

FM 100-1

The



ARMY

AUGUST 19

When used in this publication, "he," "him," "his," and "men" represent both the masculine and feminine genders.

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***FM 100-1**

**HEADQUARTERS
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THE ARMY

Foreword

There is little need for me to elaborate greatly on the contents of FM 100-1. It is brief but profound. I have used the earlier edition often as a primer for conveying to civilians who and what we are as an institution, and I commend this edition to your professional library for these purposes as well. It is also my persuasion that each of us can profit by sober reflection on its contents—those fundamentals which drive our profession and which mark us individually as unique contributors to the nation and its security.

The keystone of our contribution toward peace is total competence in waging war. That expertness can come only from an ardent study of tactics and strategy both historical and current. It demands that we develop a full appreciation for applying the principles of war in our decision process and that we cultivate a full comprehension of both the positive application of military power and its evident limitations.

The modern military professional is diverted from full-time pursuit of any such study because of the simultaneous demand for specialization—both administrative and technical—without which we could not field an adequate force. But it is clear that unless we actively pursue a process of continuing research and reflection on our profession, we risk losing the broader vision, the creativity, and the sense of purpose demanded of military leadership and upon which the Army's success in combat is totally dependent.

***This publication supersedes FM 100-1, 29 September 1978.**

A careful reading and thorough understanding of this manual will enhance our ability to perform our individual jobs in operational situations and cause us to scrutinize constructively those basic but critical assumptions underlying our plans. We must not permit ourselves to fall into the trap of using program guidance as the basis for decisions which clearly demand sound military judgment.

We seek from the soldiers, NCOs, and officers of our units, and from our civilians, an instant capability to go to war in defense of our national interests. The concomitant obligation of the Army's senior leadership is to be prepared to lead our Army wisely.



E. C. MEYER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

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Preface

In this document are expressed the fundamental principles governing employment of United States Army forces in support of national objectives of the United States. Tactical doctrine for US Army operations can be found in appropriate field manuals. The basic operational concepts for US Army tactical doctrine are set forth in FM 100-5, *Operations*.

Doctrine for joint operations, as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to provide guidance for all US Armed Forces, can be found in JCS Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.

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The Nation And The Army

The Constitutional and Legal Basis

"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

This preamble to the Constitution of the United States of America sets forth the fundamental purposes of the Constitution itself, and of the federal union it was designed to create:

- To form a more perfect union.
- To provide for the common defense.
- To promote the general welfare.
- To secure the blessings of liberty.

These fundamental statements of the national purpose provide the basic justification for the establishment of the Armed Forces of the United States; the legal basis and framework for a military establishment charged with providing for the nation's common defense are set forth in subsequent sections of the Constitution.

The Constitution firmly establishes the fundamental principle of maintaining civilian control over the Armed Forces of the United States so as to insure that the Armed Forces remain focused on, and responsive to, the needs and desires of the American people as expressed by their elected representatives. This is accomplished by the constitutional provisions which vest command and control of the nation's Armed Forces in the President and Congress, respectively. Thus, the Constitution specifies that Congress alone has the power to raise and support armies and perhaps most importantly, to declare war. The Constitution further provides that the President, as the nation's Chief Executive, will serve as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. This authority, coupled with treaty-making authority, appointive power—including the appointment of federal officers of the Armed Forces—and requirements to "... take care that the laws be faithfully executed..." are the principal constitutional bases for Presidential involvement in national security affairs.

Thus, the responsibility for managing the nation's defense through the Armed Forces of the United States is, constitutionally, shared by the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. The joint nature of this responsibility has more explicitly been defined and delimited by the War Powers Resolution of 1973.

National Security Act

While the Constitution establishes the need for a duly constituted system of defense to secure and protect the nation and its vital interests, it does not define the precise nature of that system. As a result, the national defense structure has taken many forms throughout our nation's history. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, is the legislative act which establishes the current executive structure for national defense.

The 1947 statute was enacted by Congress in recognition of the need for greater unity and coordination in providing for the security of the nation. In general, the act called for a National Security Council and a National Military Establishment; the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and designation of the Secretary of Defense as a civilian cabinet-level officer responsible for formulating general policy within the National Military Establishment. In 1949, the National Security Act was amended in order to achieve greater unity of effort, flexibility, and economy. The revised act subordinated the military departments to the Department of Defense. Previously, the military departments held cabinet-level status and were loosely grouped under the title, "National Military Establishment." The powers of the Secretary of Defense were expanded and a chairman prescribed for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The National Security Act, as amended, is also the source from which the broad functions of the Department of Defense (DOD) can be derived. Specifically set forth in DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," 26 January 1980, these functions prescribe that the DOD will maintain and employ armed forces to:

- Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.
- Insure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests.
- Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.
- Safeguard the internal security of the United States.

While these broad functions provide direction and purpose to DOD's overall activities, the specific goals and missions of the Army and the other military Services stem from national objectives and policy as determined by the duly constituted political authority.

The Army's Contribution

The increasingly dynamic and unpredictable nature of today's international environment accentuates the critical role of the Army in the overall national security

structure of the United States. The Army's capability to apply force and to establish and maintain land control affords the National Command Authority flexibility in terms of the range of political and military options available to it. The success of Army forces in supporting national policy throughout the spectrum of conflict is in large measure dependent on the coordinated development of the land, sea, and air forces of the United States and on their employment as an integrated team. This integrated team concept, together with the fact that the basic mission of the Armed Forces is to support United States policy, provides the basis for the organization and structure of the overall national security system, the Department of Defense, and the Army in particular.

The Department of the Army has overall responsibility for preparation of those land forces necessary for effective prosecution of war, and, in accordance with integrated mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war. The land forces of the Army include its organic combat and service forces and all organic aviation and water transport assets.

The Army and Strategy Formulation

The Army, both as an institution and through its members assigned to the Office

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and to unified and specified commands, provides input to the national strategy formulation process and plays a major role in the formulation of military strategy. Through the Army planning system, force planning, and the research, development, and acquisition of arms and equipment, the Army provides strategic analysis and advice on the forces necessary in peacetime to deter war and provide a credible war-fighting capability. Through contingency planning and exercises, and through the evaluation of actual field operation of Army forces in wartime, the Army provides strategic operational advice on how land forces can best be employed to enhance and protect US interests and objectives.

National security depends not only upon the maintenance of strong military capabilities but also on effective planning for their use. Individual plans may be perishable; military planning is not. The principal purpose of military planning is to provide the most effective use of military forces in meeting challenges to our security interests. In doing so, the Army individually, and in concert with the other Services, seeks to:

- Provide multiple options for national command authorities.
- Base military planning on the most current and authoritative guidance available, especially regarding assumptions on the pre-hostility actions which US political authorities are prepared to take in responding to hostile threats to our interests.
- Inform civilian authorities of the risks associated with our plans; and provide judgements regarding the most effective use of additional resources in reducing those risks.

National Power and Conflict Resolution

National power, the aggregate capacity of a state to achieve its national interests and to influence the behavior of other states, consists of several distinct yet inter-related elements—political, economic, socio-psychological, technical, and military. The attainment of national objectives, such as peace among nations on terms not inimical to United States interests, necessarily involves simultaneous employment of these components of national power. Specific goals supporting any national objective are achieved through application of selected combinations of these elements of national power. Military and national goals are therefore inextricably woven together. Application of one or all of the components of national power, including military power, may be required as the nation faces the broad sweep of international relations, ranging from free and harmonious mutual agreements between sovereign nations to unrestrained global military conflict.

The need for military forces to support and protect United States interests is based on the fact that conflict, or the potential for conflict, is inherent in relations among people and nations. Conflicts between nations may vary in scope and intensity from relatively minor contention or disagreement over policy, to fundamental and often irreconcilable clashes over ideologies and national objectives. Regardless of scope or intensity, any international conflict which can directly or indirectly affect United

States interests requires urgent address and resolution.

The majority of conflicts between nations are resolved peacefully through arbitration, negotiation, or compromise based on judicious application of one or more of the elements of power by contending nations. In those situations which affect significantly vital US interests, our political authorities may consider use of American military power. This means that the United States must prepare itself for the use of military power across the entire spectrum of conflict, from relatively mild policy disagreements, to fairly intense non-war confrontations of an economic or political nature, to a range of military situations which could conceivably include nuclear war. To achieve maximum effectiveness in support of a coherent national strategy, military power must, however, be applied in concert with, and in support of, the other relevant elements of national power.

The Strategic Aim and Military Posture

The Army of the United States, along with the other military forces of the United States, is therefore designed to provide a visible, credible, and realistic capability to support the nation's political initiatives, to reduce the probability of armed aggression against the United States, and, should war occur, to win and terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. The

word *deterrence* is frequently used to describe the first two of these capabilities having to do with conflict prevention. In a broad sense, deterring an adversary's inclination to use military force hinges on his calculation that the anticipated benefits of aggression will be exceeded by the costs. Such a calculation is a function of such complex assessments as comparative political, economic, and military strengths, mutual understanding of what constitutes vital national interests, and the respective national will of the parties toward those interests. From an exclusively military perspective, an effective deterrent strategy must take into account three primary elements:

- Geography, which is the "conditioner" of any potential military conflict.
- Capability to wage war.
- The national will to use that capability in support of national goals and interests.

A potential adversary must clearly perceive that the armed forces of the United States are capable of appropriate and rapid response and that the nation's leaders are willing to use those armed forces as required to protect US national interests. Deterrence of attack on the United States or its vital interests also depends, in large measure, on a sufficient and secure nuclear and retaliatory chemical capability, and a perceived willingness to use that capability if need be. However, a deterrent which rests solely on resort to such weapons cannot be credible under all circumstances. Consequently, effective and credible military options appropriate to a broad range of conflict levels are necessary.

This requires that the United States raise and maintain balanced, multipurpose land, sea, and air forces capable of employment in a wide range of geographical and threat environments.



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The Army in the Spectrum of Conflict

Introduction

War, in a formal sense, can be defined as the extreme expression of irreconcilable political viewpoints or purposes, be they international, national, or subnational. Narrowly conceived as a clash between opposing military forces, its broader framework includes the selected orchestration of political, economic, psychological, technological, and diplomatic means to either attain one's own purposes, or to frustrate those proclaimed or implied by an adversary or set of adversaries. Confrontation and conflict can occur without invoking military options. For that portion of the conflict spectrum involving military action, several distinctions and definitions aid the discussion.

General War—armed conflict between major powers, in which the total resources of the belligerents may be employed and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.

Limited War—armed conflict, between two or more nations, at levels below those of general war.

Unconventional War—military and paramilitary operations which include guerrilla warfare, acts of subversion, sabotage, and terrorism or other operations

low in visibility, and often covert or clandestine, and which may include military actions taken against these operations.

Revolutionary War—intrastate conflict resulting from an insurgent's attempt to seize, by force of arms, political power within a country.

However war is categorized, certain considerations define very fundamentally the Army's role in it.

Political Purpose. Since war is, among other things, a political act for political ends, the conduct of a war, in terms of strategy and constraints, is defined primarily by its political objectives.

Military Goal. Since military forces are instruments of political purpose, the military goal must be to further that purpose. Such limitations as are inherent or implied in political purposes must also be reflected in military missions and tasks.

Scope. The scope and intensity of modern warfare are therefore defined and limited by political purposes and military goals. The interactions of military operations, political judgments, and national will serve to further define, and sometimes limit, the achievable objectives of a conflict and, thus, to determine its duration and the conditions for its termination.

Landpower. The imposition of territorial control, or the resistance to such control, has been the central military objective in the majority of wars of recorded history. Control of seas and of airspace is also vital in modern land warfare; without this extraterritorial security, land control is not likely to be achieved nor sustained. All military Services thus make direct and essential contributions to the ultimate control of land and of its peoples.

While the power to deny or to destroy is possessed by all the military Services, the fundamental truth is that *only ground forces* possess the power to exercise direct, continuing, and comprehensive control over land, its resources, and its peoples. Land forces thus perform important, and largely unique, functions besides denial and destruction: *landpower can make permanent the otherwise transitory advantages achieved by air and naval forces.*

Spectrum of Conflict

The United States Army, by virtue of its capability to establish and maintain control over land at prescribed times and places, can operate across a very broad band of the total spectrum of conflict. In a dynamic and unpredictable international environment, this multiple capability provides a hedge against uncertainty and a full range of choices to the President and the Congress. Hence, a flexible Army serves to strengthen the nation's position in security and foreign policies, in negotiating treaties, in dealing with foreign governments, and in establishing

alliances for mutual security. In conjunction with the other military Services, the Army fulfills three major strategic roles: conflict prevention, conflict control, and conflict termination.

■ **Conflict Prevention.** Likely conflict situations can be forecast through analysis of national interests, goals, and policy objectives of the United States, its allies, and potential adversaries. Strategies can be developed to anticipate potential problems and to resolve them if they arise. Such strategies, may, and likely will, require bringing together a combination of the elements of national power to reach a solution acceptable to the parties to the dispute without resort to the use of force. While military power should complement diplomatic initiatives, it may assume the primary role if negotiations fail to resolve differences. However, the primary contribution of military power to conflict prevention is the threat of its use should other avenues fail.

The deterrent value of military forces is not simply a function of size, quality, and operational capabilities. It also depends on the perceptions an adversary holds regarding their effectiveness and our national willingness to employ them. *An evident ability and will to wage war effectively is essential to the success of conflict prevention.* The Army's forces in being, both at home and abroad, are designed to provide a balanced range of capabilities to insure that the national political leadership possesses a full range of options in international undertakings. While inexorably linked to the US strategic nuclear deterrent, these forces make credible the perception by any adversary that the nation has the war-fighting ability and the resolve to employ varying degrees of force to protect vital interests and secure objectives. Forward-deployed Army forces identify regions of US vital interests, and signal the highest degree of commitment and assurance that aggression will not be tolerated. The very

presence of Army forces commits the prestige, honor, and resolve of the United States to stated national objectives. Their deployment in times of crisis is the gravest response the nation can make short of war, and demonstrates the national will to prevent conflict.

Conflict Control. In today's world, the advent of hostilities will quite likely be followed closely by political initiatives intended to limit the scope of conflict. These initiatives may involve limiting geographical areas of interest, ruling out specific weapon systems, or creating conditions conducive to negotiations. Diplomatic actions may include:

- Respecting the neutrality of nations not involved in the conflict.
- Adopting constraints on the use of special weapons systems.
- Proposing a cease-fire.

It is also true, however, that the capability and willingness to act quickly, and decisively, and in a manner consistent with expressed political goals are essential to conflict control. This is especially true of conflicts involving conventional forces—a fact which makes Army forces particularly appropriate in conflict control. Their inherent flexibility in terms of strategic and tactical mobility and firepower enhances the nation's ability to respond rapidly and efficiently to a variety of threat scenarios. However, the piecemeal application of conventional military power to control conflict is of little, if any, value. Land forces must be committed at a level of strength which, from the outset, provides a favorable ratio of combat power to insure a swift and decisive military resolution of the conflict.


Conflict Termination. The destructive power of modern military weaponry confronts all antagonists in modern war with the possibility that their use could

result in destruction of the very objective each side seeks to attain or preserve. Therefore, a positive strategy—one which provides for early achievement of national aims and early conflict termination—is essential and must be planned in advance. In conflicts with adversaries of more limited power, the United States may possess sufficient conventional means to pursue hostilities to an advantageous conclusion. In conflicts with major powers, the United States may be faced with situations where the achievement of an advantageous position for conflict termination may require a political decision to use nuclear weapons.

In either case, Army forces are uniquely suited to conflict termination by virtue of their capability to close with and destroy the organized and irregular forces of an enemy power or coalition of powers; to seize and control critical land areas and enemy populations, to include the economic base; and to defend those areas essential to the successful prosecution of a war by the United States and its allies.

The Army and General War

General war, which may or may not involve the use of nuclear or chemical weapons, requires a US military capability to respond effectively to overt aggression, minimize damage to the United States, defeat enemy military forces, and undertake military operations designed to conclude the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. Prior to war, the Army's



GENERAL WAR

forward-deployed forces, standing guard with other US and allied forces, backed by US strategic reserves, serve notice that aggression will be resisted. If war comes, it is the task of these forces to deny the enemy the success he seeks. The Army makes an essential contribution to the successful prosecution of general war by its ability to conduct the land battle with or without nuclear or chemical weapons, and by its staying power in prolonged military operations.

The Army and Limited War

At levels of conflict short of general war, the Army must be able to field units tailored to situations that may face the United States and its allies. Army doctrine, organization, equipment, and training are, therefore,



LIMITED WAR

designed to assure the capability to execute missions in wars of any size, intensity, scope, and geographic location. An Army capability for worldwide deployment is essential if the United States, in concert with its allies, is to respond appropriately to the wide variety of circumstances likely to be encountered in today's highly dynamic international environment.

The Army and Security Assistance

US national security interests are well-served by the stability and security of our allies and of other free-world and nonaligned nations which share our goals of independent development in a climate of peace. Security assistance programs of the Departments of State and Defense provide to these coun-




SECURITY ASSISTANCE

tries economic and military support and services considered essential to their stability and security. The Army makes an important contribution to these programs through partnership activities and in satisfying assistance obligations established by the national political authority. Military advisory and assistance programs with friendly states are instrumental in implementing US national security policies. The Army shares in the logical outgrowth of these programs—the benefits of mutual friendship, cooperation, understanding, and resolution of tension—all of which serve the nation's interests.

Supplementary Roles

The national security role, as defined by national policy, is the sole determinant of the need for an Army. A standing force,



SUPPLEMENTARY ROLES

adequate to its basic function, can also contribute in peacetime to the nation's general welfare through limited domestic involvement. Such involvement is, however, constrained by law, tradition, and the need to maintain the Army's readiness to fulfill its primary roles. Within these limitations, the Army contributes to domestic progress in areas where its training, organizational skills, and flexibility are needed and appropriate:

- Providing humanitarian relief during national disasters.
- Assisting civilian communities during civil disturbance emergencies by providing men and equipment in support of civilian police forces.
- Assisting civilian communities with civic-actions programs.
- Improving flood control and navigation.
- Adding to the nation's scientific and technological capacity through extensive research and development programs.

Because the Army reflects the character of the nation's institutions, values, and motivations, it also strives for equal opportunity and the betterment of those citizens who

serve in uniform by equipping them with technical, managerial, and leadership skills of great value to the civilian sector. These roles represent positive contributions to the nation's well-being.



Chapter

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The Principles of War and the Operational Dimension

Introduction

Modern warfare requires the application of both the science and the art of war. The science of war is in a constant state of change, driven by new technological developments which can radically change the nature of the battlefield. The art of war, on the other hand, involves the critical historical analysis of warfare. The military professional derives from this analysis the fundamental principles—their combinations and applications—which have produced success on the battlefields of history. The principles of war, thus derived, are therefore a part of the art rather than the science of war. They are neither immutable nor causal, and they do not provide a precise mathematical formula for success in battle. Their value lies in their utility as a frame of reference for analysis of strategic and tactical issues. For the strategist, the principles of war provide a set of military planning interrogatives—a set of questions that should be considered if military strategy is to best serve the national interest. For the tactician, these principles provide an operational framework for the military actions he has been trained to carry out. They are neither intended nor designed to be prescriptive; the principles of war, if understood and applied properly, should stimulate thought and enhance flexibility of action.

The Principles of War

The United States Army published its first set of principles of war in a 1921 Army training regulation. These principles were in large measure drawn from the work of British Major General J. F. C. Fuller, who developed a set of principles of war during World War I to serve as guides for his own Army. In the ensuing years, these original principles of war adopted by our Army have undergone minor revisions and changes, but have essentially stood the test of analysis, experimentation, and practice. For the United States Army today, the Principles of War are:

Objective
Offensive
Mass
Economy of Force
Maneuver
Unity of Command
Security
Surprise
Simplicity

1. Objective. *Every military operation should be directed towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.*

As a derivative of the political aim, the *strategic military objective* of a nation at war must be to apply whatever degree of force is necessary to allow attainment of the political purpose or aim for which the war is being fought. When the political end desired is the total defeat of the adversary, then the strategic military objective will most likely be the defeat of the enemy's armed forces and the destruction of his will to resist. It is essential, however, that the political purpose be clearly defined *and* attainable by the considered application of the various elements of the nation's power. Not until the political purpose has been determined and defined by the President and the Congress can strategic and tactical objectives be clearly identified and developed. Once developed, the strategic objectives must constantly be subjected to rigorous analysis and review to insure that they continue to reflect accurately not only the ultimate political end desired, but also any political constraints imposed on the application of military force.

Just as the strategic military objective focuses on the political ends, so must tactical military operations be directed toward clearly defined, decisive, and attainable *tactical objectives* that ultimately assist in achieving the strategic aims. Similarly, intermediate tactical objectives must quickly and economically contribute, directly or indirectly, to the purpose of the ultimate objective. The selection of objectives is based on consideration of the overall mission of the command, the commander's assigned mission, the means available, and the military characteristics of the operational area. Every commander must clearly understand the overall mission of the higher command, his own mission, and the tasks he must perform and the reasons therefore; he must consider each contemplated action in light

of his mission, and he must communicate clearly to his subordinate commanders the intent of the operation upon which the command as a whole is about to embark.

2. Offensive. *Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.*

While the principle of the objective requires that all efforts be directed toward a clearly defined "common goal," the principle of offensive suggests that offensive action, or maintenance of the initiative, is the most effective and decisive way to pursue and attain that "common goal." This is fundamentally true in both the *strategic and tactical sense*. While it may sometimes be necessary to adopt a defensive posture, this should be only a temporary condition until the necessary means are available to resume offensive operations. An offensive spirit must be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations—it must be an *active* defense, not a *passive* one. This is so because offensive action, whatever form it takes, is the means by which the nation or a military force captures and holds the initiative, achieves results, and maintains freedom of action. It permits the political leader or the military commander to capitalize on the initiative, impose his will on the enemy, set the terms and select the place of confrontation or battle, exploit weaknesses and react to rapidly changing situations and unexpected developments. No matter what the level, strategic or tactical, the side that retains the initiative through offensive action forces the foe to *react* rather than *act*.

3. Mass. *Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.*

In the *strategic context*, this principle suggests that the nation should commit, or be prepared to commit, a predominance of national power to those regions or areas of

the world where the threat to vital security interests is greatest. For nations such as the United States, which have global security interests in terms of politico-military alliances and commitments and resource dependencies, the accurate and timely determination of where the threat to vital national interests is greatest is becoming increasingly more difficult. In today's volatile world, the nature and source of threat often change in dramatic fashion. It is therefore incumbent upon military strategists to anticipate the most likely areas of concern and develop suitable contingency plans. Since every possible contingency or trouble spot cannot be anticipated, much less planned for, it is absolutely essential for Army planners and Army forces to retain flexibility of thought and action.

In the *tactical dimension*, this principle suggests that superior combat power must be concentrated at the decisive place and time in order to achieve decisive results. This superiority results from the proper combination of the elements of combat power at a place and time, and in a manner of the commander's choosing, in order to retain the initiative. The massing of forces, together with the proper application of other principles of war, may enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive battle outcomes.

4. Economy of Force. *Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.*

As a reciprocal of the principle of mass, economy of force in the *strategic dimension* suggests that, in the absence of unlimited resources, a nation may have to accept some risk in areas where vital national interests are not immediately at stake. This means that if the nation must focus predominant power toward a clearly defined primary threat, it cannot allow attainment of that objective to be compromised by unnecessary diversions to areas of lower priority. This

involves risk, requires astute strategic planning and judgment by political and military leaders, and again places a premium on the need for flexibility of thought and action.

At the *tactical level*, the principle of economy of force requires that minimum means be employed in areas other than where the main effort is intended to be employed. It requires, as at the strategic level, the acceptance of prudent risks in selected areas in order to achieve superiority in the area where decision is sought. Economy of force missions may require the forces employed to attack, defend, delay, or conduct deception operations.

5. Maneuver. *Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.*

In the *strategic sense*, this principle has three interrelated dimensions: flexibility, mobility, and maneuverability. The first of these involves the need for flexibility in thought, plans, and operations. Such flexibility enhances the ability to rapidly react to unforeseen circumstances. Given the global nature of US interests and the dynamic character of the international scene, such flexibility is crucial. The second dimension involves strategic mobility, which is especially critical for an insular power such as the United States. In order to react promptly and concentrate and project power on the primary objective, strategic airlift and seairlift are essential. The final strategic dimension involves maneuverability within the theater of operations so as to focus maximum strength against the enemy's weakest point and thereby gain the strategic advantage.

In the *tactical sense*, maneuver is an essential element of combat power. It contributes significantly to sustaining the initiative to exploiting success, to preserving freedom of action, and to reducing vulnera-

bility. The object of maneuver is to concentrate or disperse forces in a manner designed to place the enemy at a disadvantage, thus achieving results that would otherwise be more costly in men and materiel. At all levels, successful application of this principle requires not only fire and movement, but also flexibility of thought, plans, and operations, and the considered application of the principles of mass and economy of force.

6. Unity of Command. *For every objective, there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander.*

This principle insures that all efforts are focused on a common goal. At the *strategic level*, this common goal equates to the political purpose of the United States, and the broad strategic objectives which flow therefrom. It is the common goal which, at the national level, determines the military forces necessary for its achievement. The coordination of these forces requires unity of effort. At the national level, the Constitution provides for unity of command by appointing the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed forces. The President is assisted in this role by the national security organization, which includes the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the highest level, and the unified and specified commands and joint task forces at the operational levels.

In the *tactical dimension*, it is axiomatic that the employment of military forces in a manner that develops their full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command means directing and coordinating the action of all forces toward a common goal or objective. Coordination may be achieved by

cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by vesting a single tactical commander with the requisite authority to direct and coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal.

7. Security. *Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.*

Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. At the *strategic level*, security requires that active and passive measures be taken to protect the United States and its Armed Forces against espionage, subversion, and strategic intelligence collection. However, implementation of such security measures must be balanced against the need to prevent them from severing the link between the American public and its Army. In addition, they should not be allowed to interfere with flexibility of thought and action, since rigidity and dogmatism increase vulnerability to enemy surprise. In this regard, thorough knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine, and detailed strategic staff planning can improve security and reduce vulnerability to surprise.

At the *tactical level*, security is essential to the protection and husbanding of combat power. Security results from the measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, sabotage, or annoyance. Security may be achieved through the establishment and maintenance of protective measures against hostile acts or influence; or it may be assured by deception operations designed to confuse and dissipate enemy attempts to interfere with the force being secured. Risk

is an inherent condition in war; application of the principle of security does not suggest overcautiousness or the avoidance of calculated risk.

8. Surprise. *Strike the enemy at a time and/or place and in a manner for which he is unprepared.*

To a large degree, the principle of surprise is the reciprocal of the principle of security. Concealing one's own capabilities and intentions creates the opportunity to strike the enemy unaware or unprepared. However, *strategic surprise* is difficult to achieve. Rapid advances in strategic surveillance technology make it increasingly more difficult to mask or cloak the large scale marshaling or movement of manpower and equipment. This problem is compounded in an open society such as the United States, where freedom of press and information are highly valued. However, the United States can achieve a degree of psychological surprise due to its strategic deployment capability. The rapid deployment of US combat forces into a crisis area can forestall, or upset, the plans and preparations of an enemy. This capability can give the United States the advantage in both a physical and psychological sense by denying the enemy the initiative.

Surprise is important in the *tactical dimension* for it can decisively affect the outcome of battle. With surprise, success out of proportion to the effort expended may be obtained. Surprise results from going against an enemy at a time and/or place, or in a manner, for which he is unprepared. It is not essential that the enemy be taken unaware, but only that he become aware too

late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed and alacrity, employment of unexpected forces, effective intelligence, deception operations of all kinds, variations of tactics and methods of operation, and operations security.

9. Simplicity. *Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to insure thorough understanding.*

In both the *strategic and tactical dimension*, guidance, plans, and orders should be as simple and direct as the attainment of the objective will allow. The *strategic importance* of the principle of simplicity goes well beyond its more traditional tactical application: it is an important element in the development and enhancement of public support. If the American people are to commit their lives and resources to a military operation, they must understand the purpose which is to be achieved. Political and military objectives and operations must therefore be presented in clear, concise, understandable terms: simple and direct plans and orders cannot compensate for ambiguous and cloudy objectives. In its military application, this principle promotes strategic flexibility by encouraging broad strategic guidance rather than detailed and involved instruction.

At the *tactical level*, simplicity of plans and instructions contributes to successful operations. Direct, simple plans, and clear, concise orders are essential to reduce the chances for misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, the simplest plan executed promptly is to be preferred over the complex plan executed later.

Application

While any set of principles of war adopted by a nation has application across the entire spectrum of warfare, it must be understood that these principles are interdependent and interrelated. No single principle can be blindly adhered to, or observed, to the exclusion of the others; none can assure victory in battle without reinforcement from one or more of the others. Indeed, the military forces of each nation conduct operations on the basis of operational concepts which are derived from combinations of principles. For example, an operational concept deriving from a combination of offense, mass, surprise, and maneuver might suggest a large military force, using masses of swiftly moving armored forces, whose dominant mode of operation is to overwhelm, disrupt, and destroy, using surprise and maneuver to assist in the execution.

Although the most common application of the principles of war is in the form of operational concepts on the field of battle, the principles can also be useful integrated into the *military estimate and decision process* as an aid to judgment and analysis. The principles of objective and unity of command, for example, can assist in mission analysis both at the strategic and tactical level. They are also valuable aids in determining the purpose and direction of effort. In a like manner, the principle of simplicity can serve as a measure for the formulation of tasks. The principles of offense, mass, economy of force, maneuver, security, and surprise can assist in the analysis of the situation as well as in the formulation of

courses of action. Again, simplicity can serve as the measure against which the courses of action can be compared.

Planning. *Planning* is essential to the operation of the Army both in preparing for war and in the conduct of war itself. Planning is both an art and a science. As a science it deals with the specifics of manpower, arms, equipment, and monies, both actual and projected. However, since the future cannot be accurately predicted nor the rate of change held constant, planning is also an art. As such, it deals in intangibles; as a distillation of military art, the principles of war are particularly valuable as an aid to planning.

Force planning, as part of the planning, programing, and budgeting system, is an integral part of preparation for war. Such planning deals primarily with fixed values, physical quantities, and unilateral action; with the mechanics of force structuring and force manning; and with the research, development, and acquisition of arms and equipment. While thus primarily concerned with the science of war, force planning also involves an appreciation of the art of war. Using the principles of war as a frame of reference, the force planner can better appreciate the potential utility of the designed force on the field of battle.

Contingency planning is the closest approximation among all planning forms to the conduct of actual war. It deals primarily with variable quantities, intangible forces and effects, and a continual interaction of opposites. While also concerned with the science of war, primarily the characteristics of weapons and the means for maneuvering, supplying, and controlling military forces, contingency planning draws more closely on the art of war. Like the principles of war, contingency plans are not absolutes, but are designed to identify the right things to do

and assist in doing things right. Application of the principles of war to the contingency planning process insures practicality and simplicity and provides a direct link to actual execution on the battlefield.

The Total Force

For purposes of national security planning, US Active and Reserve component forces and allied forces are conceived as an entity, the Total Force. Aside from the political advantages, these forces together possess a military effectiveness greater than the sum of the capabilities of their separate parts. In practical terms, this means that the Department of Defense and the individual Services take appropriate account of all capabilities of these forces, both in primary and alternate roles, when structuring US forces or planning their employment. Total Force planning, budgeting, and operations can increase employment options for specific weapon systems, expand the effective roles of Reserve and National Guard forces, take allied defense efforts more fully into account, and promote interservice and intra-alliance support.

Within the Army, this policy is reflected as a *Total Army* bond among the Active Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and the civilian work force. It is expressed in the balance of our force structure and in equipment modernization programs. Total Force operational planning reflects active cooperation and affiliation between Active and Reserve component units. It is designed

to enhance the mobilization potential of the Reserve units and insure their timely availability for wartime reinforcement.

The Operational Environment

Each military Service is designed for maximum effectiveness while operating on or within its associated medium—land, sea, or air. Since each medium meets the other two, the military forces of the United States are necessarily interdependent, each contributing vital capabilities for the coordinated employment of land, sea, and aerospace forces as an integrated team.

Each Service properly emphasizes development of capabilities designed to exploit the unique characteristics of the primary medium of its operation; and each seeks to develop or acquire force capabilities essential to the accomplishment of its assigned missions and functions on or within that medium. Both considerations are valid criteria for the development of weapons and equipment, but the second is the decisive factor in total US military force structuring.

The proper assignment of weapons and equipment to military forces for specified roles and missions depends, finally, upon the logic of the tactical or strategic uses for which they are intended, and upon the attainment of such levels of operational cohesion and flexibility as are necessary to insure responsiveness to national purposes.

Any War, Anywhere, Anytime, Any Manner

Inherent in Army readiness is the maintenance of a continuing capability to fulfill its missions; to engage if called upon, in "any war, anywhere, anytime, in any manner." These all-embracing injunctions involve three basic concepts:

Mobility. Mobility implies readiness to move rapidly to the scene of action and to anticipate the requirement for forward deployment in critical areas, as well as the capability to move tactically on the battlefield. The tactical dimension of mobility requires that weapons, their carriers or platforms, personnel, supporting munitions, and materiel be capable of movement rapidly and responsively. This movement must be accomplished under any conditions of visibility and weather, over any type of terrain, on or above the surface of the earth, in order to apply force on the enemy at decisive times and places and to avoid, confuse, or counter the enemy's similar aims and attempts.

Flexibility. When the United States and its allies are faced with aggression, or the threat of aggression, the nation must be able to call on its military establishment for forces suited in type and degree to appropriate levels of reaction. To this end, the Army must be multicable to operate effectively with a wide variety of weapons, organizations, and tactics so that decisions on the use of politically or militarily mandated forces may be made on the basis of broad national and allied interests and values rather than forced by limitations of the force

structure. Flexibility also requires that, with some exceptions, no major unit be limited by organization, training, or equipment to operations in a specific area or under special conditions. The division, the basic combat unit, is a combined arms air-land battle team, self-contained and capable of independent operations and tailored to meet the peculiar requirements of specific missions and areas of conflict by appropriate adjustment of combat and support units. The capabilities of any major combat unit, be it corps, division, brigade, or battalion, can be enhanced with field and air defense artillery, armor, infantry, engineer, or other units.

Staying Power. The mobility, range, accuracy, and lethal effects of modern weapons, combined with surveillance, target acquisition, communications, and command control devices, require that the total area of conflict be regarded as the potential battlefield. Commanders must anticipate severe personnel and equipment casualties, restricted mobility, constrained logistic resupply capabilities, and reduced reaction times. The side which best demonstrates its ability to sustain combat operations and retain its effectiveness as a fighting force will be in a favorable position to win. Throughout the conflict, combat engagements will often be quick, intense, destructive, and decisive. The first battles must be regarded as crucial. Thus, the Army's concept of sustained land combat embraces:

- Development and maintenance in the United States and overseas of modern, balanced, field forces, including combat and supporting components. These forces must be capable of conducting joint and combined combat operations over extended frontages, and for extended periods of time, without significant initial reinforcement other than by tactical air forces.

- Maintenance of a strong continental base to provide the industrial, administra-

tive, logistical, training, and mobilization support necessary to sustain these forces.

- Readiness for timely response to any mission—from land warfare by forward-deployed forces to selective contingency operations in jungle or desert environment, from armored and mechanized infantry missions to special operations including amphibious or airborne.

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare

Nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare are linked conceptually only to differentiate the three weapons involved and the effects, from conventional-explosive type weapons. For each of the three types of weapons, the United States has separate and distinct national policies:

Nuclear Warfare. The primary national security policy of the United States on nuclear warfare is to deter it by means of a strong US nuclear warfare capability. This deterrent policy, however, does not preclude the first use of nuclear weapons by US forces. Such use by land forces, when authorized by the President, would be closely controlled and likely to be limited in an attempt to reduce the risks of escalation. At the same time, the attack should forcibly change the perceptions of enemy leaders and create a situation conducive to negotiations. The principle of retaliatory responses is similar; efforts should be made to control escalation

by a combination of clearly perceivable limits on retaliatory strikes and the threat of more extensive strikes if the enemy chooses to escalate. Either way, the primary objective for the use of nuclear weapons by US land forces is the termination of war on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies at the lowest feasible level of conflict.

Biological Warfare. The national security policy of the United States on biological warfare renounces the development and maintenance of an offensive biological capability. Further, it relies on the other US military capabilities to deter other nations from using biological weapons. This policy, established in November 1969, resulted in the subsequent dismantling of the US offensive capability for biological warfare and the ratification of the Biological Warfare Convention, an international treaty outlawing the production, stockpiling, and development of biological weapons. Although US forces are prohibited from using biological weapons in war, they must be prepared, trained, and equipped to defend against their use by an enemy.

Chemical Warfare. The national security policy of the United States on chemical warfare is to deter it by developing and maintaining a retaliatory chemical warfare capability, while seeking international agreement to prohibit chemical weapons' use. This policy precludes the first use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons by US forces. Retaliation in kind is recognized by the reservations made by most of the signatories to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, an international treaty banning the use of chemical weapons in war. The Protocol was ratified by the United States in 1975. Although US forces are prohibited from initiating the use of chemical weapons in war, they must be prepared, trained, and equipped to survive first use by other nations and then be ready to retaliate in scope and kind.

Army Force Requirements.

It is evident from the preceding discussion that many considerations and factors influence the size and shape of the US Army. However, the requirements for Army forces—corps, divisions, brigades, battalions—and their support are drawn up in response to three primary factors. These are:

- The national military strategy.
- The military capabilities of the nation's potential enemies.
- The allies with whom we expect to fight.

Requirements thus drawn up are always constrained in the end by the realities of the budget process, in which all national programs compete for resources. It is, however, necessary that the requirements be clearly and objectively set forth. In the contemporary world, it is also necessary that Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force requirements be coordinated so as to exploit unique characteristics of each Service, and so as to avoid unnecessary duplication among the Services.

In terms of contemporary national priorities, requirements for Army forces stem from the nation's commitment to the NATO Alliance, and to the Republic of Korea; the nation's concern for, and vital interests in, the oil resources of the Middle East; the nation's concern that America—North and South—be as unified as possible toward common goals; and national concerns for other areas of the world in which the United States has treaty obligations or other interests.

Given those priorities, the Total Army is designed to provide the force in being to

fight the early battles, and the reinforcing forces which, when mobilized, provide additional combat power, but which more importantly provide the sinews of war—the logistical and other supporting forces to sustain the combatant forces in battle. It is for these reasons that the Active Army is dominated by heavy divisions, reflecting the requirement to fight heavy mobile forces and to fight outnumbered. Light divisions of the Active Army and of the Reserve component forces are designed to add to the combat capability of the heavy forces, fighting where missions, enemy, terrain, and other factors favor employment of light forces. The readiness of these forces to fight—essentially in any kind of war, virtually anywhere, and at any time—is the day-to-day business of the Army.

Of equal concern with readiness is the deployability of Army forces. For mobility on the battlefield, the Army relies on its built-in capabilities—the mobility of equipment and units. However, for mobility to the battlefield, the Army must rely on the US Air Force airlift and US Navy sealift forces—a fact which must be taken into account in the design of Army forces and equipment.

In sum, the force structure of the Army reflects the need for mobility, flexibility, and staying power in a combination of forward-deployed and strategic-reserve-reinforcing units. General war and contingency scenarios govern the overall structure of the Army and determine the specific mix of divisions and nondivisional combat and tactical support units needed to structure balanced field forces in time of combat.

In determining the proportion of divisions, nondivisional combat units, and tactical-support units in a force for any specific situation, the guiding principle is to provide the maximum combat force consistent with minimum support. The achievement and maintenance of a proper balance requires continual reevaluation and adjustment as conditions, technologies, and strategies change.

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The Profession of Arms

Introduction

The men and women serving in today's Army are part of a proud profession long in history and rich in heritage and tradition. The military profession, one of the oldest known to history, has over the long sweep of time been profoundly affected by great changes in human and scientific affairs—changes which have had dramatic impact on the nature and substance of the military professional's role. These swift and broad-based advances, hallmarks of the human race, have compelled the military profession to constantly adapt to new realities—not only on the field of battle, but also in this profession's relationships to the society it serves.

It is true that the fundamental principles which have served to guide fighting men at the pivotal edge of battle have remained relatively constant. It is also true that these timeless principles of war are essential ingredients of victory in battle. However, these alone are insufficient for an Army charged with as awesome a responsibility as is ours—they cannot alone support the foundation of a modern US Army in service to the nation. These principles must be harnessed to a set of values and ideals—a professional ethic—consistent with our nation's heritage and linked to our national goals and objectives.

The Professional Army Ethic

As a profession—a calling which demands of its members specialized knowledge and skills, and intensive preparation—it is imperative that the military profession embrace a professional ethic. In this ethic should be set forth those values and principles of conduct which govern our behavior both as a group and as individuals. Furthermore, such a professional ethic must be understood and accepted in its totality by individuals at every level of military operations—from the soldier on point, to the field commander, to the general officer testifying before Congress. It is true, therefore, that while personal value systems or ethics may vary from individual to individual, professional integrity demands of each soldier an uncompromising commitment to those institutional values which form the bedrock of our profession—the *Army Ethic*.

Conceptually, the professional ethic of our Army is subordinate to, but supportive of, the American national purpose, and the national ethic which flows therefrom. This national purpose, formally codified in our

Constitution, is an expression of the enduring values in which our nation is rooted. Due to the dynamic nature of the world in which we live, formal expression of the national ideal sometimes lags behind the current ebb and flow of society's aspirations and values. At the same time, our professional ethic is not totally immune to these societal pressures. This is especially true since the Army ethic is in a very real sense also a composite of the myriad individual value systems and personal consciences of its members.

Nevertheless, the Army ethic must strive to set the institution of the Army and its purpose in proper context—that of service to the larger institution of the nation, and fully responsive to the needs of its people. Our ethic must convey the moral framework and the ultimate sense of purpose necessary to preserve and continually renew an Army which plays a significant role in the maintenance of our free and democratic society. It is from this Constitutional charge, and from the harsh realities of the battlefield—where our lives and the lives of those around us may be hazarded to shield the Republic—that the Army ethic holds resolutely to four fundamental and enduring values.

Loyalty to the Institution. The first fundamental value imbedded in the Army is *loyalty to the institution*. This value implies recognition that the Army exists solely to serve and defend the nation. It represents unswerving loyalty directed upward through the chain of command, and accepts as proper and fitting the subservience of the military to civilian control. It demands total adherence to the spirit and letter of the lawful order, to the fullest of one's comprehension of that order.

Loyalty to the institution is the value which permits application of the power derived from the Army's "grass roots"—units work-

ing in harmony toward individual and collective goals—and applies it to the larger goal of service to the nation. Obedience and disciplined performance, despite difficulty or danger, are its hallmarks.

Loyalty to the Unit. The second fundamental value is *loyalty to the unit*. This value implies a two-way obligation between those who lead and those who are led; an obligation to not waste lives, to be considerate of the welfare of one's comrades, to instill a sense of devotion and pride in unit—to the cohesiveness and loyalty that meld individuals into effective fighting organizations.

Personal Responsibility. Essential to the proper expression of loyalty to institution and unit is a deep sense of *personal responsibility*, the third fundamental value of the Army ethic. Personal responsibility equates to the individual obligation to accomplish all assigned tasks to the fullest of one's capability; to abide by all commitments, be they formal or informal; and to seize every opportunity for individual growth and improvement. This value also requires of each of us a willingness to accept full responsibility not only for our own actions, but also for the actions of those in our charge.

Selfless Service. The last, and perhaps most important, of the fundamental ethical values is that of *selfless service*. Selfless service to the nation in general, and to the Army in particular, requires each of us to submerge emotions of self-interest and self-aggrandizement in favor of the larger goals of mission accomplishment, unit esprit, and sacrifice. In a profession where life itself is ultimately at stake, there is little tolerance for motives of self-interest or personal gain. Service in the professional Army requires teamwork in its most literal and ultimate sense—teamwork which unfail-

ingly emphasizes the collective and greater good of the institution.

The Army ethic thus provides each of us with a superstructure of values designed to assist us in carrying out our duties and functions as Army professionals. Unquestionably, we will sometimes find ourselves in circumstances in which personal and institutional value systems conflict: it is in such instances that the Army ethic must provide guidance and assistance.

Professional Soldierly Qualities

The Army ethic attempts to formalize the soldiers' philosophy and provide the value base for military service in the professional sense. It helps clarify how we differ from the broader society which we serve, and how our Army differs from the armies of other societies. The Army ethic does not displace, but rather builds upon those soldierly qualities which have come to be recognized as absolutely essential to success on the battlefield. It is our collective task as Army professionals to imbue these soldierly qualities into ourselves and our units. This must be the focus of our efforts; for us to be successful, we must clearly recognize and understand the four qualities essential to soldiers and their leaders as they strive to do the nation's will within the framework of the constitutional, legal, and political imperatives which provide the governance of their ultimate task—the direction of violence.

Commitment. Commitment is the first of these soldierly qualities. Military service for the American soldier represents a com-

mitment to some purpose larger than himself. It is this commitment—the willingness to recognize and embrace it at the outset and the willingness to continue to uphold the idea as a military professional—that sets the soldier apart from his nonmilitary peers. While this commitment, in its broadest sense, represents an avowed willingness to lay down one's life in the service of one's country, the immediate focus of that commitment varies in degree and scope as soldiers advance in tenure, rank, and responsibility. For generals, especially those serving at the highest levels, this commitment translates into a day-to-day concern for the broadest national goals and military aims and strategies; soldiers of lower ranks, on the other hand, most often focus their immediate commitment on the unit to which they belong—their platoon, company, troop, battalion, or squadron. However, it is the efficient functioning of these small units that usually wins in battle, thereby insuring attainment of the broad national goals. The effectiveness of the aggregate effort is a function of the strength of mutual commitment among and between soldiers. The Army seeks it from training at initial entry, and pursues it determinedly thereafter. And so commitment in both contexts—to the idea of military service in general, and to the unit to which one belongs—is the first essential soldierly quality which must be embraced and nurtured.

Competence. Finely tuned proficiency is one of the oldest soldierly qualities required for success on the battlefield. However, the increasing complexity and sophistication of modern weapon, support, and organizational systems makes its attainment ever more difficult. Hence, tough and demanding training deserves—indeed requires—increasingly more of the Army's time. Each of us has a responsibility to strive for, and maintain a thorough knowledge of our job, in both an individual sense and as a team member in

those all-important small groups and units upon which the success of the Army in battle depends so heavily. Competence also serves to instill in our individual soldiers and units a sense of confidence—that firm belief, trust, and reliance on one's own abilities and on the abilities of superiors and subordinates. The confidence which flows from competence is an essential ingredient of success. Without it, morale, esprit, and pride of unit suffer. With it comes the willingness to grasp the initiative—to be bold in thought and deed.

Candor. Soldiers have no time or use for untruths or double meanings. Especially under battle conditions, truthfulness and sincerity among soldiers have no substitutes. All communication *must* be at once accurate, straightforward, and honest—the stakes in battle are too high, and the time too short, for anything less to be acceptable. In the larger sense, the whole success of mil-

itary operations and the accomplishment of national aims may turn on this kind of *candor*. In a more limited sense, candor evokes trust, which cements the bond of brotherhood between men under fire.

Courage. The American soldier symbolizes today, as always, the word "courage." This is so because courage is an essential ingredient of the soldier's overall makeup. In the military context, as in many others, courage is not simply the absence of fear. It is rather the willingness to recognize that in battle, as in other circumstances where danger threatens, fear or apprehension are ever-present realities. Courage is the further ability to persevere with physical and moral strength, and to prepare and condition oneself to act correctly in the presence of danger and fear. Courage, then, is what finally defines the word, "Soldier."

The Army's task is a complex one. It serves the nation, but in doing so, it must serve the soldier as well. It is a value-centered institution, which constantly strives to understand and practice the qualities it must bring to that ultimate test, the battlefield. The challenge facing the Army today is that somewhere, sometime, the success or failure of critical national policies will once again rest in the hands of a few good, well-led soldiers, who trained well in time of peace to fight well in time of war. The professional Army must stand ready to meet that challenge.



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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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Chief of Staff

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