large number of wounded, together with the number required to care for them (estimated at from four to five persons for each wounded), it can readily be seen that the wound-producing weapon has a greater strategic value than the one which kills outright.[26]

Germany's corresponding calculus, as reported by Gilchrist, featured a thoroughgoing pragmatism covered with a thin veneer of ethics:

> *In the matter of making an end of the enemy's forces by violence it is an incontestable and self-evident rule that the right of killing and annihilating, in regard to hostile combatants is inherent in the war power, and its organs, that all means which modern inventions afford, including the fullest most dangerous and the most massive means of destruction, may be utilized. . . . These last, just because they attain the object of war as quickly as possible, are on that account to be regarded as indispensable, and, when closely considered, the most humane.*[27]

Alternatively stated, those weapons that enable the state to realize its war aims in the shortest possible time are, by definition, the most humane. If Germany did not intend this argument to apply to gas weapons, it is difficult to imagine what it did intend the argument to apply to. Gilchrist certainly thought it did.

Whatever the case, the experimentation with and stockpiling of vastly more lethal gases in the interwar years calls into question the genuineness of interest on the part of anyone in the prospect of employing gas in future wars out of truly humane considerations. This, however, should not surprise us. A century earlier, Carl von Clausewitz observed:

> *Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed. . . . To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to a logical absurdity.*[28]

For the Clausewitzian realist, movement along the endure-pity-embrace continuum always tends toward the embrace, and subordination of moral questions simply signals recognition of reality. On the other hand, no

amount of realist argumentation will ever convince the likes of Company Sergeant Major Shepard that chemical weapons are morally permissible.

With respect to the question of whether the alleged moral prohibition against chemical weapons can be overridden, at least some from the World War I era would answer "*yes*, for purpose of reprisal." In recent decades, when response-in-kind to a chemical attack has become infeasible, responses have included economic sanctions and massive cruise missile attacks—and the discussion of possible response options has at times even included nuclear weapons. Whether any of these methodologies represent an improvement over retaliation-in-kind to chemical weapons may require additional reflection.

In 1919 at the Versailles Peace Conference, the Allies decided that chemical weapons were so morally reprehensible that *Germany ought not to be allowed to have them*. (It was not until 1925 that the Allies disallowed their own employment of chemical weapons—an undertaking not ratified by the United States until 1975—and it was not until 1993 that the world at large formally foreswore chemical weapons altogether.)

Since World War I, it may be that most casual observers of war have neither endured nor pitied or embraced chemical weapons. Moreover, the number of chemical weapons attacks since World War I has not been zero, but it has been very small. Have moral scruples kept things in check? Perhaps, but that may not be the dominant reason. The argument can be made that the great powers have simply decided chemical weapons are more trouble than they are worth:

- Chemical weapons are not particularly effective in many, if not most, contemporary great power planning scenarios.
- The success of employment depends largely on the caprice of atmospheric conditions, and shifting winds can quickly make the weapons lethal for the originating side.
- Personal and collective protective equipment can significantly reduce the effect of a chemical weapon attack.

- Handling the weapons themselves is a dangerous task, and associated logistics are complicated.
- Finally, it may be argued that most military commanders would sooner avoid both the hassles and risks, leaving it to a handful of minor players in the international community to employ chemical weapons as the so-called poor man's nuke.

Decisions made based on these practicalities, however, will not keep the great powers from claiming the moral high ground.

Are chemical weapons inherently immoral? If so, then none of the World War I arguments in favor of them can carry the day. But technology has advanced in ways unimaginable in World War I. Consider the following questions:

- What if a chemical warfare agent could be developed that could be employed with acceptable discrimination?
- What if a nonlethal chemical warfare agent could simply cause one's enemy to lie down and take a nap while handcuffs are slapped on him or her?
- What if a lethal chemical warfare agent could cause instant death with no apparent suffering?

This is not the stuff of science fiction anymore. If the chemical weapons of the future were to make war less lethal than they did in the Great War, would that signal a moral improvement, or would it merely raise other troubling moral dilemmas? Would relatively pain-free incapacitation or death result in more humane war or simply in more war? (Recall General Robert E. Lee's remarkably candid observation: "It is well that war is so terrible, or we would grow too fond of it."[29]) Our future problem with chemical weapons may not be that they, à la World War I, make warfare torturous or death gruesome but rather that they could make both warfighting and killing too easy. If so, chemical warfare probably is not merely a relic of the past, the moral questions surrounding chemical weapons may not be as settled as

one might wish, and Pope's dictum may serve as a timely warning against future perils neither easily anticipated nor easily remedied.

Notes

¹ Alexander Pope, "An Essay on Man, Epistle II," available at <www.poets.org/poetsorg/poem/essay-man-epistle-ii>.

² Stuart Robson, *The First World War* (London: Routledge, 2013), 122.

³ "Laws of War Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which Is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases; July 29, 1899," Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/dec99-02.asp>.

⁴ James Brown Scott, ed., *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1915), 232.

⁵ Ibid., 116. The wording on the latter prohibition differs slightly between the two conventions but to no substantial effect. See also "Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, II)," *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776–1949*, comp. Charles I. Bevans, vol. 1 *Multilateral 1776–1917*, Department of State Publication 8407 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968).

⁶ "Kaiser Wilhelm II, August 1914, Addressing German Troops Departing for the Front," Google Arts and Culture, available at <https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/AQPvqhFE>.

⁷ See "Trench Warfare," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, available at <www.britannica.com/topic/trench-warfare>.

⁸ Diana Preston, *A Higher Form of Killing: Six Weeks in World War I That Forever Changed the Nature of Warfare* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2015), 1.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Tim Cook, *No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 37.

¹¹ Erich von Falkenhayn, *General Headquarters 1914–1916 and Its Critical Decisions* (London: Hutchinson, 1919), 47, available at <https://archive.org/stream/generalheadquart00falk#page/46/mode/2up>.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Preston, *A Higher Form of Killing*, 234.

¹⁴ Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Re Publica* III.xxiii, in *De Re Publica and De Legibus*, trans. C.W. Keyes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928), 211–213.

¹⁵ Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, *A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Chemical and Biological Warfare* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 16.

¹⁶ John Lee, *The Gas Attacks, Ypres 1915* (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., 2009), 148.

[17] Ibid., 77–78.

[18] Ibid., 78.

[19] "Churchill's 1919 War Office Memorandum," National Churchill Museum, available at <www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/churchills-1919-war-office-memorandum.html>.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Edward W. Spiers, *A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (London: Reaktion Books, Ltd., 2010), 43.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Harry L. Gilchrist, *Comparative Study of World War Casualties from Gas and Other Weapons* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1928), 47.

[26] Ibid., 2.

[27] *The German War Book*, 1910, quoted in Gilchrist, *Comparative Study of World War Casualties from Gas and Other Weapons*, 3.

[28] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75–76.

[29] Edward Porter Alexander, *Military Memories of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907), 302.

Ethical Implications for Holistic Servicemember Care

Anglo-American Army Chaplaincy in World War I: A Centenary Perspective

By Michael Snape

The history of Anglo-American chaplaincy cooperation is curiously neglected. Since 1900, British and American forces have served together in the Boxer Rebellion, two world wars, the Korean War, Gulf War, and the war on terror, to say nothing of their routine collaboration in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although histories of 20th-century British and American chaplaincy have multiplied in recent decades, almost all focus on a single national context, an individual service, a specific conflict, and/or a certain religious tradition. However useful in other respects, such selectivity has served to obscure the fundamental connection between British and U.S. Army chaplaincy, especially that which occurred in World War I. If mentioned at all, this collaboration usually receives only a nod of acknowledgment, although Richard Budd has rightly emphasized its formative role in shaping the organization of American chaplaincy.[1]

Significantly, and although interoperability has now become something of a buzz term in British and American chaplaincy circles, what has long been neglected or forgotten is that the basic patterns and contours of 20th-century British and U.S. Army chaplaincy emerged from the same roots and challenges posed by the first global war of the 20th century—a war in which, for the first time in their histories, both Great Britain and the United States sent mass citizen armies to fight an industrialized war overseas. This

chapter studies the commonalities between the British and American experiences of the First World War; highlights the religious, cultural, and military similarities between the two nations at that time; and examines the critical role played in creating a new model of U.S. Army chaplaincy, fashioned on British lines, by Charles Henry Brent, the Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Western New York.

To understand the context in which this new model of U.S. Army chaplaincy arose, it is important to grasp some of the key cultural and religious dynamics of the "Anglosphere" in the early 20th century. Despite major governmental differences between Great Britain and the United States (especially, for our purposes, the latter's Republican constitution and its separation of church and state) and mass immigration from southern, central, and eastern Europe, American society closely resembled its British counterpart in that it was overwhelmingly Christian, predominantly Protestant, and normatively English-speaking. Furthermore, and despite their estrangement from the mother country and their ingrained suspicions of British imperialism, the members of America's Anglo elite were closely bound to the British Isles by linguistic, cultural, and religious ties. British and American Protestants of British descent shared global missionary horizons, a Puritan moral outlook, denominational links that spanned the Atlantic, and, in the King James Bible of 1611, a standard version of Scripture. Significantly, the President who took the United States to war in 1917 was a Presbyterian who prided himself on his Scottish Covenanter heritage and whose mother had been born in the English border town of Carlisle. His grandfather, Thomas Woodrow, had been its Congregationalist minister.[2] But there were many indicators of this shared Protestant milieu.

It was instanced, for example, in the Anglo-American majority at the Edinburgh Missionary Conference of 1910; in the prominence of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in both countries; and in the trans-Atlantic appeal of evangelists such as Ira David Sankey and Dwight L. Moody and British-born Rodney "Gypsy" Smith. The turn of the 20th century has also been termed "the great age of Episcocratic supremacy"

in the United States, an age when the Protestant Episcopal Church, an integral part of the worldwide Anglican Communion, sought to realize its vision of being America's *national*, if not established, church.[3] Inspired by their church's English heritage, its theological breadth, and its cultural and financial capital, Episcopalian pretensions were underlined by the National Cathedral project in Washington, DC ("a House of Prayer for *All People*," according to its originator, Bishop Henry Yates Satterlee).[4] An epitome of the English Gothic revival and designed by British architect George Frederick Bodley,[5] its charter was granted by Congress and signed by (Presbyterian) President Benjamin Harrison in 1893.[6] Episcopalians envisaged their massive new cathedral as nothing less than "America's Westminster—a great expression of national unity, a burial place for great national heroes."[7] When its foundation stone was laid in September 1907, Admiral George Dewey and President Theodore Roosevelt (another hero of the Spanish-American War, and an occasional Episcopalian) were present, and the Anglican Bishop of London was at hand to address the concourse of 10,000 worshippers and well-wishers.[8]

These years were also characterized by dwindling strategic tensions between the British Empire and the United States. Despite the War of 1812, the maritime tensions stirred by the American Civil War, and the emergence of the United States as a global naval power, Anglo-American naval tensions were, in the main, notable by their absence. Because of their service across the world, relations between the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy had been cordial for generations. According to Peter Karsten, the typical U.S. Navy officer of the late 19th century was "an Anglophile because he identified with his British colleague in every imaginable way—socially, professionally, ideologically, culturally, historically, and racially."[9] While a fashionable trans-Atlantic Anglo-Saxonism—famously (or notoriously) expressed in Rudyard Kipling's poem of 1899, "The White Man's Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands"—played on a common language and shared racial origins, Protestant Christianity, and above all Anglicanism, was a key ingredient of this cultural cement.

Moreover, Episcopalianism was *very much* the keynote religion of America's professional officer corps until the Cold War era. As Michael E. Shay has observed, prior to the First World War "a disproportionate number of Episcopal priests served as Army chaplains,"[10] a situation that also obtained in the U.S. Navy.[11] In fact, and despite the notional limitations of the First Amendment, the Protestant Episcopal Church was all but established at West Point and Annapolis: from 1896 to 1959, an unbroken succession of Episcopalian chaplains held office at West Point, their influence enhanced by a system of mandatory chapel attendance for the budding elite of the Regular Army.[12] At Annapolis, where a similar regime obtained for the Navy's officer cadets, such privilege was less blatant, but the prevailing tone was unmistakably Episcopalian.[13]

In the conformist, hierarchical, and close-knit world of the professional officer corps, the influence of these systems was unmistakable, with almost half of America's admirals and generals claiming to be Episcopalians in the decades between the Spanish-American War and World War II.[14] In contrast, in 1916, the Episcopalian share of the national population was in the order of only 1 percent.[15] As the sociologist Morris Janowitz concluded in 1960, the Protestant Episcopal Church "dominated organized military religion" in the United States throughout the first half of the 20th century.[16] On the eve of the First World War, these affinities had found their supreme expression in the person and worldview of Alfred Thayer Mahan—U.S. Navy officer, historian, and maritime strategist. Mahan's reputation as the "Prophet of Sea Power" on both sides of the Atlantic stemmed from his reading of the providential nature and trajectory of national histories, an understanding that was strongly Anglophile in character and deeply influenced by his Episcopalian faith and mindset.[17]

In Great Britain, this strong sense of amity and affinity was reflected and reciprocated in organizations such as the Anglo-American League, inaugurated in London in July 1898 to the distant rumblings of the Spanish-American War, and with the archbishops of Canterbury and York in attendance.[18] The objectives of the League were stated in the following terms:

> *Considering that the peoples of the British Empire and of the United States of America are closely allied in blood, inherit the same literature and laws, hold the same principles of self-government, recognise the same ideals of freedom and humanity in the guidance of their national policy, and are drawn together by strong common interests in many parts of the world, this Meeting is of opinion that every effort should be made in the interests of civilization and peace to secure the most cordial and constant co-operation between the two nations.*[19]

Subsequently, the strength of such sentiment was reflected in an ostentatious determination to celebrate the end of the War of 1812, as well as a century of peace among Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. Though 1914 is better known for the outbreak of a new European war, it also marked the centenary of the Treaty of Ghent, signed on Christmas Eve 1814, and a flurry of preparatory meetings and commemorative events duly took place in Great Britain and North America.[20] Patronized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the culmination of these celebrations of trans-Atlantic friendship was comprehensively and unexpectedly spoilt by Germany's invasion of Belgium.[21]

This conjunction of British and American concerns and interests had implications for chaplaincy matters long before the outbreak of the First World War. In personal terms, Edmund Pepperell Easterbrook, who was appointed the U.S. Army's second Chief of Chaplains in 1928, had been born in the town of Torquay in Devon, England. He had subsequently emigrated from his native land, trained as a Methodist minister, and served a series of pastorates in New York. A volunteer chaplain with the 2nd New York Infantry Regiment during the Spanish-American War, Easterbrook became a regular Army chaplain in 1900 and succeeded Bishop Charles Henry Brent as the senior chaplain of American forces in Europe.[22]

But Britain supplied institutional models as well as individual chaplains. Since the Army did not have a separate corps or even a supervisory chaplain of its own, in the early 1890s its short-lived "Army Chaplains'

Alliance" looked to Britain's Army Chaplains' Department, founded by Royal Warrant in 1796, as a pattern to follow.[23] Frustrated by a system that rendered them scattered functionaries of the Adjutant General's Department, its members were moved by the failure of Congress to enact a bill that would have created a new chaplain corps along British lines.[24]

While the "benign neglect" of Congress hindered the development of an Army chaplaincy in the 1890s, the acquisition of an overseas empire as a result of the Spanish-American War threw up new parallels with Britain's chaplaincy systems.[25] As Bishop of the Philippine Islands, and like many of his fellow Anglican bishops in British India, Brent's main responsibility was to his fellow nationals, and to soldiers above all, rather than to the indigenous population.[26] Despite his reputation as a missionary, Brent was under no illusion that his primary duties in the Philippines had laid the foundation for his work in the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe. As he wrote to Bishop William Lawrence of Massachusetts in 1918, "I came to France as part of my *real work* as Bishop of the [Philippine Islands]—the continuance of my work in and for the Army."[27]

Given the tightly spun webs that bound them to Great Britain and its wider Empire (and especially neighboring Canada), for many Anglophone Protestant Americans the First World War began not on April 6, 1917, but on August 4, 1914. From the outbreak of war in Europe, American volunteers flowed into the ranks of the British and Canadian (as well as French) armies. Among them was Stanley Willis Wood of Kansas City, Missouri, who resigned his commission in the 7th U.S. Infantry in December 1914 to enlist as a private in the British army and who died in Flanders in 1916 serving as an officer in a Canadian infantry battalion.[28] Likewise, John Robertson, a Presbyterian minister from West Virginia, joined the British army as a chaplain and served on the Western Front, presumably for what was initially the standard term of 12 months. He then returned to the United States, was commissioned as an Army officer when the United States entered the war, and, by the summer of 1918, had once again returned from Europe to lecture recruits in stateside training camps.[29]

While the interwar pacifist writer Ray H. Abrams later castigated the Episcopalians as the most vocal supporters of the Allies and America's emerging Preparedness Movement, they were only part of a much larger and influential spectrum of pro-British Protestant sympathizers. As Abrams conceded, "The strong Scotch-Presbyterians and Wesleyan Methodists leaned, naturally, towards Great Britain. . . . The Baptists, Congregationalists, Unitarians, Universalists . . . all with their English origins and backgrounds, retained their sympathies with the mother country."[30] Among pro-British clerical activists was C. Seymour Bullock—a Canadian army chaplain, American citizen, and veteran of the Spanish-American War—who recruited sympathetic Americans to Canada's multi-battalion "American Legion."[31] In fact, and according to the British weekly newspaper the *Graphic*, "There were so many American parsons applying for the position of chaplain with the Legion that it was said that they could have raised a Legion of American ministers."[32]

Even against the backdrop of war, the customary exchange of religious news, views, and personnel continued, though now with an inevitable wartime twist. Due partly to British control of trans-Atlantic cable communication, and some deft manipulation of the U.S. press, American church newspapers largely followed their secular counterparts in carrying a preponderance of pro-Allied reportage.[33] As the war unfolded, this included papers such as the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Chicago Tribune* printing stories of the exploits of intrepid British and Canadian chaplains. For example, in February 1917 the *Washington Post* reported how no fewer than 450 Germans had been captured by just 18 men of the Dublin Fusiliers—ably assisted by their Roman Catholic chaplain.[34] And there was much to report on British and Canadian chaplaincy in general, both before and after the United States entered the war on Good Friday 1917.

Some of the most colorful stories, especially those from the frontline, arose from what was a wartime revolution in the nature and organization of British army chaplaincy. In 1914, this was a sedate and disjointed affair. Besides the Chaplain-General, who was based at the War Office, the

Army Chaplains' Department consisted of 108 commissioned chaplains representing just three denominations—Anglicans (predominantly), Presbyterians, and Roman Catholics. In addition, there were 45 "Temporary" or "Acting" chaplains who, though not commissioned, were likewise engaged in full-time ministry to the British army.[35] In aggregate, their work approximated to a parochial ministry in Regular Army garrisons as far afield as Cairo, Pretoria, and Mauritius. In India, however, British soldiers were the responsibility of a different agency. This was the Indian Ecclesiastical Establishment, a body of full-time government chaplains, including several Anglican bishops, supplemented by paid missionary clergy as the need arose—including a number of American Methodists.[36] Britain's part-time soldiers, embodied in the Territorial Force from 1908, had a Chaplains' Department all their own, notionally larger than that of its regular counterpart.[37] In peacetime, this ad hoc system was sufficient for the support of a regular army of 250,000 men, plus a similar number of Territorials. It was, however, wholly inadequate to meet the pressures of a global war.

After August 1914, the scale of the challenge saw millions of additional soldiers flood the ranks of the British army—initially volunteers but, after January 1916, and for the first time in British history, conscripts as well. Initially, Britain's composite chaplaincy system struggled to cope: mobilization plans for the regular department went astray; India's slender base of suitable British clergy could not supply its expeditionary forces; Territorial chaplains, so often honorary appointees, stayed at home.[38] Furthermore, when they did arrive in Flanders, Gallipoli, East Africa, or Mesopotamia, chaplains were usually banned from the frontline in keeping with the Geneva Convention of 1864—and in the hope of sparing soldiers the dispiriting spectacle of dead and wounded clergy littering the battlefield.[39] If this were not enough, at home the churches bickered relentlessly over chaplaincy matters: Catholics, Presbyterians, and Nonconformists versus Anglicans over heated allegations of War Office favoritism, and, among Anglicans themselves, Anglo-Catholics versus Evangelicals over perceived discrimination against Anglo-Catholic candidates and practices.[40]

All of this changed decisively, however, in 1916, with the coming of conscription and the looming prospect of the Somme offensive. Assuming command of the British Expeditionary Force in December 1915, Sir Douglas Haig presided over a transformation of British army chaplaincy on the Western Front. Partly connected to his growing dependence on his headquarters chaplain, a young Presbyterian biblical scholar named George S. Duncan, Haig lectured his commanders (and even eminent churchmen such as the Archbishop of Canterbury)[41] on the critical importance of having "large minded, sympathetic men as Parsons," chaplains who would spare no effort in preaching and promoting "the *Great Cause* for which we are fighting," and who would shun any form of sectarian strife. Haig also emphasized the intrinsic morale value of chaplains as providers of organized recreation and amusements and, perhaps more importantly, encouraged the removal of any restrictions on their movements.[42]

Following this new course, British chaplaincy developed in leaps and bounds—including much higher ratios of chaplains to soldiers, new organizational structures, and new areas of specialization, including a novel ministry to the aviators of the Royal Flying Corps.[43] In a powerful testimonial to the importance and diversity of religion in British society, and its significance for the morale of Britain's new citizen army of conscripts and wartime volunteers, by 1917 no Allied army was making more use of its chaplains than the British. By this stage of the war, a typical British infantry division had an establishment of 17 chaplains, whereas, in the Imperial German Army, a Bavarian division had only 4, and a Prussian division just 2.[44] In an official dispatch to the War Office on the campaigns of 1917 (a year that saw the grueling battles of Arras, Messines, Third Ypres—Passchendaele—and Cambrai), Haig affirmed the value of his chaplains' work as "incalculable,"[45] and he maintained this verdict for the rest of the war.

By November 1918, well over 5,000 commissioned chaplains of the Army Chaplains' Department, representing no fewer than 11 denominations, had served the 5.7 million soldiers who had passed through the ranks of the British army.[46] Of these chaplains, 96 had been killed in action or died

of wounds, 91 of them since the summer of 1916.[47] The department's three Victoria Crosses exceeded the total awarded to many famous infantry regiments, such as the Oxford and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and the Welsh Guards.[48] On the Sunday after the Armistice, Haig wrote to Dr. J.M. Simms, the senior non-Anglican chaplain on the Western Front, "Strengthened as I know I and the whole Army have been by the Divine Power, I cannot adequately express the gratitude which I owe to you and all our chaplains for the grand work which they have rendered to our Cause. And to you in particular, my dear Dr. Simms, I thank you with all my heart."[49] The lessons to be learned from the British experience were clear but, as we shall see, took time to take hold in the American Expeditionary Forces.

The decades preceding the First World War were marked by much-needed progress in the organizational development of U.S. Army chaplaincy. The aftermath of the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection of 1899–1902 saw the inauguration of Army examining boards for chaplain candidates, the adoption of a system of regimental chaplaincy, an increase in the number of Regular Army chaplains, and the introduction of promotion for meritorious service.[50] At the same time, and in keeping with the zeitgeist of the Progressive Era, the multiplication of denominational endorsing committees signaled a new interest in chaplaincy matters among the sending churches.[51] In 1913, the newly formed Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America (FCC) created its Washington Committee on Army and Navy Chaplains, a body that served as a key point of contact between the Armed Forces and America's mainstream, English-speaking Protestant churches.[52] Chaplains themselves also evinced a greater collective consciousness, with the Association of Chaplains of the Military and Naval Forces of the United States being formed in 1912. By the eve of war, and through a series of mergers and rebrandings, this had combined to form the FCC's General Committee on Army and Navy Chaplains.[53] However, and despite bureaucratic advances, subsequent experience in France and the United States revealed glaring deficiencies in the organization of Army chaplains and almost insurmountable obstacles to their work on the ground.

When the United States declared war, almost 150 Army chaplains were on Active duty, half of them National Guard chaplains serving with Federalized units on the Mexican border.[54] According to the National Defense Act of 1916, which significantly enlarged the Regular Army in face of the increasing threat of war, every infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineer regiment was to have its own chaplain and a ratio of one chaplain per 1,200 Soldiers was fixed for the coastal artillery.[55] Nevertheless, the United States remained woefully unprepared to wage the kind of war unfolding on the Western Front: as David R. Woodward has unambiguously stated, "The U.S. Army could not have been less prepared to wage war abroad when [President Woodrow] Wilson decided to send an expeditionary force to Europe."[56] And this was certainly true of its chaplains, who were without a corps of their own, still controlled by the Adjutant General's Department, and very much at the mercy of local commanding officers.

They also had no idea what they were heading for. In June 1917—in the wake of the battles of Verdun and the Somme, and just after British engineers had reconfigured Messines Ridge in what was then the greatest man-made explosion in history—Father George J. Waring, a Regular Army chaplain of 13 years standing, author of a chaplain's manual, and a self-styled "Advocate of Manly Sports for American Soldiers," expanded on the duties and qualities of a good chaplain for the benefit of the *New York Times*. With what in retrospect seems a chilling naivete, Waring blithely discoursed on the need for friendly, sympathetic, and open-minded chaplains, men who were good at organizing recreations, liaising with neighboring civilian clergy, and visiting the inmates of the post hospital and guardhouse. The article concluded by enthusing, "Chaplain Waring wants to go with American troops to France, if he can be spared from his work on Governors Island [New York]. He was born an Englishman and has relatives in the British Army."[57] While Waring does not appear to have joined the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF),[58] hundreds of his fellow chaplains were not spared the much harsher realities of a wartime ministry in France.

In structural terms, the main problem was the reorganization of the AEF's infantry divisions in July 1917. In order to provide greater staying power when in the line, under General John J. Pershing's General Organization Project, their component regiments were trebled in size to nearly 4,000 men, without any augmentation of their attached chaplains.[59] In fact, it was not until June 1918 that Congress passed remedial legislation to allow 1 chaplain per 1,200 Soldiers—and even then, according to Pershing, who was very much the cause of the problem, "there was a continuous shortage of chaplains with the fighting units and in the hospitals and camps in the rear areas."[60]

In terms of practical preparation, a chaplains' school at Fort Monroe, Virginia, opened in March 1918. Though soon relocated to Camp Zachary Taylor, Louisville, Kentucky, in both locations it was hamstrung by the nature of its curriculum. Although the school was hailed by the *New York Times* as a far-sighted venture, in advance of even British training methods,[61] its curriculum majored on such marginal matters as "horseback riding and cavalry drill" and "camp sanitation." According to one graduate, "The three subjects of study on which most emphasis was laid were international law, military courts procedure, and Army regulations."[62] Sketchily prepared, if at all, for the rigors of trench warfare, those Army chaplains who sailed for France joined colleagues who for a considerable time ministered in an organizational vacuum. Many were assigned with scant regard to the size or denominational composition of their units, and there was not even a consolidated list of AEF chaplains. As one of them put it, "Chaplains are assigned with the nonchalance of cavalry remounts."[63] With little supplied by the War Department other than a chaplain's flag and an assembly tent,[64] as the AEF accumulated "Over There," its chaplains were also thrown into unequal competition with well-resourced civilian welfare organizations such as the Knights of Columbus, Red Cross, Salvation Army, Jewish Welfare Board, and, above all, the YMCA.[65] Not only did the YMCA have an active tradition of military work that stretched back to the United States Christian Commission of the Civil War, but most of these organizations

also sent chaplains of their own to France.[66] To complete the humiliation of Army chaplains, the stateside multiplication of training areas, testing grounds, Army schools, and transit camps fueled the proliferation of rival "camp pastors," civilian clergymen engaged by their own denominations, and even by commanding officers, to serve the needs of their occupants.[67]

The figure who brought order out of this chaos, gave purpose and cohesion to chaplaincy in the AEF, and thereby laid the foundations of the postwar Chaplain Corps was Bishop Charles Henry Brent. And here it must be emphasized how uniquely placed and qualified Brent was to do this—and how much he drew on British guidance and on British and Canadian methods. In personal terms, Brent's ministry in the Philippines, and his dealings with senior military and civilian figures as they rotated through the islands, had created an extensive personal network of friendship and acquaintance that went to the very top of the U.S. Army and the AEF. Most significantly, in 1910 Brent had baptized and confirmed Pershing and his wife into the Protestant Episcopal Church.[68] Consequently, Pershing, who was armed with unprecedented plenipotentiary powers by President Wilson,[69] readily acknowledged Brent as his "spiritual adviser," in professional as well as in personal terms.[70] In fact, and before he went to Europe, Pershing had suggested to Brent in May 1917 that he should "organize the work of the chaplains in the AEF," a proposal Brent had declined in order to return to the Philippines.[71] Furthermore, Brent's links with the YMCA, and with the mainstream Protestant world that had gathered for the Edinburgh Missionary Conference, was underlined by his very presence in France at the beginning of 1918.

The previous November, Brent had been given a commission by John R. Mott, then General Secretary of the YMCA's National War Work Council, to go to France to iron out organizational problems in the AEF and to assist in "promoting the work of this Association among the soldiers of America and her Allies."[72] Brent was able to accept this commission due to his recent election as Bishop of Western New York, on condition that its diocesan Standing Committee gave him indefinite leave for the duration of

the war.[73] If Brent held considerable sway with the YMCA, he also bridged a cultural gap between the AEF and its British and Canadian allies and their supporting chaplaincies. Of Anglo-Canadian parentage and a Canadian by birth, Brent had quietly maintained dual citizenship after taking out his naturalization papers in 1891.[74] His American nephew, the son of a New Hampshire rectory, was, significantly, serving in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.[75] A fervent Anglophile and interventionist, Brent had strongly backed the Preparedness Movement and, when America finally declared war, had been engaged in a prolonged, morale-boosting visit to Great Britain and to the Allied armies in France.[76] Last but by no means least, Brent's ecumenical—even interfaith—theology and outlook was broad enough to pursue and realize the task of forging a unified AEF chaplaincy out of a religiously diverse and organizationally incoherent array of U.S. Army chaplains.[77]

But Brent's recasting of American chaplaincy could only be realized in stages. For several months after his return to France in December 1917, and besides his work for the YMCA, Brent's main goals had been "to keep men's idealism alive" in the growing AEF,[78] and to promote "good will between British and American"—an objective he declared to Major Robert Bacon, former American Ambassador to France and prospective chief of the American Mission at British General Headquarters, during his first visit to AEF headquarters at Chaumont.[79] And Brent certainly applied himself to his task, delivering a trademark lecture on America and the war to British and Canadian troops on 11 different occasions in late January and early February 1918.[80] Another lecture, on "The Unity of England and America," captured his personal commitment to the war as well as the common goals of the two nations:

> To a man who has nothing but British blood in his veins like myself, even though he be, again like myself, a loyal American citizen, it is a perennial joy to be among those who owe allegiance to the British Empire. Common blood is a powerful tie in itself. But there is

something still more powerful—loyalty to a common ideal springing
out of a common heritage. . . . You and we are one—one in aspira-
tion, one in inspiration, one in purpose.[81]

Brent's message clearly had the intended effect on his British audiences.
Harry Blackburne, the senior Anglican chaplain of the British First Army,
acclaimed one of Brent's lectures as "superb,"[82] while another British chap-
lain wrote to the *Scotsman* newspaper how, on hearing Brent for a second
time, "Again the note of encouragement was struck as with the sound of a
trumpet . . . many of us were glad to hear the herald of the great Republic,
to feel the inspiration of a great soul like Bishop Brent. It lifted our feet a
little higher and carried us on till we met those [that is, the Americans] who
should help us to put his words into deeds."[83] At the end of June, and with
Pershing's blessing, Brent even proclaimed this heady message of unity to
the combined Anglo-American battle fleet anchored at Scapa Flow in the
Orkneys, where he and British Admiral Sir David Beatty "agreed that the
unity begun now must last through the coming centuries, binding our
nations together."[84] Brent's work was widely recognized at the time, with
Hensley Henson, the Bishop of Hereford, noting in July 1918:

> *Mrs. Burgess came to see me. She has been "canteening" in*
> *France with the American Army, of which she gives a laudatory*
> *account. . . . Bishop Brent's main object, she says, is to minimize*
> *the friction between the Americans & the British, & to establish*
> *a mutual understanding between them. At first relations were*
> *strained by the intolerable bumptiousness of the Transatlanticks*
> [*sic*], *but matters had improved. There was much appearance of*
> *religion among the new troops, but whether it will survive, or vanish*
> *as in the case of our own men, remains to be seen.*[85]

Brent's sense of Anglo-American convergence also applied to his
plans for chaplaincy in the AEF, which were strongly shaped by Brit-
ish and Canadian precedents. In March 1917, and while playing the

pro-Allied tourist, Brent had been hosted by the British Expeditionary Force's (BEF's) Deputy Chaplain-General on the Western Front, Bishop L.H. Gwynne, in civilian life Bishop of Khartoum.[86] And it was with Gwynne present that Brent and Pershing had first discussed "organizing the chaplains' services" on January 7, 1918. According to Brent, he and Pershing agreed to form a small team of supervisory chaplains, "one of whom should be a [Roman Catholic]." They also resolved to poach "the best men in the Red Cross and the YMCA," while Pershing promised to lobby Washington "for an increase of chaplains—1 to 1,200 men or about 3 to a [regiment] of 3700." (As Brent piously put it, "As the Spiritual Protector of the Army he feels he must do everything to aid their cause."[87])

Pershing's recollection of the meeting, however, put a much stronger emphasis on Gwynne's contribution: "To assist us in organizing the work of our chaplains, Bishop Gwynne, Deputy Chaplain-General of the British forces, kindly visited us and explained their methods of control and direction of the chaplains' work, and from their system we adopted such features as were applicable to our service."[88] (Interestingly, Gwynne's account had yet another emphasis, dwelling on Pershing's fixation with venereal disease, a topic that made for an awkward lunch.[89]) The upshot of their meeting was a detailed memorandum composed by Brent elaborating their core conclusions and including a table of organization for the Canadian Chaplain Service, stressing the high proportion of chaplains to soldiers (that is, 1 to 1,000) and the primary role played by its director. The British (who, it was rightly acknowledged, had very much shaped Canadian chaplaincy[90]) were also invoked: Brent's memorandum had been sent to the Chaplain-General in London for "careful consideration," and, in his covering letter, Brent noted that Gwynne had been "of the greatest service from his ripe experience," notably in pressing the need for chaplains to be fully militarized and embedded in army units. He also cited the British experience in emphasizing to Pershing (whom he flattered as "the father of the AEF"), the huge value of a proper chaplaincy system: "[Y]ou should allow no vantage ground to escape you in your

unprecedented opportunity for leadership. It will react—it has already reacted beneficially—on Great Britain."[91]

As the American buildup gathered pace (of the 2 million Doughboys who arrived in France in America's 19 months of war, three-quarters arrived in its last 6 months),[92] Brent's memorandum on the reconstruction of American chaplaincy was gradually implemented. On February 21, Pershing told him that he would ask Washington to commission him as a chaplain with the rank of major and have him designated "H.Q. Chaplain."[93] Although Brent therefore relinquished his work with the YMCA, it was not until the beginning of July that he received his commission as "Major and Chaplain,"[94] a process delayed by Pershing's attempt to raise his bid to a lieutenant-colonelcy.[95] Nevertheless, the projected transformation of AEF chaplaincy continued. On February 7, a conference "on reconstruction plans" took place attended by Brent, some fellow U.S. chaplains, the YMCA, a British Church Army commissioner, and Harry Blackburne.[96] In March, Brent presided at a meeting of what he later called "the Board on Chaplains' Organization," discussing their respective contributions with senior representatives of the YMCA and the Red Cross.[97] On May 1, 1918, Paragraph VIII of Pershing's General Order 66 finally established an AEF "Chaplains' Office, under the supervision of the Adjutant General,"[98] and, on May 10, the AEF newspaper *Stars and Stripes* published Brent's report on its new chaplaincy arrangements.

Stressing the imminent increase in chaplains and insisting that "It does not require any extended argument to justify the movement to organize the chaplains into a corps with a central office at [General Headquarters]," Brent explained that the new Chaplains' Office (often also termed, rather confusingly, a "permanent Board of Chaplains") would comprise three members (two Protestants and a Roman Catholic), one of them the senior chaplain. Ultimately, its responsibility would be to "conserve, coordinate, and use to best advantage all the religious effort that is being put forth in the AEF," including that of the Red Cross, YMCA, and Knights of Columbus. Besides ensuring the right of its Soldiers to exercise their religion freely, in

addition to the mandate of the First Amendment, the driving reason for the new dispensation was claimed to be "that the chaplain has emerged from the obscurity of rather an anomalous adjunct of the Army into one of the most honoured [*sic*] and essential agencies in the military establishment. He is capable of giving a morale that no one else can, and in heroism and virility he has been found second to none."[99]

As Brent laid the foundations of a "chaplains corps," as Pershing had termed it from the outset,[100] he continued to be guided by British models. The elaboration of a hierarchy of senior Army, corps, divisional, and base chaplains followed the British pattern,[101] as did the opening of the AEF's own chaplains' school,[102] and, from October 1918, the publication of a chaplains' bulletin.[103] Even Brent's role as the instigator of the controversial, Army-wide regulation of May 1918 that banned the wearing of rank insignia by chaplains was inspired by British precedents (for, as Brent explained in *Stars and Stripes*, "In the British navy, for instance, chaplains have no rank" and in the U.S. Army, "The uniform mode of address, according to law, is 'Chaplain,' unless the familiar and affectionate title of 'Padre' displaces it, as it frequently does in both the English and American armies").[104]

But there was also practical cooperation, especially as the AEF entered the fray in earnest from May 1918. (The first Doughboys entered the line in October 1917, suffered their first combat casualties in November, and by March 1918 had sustained fewer than 200 combat fatalities on the Western Front: unsurprisingly, a contemporary quip ran that AEF stood for "After Everything's Finished."[105]) Sometimes, this collaboration was decidedly trivial, as when Bishop Gwynne's staff chaplain, B.G. O'Rorke,[106] wrote to Brent in February 1918 advising him of the aid available from the Church of England's Guild of Church Needlecraft.[107] However, it could also have much deeper ramifications, especially where British and American units served alongside each other or (in the case of several American divisions, and despite Pershing's resistance) under British command. In April 1918, and with Germany's spring offensive in full swing, on hearing that American troops were to support the British First Army during the desperate Battle of

the Lys, Blackburne wrote to Brent offering to "help your Chaplains in any way at all."[108] Brent's reply betrayed the chaotic state of AEF chaplaincy at that point: "Thank you for your kind offer. I have no doubt you will be able to be of great service to our Chaplains when our troops are stationed in your area. I have not yet received any notification of their arrival. As soon as I do I shall try and get you in touch with such Chaplains as there may be."[109]

By the autumn of 1918, and with the AEF now fully committed to the Allied counter-offensives, this practical interaction was commonplace. As Blackburne wrote:

> *An American Division* [the 78th] *has been attached to* [First] *Army to be taught its job, and the Army Commander* [Sir Henry Sinclair Horne] *has told us all to get in touch with our various opposite numbers and help them in any way we can. I at once got hold of their Senior Chaplain,* [Stewart M.] *Robinson, a Presbyterian, and brought him here to lunch. He is such a nice man, and most anxious to hear exactly what our chaplains do, and where they live. He has asked me to go and speak to a gathering of all his chaplains; they don't seem to bother much about their denominational differences.*[110]

Hence, and "so that they might be with some of our very best chaplains," Blackburne arranged for the chaplains of the 78th to be placed with their British equivalents for a few days, a scheme Robinson thought to be of "the greatest help to them all."[111] That September, and now plainly treated as an equal, Robinson also attended an ecumenical conference of British First Army chaplains.[112]

By this time, the likelihood that British chaplains might become directly responsible for American personnel, especially in British military hospitals in France and Great Britain, was such that on September 12 Britain's Army Council issued an instruction directing them to take full responsibility for American troops where necessary, and emphasizing that, unlike British practice, "attendance at religious services on the part of American troops is voluntary, not compulsory."[113] Although this may

have led one American chaplain to complain of being elbowed aside by his British counterparts in "English Rest camps" in France,[114] according to another, William D. Bratton, who worked between the 28 hospitals in London that treated American patients, "The co-operation of the British was excellent"—with the famous church of St. Martin-in-the-Fields, Trafalgar Square, being used for Thanksgiving Day services in 1918.[115] He also remarked that "The British Hospitals were always neat, clean and attractive, and the nurses seemed especially attentive to American patients."[116]

Nevertheless, the Armistice found Brent's reconstruction of AEF chaplaincy still incomplete, and major problems yet unresolved. Away from the battlefield, and much to the embarrassment of Bishop Gwynne and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Brent had enjoyed little success in persuading the British, let alone the French, to participate in a concerted, inter-Allied crackdown on prostitution and venereal disease—a topic of almost obsessive interest to General Pershing.[117] In organizational terms, there was confusion over whether chaplains of newly arrived divisions were subject to the direction of senior base chaplains as they waited to go to the front.[118] In more practical terms, lack of dedicated transport remained a bugbear, and as late as the autumn of 1918 denominational endorsing committees were scrambling to supply their chaplains with cars and motorcycles.[119] Finally, and despite Brent's insistence that "our first duty is to those about to die,"[120] in its haste to provide for the AEF's combat divisions his Chaplains' Office had apparently forgotten the aviators of the Air Service.[121]

At times, it even seemed on the ground as if no progress was being made. Writing in August 1918, Samuel Arthur Devan, Baptist chaplain of the 58th U.S. Artillery, had scant reason to be thankful. Ministering to a regiment that was 50 percent Protestant, 40 percent Catholic, and 10 percent Jewish, Devan had the local assistance of a female YMCA secretary and a Knights of Columbus chaplain, but even such "valued aides" could not overcome his sense of toiling like a Hebrew slave: "No transportation, no training, no office, no corps, no rank, no funds [he complained]. 'Here is no straw and no clay—now, go and make bricks!' they command."[122] Given

these gaps and tensions, one division chaplain stated succinctly, "In my judgment the overseas organization of the chaplains was positively necessary and on the whole was satisfactory. . . . The organization was obviously experimental up to the time of its dissolution but it was headed on right lines."[123] Arguably the greatest proof of its success was the performance of American chaplains on the frontline. For example, the history of the 78th Division, published in 1921, stated that "during the heavy ARGONNE fighting our Chaplains were in the thick of it for weeks at a time, overlooking sleep and food in their work of spiritual and temporal aid."[124]

Rightly conscious of the religious needs of an Army in which faith was one of very few common denominators (one camp survey showed the presence of 74 creeds among 31,079 officers and men, but only "81 atheists and infidels"),[125] in his much-publicized final report of September 1919, Pershing (like Haig) was effusive about the performance of his chaplains: "Chaplains, as never before, became the moral and spiritual leaders of their organizations, and established a high standard of active usefulness in religious work that made for patriotism, discipline and unselfish devotion to duty."[126] In contrast, and as he later reflected, before the war chaplains had been treated as little more than "handy men who were detailed to write up boards of survey or operate libraries."[127] In other words, the developmental trajectory of chaplaincy in the U.S. Army had very much followed the British precedent.

Nevertheless, in his own final report of April 1919, Brent made no mention of the sustained guidance provided by the British in particular. Even for a Canadian-born Episcopalian of strongly pro-British views, in the afterglow of victory such an admission may have taken candor too far—especially as Brent was honored by several Allied governments for his personal contribution to victory, honors that included a Distinguished Service Medal awarded in May 1919.[128] Still, the importance and legacy of this early and formative phase of Anglo-American chaplaincy cooperation cannot be gainsaid. With Pershing's support and British mentoring, Brent had taken the organization, cooperation, and training of U.S. Army chaplains

to new heights and, in the supremely challenging context of America's first campaign in Europe, had realized the vision of an independent chaplains' "corps" in a multi-religious force that numbered nearly 2 million men by November 1918.[129]

In combination with the continued and sustained efforts of lobbyists at home—military and civilian, Protestant and Catholic—the permanent remodeling of U.S. Army chaplaincy was finally achieved through the National Defense Act of 1920.[130] Although it refrained from actually using the term *corps* and did not replicate the three-man "board" of Brent's office in France, the act permanently established the Office of Chief of Chaplains in Washington, answerable not to the Adjutant General but to the Army's Chief of Staff. Apart from checking the credentials of chaplain candidates, the duties of the chief were essentially those that Brent had performed in the AEF, namely "the general co-ordination and supervision of the work of chaplains in the army."[131]

In World War II, and with their chaplaincy systems proven and matured, there was much less need or scope for the kind of Anglo-American chaplaincy cooperation witnessed in Europe in 1918. In fact, and despite serving together in several theaters of war, there is a telling lack of evidence for Anglo-American chaplaincy cooperation between 1941 and 1945. Basically, both the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps and the Royal Army Chaplains' Department revived and refined the methods and models they had inherited from the First World War. There were, of course, limited exchanges. Albert E. Basil, a maverick British army commando chaplain, earned celebrity and a Silver Star serving with U.S. Army Rangers in North Africa.[132] Likewise, prior to D-Day, such was the shortage of American chaplains in German prisoner of war (POW) camps that the care of American POWs was largely the responsibility of captive British padres. As U.S. Army chaplain Eugene L. Daniel remembered, in April 1945 they even predominated at Stalag 7-A's memorial service for President Franklin D. Roosevelt.[133]

Still, their somewhat divergent trajectories after the First World War should not be allowed to obscure the legacy of those fruitful months of

collaboration on the Western Front in 1918. Born of shared religious beliefs, moral values, and personal connections, a new pattern of American chaplaincy was developed that in the next half century would go on to shape chaplaincy in the armies of some of America's closest allies—including the Philippines, South Korea, and South Vietnam.[134] Although lost to even historians of British and American army chaplaincy, a century after its conclusion it is necessary and timely to remind ourselves that these are historically connected institutions, whose modern expressions lie rooted and intertwined in the common and unprecedented challenges of the First World War.

Notes

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[19] Lambeth Palace Library, Frederick Temple Papers, MS 52, f 40.

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"Renew a Right Spirit Within Me": Chaplains and Military Morale on the Frontline and Online

By Andrew Totten

I n the Balkans in the 1990s, I happened upon a "morale swingometer" at the entrance to a military headquarters. Its commander was rumored to nudge the arrow to the right before visits by his superior officer. Is that perhaps all that needs to be said on the ethics of morale? Certainly, temptation among British generals to just nudge the arrow would have been understandable following the publication of the latest Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey results.[1] Since 2007, these surveys—underpinned by the usual statistical witchcraft—have attempted to measure how British personnel view military life. The 2018 results indicate that three-quarters of personnel are proud to be in their service but just two in five are satisfied with service life in general. Two-thirds perceive the morale of their service as low, a higher proportion than last year, with a decline in high self-morale over the last decade evident across all ranks and services. Such a situation is particularly sensitive given that military doctrine lists "maintenance of morale" as one of the seven foundational Principles of War.

Discussions of morale are complicated by the genealogy of the word.[2] It was Cicero who invented the Latin word *moralis* to translate the Greek *ethikos*. Much of the early use of "moral" in English implied "practical": it took the Wars of Religion and the Enlightenment to reinforce morality as a domain separate from the religious or the legal. *Morale* finally emerged

in the 18th century simply as a variant of *moral*, with the spelling indicating an emphasis, rather like *rationale* relates to *rational*. English translators in turn projected the term onto Carl von Clausewitz in his distinction between the *mood* of an army as a transient thing and the *spirit* of an army that keeps its cohesion regardless of adversity.[3] A refracted version of this Clausewitzian theory had reached the British high command by the time of World War I, helping to stimulate belief in the importance of moral factors in war.[4] Finally, and largely due to the wars of the 20th century, morale as a predominantly *psychological* construct expanded from the military into wider social, political, and industrial life.

However, let us assume that what morale has referred to since the mid-19th century—confidence, hope, zeal, willingness—are attitudes that soldiers have always required and wise commanders have always monitored. From Homer to Helmand, a soldier's lot has certain constants. "Suffer hardship with me, as a good soldier of Christ Jesus," wrote Saint Paul to Timothy.[5] Let us also assume that religion historically has had the power to undermine or reinforce this morale. Regimental chaplaincy itself arose from the need of the 8th-century French army to have enough priests to hear soldiers' confessions on the eve of battle. In the 19th century, the Duke of Wellington appealed for more "respectable and efficient" Anglican chaplains for his army in Portugal to curb Methodism in the ranks. In World War II, evidence from across the British and American armies suggests that religion frequently provided crucial personal support, especially at times of crisis.[6]

Making those assumptions, then, what firstly would be the implications for chaplaincy if religion ceased to be an influential factor in British cultural life? Callum Brown has claimed that "Britain is showing the world how religion as we have known it can die."[7] If so, then British interoperability with other religious chaplaincies could become a huddle for warmth. Secondly, what would be the implications for chaplaincy if the morale of soldiers ceased to be a primary consideration for military planners? Morale for now retains a central place in British military doctrine, but its relegation

does not seem improbable if in deadly environments soldiers were to be replaced by robotics. If the first question arises from the growth of secularism and the marginalization of the divine, then the second question arises from the growth of autonomous weaponry and the marginalization of the human. The implications of both range well beyond chaplaincy of course, but for present purposes chaplaincy may offer a useful lens—albeit largely a British Christian lens—through which to glimpse that wider future landscape.

World War I

The current core doctrine of the British army understands morale as a will to win that depends on strong leadership. It deems it to consist of fighting spirit, moral cohesion, discipline, comradeship, pride in self and unit, confidence in equipment and sustainment, and a firm spiritual foundation.[8] Field Marshal William Slim is quoted to the effect that "only spiritual foundations can withstand real strain."[9] The doctrine then relates that spiritual foundation to belief in a cause, whether religious, cultural, or political. It notes that spiritual support is provided in many forms, but chaplains are mentioned first of all.[10] It is a doctrinal connection of chaplaincy to morale that was reiterated as recently as 2017. In most modern walks of life, to propose involving clergy to raise group morale might just raise everyone's eyebrows. Yet the notion has somehow endured within the military ever since it took root on the Western Front.

Chaplains at the outset of the Great War were simply required by King's Regulations to conduct services and perform burials. Anglican chaplains in particular tended to be based in rear echelons, establishing canteens and organizing recreations. This earned them no reputation for courage, but such activities forged preliminary links between chaplaincy and morale. As the war persisted, chaplains were increasingly valued for their cheerful spirit and care for the troops.[11] From December 1915, when Douglas Haig was appointed commander in chief, maintenance of morale right up to the frontline began to dominate the army's expectations of its

clergy. Of Presbyterian stock and with a strong sense of divine guidance, Haig drew inspiration from his personal chaplain, whose preaching of a manly Christianity "could make anyone fight." For Haig this was the prerequisite quality of a chaplain. As he noted in his diary, "Any clergyman who is not fit for this work must be sent home."[12] General Herbert Plumer retrospectively considered that Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne had done more than any other individual to secure victory.[13] From the American perspective, too, General John Pershing said of his chaplains, "Their usefulness in the maintenance of morale through religious counsel and example has now become a matter of history."[14]

Gary Sheffield, who has argued that British soldiers' morale was at least as important as new technology in the Allied victory of 1918, acknowledged recently that he had neglected the role of Christianity in sustaining that morale.[15] Even at the time, some chaplains wondered to what extent Christianity really underpinned their work. "An amateur stretcher bearer or an amateur undertaker, was that all that Christian priests could be in this ruin of a rotten civilization?" asked Woodbine Willie himself.[16] Most chaplains, however, do seem to have been able to rationalize their morale-raising activities as extensions of their faith. The British army, unlike its American and French allies, may not have created a central organization focused on morale.[17] Nevertheless, "the work of the army's chaplains was systematically harnessed to the maintenance and promotion of the army's morale, a process which was initiated and closely monitored from the highest levels of the army's command."[18] British soldiers may not have been voluntary churchgoers, but they had been raised through Sunday school and the likes of the Boy Scouts to be respectful of the church. Essentially, the General Staff's confidence in chaplains' potential was grounded in a shared Christian culture.

Secularization

In Britain, that culture can no longer be taken for granted. Relatively few British people now belong to a church or attend regularly. The influence of church leaders, let alone their ability to discipline the wider population, has

been hugely diminished. Within the military itself, the assumption that soldiers would have a broad if vague Christian value system faded during the 1990s. Recruits reaching the army's training regiments were perceived to be more concerned with rights and rewards than responsibilities and commitments. Core values such as courage, loyalty, and discipline had to be codified, accompanied by a utilitarian "Service Test" that judged conduct by its impact on operational effectiveness.[19] As an institution associated with traditional Christian values, the military reeled under new legislation, capped by the European Court of Human Rights ruling against its ban on gay service personnel in 1999. In that same year, an army report on spiritual values confessed "a degree of uncertainty and confusion about the role of chaplains."[20]

In 2006, I wrote that "Britain's rapid secularisation [*sic*] since the 1960s, combined with encroaching professionalism and fiscal accountability, has left chaplains lacking sure legitimacy within a culture that no longer deems Christian discourse normative."[21] Picking up on those remarks, Callum Brown observed that "it is this *cultural* collapse of Christendom that in the end needs explaining from the 1960s."[22] In retrospect, though, I am much less certain that this collapse has happened, at least within the British army. The Spiritual Needs Study of 1999 still affirmed that "chaplains are a crucial resource for commanders and soldiers."[23] It led to funding for 20 percent more chaplains and investment in their professional education. Despite concluding that "a moral code in the United Kingdom based on Christianity can no longer be taken for granted"—a conclusion that chimes with (perhaps self-fulfilling) church pronouncements since the 1960s—the report acknowledged that almost 97 percent of the army was listed as Christian.[24] The figure has declined since, but in 2017, 72 percent of all ranks across the services still declared a Christian religious identity, with the army probably closer to 80 percent.[25]

As for that image of the army as a bastion of traditional values under siege, the past quarter-century has if anything witnessed a moral renewal, not a collapse. By the 1990s, observers were likely to perceive the army as racist, bullying, sexist, and homophobic. New recruits may have been

importing individualistic values, but much more serious cultural issues confronted an institution that, since national service ended in the early 1960s, had ossified in its isolation from wider society. Christians like General Lord Richard Dannatt, former chief of the General Staff, would come to welcome human rights reforms as ending discrimination and boosting the army's legitimacy in the eyes of the society it served.[26] The codification of the moral component may not have achieved one of its original objectives (namely, preventing the encroachment of civilian law into the military), but it nevertheless provided an enduring guide for soldiers' conduct. British chaplains remain at liberty to draw on Christian narratives to flesh out the army's generic core values (which also include integrity, selfless commitment, and respect for others). Indeed, chaplain and theologian Ian Torrance has been credited as one of the moral component's architects.[27]

Ironically, my observations in 2006 about the chaplaincy struggling for coherence were penned just as Great Britain was about to embark on a campaign that would reinvigorate the specifically religious role of chaplains. Deployed to Helmand as the British Task Force Chaplain in 2010–2011, I experienced first-hand how greatly religious support was valued by those closest to danger, and how commanders recognized it as crucial to morale and operational effectiveness. Religious language resonated anew with soldiers in relation to death, repatriation, and remembrance. "Vicarious religion" was at play here,[28] but in the toughest locations soldiers' own religious practices (not infrequently assembled from their memories of movies) became accentuated: "Circumstances alter cases . . . the young men serving in Afghanistan bucked the statistical trends."[29] The opening up of British combat roles to women, and the reality that women are already "more religious than men over a wide variety of indicators throughout the Christian [W]est,"[30] suggests further interesting statistics may lie ahead.

The British military could therefore prove surprisingly resistant if not immune to secularization. The American military shows similar signs. International collaboration between chaplaincies—with religious commonalities outweighing variances in military culture—remains a worthwhile

endeavor with no obvious sunset clause. Historian John Keegan once commented that "wherever the light of religion has not died out from armies, men seem to hunger for its consolations on the eve of action."[31] Maybe religion has not died out in armies precisely because men (and women) do hunger for its consolations. Indeed, might secularism in wider society have gained ground at least in part because the modern British public has not had to countenance being mobilized militarily? Callum Brown traced the death throes of Christian Britain to 1963. Perhaps not coincidentally the last national servicemen left the armed forces that year. There is now neither political experience nor societal fear of existential war. Should existential war lie ahead of us, it is troubling to reflect that neither Britain nor America has yet had to wage such a war without the sustenance of religion. Potential adversaries are on a very different trajectory, from a rejuvenated Russian Orthodoxy to the religious cult that is North Korea.[32]

History teaches that existential wars have reenergized the religious life of our societies. It teaches too that our big wars have been won not by preexisting professional soldiers but by rapidly recruited civilians. Moreover, in Michael Burleigh's assessment of World War II, "most soldiers in Western armies remained civilians in spirit and came from societies that had not encouraged them to hate."[33] Should Christian cultural memory be reduced to embers, though, less wholesome forms of religion might well spark into life. Such religion may neither provide a firewall against hate nor highlight Saint Augustine's lesson that war is ultimately a cause for lamentation, not triumphalism. Chris Hedges of the Occupy movement has observed that "because we in modern society have walked away from institutions that stand outside the state to find moral guidance and spiritual direction . . . the institutions of state become, for many, the centre [*sic*] of worship in wartime."[34] He meant that as a warning. However, insofar as chaplaincy does survive within state institutions like our armies, the churches too may retain a voice. Chaplaincy could in time prove vital for the maintenance of religious and moral memory, and not only for the military but also for the wider society.

Autonomous Weaponry

The optics of chaplaincy can nevertheless magnify aspects of soldiering that civilians find unsettling. A defining image of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns remains that of the chaplain conducting repatriation services. Such ceremonies clearly addressed pastoral needs of bereaved families and comrades alike and struck a chord with the wider British public, too. By and large, the public differentiated between the decisions of politicians and the duties of soldiers, with enormous sympathy for the latter. However, this stoked a narrative that now predominantly treats the soldier as a victim or potential victim of politicians, hampering the government's ability, as in the case of Syria, to put "boots on the ground." Of course, politicians and commanders have always aimed to reduce the casualties on their side. If a safer, more efficient means of killing an enemy can be invented, it will be. Nevertheless, our own potential casualties have increasingly become our center of gravity. The pressure to replace service personnel with artificial surrogates has grown accordingly.

I have already surmised that the religious dimension of human conflict (including chaplaincy) is likely to persist despite the growth of secularism. Humanists in particular may find that dispiriting. Should autonomous machines occupy human terrain, however, humanists face the even bleaker prospect of humanism itself being undermined. In his forecast of humanity's destiny, Yuval Harari puts it like this: "Humanism sidelined God by shifting from a deo-centric to a homo-centric world view. In the twenty-first century, Dataism may sideline humans by shifting from a homo-centric to a data-centric view."[35] This does sound like science fiction. Whereas some scorn religious affairs, others dismiss intelligent robots as the stuff of *Blade Runner* or *Westworld*. However, retired General James Mattis, for one, is disturbed enough to be reconsidering his own assumptions. The character of war might be chameleon-like but its nature, he previously believed, was fundamentally a human endeavor, encompassing courage and fear and cowardice, and aiming at human solutions to human problems. Now,

confronted with the rise of artificial intelligence, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense has admitted, "I am certainly questioning my original premise of the fundamental nature of war that does not change. You have got to question that now. I just don't have the answer."[36]

Where Haig and Pershing sought to sustain morale among human beings waging increasingly technological warfare, leaders like Mattis face the waging of war by technology that would require no human morale. Early 20th-century chaplains responded practically to the first challenge. Philosophically, a British army chaplain of the 18th century may help to illuminate the future challenge. Adam Ferguson, a central thinker of the Scottish Enlightenment who had served as chaplain to the Black Watch, advocated establishing a citizens' militia in Scotland. This was eclipsed by Adam Smith's case for a standing army, but Ferguson's thought nonetheless endured to influence the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.[37] A classical republican concern of Ferguson was the decline of martial spirit among citizens. Autonomous weaponry may raise the specter of its decline among the military class itself. American rhetoric of the warrior, which has made recent inroads into Great Britain, will be challenged by this. Moreover, Ferguson's twin concern about the centralizing of state power and its potential for dictatorship may acquire new relevance. Technological mastery by a state or corporation in autonomous weaponry could carry with it new potential for tyranny. As President Vladimir Putin has concluded about artificial intelligence, "Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world."[38]

Clearly, we have not yet reached the stage where machines can outperform human brains and bodies across all areas. Older fashioned ways of war will not disappear overnight. Indeed, medieval barbarity is thriving on contemporary battlefields. Full autonomy, and what could be perceived as clinical warfare, may be a long way off. Moreover, the position at least of Britain's Ministry of Defence is that "we do not operate, and do not plan to develop, any lethal autonomous systems."[39] Types of human-machine teaming are nevertheless developing rapidly. A recent study by the Development,

Concepts and Doctrine Centre at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom anticipates "fewer points of human consciousness"[40] and stresses the need to optimize the remaining "human and mental capacity within such a force."[41] The paper reckons that the last military roles likely to be automated will be "where personnel conduct activities that demand contextual assessment and agile versatility in complex, cluttered, and congested operating areas."[42] Resilience seems to be increasingly a matter of systems and networks, not human hearts and minds—let alone souls. Tellingly, despite emerging from a defense doctrine center, and despite its focus on an issue with profound implications for military men and women, that paper makes no reference to morale. Yet modern military chaplaincy has been built on a doctrinal foundation of morale. If that foundation becomes unstable, what happens to chaplaincy?

Chaplaincy Conclusions

Given the rate of technological development, this instability may soon become a matter of practical concern and not just academic conjecture. At one level, chaplains may have fewer people in their care as machines assume more roles within the military; at another level, they may even discover that aspects of chaplaincy itself are deliverable autonomously. Unlike the earlier reflections on how chaplaincy emerged from the First World War, these concluding speculations on how it will adapt to 21st-century conflict and technology remain precisely that—speculations. Nevertheless, pointers to how artificial intelligence could have an impact are beginning to appear, and it would seem that none of the central pillars of chaplaincy— the religious, the pastoral, and the moral—will be left untouched. By way of conclusion, a few of these emerging effects are briefly mentioned, before recommendations are offered regarding theological themes to which chaplaincy internationally should give renewed attention.

Church of England statistics indicate that 1.2 million people are now engaging with the church's online presence, compared to the 1.1 million who actually attend church at least once a month.[43] The church also

launched a new "skill" for Amazon's digital assistant Alexa in 2018, enabling users to access religious material and advice. The app is activated by stating "Alexa, open the Church of England." (As artificial intelligence grows in power, might it become unwise to state "Alexa, close down the Church of England"?) Alexa can offer a grace before meals and prayers at bedtime, recite the Ten Commandments, describe Holy Communion, explain how to arrange funerals, and answer questions like "Who is God?" and "What do Christians believe?" Feedback by users—or worshippers—is positive. Such apps are being introduced with the best of intentions. The housebound and elderly may value them. Those in closed institutions such as prisons or the military might, too. One consequence, though, could be to further magnify trends of belief being separated from belonging and of religion being provided vicariously. Chaplains can struggle as it is to transpose soldiers' sense of regimental belonging onto church, or to prevent themselves simply becoming agents of vicarious religious ritual.

The artificial intelligence of Alexa is to be exploited further by the Church of England "to ensure users can find more answers to faith questions and to explore on other platforms in future."[44] For some, this amounts to artificial spirituality; for others, artificial spirituality is a handy definition of Anglicanism. Either way, it is not difficult to see a more mobile robotic platform offering such religious support. Pastoral care in such a form is looking less unlikely, too. The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) has suggested that the 2020s could see robots and artificial intelligence take on a quarter of British doctors' workload and nearly one-third that of nurses.[45] This is described as time freed up from administrative and repetitive tasks for better care, but evidence from Japan indicates robots are encroaching on the caring professions' core territory as well. Eric Topol, a U.S. geneticist currently reviewing Great Britain's National Health Service, has observed of Japanese robots, "Senior people are developing an emotional relationship with them and they are getting a tremendous amount of support."[46] The IPPR report itself envisages a Britain where "Home Help Robots" enable people in old age to experience "better, longer, and more fulfilling lives."[47]

Where the political imperative to care for aging citizens is one of the drivers of robotics in health service, the imperative to care for soldiers is one of its drivers in the military (with the need for battle-winning technology having primacy as always). Replacing soldiers on the frontline with machines is one approach. Another is to use machines in the frontline to provide care to soldiers. Here again it is not that difficult to picture a medical "care-bot" that incorporates an advanced version of Alexa's religious app. Indeed, given the legal and ethical controversy surrounding autonomous weapons, such care-bots may appear long before their killer cousins ever do. No soldier need be without a prayer of their faith in the face of death anywhere on the battlefield. Morally, too, such a robot might more reliably report misconduct than a chaplain who felt inclined to close ranks with the soldiers. Humanity itself could prove to be the moral weak link, incapable of navigating the accumulating nonbinary judgments of the yet-to-be-invented field of quantum ethics. Conceivably, "highly automated weapons could actually be more able to comply with the Law of Armed Conflict principles of proportionality and distinction," thus making it difficult for a state to justify not using them.[48]

Far-fetched as these speculations about robotics may still sound, chaplains like others within the military need to start questioning their basic assumptions. Where First World War chaplains maintained the morale of soldiers who were natives of factories and mines, fighting industrial war on the frontline, today's soldiers are digital natives who may end up fighting among machines online. Traditional chaplaincy will not disappear overnight. In barracks it will still involve caring for people in all the complexity of their lives and relationships. Religious practices will endure as well, albeit mixed up with startling new equipment, which may indeed offer new resources for maintaining morale. A platoon sergeant in Helmand checking his men's kit for a patrol would still have been recognizable to his First World War or even Homeric counterparts, notwithstanding the inclusion of retinal scanners and DNA swabs among the weapons and rations. On the battlefield beyond, however, the technology will literally begin to

stand on its own feet. With that prospect, and by way of resistance, three cardinal themes of Christian military chaplaincy commend themselves as worthy of further study.[49]

First, chaplaincy needs to deepen its sacramental roots. While spiritual resources may be available online, soldiers in conflict hunger for the visible and tangible. Chaplains who are mainly ministers of the Word may be vulnerable to the machines. Second, chaplaincy needs to deepen its incarnational roots. While machines may be able to venture where human chaplains struggle to follow, no robot will genuinely share the risks of soldiers. God became man, not machine, with all the risk that entailed. And third, chaplaincy needs to deepen its penitential roots. Psalm 51 was a core text of medieval military liturgies: "Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me." While robots may prove effective moral policemen, soldiers can also require forgiveness—not generally for killing the right people, but for killing the wrong people, or the right people in the wrong way. As noted in the concepts paper on human-machine teaming, the last people in the military to be automated will be those who "conduct activities that demand contextual assessment and agile versatility." The challenge of maintaining soldiers' morale across the sacramental, incarnational, and penitential demands of the emerging battlespace suggests that chaplains will be among them.

Notes

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Growth After Trauma: Moral Injury, PTSD, and PTG

By Mark C. Lee

Combat deployments affect people, and veterans return changed. Some come back worse than others, but no one comes back the same. Many have experienced various forms of trauma, and whether directly from combat operations or not, trauma can be a significant part of one's experience in war. Trauma can cause severe physical, emotional, and psychological reactions, often displaying symptoms referred to as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Trauma may manifest symptoms of PTSD, but the injury to the psyche, or soul, is much more than just symptoms of a disorder, reparable through medication and therapy. There is a deeply spiritual aspect to combat that is much more than merely psychological or physiological, yet they are interrelated. Therefore, the treatment of combat veterans' symptoms needs to address the moral aspects of the combat experience.[1] Hence, some behavioral health and religious professionals have begun to talk more about moral injury in the last few years.[2]

The argument is that the treatment of an individual with combat trauma cannot be devoid of the spiritual aspect of the person. I want to emphasize that any treatment of combat trauma should encompass not only the psychiatric and psychological treatment (with the use of medication and therapy) but also the spiritual. Therefore, I suggest that it would be prudent and important to explore the spiritual aspects of PTSD and moral injury to

aid the healing of those who suffer from combat-related trauma. As suggested by the research on PTSD, faith is important and helpful in helping trauma sufferers heal, which is also an important component of promoting post-traumatic growth (PTG). In fact, research appears to indicate that those with religious faith do better in experiencing PTG than those without faith. Regardless of what the individual suffers from, therefore, there is a spiritual component of combat experience that needs to be addressed, which can be instrumental in engendering PTG.

Research also appears to support that people can grow from their traumatic experiences, and their religious faith can play an important role in encouraging PTG. How does faith promote PTG? What is it about one's faith that facilitates growth? The answer is that growth depends on more than an individual's faith, theology, or even spiritual disciplines. There is another factor that is essential to promoting PTG. Community, especially the community of faith, is perhaps the most important element that fosters growth in people. As the saying goes, "no man is an island," and no individual can stand alone and be well, especially during psychologically, emotionally, and spiritually difficult and trying times. Community is important to the process of growth because of one's connection with others. The support from community, which one receives through the process of coping with trauma and then growing through the experience, is critical. Therefore, I explore the theological implications of ecclesiology from a Christian perspective and how that understanding can be lived out in military chaplaincy because its community for the traumatized is essential to facilitating growth.

PTSD and Moral Injury

The American Psychiatric Association (APA) first classified post-traumatic reactions as PTSD in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders–III* (DSM-III) in 1980.[3] Since then, the APA has updated the DSM twice, with the latest version released in 2013.[4] The recognition and identification, along with the labeling and naming of PTSD, really began with the

generation of Vietnam War veterans, although PTSD with different names was around for several generations.[5] American Civil War combatants were said to have "soldier's heart" for their reactions to their experiences on the battlefields. World War I and World War II veterans' experiences from combat were referred to as "shell shock" and "combat fatigue." As a result of the official diagnosis in 1980, more studies regarding the effects of warfare on veterans' psyche have been conducted.[6] Mental health professionals, and society in general, knew there were unique emotional and psychological issues related to soldiers' experiences, but PTSD did not receive prominent attention until much political pressure was exerted on the APA by veterans and supporters.[7]

The issue of post-combat trauma and its effect on veterans is not entirely answered with PTSD. As much as the military and society have focused on the problem of PTSD with veterans, there have been other voices in psychology and theology who have raised the possibility that not all combat veterans suffer from PTSD. Perhaps more are affected by moral injury, which presents very similar reactions and symptoms as PTSD, but is notably different from PTSD.

Noted American experts in trauma such as Charles Figley, Edward Tick, Jonathan Shay, and Larry Dewey, who have worked extensively with Vietnam-era veterans, support a different outlook on those with post-combat stress.[8] They prefer a change in the entire outlook to combat trauma and even the terminology of what combat veterans suffer—to move away from focusing too much on PTSD. The reactions that combat veterans suffer from might be better termed as *combat stress injury* or *post-traumatic stress* as an alternative.[9] Still others, like Shay, who coined the term, prefer *moral injury*. There is an injury, but healing and eventual strengthening are possible, and the hope and possibility of growing through one's traumatic experience is available and open to the combat veteran. An injury does not have the same sense of permanence as does a disorder.

Tick asserts that PTSD should not be dealt with as a primarily medical or psychological condition: "Modern approaches seek etiology and cure in

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brain chemistry and cognition, and a diagnosis of PTSD almost inevitably leads the sufferer, professionals, and public to look for psychological and medical treatment as if the wound were primarily a medical condition."[10] Medical and psychological treatments alone are insufficient. This is not to say that these treatment modalities are completely inept. Instead, Tick strongly advocates that while treatment for PTSD is available, the cure is not purely medical or psychological. In order to heal the combat veteran, the "unique and complex moral, ethical, and religio-spiritual dimensions of warfare that are inevitably troubling to the survivor" need to be dealt with.[11] We need to help combat veterans, who suffer from the aftermath of combat trauma, holistically—mind, body, and spirit. Post-combat trauma is really a matter of the soul, a deep core essence of the person's being that affects the mind and the heart. In healing our combat veterans, we must look at the spiritual aspect: "Healing for PTSD requires a spiritual approach because PTSD is a sacred wound to both the soul and society. . . . Healing PTSD requires moving beyond conventional therapeutic practices to restore the proper relationships between veterans and communities."[12]

Moral injury suggests a hopeful future of recovery and potential growth, as opposed to a permanent state of suffering. Proponents of moral injury espouse that the injuries sustained by a person as a result of combat exposure are, in fact, injuries to the soul of the person. Jonathan Shay states, "I really don't like the term 'PTSD' . . . the diagnostic definition of 'post-traumatic stress disorder' is a fine description of certain instinctual survival skills that persist into everyday life after a person has been in mortal danger—but the definition doesn't address the entirety of a person's injury after the trauma of war."[13] In fact, Shay created the term *moral injury*, and the term is catching on with both the Department of Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense.[14]

The propagation of moral injury is not to say that all PTSD cases are moral injury or that PTSD should be minimized. In fact, others claim that "moral injury is not PTSD. . . . It is possible, though, to have moral injury without PTSD."[15] Moral injury suggests that the aftermath of combat

trauma can affect some people in a troubling way, even if they do not meet the standards for PTSD. Therefore, many more people—a far greater percentage of combat veterans—could be suffering from moral injury and not PTSD.

Regardless of the diagnosis or injury that a combat veteran might suffer from, the primary idea of this chapter is that growth can occur. This growth, again, is known as post-traumatic growth. Furthermore, the thrust of this chapter is to examine the role of the military chaplain, as a representative of the church, in facilitating such growth.

What Is Post-Traumatic Growth?

PTG describes the phenomenon of traumatized people growing—becoming stronger, healthier, happier, and in all aspects better—after their traumatic experiences. PTG can be expressed as the improvement experienced in various facets of one's life and self because they have struggled with trauma. People who have experienced PTG state that although they would never want to go through it again, they can look back on the trauma as an experience that helped them to be better people.

In the 1980s, researchers began asking about the possibility of people growing from their traumatic experiences: "Post-traumatic growth is positive change that the individual experiences as a result of the struggle with a traumatic event."[16] People can endure significantly difficult events in life and come out of those experiences having a perspective that they are better people because of the experience, although it was pure "hell" for them during the trauma. Growth can occur after trauma, and individuals experience growth after much wrestling with the trauma. The struggle helps with meaning and purpose, leading to a new worldview to better make sense of the experience. Trauma leads one to struggle with painful experiences and the suffering of the resulting symptoms, which eventually can lead to growth.

One's engagement with the discomfort and the pain, not running away from or avoiding it but instead struggling with it, helps the person to come

out of it with better appreciation for the experience. Much like driving through a dark tunnel, one must embrace the darkness of the unknown, relying on some guiding light, to traverse the length of the tunnel to get to the other side where there is light. The result is a person who has grown and is better (more mature, wiser, stronger, and more benevolent) for having had the struggle. Combat veterans struggle with their experiences. Struggling to understand and to cope with these traumatic experiences often leads to post-traumatic growth.[17] Hence, PTG occurs when the individual struggles, reevaluates previously held worldviews, adapts and reinterprets them, and creates new perspectives that are healthy and helpful.

The underpinning meaning of PTG is growth, so it is an "experience of improvement that for some persons is deeply profound."[18] There are five domains of PTG, which can have different measurements of experienced growth for various individuals:

- greater appreciation of life and a changed sense of priorities
- warmer, more intimate relationships with others
- greater sense of personal strength
- recognition of new possibilities or paths
- spiritual development.[19]

I propose that PTG is useful to help veterans move toward a different response to combat trauma, one of a hopeful future, a new state of being, and one that is more inclusive of a larger population of combat veterans. The possibility of experiencing growth from trauma is much more appealing than keeping the focus on the psychological and spiritual injuries and disorders and the treatment of symptoms.

PTG and Combat Veterans

Two researchers deal with the specific question of whether or not PTG can be fostered in combat veterans.[20] These researchers found that while many combat veterans do experience the long-term effects of PTSD as a result of

combat trauma, there is evidence for PTG in several different populations of veterans, including aviators, prisoners of war (POWs), and Vietnam War veterans. Data appear to support that combat veterans, who are more exposed to repeated and/or prolonged trauma than most civilians, can and do experience growth after trauma. The question is how. The authors purport that "psychotherapy can nurture such change [PTG] through cognitive processing, support of attempts at mastery of new experiences, and enhancing relationships."[21] In addition to psychotherapy, they support the importance of the "life narrative in post-traumatic growth, noting how storytelling is central to this endeavor."[22] They also note that one of the differences between civilian and combat trauma is the shared trauma. Combat veterans "experience prolonged and repeated traumas, often within a supportive, cohesive group (if the unit is functioning well). The . . . common narrative . . . may enhance the process of post-traumatic growth."[23] The "common narrative" is the community of soldiers who have shared common experiences in combat. This concept of community for combat veterans is an important one, which I discuss later.

Is there evidence of PTG in combat veterans from Afghanistan and Iraq? A study of 272 veterans found that 72 percent of the respondents "endorsed a significant degree of post-traumatic growth in at least one of the areas assessed."[24] Of the six areas of measuring PTG, 16.5 percent of veterans indicated that they had a stronger religious faith after combat experiences. The study does not mention how these veterans experienced growth. Was there training, debriefing, therapy sessions, a church, pastoral counseling, and so forth that served as the impetus for growth, or did growth naturally occur over time as these veterans processed their combat experiences?

Interestingly, younger veterans who had indicated more PTSD symptoms showed more PTG. A possible explanation for this inverse relationship between the severity of PTSD symptoms and the higher PTG rate is that those dealing with higher PTSD struggle more to find the meaning of the event that challenged their previous worldview.[25] As mentioned, finding meaning and purpose of the trauma for one's life is crucial and the more one

struggles to understand the event, the more one appears to sense growth. So we can conclude that those who strive to find meaning have a higher likelihood of growing from their trauma. Furthermore, perceived unit member support was positively correlated to PTG: "Social support may promote PTG by providing a context within which to construct narratives about a traumatic experience, reintegrate them into existing schemas, and generate meaning for them."[26] Unit support translates to community, a group of people with a strong sense of common bond, as previously mentioned. For combat veterans, community is a family of people who understand, share in the narrative, and support one another through the process of dealing with the aftermath of combat. The community is for support and acceptance, a safe place to share the stories (nightmares) of the carnage and the emotional, psychological, and spiritual toll of combat. Again, this sense of community is an important component to promoting PTG.

Another study specifically deals with the population of veterans who served with National Guard units in Operations *Iraqi Freedom* and *Enduring Freedom*.[27] In the section on spirituality, the author pertinently addresses the issue of religious/spiritual coping and the impact of positive religious coping on affirmative outcomes in dealing with combat trauma. Not surprisingly, he cites the vast array of research in this arena, which predominantly indicates "religious and spiritual belief and practices . . . can be beneficial for psychological recovery as well as in personal growth post-trauma."[28] Religious beliefs help combat veterans find meaning and purpose of life and the trauma, no differently from civilians, thereby reducing the severity and duration of PTSD symptoms. Religious practices, including such rituals as the healing prayer or Holy Eucharist, can also help lead the veteran to wholeness and can engender PTG. Finally, religious beliefs and practices encourage forgiveness, which also helps to reduce the severity and duration of PTSD-induced reactions. The benefits are not only psychological; evidence supports that religious and spiritual rituals have neurological benefits as well, which suggest better brain functioning.[29] Positive and healthy religious coping with combat trauma is important to

not only reduce symptoms but also promote PTG. The author also points out that military chaplains need to work with combat veterans, along with mental health professionals of various disciplines, which is vital and necessary to promote spiritual fitness and well-being in the Army.

PTG in the Context of Christian Community

What is important in facilitating growth? As mentioned, one of the key components to facilitating growth in combat veterans is community with fellow veterans who can share in their experiences. Spiritually, the community of faith, with those who have experienced similar trauma, appears to be the single most important factor for growth. Why? Based on some of the literature available on the effect of groups on healing and helping those suffering from various forms of trauma, one can conjecture that community helps to normalize reactions, to put it in psychological terms. However, more importantly, community provides a safe place to share and find help and support, which gives people the sense of the collective will: *I* can survive because *they* have survived. Community offers friendship and a sense of bond between people who shared similar experiences of loss, fear, pain, and despair, giving to one another the healing brought through friendship. In these groups, members can begin to hope for the future and find a sense of resolve to move on, as well as learn from the trauma.

As a chaplain from the Christian faith tradition, I address the community of faith specifically from the traditional Christian concept of community.[30] What constitutes community in Christianity? The Christian concept is perhaps best represented by the church, the *ecclesia*, which in the New Testament "refers to a unique and transformed way of being human in relationship with God and with other persons. It designates a distinctive form of human community characterized by mutuality, interdependence, forgiveness, and friendship."[31]

What is the importance and role of the church in providing the help necessary to move people from sufferers to those who have experienced growth in the aftermath of their trauma? First, the Christian community,

the ecclesia, is a "new community of free persons centered on God's love in Jesus Christ and empowered to service by the Holy Spirit."[32] The church can be viewed as an organic entity—"She is a 'mode of existence,' a *way of being*." The mystery of the church, even in its institutional dimension, is deeply bound to the being of man, to the being of the world and to the very being of God.[33] Being is not only about existence but also about relationships.

Community begins with relationships. First, there is community with God and humanity. Then there is community created with individuals, gathered together to belong as one, based on the love of Jesus Christ. The church is united with, in, and through Jesus Christ, based on faith in Christ. Of the four images of the church that one author offers,[34] the one that best portrays the community of faith most helpful in the promoting PTG is church as the *body of Christ*:

> *The community participates in one Lord, one Spirit, one baptism, and thus becomes "one body." This organic image of the church as a body whose head is Christ has been enormously influential in Christian theology and in the history of the church. The image conveys the mutual dependence of all members of the community on one another, their variety of gifts which are for the enrichment and edification of the whole community, and the common dependence of all members of the body on the one head who is Christ (cf. Col. 1:15–20; Eph. 5:23). The unity of the church as one body is indispensable if it is to be effective in carrying out its mission in the world.*[35]

This definition of the church offers the best imagery of the kind of community that necessarily aided in promoting growth for those who suffered from trauma. If we understand the church to be the body of Christ, then each member of the body also represents the body. The body of Christ then represents, incarnationally, the ministry of Jesus Christ. Hence, the Christian military chaplain, as a member of the body of Christ and as an ordained representative of the church (regardless of denomination), becomes de facto the church to the people to whom he or she ministers.

The Christian community, that is, the Christian chaplain, is called to love God and others in unity while acknowledging and appreciating the individuality of persons. We have unity with God and one another, as brothers and sisters in Christ Jesus—united in our baptism and communion, and we must acknowledge our multiplicity—that we are diverse individuals. We cannot separate ourselves from the community, and we cannot lose our individuality and be subsumed by the group's identity. As one theologian puts it, our union is based on the union with God, modeled on God's own relational nature: "Jesus' high-priestly prayer, that his disciples might become one 'as you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us' (John 17:21), presupposes communion with the triune God, mediated through faith and baptism."[36]

Therefore, a community of faith is important because the veteran's trauma can impair relationships and create distance between the injured and other significant people in the veteran's life.[37] Veterans are always highly encouraged to "incorporate community and relationships as aspects of their spiritual experience."[38] A faith community is particularly important and helpful to the veteran to find support through the question of theodicy and to help restore and reintegrate the veteran to a healthy relationship with God and the worshiping body. The ultimate hope is that faith communities can help lead the veteran to a new, renewed, or restored relationship with God and to find healing and eventual growth. The community of faith can be the best and safest place for the combat veteran to explore issues of moral injury, as previously mentioned, because combat trauma is not just a psychological issue; there is a lot of spiritual injury, which causes faith struggles. The community of faith is essential to promoting PTG.

As mentioned, this community of faith for military personnel is none other than the chaplain. The chaplain is present with and for the soldiers, and journeys with them, to lead those traumatized individuals to healing, hope, and possibly growth. The collective stories connect them as a community, which supports one another through the process of growth. In this

community built between the chaplain and the soldier, Christ's promise to be "where two or three" are gathered in his name becomes real.

In the account of Jesus' resurrection, the Synoptic and Johannine gospels indicate that women—Mary Magdalene and Mary, mother of James, and another woman (either Joanna or Salome)—came to the tomb early in the morning. The gospels also indicate that Peter and other disciples were together, although not very clear as to where and for how long. Furthermore, in Luke 24:13, there is an account of two of Jesus' disciples on the road to Emmaus as they encounter the resurrected Christ. The interesting discovery here is that in all the accounts, people are together. They are huddled together, locked in a secluded home somewhere, traveling together, and more importantly, supporting one another. The rest of the world does not share their pain, loss, and grief. The rest of the world does not understand their fear and trauma. No matter what the rest of the world does not share or understand, these individuals do; they share their trauma together as a community. Perhaps they knew only fear, despair, and hopelessness. However, they had strength and encouragement together as a community because of their shared common bond.

The community was the single point of nexus for these individuals, turning their fear, confusion, chaos, hurt, despair, and trauma into hope, clarity, order, comfort, peace, and growth, both individually and as a group. They needed one another, perhaps even yearned for one another to feel the support for and with each other.

Fundamentally, community for the church is not mere co-existence or even common congregation. Rather, it is the movement to friendship, as a way of sharing and inviting others to belong, a deeper way of relating and being with one another.[39] Friendship moves individuals in groups from merely being included to really belonging to one another and to the larger community. In this type of friendship, people are called to be with one another, to share life together, and to support each other. Belonging involves shared stories, vulnerabilities, sense of co-existence, and mutuality—that which bonds individuals spiritually.

The military chaplain, as a representative of the church, becomes the church to the soldiers because of the relationship built. The chaplain becomes the community to the combat veterans, carrying out the role of the faith community, which leads to restoration of self and life. By responding in a loving and caring way, the chaplain might help the traumatized to move to a place of not only healing but also actually growing from the trauma.[40] Christian care as a form of ministry necessarily encompasses ways in which Christ's church is supposed to take care of its members—with love, compassion, grace, and mercy. The members of the body of Christ are all different, and when dealing with those who are traumatized and hurt, we ought to be mindful of how we are called to care for the weaker members of the body: "In other words, people who are the weakest and least presentable are indispensable to the church."[41]

How do we accomplish this act? A phrase that chaplains often use to refer to this form of ministry is *ministry of presence*, which speaks about the form of ministry that military chaplains engage in daily. Being merely physically present is not what that phrase means. To be present, *really* present with the other, is to share the reality of God's love, to offer friendship, companionship, and a sense of invitation and inclusion. It all starts with being attentive and engaged with the other, and deep listening. Dietrich Bonhoeffer appears to agree with the importance of listening when he writes, "Our love for the other consists first of all in listening."[42] In this ministry of presence, of actively listening, wherein the chaplain brings the Holy to the other, we are mindful that we are called to listen and guide. The key to the ministry of presence is more than being physically present; the chaplain gives of himself or herself to the other in order to make a connection, to create a bond between two people. In this process, the other is invited to belong to this community that is now created between the chaplain and the other.

We belong to Jesus Christ and to one another through our community, and it is in this community that we enter not to serve ourselves, but to serve one another. As John Swinton declares, "In order to find ourselves

we need to look away from ourselves."[43] Authentic Christian community is comprised of individuals who belong to one another, those who have abandoned "human love" for "spiritual love." We are more fully able to embrace our true identity in and through Christ when we live in such a way as to be focused on fulfilling the needs of others.

It is in being the "non-anxious presence," to put it in the words of Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE), as chaplains represent *the Holy* to the other, to simply *be* with the suffering—to sit empathetically with the other[44]: "Empathy plays a central role in pastoral care. It is a means of imaginatively stepping into the shoes of another person and seeing the world from her or his perspective."[45]

In essence, to provide a ministry of presence is to provide spiritual care that offers community to the other. It is not an endeavor to *understand* the other's pain and suffering. Instead, spiritual care is about being present and feeling with the other in the other's moment of need. To be with the other is to simply stand by, to be present, and to offer support, to pray for, and not to offer advice, solution, or empty platitudes in a well-intentioned but pitiful effort to console.

A great biblical illustration of human suffering and the "good and bad" attempts to console are found in the story of Job, whose friends provide an outstanding example of what to do as well as what not to do in a community. While his friends did a good job of listening to and remaining silently in solidarity with Job's suffering in the beginning, they ruined it later by talking. What we might learn from Job's friends, at least initially, is the art of sitting in silence. As John Swinton writes, "By sitting with Job in silence and solidarity, they offered him comfort, solace, and hope in the midst of his suffering. Sadly, they refused to listen to Job's silences, or at best they listened wrongly."[46] These friends were able to practice "ministry of presence" for a period. But Job's friends did not actively listen to or engage in a ministry of presence with him. These friends were not able to provide an empathic presence with Job; they did not place themselves in Job's position. They provided a typical, although well-intended response to the one

suffering tragedy, which is very meaningless and ineffective in the way of providing any comfort. While Job's friends began well, we can see how they were ineffective in their response to Job's calamities.

The important point here for those providing care is to offer community—first and foremost—simply by being present, listening, providing a loving and caring presence of being with a hurting member of the body of Christ, without unnecessary words, especially words that ultimately lead to questions asking why the individual suffers trauma. Combat veterans suffering from trauma do not need someone who will further evoke questions related to theodicy.

Instead, hurt and struggling people need the help of others to grow, and "during this growth we need a friend, a guide, a wise counselor—someone who accompanies us along the road and through the passages of pain."[47] This is the community—whether one or more—embodying the love of Christ, that comes alongside and walks with the traumatized, as a fellow sojourner. The military chaplain is just such a community, whether individually or corporately, to the traumatized combat veteran. Ultimately, as Jean Vanier puts it, the goal is to find new life for people in and through community: "From the wound at the heart of Christ on the cross came water and blood, the sign of the community of believers which is the Church. Life sprang from this cross; death was transformed into resurrection. That is the mystery of life born from death."[48] Vanier also offers a broader definition of what it means *to be community*: "There are three activities that are absolutely vital in the creation of community. The first is eating together around the same table. The second is praying together. And the third is celebrating together. By celebrating, I mean to laugh, to fool around, to have fun, to give thanks together for life."[49]

One might argue that Vanier's sense of community differs greatly from that of the military. However, I propose that the military context is not so different from that which Vanier proposes. The community of L'Arche, where most of the members of the community live with some sort of a disability, might appear to be more dependent physically, emotionally, and spiritually upon each other.

Conversely, military group cohesion may seem to be less dependent, with members who are stronger and more capable of caring for themselves and others. Furthermore, one might argue that the communities of the military and L'Arche are fundamentally different because the military is about force and might, destruction and death, whereas L'Arche is about meekness and gentleness, building up and giving life. However, I would argue they are not very different, if at all. Indeed, there are physical differences, with L'Arche having more dependence on others for everyday survivability, but the similarities are more apparent because both are comprised of human beings with essentially the same needs: for love, companionship, and a sense of belonging. Both are genuine communities of people who care for and about each other. Both groups of people, particularly combat veterans in the military, might be emotionally and spiritually fragile, requiring the same level of care, attention, and love. Moreover, I would also argue that both groups desire the same kind of peace.

A community such as L'Arche might define peace as tranquility and the absence of conflict, while those in the military would consider the absence of warfare as peace, especially from the world's perspective of how peace might be described. However, the peace that combat veterans desire is not only the absence of warfare or chaos and turmoil, but also what I believe to be the same inner peace that most people long for, and which is the antidote to people's everyday anxieties. For instance, "And the peace of God, which surpasses all understanding, will guard your hearts and your minds in Christ Jesus."[50] The communities of L'Arche and the military, despite the apparent differences between them, feel and share this "peace of God," which, according to Fred Craddock, "is one that 'does not have its source within—there is dissension—nor without—there is opposition—but in God. . . . The peace of God "will stand sentry watch" over your hearts and minds.'"[51] This peace ironically offers a military sense of standing guard and watching as a protective shield from anxiety. Craddock continues, "Because God's peace is on duty, they do not have to be anxiously scanning the horizon for new threats. Alert, yes; anxious, no."[52] Both of

these communities desire the same peace, which is to be free of anxiety and resting in the assurance of Christ's presence, strength, and comfort despite the tornado of turmoil, conflict, struggle, and warfare that may surround them. It is ultimately this type of peace that one wants to experience both individually and together, which exists to love and embrace.

Therefore, I suggest that Vanier's definition can be applied to the military context, particularly to combat veterans. This type of community requires vulnerability and intimacy—a willingness to be open about oneself and to share with others beyond the superficiality of most relationships. Part of being vulnerable and intimate with one another is experienced through the act of eating together. Eating connotes basic survival, for without eating, one cannot live. However, eating is not just about survival, which one could do by himself or herself. Eating together in this context is about sharing an intimate function of life with others because one is at ease, vulnerable, and personal. Therefore, eating together means not only literally sharing a meal but also encompasses riding in convoys and going out on patrols together, which in the combat zone can be a matter of survival. Sometimes, it also means living in tight quarters together, sharing horrible meals such as MREs or eating in the dining facility at odd hours after missions, and becoming intimate with fellow soldiers, depending on one another for survival and safety.

If eating is for the body's survival, praying is for spiritual life, as a part of spiritual nourishment. We all need spiritual nourishment in order for us to continue to sustain our spiritual life. According to Vanier, "If we do not have the spiritual nourishment we need, we will close in on ourselves and on our own comfort and security, or throw ourselves into work as an escape."[53] Thus, praying together for military personnel means to be the spiritual support for one another, in addition to literally praying together. Many chaplains pray for and with their soldiers before missions, and definitely after a significant event. Prayers in the combat zone were more than words, more than solace for the soul; these prayers were necessary for the survival of the soldiers' souls. Perhaps more important than individual

prayer is communal prayer, for those who pray. A community of prayer is absolutely needed and essential when one cannot utter any words of prayer.

The community grows and is strengthened through prayer, as individuals become "bread" for one another, feeding and nurturing each other. Again, Vanier writes, "Communal prayer is an important nourishment. A community, which prays together, which enters into silence and adoration, is bound together by the action of the Holy Spirit. God listens in a special way to the cry which rises from a community."[54]

One could say that prayer is the "glue" that keeps the group together in unity and harmony. The significance of praying together was most notably powerful and meaningful during times of loss in combat, whether due to death or significant injuries, where soldiers were open to words of comfort and unity in shared pain through communal prayer. One powerful example that comes to mind is the time the battalion that I deployed with in 2005 lost a Soldier on his last patrol mission. Half of the battalion was already in Kuwait when we received the news of this Soldier's fatality. About 250 Soldiers had gathered in a large tent to receive the news from one of the company commanders, and I offered a word of prayer for whomever wanted to stay to pray. Not a single Soldier left the tent. There was not a single dry eye, and all the Soldiers stayed together and huddled in their respective squads and platoons. In that moment of grief and angst, the community comforted one another and was comforted by prayer. I dare say that prayer at that moment was the spiritual nourishment and glue that particular community needed.

Finally, to come together in community, people need to celebrate. This does not, as Vanier suggests, mean just having fun; it is about celebrating life. To celebrate, especially in the context of the combat zone, is mainly about finding moments of levity and appreciating the gift of life. I spent hours in the smoke pits, as many of my fellow chaplains did, listening to the stories of Soldiers, even sometimes enduring the juvenile and crude jokes and language, as a way of celebrating the vitality of youth and giving thanks for the simple fact that we were alive yet another day. The jokes and pranks throughout the deployment, even during patrols at times, helped

manage stressful situations and break up the monotony of daily routines. Another example of celebrating life, ironically, was during memorial ceremonies to honor fallen Soldiers. It might seem counterintuitive that life is celebrated during a ceremony to memorialize a dead comrade; however, it is not contradictory. These memorial ceremonies are extremely difficult to attend, but they are valuable times for the surviving comrades to reflect on the great gift of life and to be thankful for the sacrifices of those fallen. It is a time of reflection on how valuable and fleeting life is, what we mean to each other as "brethren-in-arms," and how much meaning and value each person brings to the community. The military chaplain represents the love of God in all these times and circumstances by being present with soldiers, and loving and caring for them. This love of God is what we are called to embody and present to those for whom we care. Hence, there are tears as well as laughter in these memorial ceremonies. Therefore, a community that eats, prays, and celebrates together is vital and necessary for healing and growth. For it is in community where healing begins because, as Vanier states, "one person, all alone, can never heal another. It is important to bring broken people into a community of love, a place where they feel accepted and recognized in their gifts, and have a sense of belonging. That is what wounded people need and want most."[55]

Conclusion

Combat changes people—for good or bad—and no one comes back the same. The stressors in combat can result for some in PTSD, while for many more in moral injury. Regardless, there is the potential for people who have trauma to grow, which is PTG. The key to facilitating such growth, as I have tried to put forth in this article, is community. This community is best offered by the chaplain, who, according to Christian theology, is the very incarnational representation of the church to those combat veterans suffering from PTSD or moral injury.

Community is perhaps important enough to be declared as the single most important component to promoting PTG. However, as discussed,

community is not only a gathering of people, especially from the perspective of practical theology. Community in the Christian context encompasses the concepts of community of the secular setting, where people with common experiences or affinities can gather and feel the support and love of the other members. However, the Christian community, as the incarnational representative of Christ, is about accepting the "other," caring for others in acts of sacrificial love, which is the agape, unconditional way as Jesus did with the leper, the tax collector, the prostitute, and all who were outcast, down trodden, and marginalized. The role of the community in helping the traumatized is to accept them, to provide a safe place to hear their stories, and to love them as Christ loves them.

The Christian community, as modeled by Vanier—a gathering focused on eating, praying, and having fun (celebrating life) together—is what I propose the military chaplain ought to emulate for those combat veterans under his or her care. The significant element of this kind of community is love—for those of us who are Christians, the love of Jesus Christ. The role of the military chaplain is to replicate the ministry of Jesus, as the Christian community to our combat veterans who suffer from the aftermath of combat trauma.

Notes

[1] Warren Kinghorn, "Combat Trauma and Moral Fragmentation: A Theological Account of Moral Injury," *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 32, no. 2 (2012). More psychology professionals are acknowledging the need to address the issue of moral injury with combat veterans. Moral injury deals with "the experience of having acted (or consented to others acting) incommensurably with one's most deeply held moral conceptions."

[2] Jonathan Shay is credited with coining the term *moral injury*. However, many scholars have begun researching and writing about moral injury in the last few years. Some of the notable books on the subject recently published include Rita Nakashima Brock and Gabriella Lettini, *Soul Repair: Recovering from Moral Injury after War* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012); David Peters, *Post-Traumatic God: How the Church Cares for People Who Have Been to Hell and Back* (New York: Morehouse Publishing, 2016); Wollom A. Jensen and James M. Childs, Jr., *Moral Warriors, Moral Wounds: The Ministry of the Christian Ethic* (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2016); Brett T. Litz, et al., *Adaptive Disclosure: A New Treatment for Military Trauma, Loss, and Moral Injury* (New York: Guilford Press, 2016); Nancy Sherman, *Afterwar: Healing the Moral Wounds of Our Soldiers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); David Wood, *What Have We Done: The Moral Injury of our Longest Wars* (Columbus, GA: Little, Brown, and Co., 2016).

[3] See "PTSD History," available at <www.psychiatric-disorders.com/articles/ptsd/causes-and-history/history-of-ptsd.php>. The American Psychiatric Association classified post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a mental disorder in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders–5.*

[4] *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders–5*, 5th ed. (Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2013).

[5] Barry R. Schaller, *Veterans on Trial: The Coming Court Battles over PTSD* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012). In chapter 4, Schaller gives a lengthy history of the "politics" of PTSD and the heightened attention veterans of the Vietnam War received after the war and the veterans' reintegration, or the poor reintegration thereof, back into society. Basically, the plight of the American veterans of the Vietnam War and the toll on society caused mental health professionals and the American government to reexamine the seriousness of the psychological aftermath of combat on veterans.

[6] Jonathan Shay published *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York: Scribner, 1994) and *Odysseus in America: Combat*

Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming (New York: Scribner, 2002) to draw the parallels of the trauma of warfare experienced by Achilles and Odysseus in ancient Greek literature to what the Vietnam veteran experienced in the jungles of Vietnam and on returning home to America. Edward Tick, author of *War and the Soul: Healing Our Nation's Veterans from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder* (Wheaton, IL: Quest Books, 2005), writes that ancient societies all had rituals to send and receive warriors because those societies' elders understood the inherent trauma and the subsequent change to the warriors' psyche that warfare has.

[7] Schaller, *Veterans on Trial*, 75–80. The author makes the case that PTSD really came into the spotlight after the end of the Vietnam War and the "fall out" it had on American society with the myriad of problems and huge numbers of veterans who were unable to cope with the aftermath of combat. The problems of the Vietnam War were unique. The problems faced by Vietnam War veterans also heightened awareness and increasingly politicized the debate over PTSD. Furthermore, the definition and diagnosis of PTSD were heavily contested within the world of psychology and what was put out eventually was also influenced by many political factors.

[8] Charles R. Figley is a Vietnam War veteran and renowned expert in traumatology who has authored and edited many books on trauma, most notably, with co-editor William P. Nash, *Combat Stress Injury: Theory, Research, and Management* (New York: Routledge, 2007), a book I reference in this study. Ed Tick, Jonathan Shay, and Larry Dewey are psychologists and psychiatrists who work(ed) with Vietnam War veterans for the Department of Veterans Affairs and authors of books cited in this chapter. These experts have all worked with combat veterans and have dealt with issues of PTSD and effects of combat on the veteran's psyche and soul.

[9] Figley and Nash, ed., *Combat Stress Injury.*

[10] Edward Tick, "PTSD: The Sacred Wound," *Journal of the Catholic Health Association of the United States* (May–June 2013), 16.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., 22.

[13] Public Broadcasting Service, "Jonathan Shay Extended Interview," last modified March 11, 2011, available at <www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/2011/03/11/may-28-2010-jonathan-shay-extended-interview/6384/>. See also Shay, *Odysseus in America*; Jonathan Shay, *The Pen and the Dollar Bill: Two Philosophical Stage Props* (Washington, DC: Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, 2006), available at <www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/32/928/Presentation.PTSD.Shay.pdf>.

[14] Jeff Severns Guntzel, "Beyond PTSD to 'Moral Injury,'" *Onbeing.org*, March 13, 2013, available at <www.onbeing.org/blog/beyond-ptsd-to-moral-injury/5069>.

[15] Brock and Lettini, *Soul Repair*, xiii.

[16] Lawrence G. Calhoun and Richard G. Tedeschi, *Facilitating Posttraumatic Growth: A Clinician's Guide,* The Lea Series in Personality and Clinical Psychology (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1999), 11.

[17] Stephen Joseph, "Religiosity and Posttraumatic Growth: A Note Concerning the Problems of Confounding in Their Measurement and the Inclusion of Religiosity within the Definition of Posttraumatic Growth," *Mental Health, Religion & Culture* 14, no. 8 (2011), 843.

[18] Lawrence G. Calhoun and Richard G. Tedeschi, "Posttraumatic Growth: Conceptual Foundations and Empirical Evidence," *Psychological Inquiry* 15, no. 1 (2004), 4.

[19] Ibid., 6. Also Tedeschi and Calhoun, "The Posttraumatic Growth Inventory: Measuring the Positive Legacy of Trauma," *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 9, no. 3 (1996).

[20] Richard G. Tedeschi and Richard J. McNally, "Can We Facilitate Posttraumatic Growth in Combat Veterans?" *American Psychologist* 66, no. 1 (2011).

[21] Ibid., 21.

[22] Ibid. Also Donald Meichenbaum, "Resilience and Posttraumatic Growth: A Constructive Narrative Perspective," in *Handbook of Posttraumatic Growth: Research and Practice*, ed. Lawrence G. Calhoun and Richard G. Tedeschi (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006), 355–367.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Robert H. Pietrzak et al., "Posttraumatic Growth in Veterans of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom," *Journal of Affective Disorders* 126, no. 1–2 (2010). The study indicates that the top three areas of growth were "changing priorities about what is important in life (52.2%), being able to appreciate each day (51.1%), and being better able to handle difficulties (48.5%)."

[25] Ibid., 233.

[26] Ibid. Also Calhoun and Tedeschi, "Posttraumatic Growth," 1–18.

[27] See D. Patricia Tackett, "Resilience Factors Affecting the Readjustment of National Guard Soldiers Returning from Deployment" (Ph.D. diss., Antioch University, 2011), available at <https://aura.antioch.edu/etds/119/>. National Guard Soldiers are voluntary citizen-soldiers who belong to what is known as the Reserve component of the U.S. Army. These Soldiers train 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks

annually. These National Guard members have otherwise full-time civilian lives (work, school, families) and participate in the military on a part-time basis. The National Guard, along with the Reserve (another entity of citizen-soldiers), has been called on to fight along with the Active-duty component since the beginning of both combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are more unique and difficult challenges and problems facing Soldiers from the Reserve due to the nature of their structure and the lack of resources to support Soldiers, particularly post-deployment.

[28] Tackett, "Resilience Factors Affecting the Readjustment of National Guard Soldiers Returning from Deployment," 42–47. Citing Annick Shaw, Stephen Joseph, and P. Alex Linley, "Religion, Spirituality, and Posttraumatic Growth: A Systematic Review," *Mental Health, Religion & Culture* 8, no. 1 (March 2005).

[29] Tackett, "Resilience Factors Affecting the Readjustment of National Guard Soldiers Returning from Deployment," 46–47.

[30] My claim as a Christian theologian is not to exclude other religious faiths from the dialogue. It is merely a claim as to who I am and the particular theological framework from which I approach the subject. I believe the concept of a religious community is available and can be used in other religions. However, the concept and practice will need to be interpreted and adapted according to the religious tradition.

[31] Daniel L. Migliore, *Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1991), 189.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Jean Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church*, Contemporary Greek Theologians Series, No. 4 (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 15.

[34] Migliore offers four main images of the church found in the New Testament: the church as the people of God, people of God as a servant people, the church as the body of Christ, and a community of the Spirit, filled by the gifts of the Spirit. Migliore, *Faith Seeking Understanding*, 190–191.

[35] Ibid., 191.

[36] Miroslav Volf, *After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1998), 195.

[37] Figley and Nash, ed., *Combat Stress and Injury*, 304.

[38] Ibid.

[39] John Swinton, *Resurrecting the Person: Friendship and the Care of People with Mental Health Problems* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2000), 145–163.

Chapter 9 deals with the movement of caring for mental health patients toward community and friendship with them. Swinton discusses how the movement toward friendship is the key to authentic Christian love in action beyond merely caring for those with mental illnesses.

[40] Post-traumatic growth is for the traumatized individual to express that the traumatic experience actually helped the person become better, stronger, and better able to deal with not only the individual's own future stressors, but also to help others. Growth is expressed as feeling as though the trauma was beneficial for the individual, although the experience was not desired.

[41] Stanley Hauerwas and Jean Vanier, *Living Gently in a Violent World: The Prophetic Witness of Weakness, Resources for Reconciliation* (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Books, 2008), 74.

[42] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Spiritual Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 36.

[43] John Swinton, "From Inclusion to Belonging: A Practical Theology of Community, Disability and Humanness," *Journal of Religion, Disability & Health* 16, no. 2 (2012).

[44] Stephen D. W. King, *Trust the Process: A History of Clinical Pastoral Education as Theological Education* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007). This book gives a good background into the history and basic theories and philosophies of today's Clinical Pastoral Education, as espoused by the Association of Clinical Pastoral Education (ACPE). A brief background of ACPE is also available at <www.acpe.edu/ACPE/About_ACPE/ACPE/About_ACPE/About_ACPE. aspx?hkey=8bda1439-a609-475c-83ba-d86c9ca8e7e4>.

[45] Carrie Doehring, *The Practice of Pastoral Care: A Postmodern Approach* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006).

[46] John Swinton, *Raging with Compassion: Pastoral Responses to the Problem of Evil* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2007), 102.

[47] Jean Vanier, *Community and Growth* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1989), 133.

[48] Ibid., 157.

[49] Hauerwas and Vanier, *Living Gently in a Violent World*, 37.

[50] Phil 4:7.

[51] Fred B. Craddock, *Philippians: Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1985), 72.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Vanier, *Community and Growth*, 168.

[54] Ibid., 195.

55   Jean Vanier, *From Brokenness to Community: The Wit Lectures* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1992), 28.

Twin Children of the Great War: Assessing the Effects of Moral and Spiritual Injury Today

By Timothy S. Mallard

I f World War I demonstrated anything, it was the sheer brutality, wastage, and immensity of industrial-age combat. Against this tide, the warrior in the trench or the line, in the sky or on the waves appeared to have little or no hope of coming out unscathed either in body or in soul. Indeed, the postwar social pathos for the plight of the warrior seemed to be a type of hope-filled social exercise in revaluing human life and straining against the goads of this new scale of war.[1] Postwar Western societies yearned to reclaim an optimism about war—that somehow it would never again reach the scale of carnage the world had just witnessed, though this was not to be. Metaphorically, war from 1914 to 1919 crossed the Rubicon, never to return to its former land.

At least one outgrowth, however, of this post–Great War social debate about the nature of war was an appropriate revaluing of the individual warrior. Somehow, the recognition of the enduring injuries a combatant retains from war seemed to penetrate the collective social conscience, most especially with a growing understanding of the malady originally termed *shell shock*. Paradigmatically, World War I catalyzed a broad understanding that war produces wounds not only in the body but also in the mind *and* spirit of the warrior, often long retained long after he or she has left the battlefield. Through World War II and other subsequent 20th-century

conflicts, multiple nations held continuing discussions about how war so continuously affected their veterans.[2]

This discussion continues apace today in contemporary dialogue about a type of combat injury that has found its way into our daily discourse, that of moral injury. However, troublingly I contend that the profession of arms today is operating from a reductionist appreciation of the warrior, increasingly seeing him or her from an inchoate utilitarianism as having value only in his or her ability to perform the mission. This must reverse if the profession is to retain its status as an essentially human endeavor, where the warrior and leader are both people who in body and soul exercise reflective, discreet control of the management of such violence.[3]

Thus, in this chapter I advance this discussion by contending (as I have previously) that there is and should be an appreciation of the boundaries drawn between moral injury and spiritual injury, as I have termed it. Admittedly, what I contend here is that both of these injuries are grounded in an ontological presupposition that all human persons are fundamentally composed of both body and soul and that spirituality is the healthful exercise of the soul in life.[4] With that said, like identical twin children who are yet separate human beings, understanding the similarities and the differences between moral and spiritual injury will aid contemporary strategic military ethics in retaining a primacy on the sacred nature of the warrior, ever to be a precious resource not lightly used in the service of nations. Indeed, not only because of a century's observed experience but also because of the nature of future warfare, moral and spiritual injury will drive themselves as ad bellum opportunity cost considerations in any future nation-states' decision to go to war.

To begin, let us review a standard definition of moral injury from the eminent clinicians Shira Maguen and Bret Litz, who write:

> *Like psychological trauma, moral injury is a construct that describes extreme and unprecedented life experience including the harmful aftermath of exposure to such events (e.g. combat trauma). Events*

are considered morally injurious if they "transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations." Thus, the key precondition for moral injury is an act of transgression, which shatters moral and ethical expectations that are rooted in religious or spiritual beliefs, or culture-based, organizational, and group-based rules about fairness, the value of life, and so forth.[5]

Since the coinage of the term *moral injury* by famed clinician Jonathan Shay, the term has undergone a type of reframing in the professional discourse. Originally, Shay intended the term to capture the sense of betrayal inflicted by the chains of command on their warriors in combat, the future veterans of the Vietnam War.[6] Long after that war had ended, Shay was repeatedly helping these warriors wrestle with this loss of trust as a debilitating, residual interior injury. Gradually throughout the 1990s, however, other clinicians noted a similar sense of betrayal within veterans toward themselves as they continued to assess their actions (or inaction) from the same conflict and others.[7] The scholarly discourse began to center around the critical verb *transgression*. Scholars applied the term to note that whether a warrior's line of moral code was crossed externally or internally, the effect was the same: warriors carried a type of debilitating internal wound separate from the established clinical diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.[8]

Comparatively, I have more recently defined spiritual injury as:

the intra and inter-personal damage to souls brought on by significant trauma, including the rupture to foundational religious values, beliefs and attitudes, the inability to healthfully participate in an immanent human faith community, and the temporary or permanent loss of a transcendent relationship to God (manifested particularly in questions about forgiveness, doubt, truth, meaning, and hope).[9]

In positing this definition, I attempted to reframe the similarities and distinctions between moral and spiritual injury, categorically holding

that while I concur with the concept of moral injury, I also consider that it lacks a contextualized understanding of the warrior and his or her most foundational relationships. Neither moral nor spiritual injury occurs in a vacuum, but spiritual injury can be particularized as occurring within the warrior's soul and then emanating outward through the warrior to his or her unit, family, community, nation, and even existentially to God (or the Divine but as the warrior so defines). I framed the definition to recapture an emphasis in the profession of arms on the criticality of the warrior's soul, as General George Marshall once rightly championed.[10] Today, however, as Simon Edwards so adroitly states, the "military is exclusive in public services in understanding the importance of the soul. . . . Yet when it comes to dealing with the consequences of combat, this element is almost totally neglected."[11] Thus following Edwards's charge, I understand spiritual injury as both polyvalent and concentric in its effects. What are some of the other markers between both moral and spiritual injury?

Distinctions and Similarities

First, since the definition of moral injury is descriptive in nature it lacks specificity and leaves it open to misapplication, which I argue is indeed happening swiftly in academic, clinical, pastoral, and most especially military settings. Essentially, the term moral injury is now being bandied about somewhat indiscriminately to capture any type of nonphysical injury a warrior may suffer in combat, whether such injuries accord with the definition or not. Indeed, as I have pressed many colleagues in the profession of arms to recount even an approximate definition of moral injury or of its purpose, most cannot do so with clarity or understanding. For a term that is gaining such traction within the Armed Forces, however, this lack of specificity is quite alarming. Clarity and precision on this term will be particularly important so that commanders and senior noncommissioned officers down to the tactical level of war understand this term and apply it appropriately only when it is called for in assessing a warrior's interior woundedness.

A second concern is that the definition of moral injury is built on the theological verb *transgress* without any theological context, particularly to antecedent concepts such as "sin" or descendent concepts such as "forgiveness." In the field of ethics, this can presumptively become an assumption that the warrior has been the agent of transgression rather than the recipient of transgression, as Shay originally observed in his analysis.[12] Of course, in the treatment process for the warrior, this can and often is problematic, particularly when the warrior feels himself or herself to have been morally inculpable in any transgression against another or the victim of an unintended trauma. Indeed, it is vital that moral injury is only correctly linked to moral agency when called for by the circumstances of the originating combat trauma. When not called for, *spiritual injury* may be the more correct descriptive term. This is fundamentally based in the presupposition that all people are moral agents responsible for their actions. That said, if moral injury presupposes this agency, then spiritual injury also is predicated on the contention that all people are composed of both body and soul and that spiritual injury is based in the ontological reality of each person having a spiritual component to his or her being. Furthermore, what is paramount is not to unnecessarily freight the warrior with guilt that is not his or hers by virtue of their action or inaction in combat.

Third, the standard definition of moral injury seems to subsume a philosophical inversion of the concept under religious understanding, when, in fact, in philosophical history, this is clearly the other way round (so morality and ethics have, since ancient Greece, been seen as outgrowths of the Divine/human relationship rather than conceptual parents of the same).[13] Put another way, religious belief and spiritual praxis have almost universally been seen as the construct under which morality resides rather than the converse.[14] In our spiritually apathetic and indifferent contemporary culture, it has become de rigueur to propose that moral leadership in a democratic polity can be (and for some proponents must be) divorced from any religious or spiritual moorings, but that remains a tenuous point at the least.[15] Be that as it may, correctly inverting moral injury under

religious understanding will neither rob the definition of any of its descriptive potency nor risk crossing a line of uncritically endorsing religious belief. Rather, it will frame the concept within its most critical existential relationship for the warrior, where either moral or spiritual injury is often expressed in personal questions regarding guilt, forgiveness, atonement, or even reconciliation with either God or other persons.

Fourth, I have come to understand that, put baldly, the term moral injury is often driven or influenced by the pursuit of research dollars and institutional interests in the competition for advancement rather than the healing of persons. This is not a concern that arises principally out of the military medical healthcare system, where the legal appropriation of congressionally authorized research and treatment dollars is made generally in the interests of warriors and families, though not always so. Rather, this is a concern to which many colleagues in principally the Veterans Administration or the civilian corporate healthcare complex have alerted me.[16] In their estimation, the term moral injury is so *au courant* and demarcated that it easily serves as the basis for new proposals for research grants, allocation of limited fiscal resources for treatment budgets, and the hiring of new clinical personnel to expand organizational reach and (more troublingly) perceived organizational relevance and/or importance. At best, this freights the term with perhaps an unvoiced agenda; at worst, it completely hijacks it in service to institutional interests rather than the recovery of those affected by it. Candidly, a warrior might have cause to question: "Whose aims are being served here?" Admittedly, the term of spiritual injury that I propose lacks either such institutional potency (how does one, after all, measure spiritual injury in a research project? I do not think this can be adequately done) or institutional subservience.[17] That said, as I have continually used this term among warriors and families (and those who care for them, both pastorally and clinically), I have received little if any disagreement with the nature of the type of woundedness that it describes, only critiques about my own need to further clarify its nature, manifestations, or postvention techniques.

Fifth, I have also come to understand that the phenomena of moral and spiritual injury are both wounds that are today greatly exacerbated by the lack of language categories and/or moral formation of individuals that marked prior generations. For example, even my use of basic theological terms such as *sin*, *transgression*, and *forgiveness* might occasion quizzical or bemused responses by some as conceptual relics of a passé emphasis on religious understandings jettisoned amid a contemporary cultural fealty to the monarchy of the self. Alternatively, if I attempted to use basic philosophical constructs from Plato such as human growth along a visceral/emotional/mental trajectory or Aristotle's delineation between *hedonia* and *eudemonia,* then most moderns would have little to no comprehension of such categories.[18] While postmodern champions might see this lack of understanding as a liberation from dominant past thought constructs, as a pastoral response I generally see warriors and families with little if any ability to contextualize either their moral or spiritual injury because they do not understand themselves or natural human experiences such as pain, suffering, hope, and even death.[19]

Additionally in this vein, I might add that in the medical healing professions (principally the physical and clinical domains), we have bifurcated our conceptions of treating people as human beings created by God both body and soul in need of healing and redemption to only those, as one cynical doctor told me, who are the "pink bags" of physical matter deserving of prolonged physiological life. Moreover, I am troubled that this same predilection in the healing arts is driving the profession of arms to then see warriors only for their utilitarian value to the institution relative to their physical health and mission performance, with no affirmation of the person's immanent worth beyond his or her term of military service and eternal worth as those in need of transcendent meaning and hope.[20] Though I have no statistical proof for this assertion, I intuitively suspect that this particular organizational perspective produces a crisis of meaning for the warrior and his or her family when he or she can no longer perform and is jettisoned from the ranks of the uniformed, and may derivatively

be a causal factor in the precipitous and sustained increase in completed suicides amongst veterans in America.[21]

Sixth, another prior condition that I contend has greatly attenuated the impact of moral and spiritual injury in warriors and families is the seminal change in America to the all-volunteer force in 1976 after the Vietnam War. While this move might have been politically in tune with the tenor of the electorate at the time, it profoundly rewrote the civil-military relationship that had undergirded how the Nation went to war since the founding of the republic.[22] The very ideas of militias, conscription, or shared national sacrifice in the conduct of war are now replaced by a high emphasis on technical and scientific proficiency (especially in the operation of complex weapons platforms); an ever-increasing reliance on the accumulated tactical experience of a professional military class; the repetitive deployment and redeployment of those professional warriors over many years, that cycle occurring not only individually but also collectively for units but without significant ties to communities, towns, or cities (except for those units particularly in the National Guard); and a growing strategic disconnection of the profession of arms from its principal client, the American people. Indeed, and as an outgrowth of all these points, some now question whether we have unalterably divorced our military forces in America from the larger national democratic narrative or constitutional set of ideals that supposedly underlies a values-based military and the national will.[23] Relative to moral and spiritual injury, American warriors now often cannot go to war with a meaningful social context or relationship to the Nation (perhaps only to the Federal Government), a type of estrangement that only exacerbates individual questions regarding warrior and family experiences in combat, particularly subsequent to suffering horrific physical, mental, emotional, moral, or spiritual injury of any kind.[24] Perhaps it is an attempt to bridge this chasm that occasions the impassioned, strained pleas of many civilians to say to the warrior, "Thank you for your service," and, concomitantly, the growing cynicism and even hostility inside many combat veterans' hearts in response.

Seventh, and now shifting to further distinctions between the accepted concepts of moral injury and that which I propose, a chaplain colleague of mine rightly pointed out that there is a fundamental difference between the two in how they are conceptualized, to wit: moral injury is defined relative to the event, whereas I define spiritual injury relative to the individual (and subsequently that individual's vital relationships). It seems that this can especially have important implications for treatment.[25] A healing modality predicated on responding to the nature of an event in time (so moral injury) can misfocus the efforts of both clinicians and pastoral counselors on the circumstances of that event rather than the person affected by it. Certainly, many such experienced providers do not allow this to happen and willingly and courageously enter into the pain of the warrior. However, the definition of moral injury does not help them because it conceptually distances the provider from the warrior who occasioned the search for healing in the first place. Comparatively, the definition of spiritual injury that I propose primarily holds both warrior and provider in tension together and that relationship as the mechanism for the healing process, attending secondarily to the combat trauma as needed. Furthermore, this definition of spiritual injury catalogs its effects concentrically beginning with the warrior and emanating outward to a circle of his or her relationships including that warrior's unit, family system, community, nation, world, and even God (as articulated or held by the warrior). In point of fact, this definition of spiritual injury attempts to inculcate its effects on the warrior's most critical (and often ruptured) relationships, yet to see those relationships as keys to the warrior's eventual healing.[26] Put another way, any injury in combat does not occur in a vacuum and that warrior's healing will not either, but only through the reconciliation of severed relationships necessary to vital human flourishing, a theological proposition, to be sure.

Eighth and finally, a critical distinction to my thinking regarding how moral and spiritual injury differ is that I conceive the latter as a fundamentally existential crisis rather than an episodic experience. I base this primarily on the pain-filled responses that warriors and families have given

to me about having to live with combat trauma. For such persons, the 12 markers of spiritual injury that I formerly proposed thus call into question the whole of being and the whole of life in both a temporal and eternal sense.[27] It is not only that the former understandings of self or God are even temporarily questioned but also that they are fundamentally and permanently reevaluated, perhaps even discarded. Admittedly, this is a difference by degrees between moral and spiritual injury as concepts, but in dealing with the spiritually wounded, it becomes easier to assess because their expression of that injury is marked by a pervasiveness (so whole of being) and permanence (so whole of life) that in my experience only remains with those bearing the deep wounds of spiritual injury.

Alternatively, while the physical, mental, and emotional wounds of war often heal with time, there are spiritual wounds that linger to the depth of the person for the remainder of his or her life, yet which cry out for and even drive the need for healing in that warrior and his or her family as much as any other woundedness, no doubt.[28] As well, when in the wake of that warrior and family's spiritual reevaluation process, they then permanently alter their former beliefs regarding the experience of death and eternal life—and then that woundedness can adequately be categorized as affecting the Divine/human relationship into eternity. I cannot conceive of another type of woundedness from war freighted with such immense consequences for the soul, an imperative motivation for care that should rekindle all healing professionals in their stewardship of and coordination for that warrior and family's healing.

Effects

Due to the concentric nature of spiritual injury as I define it, this should then occasion a fundamental reassessment of both this and moral injury in the traditional ad bellum considerations of a nation's decision to go to war. If these types of wounds emanate outward from the warrior across time and space to his or her unit, family, community, nation, world, and God long after both the battle and war cease, then it would seem self-evident that any

nation must longitudinally study such effects in order to adequately assess decisions to enter into future conflicts. Indeed, one might argue that both moral and spiritual injury bear with them immense opportunity costs for the republic. What do I contend here?

Opportunity cost is an economic term defined as:

> *A benefit, profit, or value of something that must be given up to acquire or achieve something else. Since every resource (land, money, time, etc.) can be put to alternative uses, every action, choice, or decision has an associated opportunity cost. Opportunity costs are fundamental costs in economics, and are used in computing cost benefit analysis of a project. Such costs, however, are not recorded in the account books but are recognized in decision making by computing the cash outlays and their resulting profit or loss.*[29]

In the military context, opportunity costs can be found in the human capital of a nation's sons and daughters that it sends to war on its behalf. While persons are not a zero-sum game, to be sure, they are finite resources necessary to corporate human flourishing on many levels of human society (as per my definition of spiritual injury). In essence and to correlate the above definition to this chapter's topic, warriors and their families are resources that "can be put to alternative uses," and if a nation chooses to expend those resources in combat and afterward in enduring moral and spiritual injury, then such lost resources are not only tragic after effects of war but also opportunity costs that a nation may or may not have adequately counted prior to the decision to initiate hostilities. Should a nation not have so soberly assessed this type of war's cost, then this lack of foresight can produce both a derivative, enduring, and deep-seated moral and spiritual injury in warriors and families. Indeed, such opportunity cost is corrosive in its very nature to the strength and functioning of any democratic polity, as America experienced in the wake of the Vietnam War. The polyvalent *social* effects of enduring moral and spiritual injury are long and broad indeed, extending across multiple generations.

Yet there is a second corrosive opportunity cost of moral and spiritual injury to the Nation, particularly in its historic civil-military construct. First, in a profession of arms as described above (a technically and tactically proficient force so discrete in its function that it lacks a corollary to the Nation it serves), then moral and spiritual injury can radically demoralize the force preparing for future war. What I allude to here is that if such wounded warriors remain in the ranks as the force so needs them to execute the force's professional nature, then their presence can either produce exemplars of resilience or degradation, but not both. Resultantly, with a force such as America's current military where the stigmatism of either perceived personal weakness or threats to career advancement often inhibit warriors from seeking care in the first place, then both moral and spiritual injury can be subsumed under the veneer of unit readiness and ironically degrade such readiness over time.

Derivatively, this can lead to a further leadership challenge in maintaining motivation of and discipline among troops. How does a leader inspire and control a formation in which one or more warriors (especially fellow key leaders) may be suffering either enduring moral or spiritual injury, particularly in an organization that already has unwittingly sent the message that such warriors are only of value to the force as long as their mission utility remains intact? There is ample evidence from the history of war that both untreated moral and spiritual injury can result in the commission of future war crimes.

In just recent U.S. history, one thinks of the tragic murders that Staff Sergeant Robert Bales committed in Afghanistan in 2012, when he walked off his combat outpost to two neighboring villages, entered several homes, and shot dead 16 men, women, and children. In hindsight, it became apparent that Sergeant Bales was suffering the deep effects not only of post-traumatic stress disorder but also potentially moral and spiritual injury and that these were exacerbated by his being under a cocktail of powerful steroids, alcohol, and a lack of sleep. Now in Federal military prison under a life sentence, Sergeant Bales is free of the drugs he was under, is

receiving ongoing treatment and has experienced a self-professed spiritual renewal, but, while laudatory, these results do not mitigate the pain and suffering he committed against these families, their tribes, and their village.[30]

At the strategic level, when either general or flag officers exhibit moral leader failure, as it has come to be known, then this corrodes morale both within the force and outside the force among our clients, the American people. Indeed, despite many public departmental initiatives to arrest this trend, the problem has become so persistent that a recent survey of even publicly acknowledged strategic moral leader failures catalogued over 500 such instances within the U.S. joint force since 2013, including the still-ongoing "Fat Leonard" scandal within the Navy involving at least 200 career Sailors and several flag officers.[31] Collectively, all this produces within the force the effect of becoming an unreflective institution in which in a leader's professional judgment values are not measured against political aims and military objectives to produce a feasible, suitable, and acceptable course of action.[32] In short, values become delinked from plans, training, and operations and, as a result, sidelined from incorporation into a command's organizational thinking and culture and military effectiveness or in his or her advice about the same to civilian political leaders. While not wholly but perhaps only in part, all these can and do result from the degrading effects of moral and spiritual injury on a military force and are opportunity costs necessary to assess in an ad bellum, in bello, and post bellum framework.

Strategic Responses

To begin to address this, if this indeed is the contemporary landscape of moral and spiritual injury, I suggest broadly that, at least in the American context, national denominational communities and faith traditions have unconsciously abetted and exacerbated the problem. As Ed Tick has rightly noted, such faith traditions have often kept warriors and families "out of sight, out of mind," and thus unintentionally support the aforementioned divorce between the profession of arms and the body politic. He writes, "We do not help survivors rebuild dignity and rediscover inner peace.

Certainly, in contrast to traditional cultures, our modern processes do not include sacred and communal dimensions of healing."[33] If American faith communities genuinely care about this cohort of their congregations, then they must repent of this neglect and correct their course. How so? Let me offer three suggestions.

First, American religious denominations must begin a new program of intentional character formation of their adherents to prepare them for civic integration into their communities and the Nation. In only a handful of instances can I recall a major American religious denomination that intentionally and continuously plans, resources, and implements such a program to arm their confessors for their individual vocations as citizens in the Nation. Typically, either youth, family, or religious education programs treat this focus as ancillary at best, choosing instead to focus on salvific, discipleship, or church-growth strategies or programs. While these are important, such a type of vocational development for an engaged faithful citizenry would raise and maintain in adherents a continual awareness of their role in serving the kingdom of God within the kingdom of mankind.

Along this trajectory, a second suggestion is for those same religious denominations to recover and implement an ongoing program of both sending and receiving deploying warriors from their ranks with appropriate rites, sacraments, and ordinances to mark such events.[34] In contrast, many such warriors are now little more than congregational ghosts who are here today and gone tomorrow, and then here today again—their families having agonized amid their deployment and celebrated their redeployment while the body of faith ambles on unaware. Public services of blessing in deployment, continual prayers, and diaconal care for separated families, and acts of prayer, confession, and even absolution upon redeployment can and should mark such times in those who serve both God and country.

Third, I suggest religious denominations, and especially their local congregations, must rediscover a corporate vocation as places of intentional healing for veterans and families. While some local congregations can and do exercise with great forethought and energy programs designed to care

for veterans and their families, again I can count not a single larger denominational entity that does so on a consistent, broad-based basis. While some such denominations actively support their military chaplains—and this is wholly vital to such servants' ministries—I cannot name a single such national faith tradition that even attempts to offer similar support to veterans and their families amid their congregations. To call such pastoral neglect an oversight is a gross understatement; it is instead a pastoral dereliction of duty.

Turning to the profession of arms, I offer some further suggestions for recovering the criticality of this topic. First, I suggest that, broadly speaking, the field of theological ethics needs to be reintroduced to the field of military ethics.[35] Put bluntly (at least in the American context), the legal separation of church and state deriving from the non-establishment clause of the First Amendment has been too broadly applied culturally to enforce a divorce of faith from culture in general. Rather, leaders in the profession of arms need to do one thing here: exhibit the moral courage to welcome and integrate theological ethics into nuanced, respectful, yet candid discussions about some of the multiplicity of issues facing the profession, such as the rise of artificial intelligence, strategic moral leader failure, or inculcating values in warriors who come from a morally and ethically deconstructed social context.

A second suggestion is for those uniformed chaplains in the profession of arms to follow their civilian denominations in leading military faith communities to become, as Pf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer called for, the *Sanctorum Communio*.[36] I assess that many chaplains have generally, and in response to the aforementioned cultural divorce between faith and society, receded in their own pastoral leadership of such military faith communities. The net result of this for the warrior and family is that whether they attend a civilian or military congregation, they often feel an estrangement between their faith and the costly issues or effect of their collective calling to serve both God and country.

A third suggestion is that the profession of arms needs to make the considered study, understanding, and treatment of moral and spiritual

injury a topic of import at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Here I contend that leaders *appreciating* this topic will not be enough; neither will it be enough for first-term enlistees to do. Rather, from private to general, warriors at every level of the professional military education system must consistently delve into this topic both in theory and in practice, including in leading their formations. Additionally, this effort must be linked institutionally from the joint force to the Veterans Administration, particularly focusing on studying the long-term effects of both moral and spiritual injury on warriors, families, the force, and the Nation. Only by conducting such a study can the Nation's civilian and military leaders adequately assess the opportunity cost of these injuries on the profession of arms and inculcate such knowledge into future decisions to engage in war.

Conclusion

Moral and spiritual injuries remain profoundly similar yet distinct injuries in warriors and families, but our understanding of the latter's causes, effects, impacts, and healing is growing. To marshal some of this growing understanding, however, I contend that at least here in the American context, we need concerted leadership and institutional change on the part of the clinical healing complex, the profession of arms, and the Nation's faith communities and traditions. In short, a societal problem of such immense proportion will require a societal solution of like proportion.

Let me close with a hope-filled, theological ideal that has arisen within my own pastoral treatment of warriors and families. I want to propose that neither moral nor spiritual injury are ends unto themselves but are separate means to a single end, a pain-filled path toward growth in a warrior's depth of character. This may seem ironic, if not insulting, for how can such pain achieve generative effects in anyone? Without oversimplification, I hold that either deeply held moral or spiritual injuries that seem like insurmountable obstacles in one's life could be redeemed as a way of growth in both temporal and eternal life. Warriors and their combat units, families, communities, nation, and even the world need not be subsumed by the

seemingly crushing effects of these injuries arising from war. Rather, with the aegis of the Divine and utilizing our own increased understanding, determination, leadership, and continued care, we may help our warriors and families be redeemed from moral and spiritual injury in ways that benefit them now and in the future.

Notes

[1] Here I am considering the post–World War I proliferation of poetry and prose that sought to capture the warrior's experience and its cost, such as famed writers like Erich Maria Remarque and Ernest Hemingway and poets like Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen. The writings of these and others evocatively shaped the postwar attitudes of their generation. A helpful critical anthology remains Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).

[2] In my work among contemporary military chaplaincies, this professional dialogue is continuing among the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and France, to name but a few. Critical new ground is being broken particularly in Australia, where there is an emerging scholarly cooperation among chaplains and clinicians on studying the issues of moral and spiritual injury and on collaborating on new treatment models and further longitudinal research. See Lindsay B. Carey et al., "Moral Injury, Spiritual Care and the Role of Chaplains: An Exploratory Scoping Review of Literature and Resources," *The Journal of Religion and Health* 55, no. 4 (August 2016), 1218–1245. Beyond chaplaincy studies, see Edgar Jones, Nicole Fee, and Simon Wessely, "Shell Shock and Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: A Historical Review," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 164, no. 11 (2007), 1641–1645.

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 15. Huntington famously contends that the "management of violence" remains the sole province of officership in the profession of arms.

[4] Cf. Patrick Sweeney, Jeffrey E. Rhodes, and Bruce Boling, "Spiritual Fitness: A Key Component of Total Force Fitness," *Joint Force Quarterly* 66 (3rd Quarter 2012), 35–41, who relate the Joint Staff's taxonomy of Total Force Fitness along the eight domains of physical, medical, environmental, social (including family), behavioral, spiritual, psychological, and nutritional health. They define *spirituality* as "the continuous journey people take to discover and develop their human spirit. It is the process of searching for the sacred in one's life; discovering who one is; finding meaning and purpose; establishing interconnectedness with others and, if one so believes, with the divine; and charting a path to create a life worth living." Moreover, the difference between this and religion is that "they are two distinct concepts. Spirituality is both a process and path people use to discover their inner selves and develop their human spirit. *Religion* refers to institutions that propose and promote specified belief systems." However, note that these concepts come from the field of behavioral psychology and betray a lack of theological understanding about both

terms. For instance, lost in both their definition and distinction is a comparison of either immanence or transcendence (of both the Divine to humanity and vice versa) or of religion as a sociological institution that can (and in many non-Western societies does) order all human culture.

⁵ Shira Maguen and Brett Litz, "Moral Injury in the Context of War," U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for PTSD, February 25, 2016, available at <www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/treat/cooccurring/moral_injury.asp>. See also their scholarly treatment in Maguen and Litz, "Moral Injury in Veterans of War," *Research Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2012), 1–6. I have great appreciation for Maguen and Litz's work and acknowledge its continued evolution, as well as their current call for greater incorporation of spirituality into the healing modalities of morally injured veterans.

⁶ Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York: Scribner, 2003), 3–102. See also his "Moral Injury," *Psychoanalytic Psychology* 31, no. 2 (2014), 182–191.

⁷ For example, cf. Larry Dewey, *War and Redemption: Treatment and Recovery in Combat-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2004); Ed Tick, *War and the Soul: Healing Our Nation's Veterans from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder* (Wheaton, IL: Quest Publishing, 2005); and R.N. Brock and G. Lettini, *Soul Repair: Recovering from Moral Injury After War* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012).

⁸ American Psychiatric Association, "Definition of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder," *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)*, 1ˢᵗ ed. (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013), 265; 271–280.

⁹ Timothy Mallard, "The (Twin) Wounds of War: Delineating Moral and Spiritual Injury," *Providence*, vol. 5 (Fall 2016), 50–56. In this article, I noted both these initial distinctions with moral injury and further posited 12 markers of spiritual injury, principally along theological lines. In this chapter, points one, two, and three are taken from this original article. Without settling on a single definition, Carey et al., "Moral Injury, Spiritual Care and the Role of Chaplains," contend that the term *spiritual injury* was first coined by G.E. Berg in 1992, and so prior to the advent of the term *moral injury* in 2016.

¹⁰ George C. Marshall, "Speech at Trinity College, June 15, 1941," in *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, ed. Larry I. Bland, Clarence N. Wunderlin, Jr., and Sharon Ritenour Stevens, vol. 2, "*We Cannot Delay," July 1, 1939–December 6, 1941* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 534–538.

¹¹ Simon Edwards, *Soldier of Hope: Lessons from the International Community in Recovery and Growth from Battlefield Trauma and Mental Health* (London: The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust, 2016), 27. I am indebted to Revd. Dr. David Coulter, OBE, Chaplain General of the Royal Army Chaplains Department of the British Army, for alerting me to Edwards's important monograph. Edwards's work is a comprehensive review across Western militaries regarding current thinking around post-traumatic stress disorder, moral injury, and appreciatively as above the potential for chaplains and spiritual healing to play a greater role in this area of holistic warrior health.

¹² Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam*, explored how the pervasive and consuming nature of moral injury in the warrior's soul can, if not treated, lead to a full mental break with reality.

¹³ For an example of how this trend continues, see Duane Larson and Jeff Zust, *Care for the Sorrowing Soul: Healing Moral Injuries from Military Service and Implications for the Rest of Us* (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2017), 9–10. Without precisely defining moral injury, Larson and Zust presume that it somehow is predicated on the attendant guilt of ethical failure on the part of the warrior. This conflation of act with person, to my mind, thus undercuts their otherwise fine "two mirror" treatment modality, though not their subsequent calls for fresh appreciation of the phenomenon within the profession of arms or their call for greater theological integration into the warrior healing process.

¹⁴ James H. Burtness, *Consequences: Morality, Ethics and the Future* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1999), 27ff.; and Tom Beauchamp, *Philosophical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), 21ff.

¹⁵ Cf. Timothy Challans, *Awakening Warrior: Revolution in the Ethics of Warfare* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007), 43ff. Challans believes that military chaplains should be removed from all ethical professional military education because he believes chaplains have an inability to present philosophical theories about ethics without infusing the same with religious bias. For a counterview and recent scholarly treatment, see Don M. Snider and Alexander P. Shine, *A Soldier's Morality, Religion, and Our Professional Ethic: Does the Army's Culture Facilitate Integration, Character Development, and Trust in the Profession?* Professional Military Ethics Monograph Series, Vol. 6 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014).

¹⁶ Due to the perhaps inflammatory nature of such assessments, I defer here from citing the multiple individuals who have provided me them amid our

professional discourse. Not without some irony, most of those who have made this observation to me are clinicians (either psychiatrists, psychologists, or licensed clinical social workers) working in Veterans Affairs itself.

[17] Carey et al., "Moral Injury, Spiritual Care and the Role of Chaplains," are collaborating on just such a longitudinal research project.

[18] My colleague Revd. Lt. Col. Alan Steele (Ret.), MBE, of the Royal Army Chaplains Department, has attempted to use such nonreligious constructs to overcome potential antireligious bias of students in teaching basic military ethics. Still, the fact that he (and other military chaplains across many allied forces) must resort to such tactics in order to accomplish basic pedagogical goals is perhaps instructive of how much mostly Western forces have segregated theological concepts and discourse from the contemporary profession of arms.

[19] A frankly illogical example of this is the notion that moral courage is a neurological phenomenon of right brain evolutionary development that can be physiologically stimulated and trained within the warrior. See Matthew Anderson, "Moral Courage: Behind the Magic of Leaders Making the Right Choices," in *The Role of Leaders in Building a Culture of Moral Courage: The Proceedings of the Centre for Army Leadership's 2017 Conference*, ed. William Meddings (Sandhurst, UK: Robinson House, 2018), 37–45.

[20] It is not without some irony that I repeat here the U.S. Army's current (and reductionist) "Performance Triad" for optimizing the readiness of this professional military class: nutrition, exercise (or activity), and sleep. Note that there is absolutely no incorporation of the warrior's soul or spiritual health.

[21] Office of Mental Health and Suicide Prevention, *VA National Suicide Data Report*, *2005–2015* (Washington, DC: Department of Veterans Affairs, June 2018).

[22] Adrian Lewis, "Conscription, the Republic, and America's Future," *Military Review* (November–December 2009), 15–24.

[23] Ibid. However, see also the trenchant questions of John Mark Mattox, "The Moral Foundations of Army Officership," *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 387–408.

[24] Regarding the present conflicts in which the Nation finds itself, David Wood evocatively states, "These wars demanded the intense and prolonged participation of a tiny fraction of the Nation's youth in sustained campaigns built on the intentional violation of the ancient sanctions against killing. Those who returned did so without the healing rituals of cleansing and forgiveness practiced by past

generations." See his *What Have We Done: The Moral Injury of Our Longest Wars* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2016), 9.

[25] I am grateful for Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Doug Swift's observation during a class on this subject at the U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School, Fort Sam Houston, TX, on June 28, 2017. The Command Chaplain's Office at this institution has done groundbreaking work on repeatedly addressing this topic within the uniformed services, including through multiple mobile training teams who have exported the course across Asia and Europe as well as the United States.

[26] A helpful example of this comes from the genre of the short story. Ernest Hemingway, himself a veteran ambulance driver of World War I and ultimately a victim of suicide, catalogued this in his arresting work titled "Soldier's Home." In this compact piece written in 1925, the recently returned American Expeditionary Forces Infantryman Harold Krebs struggles in his closest familial, social, communal, and spiritual relationships. Without any hint of physical woundedness in the protagonist, Hemingway explores the complex nature of such ruptured relationships in the wake of war. It is likely intentional that Hemingway chose to name his character Krebs, which is ironically a German word for *cancer* and seems to indicate the author's assessment of the corrosive nature of postwar moral and spiritual injury. See Ernest Hemingway, "Soldier's Home," *The Complete Short Stories of Ernest Hemingway: The Finca Gigía Edition* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1987), 111–116. I am most grateful to Professor Ed Barrett at the U.S. Naval Academy for facilitating my participation in 2017 in a National Endowment for the Humanities colloquy that explored the potential for the arts—particularly prose, poetry, and plays—to connect to warriors locked in extended moral injury, at which time I first encountered Hemingway's arresting piece.

[27] Mallard, "The (Twin) Wounds of War."

[28] Though he categorizes his persistent and pervasive self-doubt as neither moral nor spiritual injury, the reflections of Medal of Honor recipient Staff Sergeant Clint Romesha on his decision at the Shura House in the Battle of COP Keating reflect one moment's enduring ethical and psychic impact on the warrior. See his *Red Platoon* (New York: Dutton, 2016), 323–324.

[29] See *BusinessDictionary.com*, available at <www.businessdictionary.com/definition/opportunity-cost.html>.

[30] To be sure, Sergeant Robert Bales has publicly admitted to his crimes and their enduring impact and continues to express not only remorse for them

but also the necessary justice of his sentence rendered at court martial. See Brendan Vaughan, "Sergeant Bales Speaks: Confessions of America's Most Notorious War Criminal," *GQ.com*, October 21, 2015, available at <www.gq.com/story/robert-bales-interview-afghanistan-massacre>.

[31] Tom Vanden Brook, "Senior Military Officials Sanctioned for More Than 500 Cases of Serious Misconduct," *USA Today*, October 24, 2017, available at <www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/10/24/generals-sex-misconduct-pentagon-army-sanctions-hagel-gillibrand/794770001/>. However, force awareness of this trend is not new. See also Clark C. Barrett, *Finding "The Right Way": Toward an Army Institutional Ethic* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012); and Craig Whitlock, "Pentagon Probe Finds Three Army Generals Committed Misconduct," *Washington Post*, April 5, 2013.

[32] As a corrective to the organizational effects of moral and spiritual injury (and a general lack of ethical development among leaders), I cite with admiration the 10 small group recommendations to build a culture of moral courage within the contemporary British armed forces. See William Meddings, "Observations of the Conference: Developing Morally Courageous Leaders," in *The Role of Leaders in Building a Culture of Moral Courage*, 48–52.

[33] Tick, *War and the Soul*, 104.

[34] Ibid. However, this suggestion only draws on the *communal* aspect of war regnant in the larger major denominational traditions represented in the contemporary military chaplaincy, such as the broad framework of the just war tradition.

[35] Theological ethics may be broadly equated to moral theology and as opposed to the corollary field of moral philosophy, which seeks to segregate the discipline of ethics from any theological roots. However, my contention is that relative to moral and spiritual injury, this often segregates the warrior from his or her theological roots as well, the source of moral formation for so many under arms today.

[36] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church*, ed. Clifford Green and trans. Reinhard Krauss and Nancy Lukens (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998). In this first work of the German pastor turned martyr to Nazi hegemony, Bonhoeffer explores the necessity of the people of God being God in action for a broken, sin-filled world.

Soldier Enhancement Ethics and the Lessons of World War I

By C. Anthony Pfaff

World War I is sometimes described as either the last of the Napoleonic wars or the first of the modern ones. In truth, it was both. While it was largely fought by the kinds of mass formations perfected by Napoleon Bonaparte 100 years earlier, it was also characterized by innovations such as the tank, airplane, flamethrowers, poison gas, and hydrophones, to name only a few, that gave rise to what we now call "modern warfare."[1]

One innovation often overlooked is the use of drugs to enhance soldier performance in combat. Of course, soldiers—as well as the governments that employ them—have long sought to enhance their ability to destroy the enemy and survive. Ancient Greek hoplites, for instance, would consume large quantities of wine before battle to overcome fear and pain and then later might add an opiate to that wine to ease the physical and psychological suffering resulting from the battle just fought. Moreover, European armies had used coca plants for military purposes on an ad hoc and experimental basis as early as the 1820s.

World War I, however, was the first time armies on both sides employed the drug on a mass scale to improve soldier effectiveness. As Lukasz Kamienski observes in his book *Shooting Up: A Short History of Drugs and War*, never before did the military—on both sides of the trenches—consume

such large amounts of cocaine to enhance performance.[2] At the same time, the drug was being introduced on a mass scale into the societies where the soldiers came from with such deleterious effects that governments passed laws restricting their use.[3] Thus, World War I provides an excellent lens from which to understand the ethics of enhancements for both military and civil purposes.

The scale of drug use in World War I demonstrated that the logic of enhancement ethics for military purposes is quite different than the logic of enhancement ethics in civil society. In civil society, it is easier to bring into account moral concerns associated with freedom and autonomy, health and safety, social disruption, and human dignity. The demands of combat, on the other hand, that require soldiers to take risks and make sacrifices turn the logic of enhancement ethics around and raise new concerns regarding coercion, inequality, veterans care, and civil-military relations.

To understand what those concerns entail, we must clearly define, in ethical terms, what enhancements are and discuss how they have been applied. With this definition and history in mind, we then compare the logics of civilian and military enhancement ethics to demonstrate how military enhancements raise additional moral concerns not present in the civil context.

Defining Enhancement

Before discussing the ethics of enhancements, it is important first to be clear about what we mean. Not everything that improves soldier performance counts as an enhancement, and not every improvement in soldier performance counts as being enhanced, as there is a difference between optimization and enhancement. *Optimization* is the realization of a potential one has; *enhancement*, on the other hand, is creating a whole new potential, whether giving one capabilities that one does not already have or improving a capability one has beyond what counts as normal human function.

Of course, what counts as normal is somewhat relative to the individual. For example, the world record for the 1-mile run is 3 minutes, 43

seconds.[4] Most people, however, cannot run nearly that fast for a variety of reasons having to do with pain levels, ability to oxygenate, and the motivation and interest to do the necessary workouts. Any drug or other medical intervention that enabled one to overcome those barriers to maximize how fast one could run, had those barriers not been there, would count as optimization. Similarly, medical interventions intended to restore functions one had previously possessed, such as artificial limbs, would also count as an optimization, rather than an enhancement. This point does not suggest that medical interventions to optimize human performance do not entail ethical concerns; it is just that these are not the concerns under discussion here.

On the other hand, an intervention that allowed one to beat the world record would probably count as an enhancement, as it would give one a capability beyond what counts as normal assuming one's natural physiology would not have permitted achieving that record, regardless of how much effort one put into it. The point here is that for every individual, there is a range of normal functioning, and any interventions that exceed that range would count as an enhancement.

Certainly not everything that enables one to exceed human performance counts as an enhancement. Mechanical aids, such as a car or motorcycle, would easily allow one to beat the mile record; however, since they do not require any changes in one's own physiology, they would not count as an enhancement. Even an exoskeleton, like some of those being developed today for military purposes, would not count as an enhancement, at least for the purposes of this discussion, to the extent they do not require a change in one's physiology. Thus, what distinguishes an enhancement is the presence of a medical or biological intervention. An exoskeleton that one simply steps into is no more morally worrisome than a tank. It is not that technologies, like tanks, do not raise ethical concerns, it is just that, again, those are not the concerns under discussion here.

An exoskeleton that requires a chip implanted into one's brain in order to effectively use it, on the other hand, does raise new concerns.[5] These concerns arise because those kinds of interventions typically come at a cost

and because the human body, as a complex adaptive system, responds to these interventions in ways that are difficult to predict. Since these costs and uncertainties are not associated with mechanical aids or driven by a desire to restore normal human functioning, they pose a different set of ethical challenges. Given these considerations, the definition of *enhancement* employed here is any *medical or biological intervention* to the body intended to improve a capability beyond the range of optimal human functioning or provide one that did not otherwise exist.

In the military context, it is also worth distinguishing between *offensive* and *defensive* measures. Since the best defense is a good offense, in some sense all measures may be considered defensive; however, there is a difference between measures intended to protect soldiers from the effects of enemy weapons and those that increase soldier lethality. The former reduce risk to soldiers, but because they are defensive in nature, do not expose the soldier to additional risk. The latter, on the other hand, make it more likely soldiers will be exposed to the enemy because they would be, by virtue of the enhancement, better able to manage those risks than non-enhanced soldiers. For example, the pyridostigmine bromide provided to U.S. Soldiers during the first Gulf War to protect against the effects of nerve gas would be defensive since its intent was simply to prevent the particular effect of a particular weapon.[6] On the other hand, drugs intended to improve physical and cognitive endurance like cocaine and Pervitin, which were used by the German army in World War II, would count as offensive since the intended effect was to enhance soldiers' lethality.

Performance-Enhancing Drugs in World War I and Beyond

While a number of psychoactive and other performance-enhancing drugs were under study and available to the public, cocaine probably had the most widespread use in improving human performance during World War I. Cocaine was introduced into European and, to a lesser extent, American armies in the late 1800s as researchers noticed the effect it had on not only

endurance but also appetite suppression. Thus in the beginning, the overall military utility of the drug was in its ability to ease the burden of sustaining troops rather than its ability to increase their lethality. As a result, cocaine supplies increased and the price dropped, making it available in significant quantities to the public.[7]

There are no reliable records regarding the full scope of cocaine use by European militaries in the war. German and French pilots used the drug to extend their endurance on long fights as well as to enhance their abilities to survive a duel. On a much more massive scale on the ground, soldiers were often given the drug prior to assaults. The British, for example, had routinely provided rum to soldiers prior to departing the trenches, into which they had mixed cocaine, often without the soldiers' knowledge. Not only did the drug improve endurance, but it also reduced the sense of risk while leaving one largely in control of one's actions. Further driving this use were primarily three factors: mass mobilizations required to fight the war, the severe conditions on the battlefield, and the absence of controls on the drug since the full range of its effects were not well understood. The result of this use was mass addiction by soldiers as well as the wider introduction of the drug into society, which had its own negative effects.[8]

Ironically, European militaries were well aware of the negative effects of cocaine addiction and sought to restrict its use by soldiers. For example, Britain passed the Defence of the Realm Act of 1914 to establish a number of regulatory schemes making the unauthorized sale or use of cocaine by soldiers punishable by prison. Such regulations, however, did not prevent soldiers from bringing their addictions home with them and seeking alternate sources for the drug. As a result, black markets developed and cocaine use became associated with "sex, hedonism, moral decay, and enemy subversion."[9] It is the last association that especially raised concerns about cocaine as it was increasingly portrayed as an "unfair" tool of war employed to undermine society, despite the fact that almost all cocaine produced at the time came from the Netherlands, which was neutral at the

time. So while the war increased the scope and scale of cocaine use in the military and civil society, it also drove efforts to regulate and control its production and use.[10]

Unfortunately, these lessons did not stick. As one researcher observes, if cocaine was the drug of choice in World War I, amphetamines were the drug of choice in World War II.[11] Much like cocaine, amphetamines were relatively available to the public, but the demands of war drove up both production and use.[12] In fact, the success of Blitzkrieg owes more to 35 million methamphetamine tablets distributed to the German army prior to the invasion of France than it does to the innovation in warfare it represented.

To succeed, German General Heinz Guderian had to get his army of German tanks through the Ardennes forest in less than 3 days and take the city of Sedan. Otherwise, reinforcing French and British units would arrive, and he would be both outgunned and outnumbered. At normal rates of march, however, the drive would take at least 5 days. To overcome this obstacle, the German army ordered increased production of the drug Pervitin, itself a variant of crystal methylamphetamine, that had been used on a smaller scale but to good effect in the invasion of Poland. As a result, the Germans broke through to Sedan in time to beat the reinforcing British and French forces, and thus force France's surrender a few weeks later.[13]

Use of this drug also came with its own downsides and contributed to Germany's defeat as much as it did to its success. Excessive Pervitin use caused circulatory and cognitive disorders and eventually degraded the performance of the German army.[14] In some cases, it caused soldiers to become so jittery that they imagined enemies who were not there. One SS (Schutzstaffel) unit was easily overrun by Russian conscripts because after days of continuous Pervitin use, the soldiers had fired all their ammunition in response to the slightest noise, [15] so when the Russians attacked they were unable to resist.[16] Even before the invasion of France, Otto Friedrich Ranke himself, who not only introduced methamphetamine during World War II but also took Pervitin on a regular basis, had expressed concern about its side effects and insisted that its use be moderated and monitored.[17] The

fact that his concerns were rarely adhered to emphasizes the moral force "military necessity" can have on overriding more humanitarian concerns, even those directed at one's own people.

Amphetamines continued to be used in militaries after World War II, often with negative effects. In Vietnam, for example, use of this drug led to increased addiction as well as increased incidences of friendly fire instances and indiscriminate use of force against civilians.[18] In Afghanistan, U.S. F-16 pilots dropped a 500-pound bomb on Canadian soldiers, killing several. They accounted for the mistake by stating they were jittery from taking Dexedrine in order to remain alert during their 10-hour-long mission.[19]

Today, of course, medical technology can alter the human body and mind in ways that increase capacities well above the normal range or provide entirely new ones in ways medical professionals at the turn of the 20th century could not imagine. Take, for example, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency efforts to allow humans to control robotic systems through a neural interface that connects directly to the brain, even to the point of allowing the human to "feel" what the robot touches.[20] Though currently this research has mostly been applied to helping amputees control robotic prostheses, this technology could conceivably enable soldiers to control robotic weapons systems remotely, thus limiting their exposure to risk.

However, just as in the past, these enhancements often have side effects are that are poorly understood and may cause permanent harm to the soldier as well as the society those soldiers defend. However, the lessons of World War I can provide some insights into the appropriate norms associated with the introduction of enhancement technologies so that the moral harms to soldier and society may be avoided.

Civil vs. Military Enhancement

Patrick Lin and Fritz Allhoff argue that the ethics of human enhancement are informed by five overlapping categories of issues: freedom and autonomy; health and safety; fairness and equity; social disruption; and human dignity.[21]

Ethics of Enhancement in Civil Society

In applying these issues to human enhancement in civil society, the authors note that the prima facie freedom to choose how one lives one's life suggests there should be few restrictions on the kinds of enhancements persons should be allowed to accept. However, if unrestricted, the exercise of that freedom raises additional concerns. The first is health and safety. Not only can the physical effect of enhancements negatively affect the individual who receives them, but it can also place a burden on society when those effects are more than the individual can bear. Further constraining any "right" to pursue enhancements are the concepts of fairness and equity. Fairness arises out of the concern that anyone who possesses an enhancement has an advantage relative to those who do not, which can lead to greater, permanent inequality over time. If the wealthy are typically the ones who obtain enhancements first, and these enhancements make them even better able to obtain more wealth, then inequality over time will not only increase, but also become entrenched. This concern of equity naturally segues into the concern regarding social disruption. From the perspective of civil society, inequality can drive unrest, side effects can drive up medical costs, and enhanced, especially new capabilities can affect human behavior in unexpected ways.[22] The authors are also concerned about enhancements' effects on human dignity. To the extent they make life too easy, they may hinder the kind of moral development that allows us to realize human potential. If one can take a pill or implant a chip that makes one smarter, kinder, or even-tempered, what moral value is there to attaining these conditions?

Ethics of Enhancement in the Military

The conditions under which enhancements are employed in a military context operate under a different logic than enhancements considered in the context of civil society. In civil society, the purpose of an enhancement is to enhance quality of life, so it makes little sense to tolerate much in the way of suffering or other costs, either for the individual or society. In the military context, the purpose of enhancements is to increase lethality and

survivability; therefore, depending on the quality of the enhancement, it may make sense to tolerate a great deal of suffering as well as high costs to society. This difference in logic suggests norms associated with military enhancements will be different than in civil contexts.

Coercion. In the military context, respecting freedom and autonomy is less concerned with whether one should be prohibited from receiving an enhancement as much as whether one may be *forced* to receive one. To the extent the enhancement represents the best response to an enemy advantage, military necessity will place a great deal of pressure on commanders to offer them and soldiers to accept.

In this context, concerns regarding autonomy are probably the most difficult to work through in military contexts. In civil society, civilians are largely free to walk away from any enhancement. All that is morally required on a would-be provider is that any recipient is given as much information as possible regarding the treatment. Informed consent is a cornerstone of medical ethics. However, as the story of stimulant use in the German army suggests, it may not be entirely relevant when it comes to military enhancements. As one German bomber pilot who participated in the Battle of Britain stated, "One wouldn't abstain from Pervitin because of a little health scare. Who cares when you are doomed to come down at any moment anyway!"[23]

Offering such an enhancement forces the soldier to choose between an increased likelihood of survival, but with possible long-term and severe side effects, on one hand and an increased likelihood of death or serious injury on the other. Depending on how much soldiers perceive how receiving an enhancement affects the likelihood of these possible outcomes, they have few good reasons not to accept it: as long as the side effects are not lethal or significantly debilitating, suffering them will always "make sense." Placing soldiers in such a situation, where they have to choose between the possibilities of death, or merely suffering, in effect robs them, to some degree at least, of their autonomy. Constraining their choices to outcomes they would not otherwise choose is very much like Marlon Brando making them an offer they cannot refuse in *The Godfather.* This is a form of coercion.

The question, then, is when, if ever, would it be permissible to override a soldier's autonomy and offer, much less mandate, an enhancement? This point is where the distinction between defensive and offensive enhancements can shed some light.

Defensive. In general, it is fair to act without someone's consent when no one is worse off and at least some are better off. As Isaak Applbaum notes, "If a general principle sometimes is to a person's advantage and never is to that person's disadvantage (at least relative to the alternatives available), then actors who are guided by that principle can be understood to act for the sake of that person."[24] The nerve antidote given in the Persian Gulf War is a good example. To the extent everyone who received the pill had an equal chance of exposure to Sarin gas and a more or less equal chance—at least given what could be known at the time—of experiencing side effects, then no one was worse off than any of the others. To the extent some be exposed to Sarin, and it is worth noting that never happened, then at least some would be better off. Given those conditions, then it was probably justified to override individual consent and implement the measure.

This rationale, in fact, was a factor in the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) decision to grant the Department of a Defense (DOD) a waiver to administer it to troops in the Gulf without their consent because "withholding treatment would be contrary to the best interests of military personnel and there is no available satisfactory alternative therapy." While the decision was legally challenged in court, the court upheld it.[25] However, part of the reason the FDA granted the waiver was based on an agreement by DOD to follow up with individual Servicemembers, ensure the use was recorded in their records, and report any adverse effects. To date these requirements have not been completely fulfilled.[26] The point is that while it may be permissible to take some risk when providing defensive enhancements, governments should take extra steps to mitigate those risks.

Offensive. This notion of fairness, however, does not seem to work as well with offensive enhancements. Given the logic of military necessity, it just makes sense to commit one's most survivable and lethal systems to

battle since they stand the best chance to defeat the enemy. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that those who have offensive enhancements will more likely be committed to direct combat than those who do not. While it is possible that these enhancements will offset some of that risk, statistically speaking, repeated exposure to danger ensures at some point one will be harmed. By accepting offensive enhancements, therefore, enhanced soldiers could be worse off than those who do not accept them. Not only are they likely to experience increased risk, but they will also have to deal with whatever side effects the enhancements entail.

Offensive enhancements may not ever be permitted. Recall that the horns of this dilemma rest on the assumption that soldiers who refuse the enhancement will be committed to battle anyway and experience the same risks as soldiers who did accept it. The way out then is to alleviate the conditions that compromised the soldiers' autonomy in the first place. Doing so requires meeting three conditions: soldiers must have the option to consent to the enhancement; their consent must be informed; and if they do not consent, they will not be required to accept as much risk as enhanced soldiers and what risk they are compelled to take is more or less in line with other non-enhanced soldiers. When it comes to offensive enhancements, enhanced soldiers must be *genuine* volunteers.

Inequality. Concerns regarding inequality map onto both concerns regarding health and safety and fairness and equity. Regarding the former, one should consider not only the negative physiological effects on the individual soldier who receives it but also the safety of those who do not, as the latter are less capable than their enhanced comrade of handling the rigors of combat and thus surviving.

Regarding fairness and equity, this differential in capability introduces additional inequities as the military crafts policies regarding how enhanced and non-enhanced soldiers are treated. It might seem unfair to provide some soldiers enhancements while denying it to others. But to the extent those enhancements make the soldier more lethal, as discussed, they also make it more likely enhanced soldiers will see combat and thus be exposed

to more risk. Thus, in the military context, inequality can accrue to the enhanced rather than the non-enhanced. So again, what matters may not be who *gets* to receive an enhancement as much as it is who *must* receive one.

Veterans Care. Moreover, one also has to consider the impact on society, which depends on its military for security and which must also care for these veterans after the war is over. This means caring for those who experience side effects and finding a role for enhanced individuals after they have left the military. So to the extent enhancements introduce additional inequities into civil society or impose burdens associated with medical treatment and integration, enhancements have potentially destabilizing and costly effects.

Civil-Military Relations. Furthermore, how society treats its enhanced soldiers is a special concern for human dignity, but not just because of the potentially debilitating and isolating effects enhancements can cause. While these concerns are important, enhancements may also affect how society regards and rewards military service. Society rewards its soldiers precisely because they expose themselves to risks and hardships so that the rest of society does not have to. However, to the extent soldiers employ cogniceutical enhancements that control fear, for example, or physical enhancements to eliminate the source of fear, such as neural implants that allow soldiers to control weapons remotely, such regard and rewards will seem misplaced. If one does not experience fear, it makes no sense to reward one for displays of courage.[27] While enhancing soldier survivability and lethality always makes *moral* sense, enhancing it to the point of near-invulnerability (or even the perception of invulnerability) will profoundly alter the warrior identity. Soldiers who experience neither risk nor sacrifice are not really soldiers as we conceive of them now and are likely better thought of as technicians than warriors.[28] This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is something that militaries intent on employing enhancements should be prepared for.

Moral Effect

The effect of any new technology acquisition must be morally permissible. To the extent an enhancement contributes to violating some other

moral norm, it is impermissible. In Vietnam, improper use of drugs led to increased addiction as well as increased incidences of friendly fire instances and indiscriminate use of force against civilians.[29] If that were a necessary effect of the drug, its use would not be permitted.

In this context, however, it is first important to differentiate between appropriate use and abuse. To the extent amphetamine use necessarily entails, or at least makes highly likely, the employment of indiscriminate and disproportionate force, amphetamine use would not be morally permissible. On the other hand, to the extent that properly regulated use provides some benefit and avoids bad effects, then the issue lies not with the enhancement itself but with how it is applied by recipients or the medical professionals who prescribe them. The moral requirement is to ensure that use is regulated so that the immoral effect does not occur.

A Necessity

Given a permissible effect, any enhancement must also be necessary. In this context, military necessity is not just about what it takes to defeat a particular enemy. As Michael Walzer notes, it also includes reducing the lives, time, and money it takes to do so.[30] So military necessity is not just about what works, but also about what works best. Under this definition, any enhancement could be necessary as long as it provided some military advantage *and* there was no less costly means to obtain that advantage.

This understanding is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. Given that enhancements can have negative effects on one's own soldiers, it is not enough that it provides an advantage; it must also avoid a disadvantage. If one is likely to achieve victory without enhancement, then it makes little sense to take the physical and moral risks associated with providing them. If, on the other hand, providing enhancements is the only way of offsetting an enemy advantage, then they may be considered necessary. This point, however, does not suggest military leaders should not pursue technological—or any other kind of—overmatch against an enemy. However, given the potential, and possibly unforeseen consequences, of at

least some enhancements, if one can win a war without them, in general, one should.

Proportionality

No account of military ethics would be complete without proportionality, which requires that any good attained by the enhancement must be proportional to the harm caused, whether that good or harm accrues to the enhanced soldier, the military objective, or society.[31] From the soldier's perspective, the benefit is increased survivability, the cost is whatever negative side effects he or she may have to live with (or die from), and how that will affect his or her quality of life. From the military's perspective, the good achieved is the increased lethality or other capability the enhancement represents, while the costs are the loss of a soldier once any side effects make it impossible to serve as well as any compensation or healthcare costs the negative effects may entail. For society, the benefits are the increased security a more capable military represents, while the costs include not only the costs of dealing with the side effects but also the cost of integrating the enhanced soldier back into society.[32]

This account of benefits and costs is not meant to be inclusive. But it does illustrate the incommensurability of many of these goods and harms. How much "extra" security for society, for example, is worth what kind of side effects for the soldier? Given that medical and compensation costs can be incurred for years, what dollar amount exceeds the military advantage achieved or, perhaps more importantly, the disadvantage avoided, when adversaries pursue and implement the same enhancements?

These concerns do not entail proportionality and cannot apply here. Proportionality applications always suffer from concerns regarding difficulties associated with quantification and comparing incommensurate goods. As one researcher notes, "Proportionality turns out to be a hard criterion to apply, for there is no ready way to establish an independent or stable view of the values against which the destruction of war is to be measured."[33] The same can be said of the suffering potentially caused by enhancements.

Moreover, Brian Orend suggests that while proportionality will never provide a precise account of relative benefits and costs, it sets prudence and utility as limiting conditions on the pursuit of goods like increased security.[34] This point simply suggests enhancements can be both morally permissible and necessary, but still not worth it. While it may be difficult to determine whether a particular enhancement is proportional, it is much easier to establish whether it is disproportionate. We know, for example, without the need for precise quantification, that threatening divorce over a disagreement about what to have for dinner is disproportionate without having to commit to what would be a proportionate response.[35] We can make similar judgments about enhancements.

Conclusion

World War I transformed not only the character of war, but also the characters of the societies that fought it. Had it not been for the war, technologies such as the airplane and automobile, which were present before the war, would probably not have entered society as rapidly and forcefully as they did. The same is true for medical technologies, including those intended to enhance human performance.

In this context, the lesson of World War I is that human enhancement, even apart from war, is morally problematic. In the civil context, where enhancements are typically intended to enhance quality of life, they still raise concerns about autonomy, equality, safety, social stability, and human dignity. The logic of enhancements in civil society, however, suggests little reason to bear much risk or cost in their acquisition. If the purpose of an enhancement is to improve quality of life, then it makes little sense to tolerate much suffering for oneself or society. The logic of military applications, on the other hand, amplifies these concerns and turns some on their heads. Because the purpose of military enhancements is to increase lethality and survivability, it does make sense to accept a fair amount of inequality, suffering, social disruption, and isolation. As a result, policies regarding the norms of enhancement acquisition are going to look different in civil and military contexts.

Taken together, the real risk of enhancements may be in how their application will affect the soldier and thus the military profession's relationship with the larger society it serves. Changing the nature of the soldier changes the military, and changes in the military can have profound impacts on society. The point here is not to avoid enhancements. The rapid pace of technological development, especially in the context of international competition, assures that enhancements will be a part of future military acquisitions. The point is that policies regarding the ethics of enhancements will also constantly evolve, and thus policymakers will require constant attention to the moral categories associated with their development and implementation.

Notes

[1] Eric Sass, "12 Technological Enhancements of World War I," *Mental Floss*, April 30, 2017, available at <http://mentalfloss.com/article/31882/12-technological-advancements-world-war-i>.

[2] Lukasz Kamienski, *Shooting Up: A Short History of Drugs and War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 96.

[3] Ibid., 102.

[4] "1 Mile World Record 3:43:13 Hicham el Guerrouj," YouTube, available at <www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ji0yK7fV5Rk>.

[5] Patrick Lin, Maxwell Mehlman, and Keith Abney, *Enhanced Warfighters: Risk, Ethics, Policy*, Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies Working Paper 2013-2 (Cleveland, OH: Case Western University, January 2013), 17.

[6] Ross M. Boyce, "Waiver of Consent: The Use of Pyridostigmine Bromide in the Persian Gulf War," *Journal of Military Ethics* 8, no. 1 (2009), 1–18. See also Lin, Mehlman, and Abney, *Enhanced Warfighters*, 14–15. These authors argue that vaccines are better thought of as "therapy" and thus not enhancements since they seek to prevent diseased conditions; however, they acknowledge this distinction may not apply in all contexts. Since pyridostigmine bromide use was not simply to prevent a diseased condition but also to enable Soldiers to operate in an otherwise hostile environment, I consider it as an enhancement for this discussion. See also Lin et al., 48, for their discussion on pyridostigmine bromide use in the Persian Gulf War.

[7] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 93–95.

[8] Ibid., 96–97.

[9] Ibid., 101.

[10] Ibid., 101–103.

[11] Ibid., 103.

[12] Norman Ohler, *Blitzed: Drugs in Nazi Germany*, trans. Shaun Whiteside (New York: Allen Lane, 2015), chapters 1, 2.

[13] Ibid., 67–88.

[14] Ibid., 36. See also Andreas Ulrich, "The Nazi Death Machine: Hitler's Drugged Soldiers," *Der Spiegel*, May 6, 2005, available at <www.spiegel.de/international/the-nazi-death-machine-hitler-s-drugged-soldiers-a-354606.html>.

[15] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, Kindle ed., retrieved from Amazon.com, location number 2902.

[16] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 111.

[17] Ohler, *Blitzed*, 71.

[18] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 189.

[19] Lin, Mehlman, and Abney, *Enhanced Warfighters*, 5–6.

[20] Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, "DARPA Helps Paralyzed Man Feel Again Using a Brain-Controlled Robotic Arm," October 13, 2016, available at <www.darpa.mil/news-events/2016-10-13>. I owe this example to Jason Wesbrook.

[21] Fritz Allhoff and Patrick Lin, "The Ethics of Human Enhancement: A Symposium," *Nanoethics* 2 (2008), 256.

[22] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, xxiii. As Kamienski notes, "Psychiatrists agree that even if the effects of a given mind-expanding substance were well-known, we cannot fully predict human reactions."

[23] Ohler, *Blitzed*, 114.

[24] Arthur Isaac Applbaum, *Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 151.

[25] Lin, Mehlman, and Abney, *Enhanced Warfighters*, 37.

[26] Efthimios Parasidis, "Human Enhancement and Experimental Research in the Military," *Connecticut Law Review* 44, no. 4 (April 2012), 1125–1126.

[27] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), 71–76.

[28] Nick Bostrom, "Dignity and Enhancement," in *Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics*, ed. Adam Schulman and Thomas W. Merrill (Washington, DC: The President's Council on Bioethics, March 2008), available at <https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_dignity/chapter8.html>. In this article, Bostrom argues that one can acquire virtues by means of an enhancement as long as accepting the enhancement is a function of one's authentic self. For example, consider two people, one who was born with a calm temperament and one who was not, but has acquired it through disciplined control of her emotions. In this case, we should think the person who has acquired the disposition through choice rather than birth more authentically possesses the virtue. By extension, then, traits one acquires by virtue of enhancement, as long as the enhancement is one's choice and one chooses it in order to acquire the trait, is more *authentically* one's own than traits one has acquired by birth. Thus, enhancements may not always have the corrosive effect on human dignity as some suggest. However, to the extent that possessing a trait depends on an ability to control one's response to an emotion, like fear, then one can only display the trait when the relevant emotion is present. So enhancements

that eliminate or mask relevant emotions would preclude acquisition of the trait. Bostrom does note that the effects of enhancements on human dignity in general are complex and inconsistent. For example, enhancing one's empathy can undermine one's composure if one becomes overwhelmed by the suffering one perceives. While it may be conceivable that enhancements can aid one in the acquisition of a virtue like courage, it is not clear that doing so would always entail a positive contribution to one's dignity.

29 Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 188.

30 Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 144.

31 Lin, Mehlman, and Abney, *Enhanced Warfighters*, 67.

32 Ibid., 4.

33 Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 129.

34 Brian Orend, *The Morality of War* (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006), 60.

35 Ibid., 60.

The Proper Marking of Medical Personnel and Equipment: Lessons from the Great War

By Patrick Naughton

I n April 1917, after repeated attempts at diplomacy aimed at keeping itself out of the conflict raging in Europe, the United States declared war against Imperial Germany and later its allies. The 65th Congress authorized and directed that the President "employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and . . . bring the conflict to a successful termination all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged."[1] Thus, the United States entered into the first world conflict in which Allied nations truly attempted to undertake a whole-of-government approach, with the aim of achieving unity of effort between its joint military forces, interagency communities, and intergovernmental entities. In addition, the Allied nations attempted to extend this coordination not only within their own governments but also among their Allies as well.

The new multidomain operations (MDO) concept, and its efforts to prepare the U.S. military for the next 25 years of conflict and beyond, will require the coordination of military forces across allied nations like never before. World War I offers a number of lessons on how to anticipate future conflict and prepare forces to operate within a rapidly developing operational environment. As part of this understanding, the military medical

community must determine how it will conduct operations within future war theories before the onset of hostilities. Five areas are examined in this chapter to appreciate the lessons that can be gleaned from the Great War. First, the newly developing MDO concept and its link to World War I are discussed. Second, the conceptual visualization of the Great War is compared with today's operational understanding of the battlefield. Third, the proper employment and marking of medical personnel, units, and equipment that were implemented during the conflict are examined. Fourth, the impact these medical practices had on later conflicts and their steady decline over the past years are scrutinized. Lastly, how medical units could be employed within the future MDO concept and the ethical challenge that it presents to military leaders are considered.

After World War I, the Surgeon General of the Army, Major General Merritte Ireland, commented on the difficulty of providing medical support during major combat operations. Ireland wrote that medical support during the war

> was a complex and sometimes desperate matter, often hampered by lack of transportation facilities, by the impassable condition of roads boggy with mud or crowded with other vehicles, and by the generally torn up condition of the combat areas. It required the prompt mobilization of every kind of vehicle, such as ambulances, motor trucks, lorries and other rolling stock attached to the sanitary formations which move forward with the fighting divisions, as well as the establishment of evacuation hospitals and rest stations on the line of communications and of base hospitals and convalescent camps in the zone of the interior, with their own type of transportation, including ambulance service, hospital trains, hospital barges and hospital ships.[2]

This passage could literally be plucked from history and used to describe the challenges now facing the military medical community as it grapples to understand how it will fit within the new MDO concept and possible

large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against a peer competitor. World War I can thus offer leaders a valuable case study in major combat operations when considering the proper employment of medical personnel, units, and equipment within ethical guidelines and law of war guidance.

The MDO Concept and Its Link to World War I

General David Perkins, USA, in his first of a series of articles published in *Military Review* to explain his concept of MDO, opens his discussion with links to the "open warfare" concept stressed by American Army General John Pershing at the eve of the U.S. entry into World War I. He explains the disconnect between the proposed doctrine and battlefield realities that the United States and its Allies struggled with throughout the war. This disconnect resulted in such heavy casualties that it "forced the combatants to realize that the lethality of rapidly firing artillery, machine guns, mortars—and later, gas, tanks, and aircraft—made tactics such as those advocated by Pershing's open warfare doctrine almost suicidal."[3] This later resulted in Pershing commenting that "perhaps we are losing too many men" when beginning to reexamine U.S. doctrine in World War I.[4]

Establishing direct connections between the development of doctrine during the Great War and the new MDO concept is easy. In fact, General Perkins makes that same correlation throughout his three-part series of articles on MDO. He also makes the valid point that, unlike what was undertaken during World War I, present-day doctrine must not have change forced on it as "[c]reating new doctrine in the midst of large-scale combat is a costly endeavor because doctrinal tactics are devised using trial and error and are paid for in blood."[5] Spearheaded by General Perkins and others, the American military, rather than waiting for the future commencement of LSCO with a peer competitor, is beginning to discuss what the next fight will look like now. Essentially, the MDO concept "calls for ready ground combat forces capable of outmaneuvering adversaries physically and cognitively through extension of combined arms across all domains."[6] Currently, the domains are understood as land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.[7]

General Perkins is, of course, not the only senior U.S. Army leader to recognize that a shift in our understanding of potential future conflict is necessary. The 39th Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark Milley, gave a speech on the same topic. General Milley also linked what is presently occurring directly to the First World War:

> *In all the past cases of significant change in the character of war, the elements were all present prior to the war, but few if any ever realized their significance. . . . All the elements of World War I were visible in the Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, but very few understood their profound impact in the summer of 1914, as Europe slid over the abyss.*[8]

In addition, the MDO concept is not being embraced or developed by the Army alone, as evidenced by a recent article co-authored by General Perkins and General James M. Holmes, USAF. In it, they discuss attempts to integrate and converge "land and air domain capabilities in order to create the merged multidomain capabilities that will be required for success in future combat."[9]

The MDO theory is unique because it is still a developing concept that has only recently been officially codified in doctrine.[10] As MDO continues to evolve, it is important to remember that it mainly "offers a hypothesis to inform further concept development, war-gaming, experimentation, capability development and culture change."[11] Technology and its application within the different domains is evolving so quickly that military leaders are wrestling with the impact it will have on future war. Because of this, World War I is closely linked to today's developing MDO concept in preparing for possible future LSCO. Though the concept did not exist then, it is easy to overlay today's definition of the different domains onto the Great War. Just like today, new technologies in aircraft, machine guns, naval ships, and electronic communications developed quickly just prior to and during the First World War, so much so that military leaders from the time period struggled to connect strategic, operational, and tactical

doctrine to battlefield realties, which unfortunately resulted in massive casualties and disastrous results. Thankfully, today's military leaders have realized the folly of adjusting and creating doctrine on first contact and are attempting to prepare for future war now.

Visualizing the Battlefield

The theater of operations in the First World War was divided into three main sections. Starting with the area closest to the enemy and moving back toward one's home country, the sections were called the Zone of the Advance, Lines of Communication, and the Service or Zone of the Interior.[12] Military medical apparatus in the Zone of the Advance, also called the Military Zone, consisted of aid stations, field dressing stations, and field hospitals, with casualties evacuated through these roles of care in that order.[13] Within the area dubbed the Lines of Communication, which served as the "connecting link between the service of the interior and the zone of the advance," there was a further subdivision into advance and base sections.[14] The advance section included evacuation hospitals, and the base area was where the base hospitals would be established in Hospital Zones.[15] Casualties were evacuated through the roles of care via the aid stations, field dressing stations, evacuation hospitals, and then finally the base hospital, where the highest level of care was located.[16] Lastly, the Service of the Interior, usually a nation's home territory, provided convalescent and general hospitals focused on the recovery and mobilization of troops.[17]

To compare the World War I conceptualization of the battlefield to today, current military doctrine must be examined. Recently, the Army issued updated doctrine regarding the understanding of the "physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and focus" within an area of operation (AO).[18] This new doctrine, published in October 2017 in Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, breaks down the AO into five main parts. Listed in order from closest contact with the enemy, they include the deep, close, consolidation, joint security, and strategic support areas.[19] Looking at modern day roles of care starting from closest to the forward line of troops, the close area

consists of role one and two assets mostly found in Brigade Combat Teams and several Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) units that provide direct support to the modular division and support to other EAB units. The consolidation, joint security, and possibly some in the strategic support areas contain role three assets that provide the most definitive level of care in theater. Role four facilities are located within the continental United States.[20]

As medical planners consider the Health Service Support (HSS) plan and layout of medical units, it becomes important to understand the different domains and how the AO is divided within the new MDO concept. Regardless of how the battlefield is conceptually visualized, it is important to understand, as was noted in a British World War I FM that is still applicable today within the MDO concept, that the "presence of a number of sick and wounded proves an encumbrance to a Commander, and since his mobility will be handicapped by being compelled to carry a number of unfit men, every effort is made to remove them to the lines of communication with all despatch."[21] Like Surgeon General Ireland's comment, this doctrinal statement from the Great War is timeless and will never change, no matter what future warfare theory is presented.

Employment of Medical Personnel, Units, and Equipment

Just like combat forces, the military medical community in World War I had to quickly adjust to the new realities of warfare. Due to the deadly effectiveness of these newly implemented killing technologies and weapons of mass destruction, combined with the lowered standards of ethical thresholds on all sides regarding their employment, warfare soon resulted in massive casualties at a level never before experienced. As such, all nations had to aggressively adjust their HSS systems to safely and quickly clear the battlefield of wounded and sick in order to maintain morale and free combat forces to conduct operations. During the war, the United States and its Allies refined the proper markings of medical equipment, personnel, and units, setting a precedent for the world to follow through to the next

world war and beyond. Properly marked personnel with arm brassards, red crosses on medical equipment and units, combined with a system of displayed lanterns in low visibility, all sought to enhance the protected status of HSS structures and evacuation routes in order to improve the survivability of patients on the battlefield.

The 1918 update to the U.S. Army's *Manual for the Medical Department* stated that "all persons belonging to the sanitary service . . . attached to the Army wear on the left arm a brassard bearing a red cross on a white ground, the emblem of the sanitary service of armies."[22] At the time, the sanitary service was how the Army's Medical Department was referred to. In addition, the manual decreed that "All sanitary formations display during daylight (reveille to retreat) the Red Cross flag. . . . At night the positions of sanitary formations are marked by green lanterns." Lastly, "All materiel pertaining to the sanitary service is also marked with the Red Cross emblem, a red cross on a white ground."[23] The manual contained packing lists for different types of medical units in the Army. All of the lists included "Flag, distinguishing, Red Cross."[24]

The clear marking of medical units and personnel was a survival technique that was discovered under combat conditions during the war. "Appendix A: Report on Organization, Equipment, and Functions of the Medical Department," found in *The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War*, discusses this in detail.[25] These books, 17 volumes in all, were published during the 1920s under the direction of Surgeon General Ireland. They contain a plethora of lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) from the war that the Army Medical Department could study as it prepared for its next conflict. The appendix states, "Every hospital should be provided with a cross of white canvas . . . to be pinned firmly to the earth, preferably on green grass-before any other detail is given attention. . . . The adoption of this expedient saved many hospitals from enemy fire."[26] It then addresses the criticality of this marking: "The importance of placing this white cross before any part of the unit is erected lies in the fact that aerial observers take photographs in the

daytime and bombing planes discharge their missiles by night upon any point indicated in the picture, unless this cross is observed."[27] Volume eight of the set concludes "that many hospitals were spared by enemy airplanes because of their being marked in the way indicated . . . bombing planes discharged their missiles against points indicated . . . unless the cross marking a hospital site was plainly observable."[28]

Proper medical markings were not limited to medical facilities alone. Evacuation platforms were also clearly marked to include field ambulances and hospital trains. A TTP learned during the war was that "Each machine [ambulance] should have a large white cross painted on its top and a red cross on the sides, the color of the ambulance being khaki, against which background the red and the white crosses are emphasized. The white cross on top is necessary for protection against enemy aircraft."[29] Properly marking hospital trains were also discussed; these specially constructed railcars were crucial for transporting patients from evacuation hospitals back to the Hospital Zones: "The exteriors of the cars are the color of Army khaki, with the Red Cross of the Medical Department imposed upon the sides, roof, and at each end of the cars."[30]

In addition to learning the importance of properly marking medical units and equipment to avoid destruction, the Army Medical Department grew to understand that a hospital's location was directly related to survivability. The Army realized that "care must be exercised to avoid crossroads, which are targets for enemy artillery, and the vicinity of ammunition dumps or aerodromes, or the vicinity of railheads, factories, or conspicuous buildings that are on ground recently vacated by the enemy."[31] Furthermore, "advantage should be taken of existing buildings which do not offer a target. All selected sites will be conspicuously marked with a large white cross upon the ground upon a dark background to preclude damage by indirect fire following aerial observation."[32]

None of this is meant to imply that by simply displaying a large red cross, protection was guaranteed for a medical unit. World War I frequently saw the enemy disregard the protections this marking was meant to provide.

In addition, this protection is not realistic for medical units close to actual combat. In the war, it was common practice for aid stations close to the front to be instructed that in "modern combat every available cellar, dugout, or cave affording protection from shell fire must be made use of, and if the terrain does not afford such shelter first aid must be rendered in the open and the evacuation to a sheltered location by litter made as quickly as possible."[33] This same concept is recognized today as the "proximity to combatant" notion, which essentially means that the closer medical personnel and units are to combat "gives no just cause for complaint. Medical and religious personnel are deemed to have accepted the risk of death or injury due to their proximity to military operations."[34]

Despite the understanding that medical units close to the front were at risk, it was generally accepted on all sides that those medical units clearly marked in the rear areas were to be respected; of course, this did not always occur. War diaries and primary sources are riddled with examples of proper markings being ignored. In his war diary, one man from Canada described a conversation he had with another after the initial bombing of the hospital he worked in: "There wasn't a bed left standing. Luckily, we had removed most of the patients into the cellar—but those who were left are still there, buried in the ruins. 'The usual German respect for the Red Cross!' I commented bitterly. 'The flag makes a good mark for their artillery,' he returned, with a smile; 'they always look for us.'"[35] An American in the war recorded in his memoir, "the Boche [Germans] had bombed the hospital two out of the last three evenings. At first, they thought it a mistake, but when they kept it up it became apparent that there was no mistake. This is a big field hospital in white tents and lots of red crosses plainly visible. I have myself seen it from the air and you can see it more distinctly than anything in the neighbourhood."[36]

Though incidents like this did occur, however, according to General Ireland, "On the signing of the armistice (Nov. 11, 1918), we had available in France for an army of a mean total strength of nearly two million, 261,403 beds, in 153 base hospitals, 66 camp hospitals and 12 convalescent

camps."[37] This massive amount of large medical facilities from the Americans alone, some with 1,000 beds each, would not have survived on the battlefield without adherence to the guidelines, that is, posting them away from military objectives and properly marking them with a clearly definable red cross.

The Impact of World War I on the Future

All these medical TTPs and lessons learned during the war still guide law of war and ethical guidance for the employment and emplacement of military medical facilities and evacuation platforms, which is codified in international law and official U.S. doctrine. The well-known Geneva Convention, which refers to a set of agreements signed by numerous countries after World War II that established rules of war, contains numerous articles directly related to medical forces on the battlefield. However, Articles 19, 24, 39, and 42 are critical because they speak to the proper employment and markings of medical units that have an impact on the new MDO concept and FM 3-0. Signatories to the Geneva Convention and its protocols agreed to the following:

- 1st Convention, Article 19: Fixed establishments and mobile medical units of the Medical Service may in no circumstances be attacked, but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict. . . . The responsible authorities shall ensure that the said medical establishments and units are, as far as possible, situated in such a manner that attacks against military objectives cannot imperil their safety.[38]

- 1st Convention, Article 24: Medical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of the wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, staff exclusively engaged in the administration of medical units and establishments, as well as chaplains attached to the armed forces, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances.[39]

- 1st Convention, Article 39: Under the direction of the competent military authority, the emblem shall be displayed on the flags, armlets and on all equipment employed in the Medical Service.[40]

- 1st Convention, Article 42: The distinctive flag [red cross or other recognized emblem] of the Convention shall be hoisted only over such medical units and establishments as are entitled to be respected under the Convention. . . . Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary steps, in so far as military considerations permit, to make the distinctive emblems indicating medical units and establishments clearly visible to the enemy land, air or naval forces, in order to obviate the possibility of any hostile action.[41]

Despite international protocols and guidance as well as internal U.S. regulations, however, the Department of Defense (DOD) has witnessed the steady degradation of the proper marking of medical personnel and equipment, while America's allies have largely maintained this standard. The *Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, last updated in December of 2016, supports the Geneva Convention articles and codifies the guidance to all DOD branches, which can then be found in Service-specific law of war field manuals and doctrine.[42] Though the manual supports the conventions, it does contain one crucial caveat:

> *The display of the distinctive emblem is under the direction of the competent military authority. Thus, the military command may authorize the removal or obscuring of the distinctive emblem for tactical purposes, such as camouflage. Similarly, it would be appropriate for the distinctive emblem to be removed if it is assessed that enemy forces will fail to respect the emblem and seek to attack medical personnel; display of the emblem in such circumstances would not be considered "feasible" because in that instance it would not result in a humanitarian benefit. In the practice of the United States, removal or obscuration of the distinctive emblem has generally been*

controlled by the responsible major tactical commander, such as a brigade commander or higher.[43]

This stipulation has dominated the past 18 years of employment of medical units and personnel due to the nature of the adversaries faced, who typically do not respect any international standards. Unfortunately, this thought process continues to direct military medical and nonmedical planners regarding the deployment of medical units in consolidation areas. Though the *DOD Law of War Manual* allows for this proviso, it does caution that the "absence of the distinctive emblem may increase the risk that enemy forces will not recognize the protected status of military medical . . . and attack them in error."[44]

Lastly, no official guidance has ever been issued to stop wearing the red cross brassard for medical personnel in combat areas. Once a common accoutrement to all U.S. military medical personnel, it has been removed from usage, though all U.S. allied medical personnel still wear it. In fact, the medical red cross brassard is still authorized for wear per official U.S. Army uniform guidance.[45] It has become another victim of the past 18 years of counterinsurgency operations where, rightfully so, many believe that the wearer presents a target, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite this, DOD has begun to reexamine the proper marking of medical personnel. To adhere with the international Geneva guidance that all medical personnel shall "carry a special identity card bearing the distinctive emblem" and that the "card shall be water-resistant and of such size that it can be carried in the pocket," DOD now includes the red cross on identification cards.[46] Beginning July 2014, DOD began to permanently "issue the Geneva Conventions Common Access Card with a red cross emblem to military personnel and DOD civilian employees in certain medical, medical auxiliary or religious occupational specialties."[47] This is a step in the right direction and something not done until now; previously, this card was issued before deployment as a slip of paper, if at all.

The Ethical Challenge

World War I witnessed numerous ethical and law of war challenges that included the harnessing of industrial technologies and the use of poison gas, both intended to create massive casualties. President Woodrow Wilson, in his address to Congress to obtain a declaration of war in April 1917, directly referenced historical attempts at establishing international laws of war that

> had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon . . . where no nation had right of dominion. . . . By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meagre enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded.[48]

Wilson went on to describe in detail the various ethical and law of war violations that Germany had committed during the war and declared that the "challenge is to all mankind."[49] According to Wilson, its enemies' erosion of ethical and law of war standards was a root cause of America's entry into the conflict.

The war itself presented numerous ethical dilemmas at all levels. Unrestricted submarine warfare, blockades aimed at starving civilian populations, ethnic-driven atrocities, and the use of horrendous weapons at the tactical level all presented ethical challenges that leaders had to wrestle with during the conflict. Today, as the United States emerges from over 18 years of conflict, it is struggling to posture itself for the next big potential fight. As General Milley declared, "We have dedicated significant time and resources to thinking about drivers of change, and the future operational environment, how warfare is changing and how we must adapt our doctrine, our organizations, equipment, training, and leader development."[50] The MDO concept is the driving conceptual framework through which the future of warfare is being considered. With this thought process, senior leaders must again consider and anticipate the ethical challenges that may

occur over the next 25 years before they happen, rather than during the conflict, as was witnessed in World War I.

As a part of this forward thinking, it is crucial that the military medical community participates in the discussion. Currently, as the MDO concept is being presented, many military leaders believe that all units on the battlefield "will likely have to be small. They will have to move constantly. They will have to aggregate and disaggregate rapidly. They'll have to employ every known technique of cover and concealment. In a future battlefield, if you stay in one place for longer than two or three hours, you'll be dead."[51] This concept of deploying units directly conflicts with doctrinal and law of war guidance on how medical Echelon Above Brigade units are employed in the consolidation areas to provide Health Service Support. Even the newly designed field hospitals could not follow these criteria.[52] World War I and its HSS plans, combined with its marking of medical units, equipment, and personnel, offer the perfect vehicle to study the employment of medical units within the new MDO concept. This raises a core ethical question: Do lessons from the First World War—for example, clearly positioning, marking, and employing medical units to enhance their survivability—still hold merit? Or is this an outdated concept and the only protection from deep strikes comes from smaller, nimble units that are camouflaged?

Conclusion

As America emerges from this recent period of conflict, it must look forward toward what may come next. Though this appears challenging, the U.S. medical community has done it before. In 1956, the U.S. Army Center of Military History, working with the Army Medical Department, published an exhaustive history of medical activities in World War II. Like the earlier accounts published in the 1920s, this one sought to enlighten Army medical personnel "who daily face policy and management problems similar to those recounted here."[53] By 1956, the Army had fought three major large-scale combat operations in the first half of the century: World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. It faced an uncertain future in a

Pentomic Age and the Army Medical Department once again found itself trying to define its role as new combat doctrine was being developed to counter Soviet nuclear threats.

Interestingly, this new history of medicine described a direct link back to World War I medical doctrine and the interwar years, claiming, "The Surgeon General and his associates, like many others in the Army and the Government at large, found it difficult to break peacetime habits of thought and action in order to plan imaginatively for a second World War."[54] It discussed many of the TTPs from World War II and linked their development directly back to World War I.[55] It concluded that this direct historical continuity between doctrine development, practical application, and lessons learned is

> *merely a reminder that the full meaning . . . can only be grasped if it is read with some knowledge of earlier events. Even without this background, however, readers who now or in the future are engaged in the work of hospitalization and evacuation should find much in the account to help them build on the achievements and avoid the pitfalls of the past.*[56]

Fortunately, today's senior military medical leaders are embracing new discussions and ideas informed by history on how to better employ medical assets on the battlefield.

The future of warfare is ambiguous and multifaceted; however, even General Milley concedes that within this uncertainty and complexity, one of the few things that the military must still deliberately plan for is medical support.[57] As America shifts its focus to LSCO and the MDO concept, it is important to reexamine, as was done in World War I, the Geneva Convention articles and law of war guidance when considering medical support for future conflicts over the next 25 years. When determining how military medicine will be employed in the future within the MDO concept, senior leaders encounter the core ethical question: Do we adopt the lessons of the First World War and clearly position, mark, and employ our medical units

so there is no mistaking what they are? Or do we attempt to camouflage them in the hopes that this will protect them from enemy deep strikes extending into the consolidation area?

The MDO concept and the perceived posture of possible adversaries are forcing the United States and its allies to reexamine ethical imperatives and law of war guidance when considering medical support for future conflicts. The First World War and the actions taken on all sides to mark and protect medical units and personnel before, during, and after the conflict offer numerous lessons for the United States and its allies. It should be studied by military professionals to discover the links between the doctrinal and conceptual changes that occurred before, during, and after the interwar years to truly understand the shift occurring today.

Today's threats present the most significant readiness challenge to U.S. forces since the Cold War. As the United States shifts from stability and counterinsurgency operations and begins to consider the threats posed by near-peer competitors, such as Russia and China, it must examine the proper markings of medical units and personnel per international agreements and law of war guidance and form a commensurate medical posture with its allies. For each threat, America must determine prior to the advent of hostilities what protected posture its medical units will adopt within the MDO concept and LSCO. Entering a conflict with inadequately marked medical units or personnel will, due to mistargeting, result in massive disruption to the ability to provide care. In addition, regardless of whom America faces, its medical posture must be coordinated with its allies. To avoid learning costly lessons in the opening phases of hostilities with a near-peer competitor, the U.S. military must have this conversation now.

Notes

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² Merritte W. Ireland, *The Achievement of the Army Medical Department in the World War: In the Light of General Medical Progress* (Chicago: American Medical Association, 1921), 8.

³ David G. Perkins, "Multi-Domain Battle, Driving Change to Win in the Future," *Military Review* 97, no. 4 (July–August 2017), 6, available at <www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2017/Perkins-Multi-Domain-Battle/>.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ David G. Perkins, "Preparing for the Fight Tonight: Multi-Domain Battle and Field Manual 3-0," *Military Review* 97, no. 5 (September–October 2017), 7, available at <www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2017/Perkins-II-Preparing-for-the-Fight-Tonight/>.

⁶ *Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21ˢᵗ Century* (Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center, January 18, 2017), available at <www.arcic.army.mil/App_Documents/Multi_Domain_Battle.pdf>.

⁷ *Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner's Guide* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2016), 5.

⁸ Mark A. Milley, "AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon, October 4, 2016," available at <http://wpswps.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/20161004_CSA_AUSA_Eisenhower_Transcripts.pdf>.

⁹ David G. Perkins and James M. Holmes, "Multidomain Battle: Converging Concepts Toward a Joint Solution," *Joint Force Quarterly* 88, no. 1 (January 2018), 54, available at <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/1412174/multidomain-battle-converging-concepts-toward-a-joint-solution/>.

¹⁰ The term *multidomain operation* first entered official doctrine with the publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2017).

¹¹ *Demand Reduction: Setting Conditions to Enable Multi-Domain Battle White Paper* (Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center, February 21, 2018), 1.

¹² *Manual for the Medical Department, United States Army* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1918), 177.

¹³ Ibid., 204, 210–211.

[14] Ibid., 224.

[15] Ibid., 225.

[16] Ibid., 226.

[17] Ibid., 194–197.

[18] FM 3-0, 1–30.

[19] Ibid.

[20] FM 4-02, *Army Health System* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2013), 1–7, 1–10.

[21] G.R.N. Collins, *Military Organization and Administration* (London: Huge Rees, Ltd., 1918), 272.

[22] *Manual for the Medical Department*, 184.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., 270, 275, 283, 301.

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[26] Ibid., 855.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Charles Lynch, Joseph H. Ford, and Frank W. Weed, *The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War*, vol. 8, *Field Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1925), 170.

[29] Ford, *Medical Department*, 853.

[30] Ibid., 888.

[31] Ibid., 878.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid., 882.

[34] *Department of Defense Law of War Manual* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 458.

[35] F. McKelvey Bell, *The First Canadians in France: The Chronicle of a Military Hospital in the War Zone* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1917), 177.

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[37] Ireland, *The Achievement of the Army Medical Department in the World War*, 7.

[38] International Committee of the Red Cross, "Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 19."

[39] Ibid., "Article 24."

[40] Ibid., "Article 39."

[41] Ibid., "Article 42."

[42] *Department of Defense Law of War Manual.*

[43] Ibid., 496.

[44] Ibid., 496–497.

[45] Department of the Army, Pamphlet 670-1, *Guide to the Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2017), 231–232.

[46] International Committee of the Red Cross, "Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 40."

[47] Amaani Lyle, "DOD to Include Red Cross Emblem on Some Common Access Cards," *DOD News*, June 11, 2014, available at <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122454>.

[48] Woodrow Wilson, *Address to Congress to Request Declaration of War Against Germany* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1917), 3, available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/9264310>.

[49] Ibid., 4.

[50] Milley, "AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon, October 4, 2016," 8.

[51] Ibid., 15.

[52] For a discussion on the new Army Field Hospital, see Ellen Crown, "Army Combat Support Hospitals Converting to New Modular Field Hospitals," *Army.mil*, July 11, 2017, available at <www.army.mil/article/190657/army_combat_support_hospitals_converting_to_new_modular_field_hospitals>.

[53] Clarence McKittrick Smith, *The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1956), ix.

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[57] Milley, "AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon, October 4, 2016," 16.

Toward a Resilient Military Ethic

By Nathan H. White

As this volume of reflections on military ethics in light of World War I comes to a close, a framing of diverse insights is both necessary and beneficial. This evaluation may be accomplished, I suggest, by relating military ethics more broadly to the overall purpose of military action, as well as of human life. Within this schema, war may be understood as an attempt at *resilience*—a striving after societal flourishing that was as evident in the Great War as it is today. By situating discussion about military ethics in this way, we may achieve greater clarity regarding the purpose and nature of war as well as insight into possible present and future expressions of warfare and the place of ethics in them.

The Telos of War

Human beings, it would seem, have an innate drive toward life.[1] Individuals and societies alike seek not only to survive but also to flourish despite forces that would undermine these efforts. Scholars have been contemplating this phenomenon for millennia. Aristotle, for instance, characterized the shared goal of human flourishing in this way: the telos (goal/purpose) of the socio-political establishment is to enable development "for the sake of the good life [*eudaimonia*]."[2] Aristotle's understanding of society is inextricably linked to his understanding of human nature; because human beings are

political animals, naturally gathering into societies for the pursuit of mutual flourishing, human life is necessarily tied to ethical considerations such as the evaluation of what constitutes "the good life" and appropriate means to achieve this end—themselves always ethical and value-laden efforts.[3] Therefore, as long as humans gather together in societies, they demonstrate the continued relevance of ethics, in the very least through the adoption of a common telos and hope for progress toward this end. In sum, humans are ethical beings because they are political beings. Furthermore, it follows that the state's political activities are an extension of ethical action. Here, acts of warfare themselves become extensions of political action[4]—or, as Clausewitz famously put it, war is a "mere continuation of policy by other means."[5] In this respect, ethics cannot be untethered either from politics or warfare.

Donald Kagan, however, suggests that such a view is misplaced. He notes wryly, "It is a special characteristic of the modern Western world, as opposed to other civilizations and the premodern Western World, to believe that human beings can change and control the physical and social environment and even human nature to improve the condition of life."[6] Instead, for Kagan, the origin of war is found elsewhere. Though he acknowledges that many scholars have located motivation for war in "competition for power,"[7] Kagan finds more insightful Thucydides' claim that "people go to war out of 'honor, fear, and interest.'"[8] Each of these motivations is illuminating in its own regard, yet, irrespective of impetus, the *existence* of warfare itself is indicative of the human struggle to flourish. This demonstrates, as Kagan notes regarding war, that the "secret of the success of our species has been its ability to learn from experience and to adapt its behavior accordingly."[9]

War, then, could be conceptualized as an attempt at resilience. In particular, through war human societies seek to ensure their own flourishing despite detractors. Within the arena of military ethics, the concept of resilience may therefore provide a helpful framework for assessing the pursuit of *eudaimonia* (or, alternatively, the motivations of honor, fear, and interest, as it may be) through war, at both individual and societal levels. This follows from Aristotle's thought, where, because war is a political act, the aims of

war (however conceived) and acts of warfare are themselves value-laden and therefore inherently concerned with ethics (right practice). Thus, ethics is vital to the waging of warfare inasmuch as it defines and delimits the motivations, scope, and means of war in its greater aim of supporting the flourishing of society at large.[10]

But some may consider this an outdated or limited viewpoint. Given a variety of recent societal and technological advances, is ethical reflection still necessary in warfare? Put another way, will the discipline of military ethics remain resilient despite winds of societal change?

A Viable Future?

Certainly, an implied question throughout this volume has been whether military ethics is and will remain a viable aspect of military operations. Does this discipline have sufficient adaptability and applicability to be utilized in the warfare of the 21st century and beyond? While by no means providing a conclusive answer, it is our hope that this volume is suggestive of ways in which military ethics remains an essential aspect of the profession of arms and will continue to be so for years to come. Many contributions to this volume have highlighted the significant role of ethics in warfare, where it serves as an integral component of military planning at all echelons. This volume's retrospective look at the Great War has demonstrated that, though much in warfare has changed, much has also remained the same. Indeed, history may furnish valuable insight into the future of military ethics.

The Great War and Human Flourishing

World War I, a conflict resulting both in tremendous societal repercussions and widespread personal loss, has much to teach us. Although at first glance war may seem to be solely concerned with human conflict, war may in fact provide insight into human flourishing. Resilience, which history suggests may be both present and absent in war, is a key linkage between the two concepts.

In his classic *The Great War and Modern Memory*, Paul Fussell insightfully notes, "Every war is ironic because every war is worse than expected. Every war constitutes an irony of situation because its means are so melodramatically disproportionate to its presumed ends. . . . But the Great War was more ironic than any before or since. . . . It reversed the Idea of Progress."[11] The irony of World War I, in particular, is that the supposed advance of human civilization—technological and otherwise—led not to greater peace, but rather to a war unlike the world had before seen. A monumental shift had occurred in warfare, and this change did not seem to lead to greater human flourishing. At a societal level, the Great War evoked a distinct lack of resilience—regress instead of the hoped-for progress. This was evidenced perhaps nowhere more clearly than in the testament of individual lives, particularly of those lost and those irreparably marred.

Individual Resilience

Warfare is a complicated matter, involving a conglomeration of technological, political, and social considerations as well as the most sacred of human commitments. From its intensely physical nature to the unseen but powerful forces of personal and societal motivation, war not only involves but also challenges basic human needs, longings, and commitments. When the detritus of technological and political trappings is pushed aside, the simple fact remains that war is primarily concerned with human beings.[12] Despite a variety of motivations for war, the actual waging of war is a very personal, and very human, matter.

Yet, ostensibly with the exponential industrialization of warfare in World War I and beyond, the human side of warfare gradually began to be displaced. The mechanization of weapons systems, defensive technologies, and means of communication increasingly sidelined what were once human-centric capabilities and tasks through enabling more effective warfare while also preserving one's own safety. Indeed, the sanguine, earthy nature of much pre-industrial warfare, where close combat often entailed warriors being near enough to smell one another, was replaced

by a "safe" distance removed from not only the smell of one's opponent, but also the sight of their faces and sound of their cries.[13] Through this monumental change, warfare's essentially human character was still apparent, albeit a character somewhat distanced from the immediacy of many earlier types of warfare. But, despite changes, at the individual level of human warriors engaged in warfare, persons sought to press on despite obstacles in order to preserve human flourishing at its most basic level—that of survival.[14]

Yet war, inasmuch as it is a human endeavor, is often traumatizing.[15] This was certainly the case in World War I where, as Martin Gilbert suggests, "individual suffering and distress were on a massive scale, particularly in the front-line trenches."[16] Indeed, in pursuing the flourishing of their society through warfare, nations can traumatize their inhabitants—the warriors who themselves become a part of the collateral damage of this quest—in what could be termed "personal wounding in pursuit of national resilience." Nation-states often attempt to mitigate this damage through programs aimed at developing resilience among warriors. This, in itself, is an ethical move in support of an ethical dilemma and cannot be disentangled from ethical considerations. Because the resilience of human beings is significantly influenced by ethical and spiritual correlates,[17] it seems likely that these factors will remain important within the human domain of warfare in the present and the future.[18]

Contributions to this volume have reflected on the importance of ethics in warfare from a variety of standpoints. Utilizing insights gained from the Great War, authors have addressed topics as diverse as chemical warfare, nationalism, technological advance, and human recovery from trauma. We may see each of these areas as being concerned with the proper ordering of human life within the context of war—what I have described as resilience—in its own way. Indeed, the appeal of the concept of resilience is evident throughout this volume. David Richardson calls for a renewed "spiritual resilience" grounded in a transcendent ethic to support warfighters, while Andrew Totten raises questions concerning the centrality of

human resilience in warfare given the rise of autonomous warfare systems. Other contributions also trace various efforts to support the resilience of warriors such as the use of drugs (Pfaff), spiritual resources (Lee), and education (Statler) in the promotion of sustained well-being. Yet it is not a foregone conclusion that such considerations will be necessary in the warfare of the future. As Totten argues in this volume, "Resilience seems to be increasingly a matter of systems and networks, not human hearts and minds, let alone souls." If the centrality of individual human resilience within warfare is in question, how much more so is the entire enterprise of military ethics?

Changing Paradigms?

At the center of these queries are two considerations: the changing nature of Western society—what has been termed a move toward a "post-Christian" society—and changes in fundamental relationalities between human beings and technology.

Societal Shifts

With the tradition of Western military ethics largely situated within a heritage of a Judeo-Christian culture that is waning in influence in the West, is this discipline still relevant to modern warfare, or is it merely a relic of the past? Will it remain resilient, surviving the monumental societal changes currently occurring so as to sustain applicability and efficacy for societies engaged in warfare and for those employed in promulgating it? Given the gravity of the taking of human life and the widespread destruction that often accompanies war, many would maintain that ethical reflection is needed in order to be responsible in this serious matter. Yet in a postmodern and computer-age society, ethics can often be regarded as passé—a hindrance to "What works" and "What makes me happy." While changing societal currents are substantial, rather than being a detriment to the continued relevance of military ethics, its historical grounding within a particular tradition of thought provides a basis from which it may grow and

develop as it reassesses contemporary situations in light of a rich history. This foundation, then, is not something to discard, but rather something upon which to build, especially during times of great change.

Technological Shifts

Beyond shifting ethical foundations, 21st-century conflicts evidence a change that some characterize as a fundamental shift in the character of war—a new paradigm in which warfare loses its human trappings.[19] A number of contributions to this volume have highlighted this shift, suggesting that current and future conflicts may operate according to a profoundly different paradigm. That a seismic shift within human-technological relations is occurring cannot be doubted, but this change does not necessarily create a new paradigmatic understanding of warfare. Given that war, as a political activity, is concerned with the societal pursuit of human flourishing, even if the *waging* of war increasingly becomes less human-centric, the telos of war itself remains unchanged. Flourishing is still evaluated in terms of *human* flourishing. Computer systems do not wage war on their own behalf, but rather are utilized by human agents on behalf of a nation-state and its desired flourishing.[20] Thus, even in a warfare environment characterized by non-human actors, the nature of warfare will necessarily remain human—and also ethical. Warfare is used in service of human communities, seeking their welfare and flourishing, and therefore ethical considerations remain relevant inasmuch as human beings are the authors of warfare (albeit perhaps increasingly not the *agents* of warfare) and the object of warfare's telos.

A New Epoch of Warfare?

Are the societal and technological advances of our own time of sufficiently revolutionary character to require a new paradigm of warfare, and thus also of military ethics? Has the rapid development of artificial intelligence sidelined the human element in war altogether? Perhaps. "Time will tell," as the saying goes, yet, as we have begun to explore in this volume, time may also give insight in an altogether different manner—through looking to the past.

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face many of the same challenges faced by military leaders of the First World War. Now warfare seems to be shifting once again, but will this result in the betterment of humanity?

In the conclusion to his magisterial treatment of the development of society and warfare over the last millennium, William McNeill suggests that in our own era:

> [a]*wesome power and awful dilemmas have never been so closely juxtaposed. What we believe and how we act therefore matter more than in ordinary ages. Clear thinking and bold action, based as always on inadequate evidence, are all we have to see us through to whatever the future holds. It will differ from anyone's intentions as radically as the actual past differed from our forefathers' plans and wishes. But study of that past may reduce the discrepancy between expectation and reality, if only by encouraging us to expect surprises—among them, a breakdown of the pattern of the future suggested in this conclusion. For however horrendous it is to live in the face of uncertainty, the future, like the past, depends upon humanity's demonstrated ability to make and remake natural and social environments within limits set mainly by our capacity to agree on goals of collective action.*[23]

In a word, then, the future depends on our *resilience*. As we assess the challenges of future warfare, we must evaluate how we may successfully—and resiliently—face what is to come. What seems to be clear is that military ethics must remain an essential part of societal efforts to shape what McNeill calls "goals of collective action" and means of pursuing them in the promotion of human flourishing.

Thus, even if we are entering a new paradigm of less-human warfare, we will need all possible resources at our disposal to face the challenges of future war—which will still remain a paradigm of *war*, and therefore necessarily be concerned with the flourishing and resilience of human beings. As such, ethics will persist as a vital aspect of warfare, properly utilizing ways,

ends, and means so as to ensure that the society we are intent on preserving through war is itself one worth preserving.[24]

Notes

¹ See, for instance, Ilia N. Karatoreos and Bruce S. McEwen, "Annual Research Review: The Neurobiology and Physiology of Resilience and Adaptation across the Life Course," *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry* 54, no. 4 (April 2013), 337–347.

² Aristotle, *Politics* I.2, 1252b30. Quotations are from Jonathan Barnes, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, vols. 1 and 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Aristotle goes even further to claim that "a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only" (III.9, 1280a32-3). Indeed, the "end of the state is the good life" (III.9, 1280b39–1281a4). Similarly, in the terms that the Founding Fathers used to frame the Constitution, the United States of America was founded in order to "establish Justice, insure [*sic*] domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence [*sic*], promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."

³ Aristotle recognized that disagreement exists concerning what constitutes "the good life" (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.4, 1095a21-5). Nonetheless, he still viewed *eudaimonia* as something that is inherently valuable, thereby being the proper telos of both human life and human society (*Nicomachean Ethics* I.7, 1097a35-b5).

⁴ For instance, Aristotle suggests that "the higher parts of states, that is to say, the warrior class, the class engaged in the administration of justice, and that engaged in deliberation . . . these are more essential to the state than the parts which minister to the necessaries of life" (*Politics* IV.4, 1291a26-9). Cf. *Politics* I.5, 1254b30; I.8, 1256b22-6. Commenting on Aristotle's *Politics*, Alasdair MacIntyre draws together several of these themes by noting the necessity of the use of virtue in ethical living: "The courage and skill required in military actions, the temperateness required in respect of pleasures . . . all these may at different times have to be judged rightly if a just judgment is to be made." Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 106. I am grateful to Thomas Achord for his helpful discussion of these matters.

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Bk. 1, Ch. 1, 24. John Keegan qualifies both Aristotle and Clausewitz's claims, noting that war itself predates both nation-states and politics. He suggests regarding these thinkers, "Neither dared confront the thought that man is a thinking animal in whom the intellect directs the urge to hunt and the ability to kill." See John Keegan, *A History of War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 3. Keegan's insight is worthy of serious consideration,

but, in the end, it complements rather than detracts from my larger argument that war itself is indicative of an attempt at human resilience.

⁶ Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* (New York: Anchor Books, 1995), 3.

⁷ Ibid., 6.

⁸ Ibid., 8, citing Thucydides, 1.76.2.

⁹ Ibid., 11. On the factors leading to the First World War in particular, see Kagan, *Origins of War*, 81–214.

¹⁰ As Paul Coyer has argued in this volume, a healthy nationalism is one that balances national interest with genuine concern for the well-being of those who do not belong to the nation. This, too, is an ethical consideration. At one level, I argue that ethical considerations are an implicit aspect of human political activity, of which war is an integral part. But certainly a case could be made for ethical considerations impeding military expediency. This may seem to hold weight when considering short-term outcomes; in the last analysis, however, a reading of history would display that disposing of ethics is a self-defeating endeavor. From a purely utilitarian viewpoint, Nazi Germany, for instance, often relegated ethical concerns for the expediency of short-term outcomes—including and especially against civilian populations—that it deemed as suitable for achieving intended purposes, but this often undercut rather than supported war efforts through, among other things, galvanizing civilian populations and enemy combatants even more stalwartly against the regime.

¹¹ Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7–8. Similarly, Fussell invokes John Keegan's conclusion regarding the incomprehensibility of the Great War: "The First World War is a mystery. Its origins are mysterious. So is its course." Fussell, *The Great War*, 339, citing John Keegan, *The First World War* (London: Hutchinson, 1998).

¹² For this insight I am indebted to the Reverend David Barrett, CF.

¹³ The creation of distance between oneself and the enemy did not begin with industrialized warfare—the invention of the longbow, crossbow, and gunpowder, for instance, clearly increased lethal distance in warfare—but a strong case could be made for the exponential growth of this distance during World War I due to a number of industrial and technological advances, both offensive and defensive. Cf. William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 330–336; and Robert L. O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression* (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 231–269. This shift is evident in the fascinating early account of the war by famed violinist Fritz Kreisler who fought for his ancestral "Fatherland," Austria, on the Eastern front against Russia. Kreisler notes regarding his experience in the trenches, "it is astonishing how little actual hatred exists between fighting men. One fights fiercely and passionately, mass against mass, but as soon as the mass crystallizes itself into human individuals whose features one actually can recognize, hatred almost ceases. Of course, fighting continues, but somehow it loses its fierceness. . . . One still shoots at his opponent, but almost regrets when he sees him drop." See Fritz Kreisler, *Four Weeks in the Trenches: The War Story of a Violinist* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915), 69. The eased tension between passionate fighting and sympathy for the enemy that is evident in Kreisler's account is itself made possibly by physical distance from one's opponent. Such emotional distance from the act of killing is, in part, a corollary of the increased space between opposing parties in World War I. For an incisive description and analysis of trench warfare in World War I, see John Keegan, *The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 204–280.

[14] In the 20th century, the study of human beings' response to adversity has often been centered around research on war. This was true of the foundational understandings developed through studying soldiers returning from World War I and World War II (See Ann S. Masten, "Global Perspectives on Resilience in Children and Youth," *Child Development* 85, no. 1 [January 2014], 7–8), but is also true of the more recent study of resilience within the context of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cf. Rhonda Cornum, Michael D. Matthews, and Martin E.P. Seligman, "Comprehensive Soldier Fitness: Building Resilience in a Challenging Institutional Context," *American Psychologist* 66, no. 1 (2011), 4–9; Peter Zimmermann et al., "Personal Values in Soldiers after Military Deployment: Associations with Mental Health and Resilience," *European Journal of Psychotraumatology*, vol. 5 (May 2014); George A. Bonanno et al., "Trajectories of Trauma Symptoms and Resilience in Deployed U.S. Military Service Members: Prospective Cohort Study," *The British Journal of Psychiatry* 200, no. 4 (April 2012), 317–323; S.B. Harvey et al., "The Long-Term Consequences of Military Deployment: A 5-Year Cohort Study of United Kingdom Reservists Deployed to Iraq in 2003," *American Journal of Epidemiology* 176, no. 12 (November 2012), 1177–1184. In one respect, increased individual human resilience may be seen as a means of promoting societal resilience, including through the successful waging of war. To this end, the

concept of resilience has itself been used widely within the U.S. Armed Forces. Cf. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1-0, *The Army Profession* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, June 2015), 5-16, 6-11, 6-22, 7-1; Army Regulation 350-53, *Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2014); Lisa S. Meredith et al., *Promoting Psychological Resilience in the U.S. Military* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011); see also contributions in this volume from Richardson, Totten, and Lee.

[15]   Cf. Rut Gubkin, "An Exploration of Spirituality and the Traumatizing Experiences of Combat," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* 56, no. 4 (July 2016), 311–330; R. Srinivasa Murthy and Rashmi Lakshminarayana, "Mental Health Consequences of War: A Brief Review of Research Findings," *World Psychiatry* 5, no. 1 (2006), 25–30; Hanna Kienzler, "Debating War-Trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in an Interdisciplinary Arena," *Social Science & Medicine* 67, no. 2 (July 2008), 218–227; Karni Ginzburg, Tsachi Ein-Dor, and Zahava Solomon, "Comorbidity of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Anxiety and Depression: A 20-Year Longitudinal Study of War Veterans," *Journal of Affective Disorders* 123, no. 1 (June 2010), 249–257; Alexander C. McFarlane, "The Impact of War on Mental Health: Lest We Forget," *World Psychiatry* 14, no. 3 (2015), 351–353.

[16]   Martin Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1994), xv. Gilbert, in particular, traces narratives of individual suffering through this comprehensive volume.

[17]   Cf. Christopher C.H. Cook and Nathan H. White, "Resilience and the Role of Spirituality," in *The Oxford Textbook of Public Mental Health*, ed. Dinesh Bhugra et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 513–520.

[18]   Here, too, we may learn from the past. Charles McMoran Wilson (Lord Moran), who served as the personal physician to Sir Winston Churchill, previously was a battalion surgeon for British forces in World War I. He later wrote regarding his experiences, "In those early days of the first German War we—the Company officers and I—did not bother about men's minds; we did what we could for their bodies. We did not ask whether a man was wearing well or if he would last. Of course he would last, why shouldn't he? Months later after the corrosion of nearly a year in the Ypres salient I was less certain . . . [men] were wearing badly under stress." Lord Moran, *The Anatomy of Courage* (London: Constable, 1945), 3. Lord Moran continues to explain the profound effect that internal dispositions, such as courage, had on the well-being of the soldiers under his care. See also Edgar Jones, "Doctors and Trauma in the First World War: The Response of British Military Psychiatrists," in *The Memory*

of Catastrophe, ed. Peter Gray and K. Oliver (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 91–105; and T.W. Salmon, "Some Problems of Disabled Ex-Service Men Three Years after the Armistice," *Mental Hygiene*, vol. 6 (1922), 1–10. Despite the increased distance of human beings from the actual conduct of warfare, it seems that we cannot fully escape the effects of this conduct. One has only to look at evidence, anecdotal and empirical, of drone pilots to understand that distance does not erase the psychological impact of killing another human being. Even with autonomous weapons systems, a human being is involved at some point in the decision matrix, necessarily involving an ethical assessment of warfare. When a target is nonhuman (as in an enemy computer system), the effects of waging war against such an enemy (even to the second and third order) are effects on human beings.

[19] This change could even be characterized in terms similar to Thomas Kuhn's model of paradigm shifts within the history of science. Cf. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[20] Some, indeed, have argued for the possibility of the future autonomy of artificial intelligence—a phenomenon often termed the *singularity*. This is a possibility that I do not seriously consider here, though it has been explored in various media. See "Artificial Intelligence Poses Questions for Nature of War: Mattis," *Phys. org*, February 18, 2018, available at <https://phys.org/news/2018-02-artificial-intelligence-poses-nature-war.html>. In this volume, see especially contributions by Patterson, Fairclough, and Totten.

[21] Randall Thomas Davidson, "The Armistice," in *The Testing of a Nation* (London: MacMillan, 1919), 156. Note also Archbishop Davidson's comments at a memorial service for the fallen, held at Westminster Abbey on May 24, 1919: "Our solemn service to-day has no parallel or close precedent in the history of the world. For we are commemorating before God something which never happened until now among the sons of men. Many times there have been great wars. Many times has the world witnessed splendid fellowship and heroic devotion unto death. But now, now only, has there come to pass what you and I have seen" (211). McNeill comments regarding the paradigm-shattering experience of World War I for many, "Those who experienced the war were quite unable to fit what happened into any pattern of prior experience. Their initial intoxication with dreams of glory curdled into horror and a sense of helpless entrapment as the slaughter of the trenches persisted month after month," McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*, 308.

[22] Nigel C. Hunt, *Memory, War and Trauma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Hunt helpfully suggests ways of healing from societal war trauma

through collective remembrance and memorialization. In the same vein, McNeill argues that "[i]t is . . . no longer practicable to treat World War I as an unparalled [*sic*] catastrophe interrupting the ordinary course of historical development. If nothing else, World War II proved that the Great War was not unique." See McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*, 308.

[23] McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*, 386–387.

[24] This was also the guiding principle that motivated the American founders: "In 1776, American leaders believed that it was not enough to win the war. They also had to win in a way that was consistent with the values of their society and the principles of their cause. . . . American leaders resolved that the War of Independence would be conducted with a respect for human rights, even of the enemy." See David Hackett Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 375–376.

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Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Mark C. Lee, USA, D.Min., Ph.D., is an Episcopal priest, having served in ordained ministry for over 18 years. He has experience in parish ministry, academia, and banking and finance. Chaplain Lee is currently a certified educator candidate with Accredited Clinical Pastoral Education. Previously, he served as the curriculum developer and instructor at U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School, teaching courses on moral injury, combat/emergency medical ministry, and other topics. His previous military assignments include deputy garrison chaplain/resource manager at U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan; brigade chaplain at 1st Armored Brigade Command, 2nd Infantry Division, at Camp Hovey; 98th Medical Detachment (Combat Stress Control) at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington; and operations chaplain at 14th Engineer Battalion, I Corps. Chaplain Lee has experienced two combat deployments. His formal education includes a doctor of philosophy from the University of Aberdeen, a doctor of ministry from Erskine Theological Seminary, a master of divinity from Princeton Theological Seminary, and a master of business administration and bachelor of science from the University of Southern California. Chaplain Lee is married to Kyo Young Park and father to Nicole and Lauren.

Marc LiVecche, Ph.D., is the executive editor of *Providence: A Journal of Christianity and American Foreign Policy.* He is also Scholar of Christian Ethics at the Institute on Religion and Democracy, research scholar at the Philos Project, and the McDonald Visiting Scholar at the McDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics, and Public Life in Christ Church College at Oxford University. Dr. LiVecche completed a doctor of philosophy in theological and political ethics at the University of Chicago. While at Chicago, Dr. LiVecche worked under the supervision of the political theorist Jean Bethke

Elshtain until her death in 2013. His dissertation, titled "With Malice Toward None: The Moral Ground for Killing in War," takes a classic just war view of the question of killing in its theological and ethical dimensions in part as a response to the crisis of moral injury. Prior to his work in Chicago, Dr. LiVecche completed a master of arts in theology from Wheaton College and, before that, spent 12 years doing a variety of things in Central Europe—including leading seminars on ethics onsite at the former Auschwitz II–Birkenau Nazi concentration camp in Poland, an experience that allowed him to continue his undergraduate study of the Shoah, a study that helped permanently inoculate him against pacifism.

Colonel John Mark Mattox, USA (Ret.), Ph.D., is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, where he directs the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Graduate Fellowship Program. He was the inaugural General Hugh Shelton Chair in Ethics at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Dr. Mattox is also the former dean of the Defense Threat Reduction University and commandant of the Defense Nuclear Weapons School. He served on three continents as a field artillery officer and is a veteran of the First Gulf War. He holds degrees from Brigham Young University, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and a doctor of philosophy in philosophy and semiotic studies from Indiana University. He has served on the faculty of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the University of Maryland, and Missouri State University.

General James C. McConville, USA, currently serves as the 40th Chief of Staff of the Army. He previously served as the 36th Vice Chief of Staff of the Army from June 16, 2017 to July 26, 2019. General McConville served as commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), where he also served as the commanding general of Combined Joint Task Force–101, Operation *Enduring Freedom*; deputy commanding general (Support) of

Combined Joint Task Force–101, Operation *Enduring Freedom*; commander of 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Operation *Iraqi Freedom*; commander of 2nd Squadron, 17th Calvary Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); and commander of C Troop, 2nd Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (Light). His key staff assignments include the U.S. Army deputy chief of staff, G-1; chief of legislative liaison; executive officer to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; G-3 for 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); J5 strategic planner for U.S. Special Operations Command; S-3 for 25th Combat Aviation Brigade; S-3 for 5th Squadron, 9th Cavalry; and S-3 for Flight Concepts Division. He holds a bachelor of science from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and a master in aerospace engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology. He was also a National Security Fellow at Harvard University in 2002.

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Just American Wars: Ethical Dilemmas in U.S. Military History (Routledge, 2018), *Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Contemporary Post-Conflict* (Yale University Press, 2012), *Ethics Beyond War's End* (Georgetown University Press, 2012), *Debating the War of Ideas*, co-edited with John Gallagher (Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), *Military Chaplains in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Beyond: Advisement and Leader Engagement in Highly Religious Environments* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), *Just War Thinking: Morality and Pragmatism in the Struggle against Contemporary Threats* (Lexington Books, 2007), and *Politics in a Religious World: Building a Religiously Literate U.S. Foreign Policy* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).

Colonel C. Anthony Pfaff, USA (Ret.), Ph.D., is the Research Professor for the Military Profession and Ethics in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Pfaff previously served as director for Iraq on the National Security Council staff and on the Policy Planning staff at the Department of State. Dr. Pfaff holds a bachelor of arts in philosophy and economics from Washington and Lee University, a master of arts in philosophy from Stanford University, a master of science in national resource management from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and a doctor of philosophy from Georgetown University. He is the author of "Proxy War Ethics," *Journal of National Security Law & Policy* 9, no. 2 (August 2017), as well as numerous other works on the topic of military ethics.

The Reverend Dr. (Wing Commander) David Richardson is a British chaplain serving in the Royal Air Force (RAF). He was originally ordained into the Church of Ireland. A graduate of the universities of Edinburgh, Dublin, Belfast, and King's College London, he is currently completing further study at Cardiff University. Recently appointed as staff chaplain to the Chaplain-in-Chief, he has served on a variety of RAF flying stations and training units, and has served as an instructor at the United Kingdom's Armed Forces Chaplaincy Centre. His operational experience includes tours across Afghanistan and Iraq. Married to Ruth, a former teacher, since 1999, they have two sons.

Michael Snape, Ph.D., is the inaugural Michael Ramsey Professor of Anglican Studies at Durham University in the United Kingdom and is an ecumenical lay canon of Durham Cathedral. He earned a first-class bachelor of arts in history and theology and was awarded a doctor of philosophy from University of Birmingham. Since the late 1990s, he has specialized in the study of Christianity and conflict from approximately 1700 to the present. He was Reader in Religion, War, and Society at the University of Birmingham before being appointed to the Department of Theology and Religion at Durham in 2015. Professor Snape is the historian of the Royal Army Chaplains' Department and a historical adviser to the Young Men's Christian Association England and the Bible Society. Since 2009, he has co-organized the Amport Conference on Religion and War in the Modern World, which is held annually in the Armed Forces' Chaplaincy Centre, a constituent college of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. His major publications include *God and the British Soldier: Religion and the British Army in the First and Second World Wars* (Routledge, 2007), *The Royal Army Chaplains' Department, 1796–1953: Clergy Under Fire* (Boydell Press, 2008), and *God and Uncle Sam: Religion and America's Armed Forces in World War II* (Boydell Press, 2015).

Commander Thomas J. Statler, USN, is the command chaplain in the Joint Forces Staff College at the National Defense University. He teaches a military ethics elective on the just war tradition and the profession of arms and is the faculty ethics advisor. Chaplain Statler earned a bachelor of science in secondary education, a master of divinity, and a master of theology. After receiving his naval professional code in ethics, he also taught two ethics electives at the Naval Postgraduate School from 2008 to 2011. Chaplain Statler is certified in Joint Professional Military Education Phase II and is a charter member of the Navy Chaplain Corps Ethics Community of Interest.

Padre Andrew Totten, MBE, was born in Belfast and educated at Queen's University, Trinity College Dublin, and Cardiff University. Ordained as

an Anglican priest in the Church of Ireland, he has been a British army chaplain since 1994. Serving at regimental, brigade, and divisional levels, his operational experience covers Bosnia, Kosovo, Ulster, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He graduated from the Royal College of Defence Studies in 2017 with the individual prize for strategic analysis. His current assignment is as principal at the Armed Forces' Chaplaincy Centre, a constituent college of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. He is an Honorary Chaplain to the Queen.

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